Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 2).
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
October 3, 1938
332 Pa. 342
Samuel Handler, Assistant District Attorney, with him Carl B. Shelley, District Attorney, and Earl V. Compton, Special Assistant District Attorney, for respondent.
OPINION BY MR. CHIEF JUSTICE KEPHART, September 7, 1938:
The Court is unanimously of the opinion that the order of the court below, dated August 1, 1938, which forbids District Attorney Shelley, Charles J. Margiotti and Edward Friedman from testifying before the legislative committee, and also impounds documentary evidence, must be and it is hereby vacated and set aside, because of lack of power in the сourt to make it. The information given to the District Attorney and others named in this order is not privileged in the sense that the witnesses may not be required to divulge it on the ground of privileged communications as argued; nor may the documentary evidence be impounded beyond the reach of the legislative committee.
The main question, whether Acts 1 and 4, are constitutional, is reserved for further consideration; they provide that investigation by the legislature of charges of misdemeanor in office, made against civil officers subject to impeachment, shall have precedence over the jurisdiction of grand juries, and suspend any other pending investigation. The importance of this question before us cannot be overestimated, as it involves an examination
We will briefly at this time state our reasons for the аction taken.
The constitution provides in
Can the legislature limit, qualify or suspend the jurisdiction of the courts to investigate alleged crimes committed by civil officers, as the acts here in question seek to do, is the vitally important question presented to us. May the legislature stay the judicial hand until the legislature has completed its investigation, or may the two coördinate branches of government, legislative and judicial, concurrently proceed, each free from trammel or interference by the other? The solution of this problem is of the utmost gravity and should be arrived at, only aftеr the most thorough investigation, study and consideration, to the end that there shall be no unseemly conflict between the two branches of government, the legislative and judicial, and a breakdown in its orderly administration. The further question whether the Attorney General may supersede the District Attorney will be passed upon when we decide the main question. Upon these reserved questions, the Court will, after further necessary deliberation, hand down its opinion as soon as a decision can be reached.
Order of August 1, 1938, is vacated and set aside.
OPINION REFUSING COMMITTEE‘S REQUEST FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION.
Constitutional law—Courts—Grand jury—Indictment—House of Representatives—Impeachmеnt—Civil officers—Legislative power to halt grand jury investigation—Power of Supreme Court—Act of July 30, 1938, P. L. 18—Constitution, Article I and Article VI.
1. The Act of July 30, 1938, P. L. 18, which provides that whenever the House of Representatives shall undertake the investigation of charges of misdemeanor in office on the part of the governor, or any other civil officer who is liable to impeachment, any other investigation of the same charges, theretofore instituted by or before any other officer, body, agency or court of the Common-
2.
3. An indictment can be found in the Commonwealth only by a grand jury. [353]
4. Under
5. The power of a court of quarter sessions to direct an investigation by a grand jury is a judicial power. [354]
6. The provision in
7. The power of the quarter sessions, acting by its grand jury, to inquire and to indict, and the power of the legislature to conduct and try impeachments, are independent powers that can be exercised independently. [354-5]
8. Where one of two bodies, one a part of the legislative branch of government, and the other of the judiciary, each provided for by the Constitution, claims the right of halting the other in exer-
Mr. Chief Justice KEPHART and Mr. Justice DREW concurred in the order.
OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE LINN, October 3, 1938:
This is an original petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain the court of quarter sessions of Dauphin County from proceeding with a grand jury investigation ordered by that court. The petition was presented by a committee of the House of Representatives, appointed pursuant to a recent act of assembly, and is opposed by the district attorney.
The proceeding in the quarter sessions began April 28, 1938, when the district attorney presented his petition alleging criminal misconduct by civil officers of the commonwealth and others, and averring the necessity of a grand jury investigation. April 29, 1938, after considering the petition, the court directed that the grand jury be convened on May 11, 1938, to make the investigation.
May 9, 1938, the Governor and the Attorney General applied to this court for a writ of prohibition to restrain the court of quarter sessions from carrying its order into effect. A rule to show cause, with stay of proceedings, was allowed. May 25, 1938, after hearing the parties, we granted leave to the district attorney, within 20 days, to amend or supрlement his petition for the grand jury investigation: 332 Pa. 289. An amendment curing the defect in the original petition was filed. June 20, 1938, after hearing the parties on the amended petition and answers, the writ of prohibition was refused and the record was remanded to the court below for further proceedings: 332 Pa. 326. July 11, 1938, the learned judge in the court below, after satisfying1 himself that an in-
On July 22, 1938, before the time fixed by the court for the attendance of the grand jury, the Governor issued a call for a special session of the legislature to meet July 25, 1938. Pursuant to Act number 2, approved July 30, 1938, seven members of the House of Representatives were appointed a committee (in the words of the statute) “to undertake the investigation of charges of, or involving, misdemeanor in office, against any civil officer who is liable to impeachment.” It is that committee, hereafter called the petitioner, which has invoked the jurisdiction of the court by applying for the writ now under consideration. For the purposes of this case, it is unnecessary to say anything more about Act number 2. But the constitutionality of Act2 number 4,
Had the legislature power to subject the existing quarter sessions proceeding to the terms of the Act? It was approved July 30 and if applied to the present case, would require the court to suspend the exercise of its judicial power over the existing proceeding “until the House of Representatives shall have completed its investigation“; not only does the legislature attempt so to enjoin the court, but it directs that the court may not resume its constitutional functions (1) until after the House shall have сompleted its investigation and (2) until after the court shall then examine “the testimony taken by the House of Representatives, or its committee, [and] determine that a further investigation is necessary to develop information not disclosed to the House of Representatives, or its committee.” It may be noted, in passing, that it is not apparent, if its power of investigation is suspended, how the court may discover or acquire information not disclosed to the House or its committee.
