IRENE DANOPULOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. AMERICAN TRADING II, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL NO. C-150585 TRIAL NO. A-1406301
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
July 20, 2016
2016-Ohio-5014
CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge.
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas; Judgment Appealed from is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
W. Michael Conway, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge.
{1} Plaintiff-appellant Irene Danopulos appeals the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court‘s entry of summary judgment for defendant-appellee American Trading II, LLC, in her action for conversion related to her stolen jewelry. Danopulos also challenges the trial court‘s denial of her requests for leave to amend the complaint to add two causes of action. Because the trial court erroneously interpreted
I. Background Facts and Procedure
{2} On June 21, 2014, Danopulos‘s jewelry, which she valued at $48,000, was stolen from her home in Montgomery County. American Trading, a licensed pawnbroker located in Hamilton County, purchased the jewelry from a third party for $2,125 on June 24, 2014. On July 17, 2014, a Montgomery County detective advised American Trading that the items were stolen and that Danopulos wanted them returned. American Trading refused.
{3} Danopulos then filed this lawsuit against American Trading, presenting a cause of action sounding in replevin and conversion that sought the return of the stolen jewelry or, alternatively, damages in the amount of $48,000 in the event that the items could not be returned. During the litigation, Danopulos learned that American Trading had sold the stolen items before she had asked for their return.
{4} After unsuccessfully moving to dismiss the complaint, American Trading moved for summary judgment. Relying on a case from the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, Molk v. Gold Star Pawn Shop, L.L.C., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-089, 2011-Ohio-2454, American Trading argued that its compliance with two specific provisions of
{5} Danopulos opposed summary judgment in part on the ground that American Trading‘s purported compliance with the waiting provision of
{6} The trial court granted summary judgment to American Trading. The court found, relying on Molk, that American Trading‘s compliance with the relevant provisions of
{8} Danopulos now appeals, challenging in two assignments of error the grant of summary judgment and the denial of the motions for leave to amend the complaint.
II. Analysis
A. Summary Judgment on Conversion Claim
{9} In her first assignment of error, Danopulos argues that summary judgment was improper because a genuine issue of fact remained as to whether American Trading complied with the reporting provisions of
{10} Initially, we note that we review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the standards set forth in
{11} Conversion is a common-law tort relating to the wrongful exercise of dominion over property in exclusion of the owner‘s right, or the withholding of property from the owner‘s possession under a claim inconsistent with the owner‘s rights. See, e.g., Eysoldt v. Proscan Imaging, 194 Ohio App.3d 630, 2011-Ohio-2359, 957 N.E.2d 780, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.), citing Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, 226, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), reversed on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977); Fulks v. Fulks, 95 Ohio App. 515, 519, 121 N.E.2d 180 (4th Dist.1953). Here, Danopulos alleged that American Trading converted her stolen jewelry, which American Trading sold and has not returned to her.
{12} Under the common law, a thief does not acquire good title to stolen property and, therefore, “one who purchases or acquires property from a thief,” even in good faith, does not have a right to the possession of the goods against “the rightful owner.” Wacksman v. Harrell, 174 Ohio St. 338, 340, 189 N.E.2d 146 (1963); see Allan Nott Ents. v. Nicholas Starr Auto, L.L.C., 110 Ohio St.3d 112, 2006-Ohio-3819, 851 N.E.2d 479; M & M Hotel Co. v. Nichols, 21 Ohio Law Abs. 66, 32 N.E.2d 463 (1st Dist.1935). This long-standing rule has been codified in part in
{13} It is undisputed that American Trading is a pawnbroker. The Ohio licensing provisions related to pawnbrokers are set forth in
{14} Our resolution of this issue involves the interpretation of the provisions in
{15} Moreover, to the extent that there is any ambiguity, except for remedial laws, we must construe “statutes in derogation of the common law * * * strictly.”
{16} Ultimately,
{17} American Trading maintains that Molk supports the trial court‘s decision. See Molk, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-089, 2011-Ohio-2454. In that case, the plaintiff, Mark Molk, allowed his friend, Joseph Sabo, to borrow his four firearms for the purpose of having them appraised. Id. at ¶ 6. Sabo instead pledged the firearms to Gold Star, a pawnbroker, and Gold Star‘s employee, Anthony Zaffiro, furnished the information related to the pledge to the municipal police department where Gold Star was located in accordance with
{18} The trial court held that because Gold Star had complied with the relevant provisions of
{19} Molk contains no analysis explaining how a pawnbroker‘s compliance with
{20} The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly protected the common-law rule of a true owner‘s superior interest in stolen property. For example, in Allan Nott Ents., 110 Ohio St.3d 112, 2006-Ohio-3819, 851 N.E.2d 479, the court held that “absent any question of estoppel arising from the act of the owner, a thief cannot convey valid title to a stolen motor vehicle to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, although the certificate used in the purported transfer appears valid on its face,