The learned judge in the court below was of opinion that the Act was an unauthorized deprivation of the constitutional power of the court and declined to suspend the pending proceeding, and, on motion of the district attorney, impounded documentary evidence, and also made an order restraining the district attorney and two named witnesses from testifying before the petitioner. Following that action, the petitioner, denying
Petitioner stands on
Both parties, in support of their positions, refer to the doctrine of the separation of governmental powers into legislative, executive and judicial. This separation appeared in Pennsylvania as early as 1776 in the Plan or Form of Government for the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, prepared by the convention in that year.4 The separation was continued in our constitutions of 1790, of 1838, and of 1873. Accordingly, when the constitution of 1873 was adopted, the people acted in the light оf generations of experience with the operation of
The first article of the constitution contains the Declaration of Rights;
The power of the quarter sessions to investigate by means of the grand jury has been exercised in this commonwealth since 1791: McNair‘s Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 57. An indictment can only be found in this commonwealth by a grand jury.5
It cannot be denied that the power already exercised by the court of quarter sessions and by this Court in its judgments rendered in the same proceeding, is the exercise of judicial power. The delegation to the House of Representatives of the sole power of impeachment did not have the effect of depriving the court of its power to continue the investigation in the existing proceeding of crimes constituting misdemeanor in office. This is emphasized by the provision in
We are also impressed with the point that the framers of the constitution cannot have intended that the power of indictment should be suspended until after the conclusion of the impeachment trial because, during the resulting delay, the period of limitation would be running.
The power of the quarter sessiоns, acting by its grand jury, to inquire and to indict, and the power of the legislature to conduct and try impeachments, are independent powers that can be exercised independently and therefore must so be dealt with in order that full effect may be given to every provision. It was said in argument that if the investigations were carried on at the same time they might seriously conflict with each other. We are reluctant to accept that statement and may perhaps venture to predict that responsible persons to whom these investigations are intrusted by the law, will conduct thеmselves with that restraint required, and to be expected, of persons engaged in the administration of
The record, then, presents two bodies, each provided for by the constitution, one of which claims the right of halting the other until it shall have finished its inquiry. In such circumstances it is the duty of this Court, recognized for more than a hundred years, to determine which of the two constitutional contentions is sound. This duty must of course be performed with due regard to the right of the legislature to exercise the powers delegated to it by the constitution. The applicable principles have frequently been applied and cannot now be disputed. They were stated by GIBSON, C. J., in De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20 (1850), a case in which the legislature had directed that a new trial should be granted in a particular case, the grant of a new trial being, of course, only one of many ways of attempting to exercise a judicial power vested solely in the courts. He said: “If anything is self-evident in the structure of our government, it is, that the legislature has no power tо order a new trial, or to direct the court to order it, either before or after judgment. The power to order new trials is judicial; but the power of the legislature is not judicial. It is limited to the making of laws; not to the exposition or execution of them. The functions of the several parts of the government are thoroughly separated, and distinctly assigned to the principal branches
We are of course mindful of the rule that a statute may not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no doubt of it. But the Act is not a mere exercise of a legislative power to deal with jurisdiction or procedure (compare Com. v. Ramsey, 42 Pa. Superior Ct. 25, 37, 38) but is a deprivation of the exercise of a judicial power vested in the court by the constitution; the legislature cannot abolish the grand jury. There can be no doubt that the delegation to the House of Representatives of the solе power of impeachment of civil officers does not in express words, and cannot be said to have been intended to, confer authority on the legislature to take from the quarter sessions its immemorially exercised power to use the grand jury in the respect challenged. This, we think, is too clear to need elaboration or an extended discussion of precedents; among other Pennsylvania cases illustrating the application of the rule are the following: Ervine‘s Appeal, 16 Pa. 256 (1851); Pittsburgh & Steubenville R. R. Co. v. Gazzam, 32 Pa. 340 (1858); Commonwealth ex rel. v. Commissioners of Allegheny County, 37 Pa. 237 (1860); Reiser v. William Tell Saving Fund Association, 39 Pa. 137 (1861); Commonwealth ex rel. v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446 (1862); Baggs‘s Appeal, 43 Pa. 512 (1862); Richards v. Rote, 68 Pa. 248 (1871); Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627 (1888); Commonwealth ex rel. v. Clark, 331 Pa. 405 (1938). Compare New Britain Borough School District, 295 Pa. 478. See also U. S. v. Klein, 80 U. S. 128; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 478, for rulings on the federal constitution.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice DREW concur in the order.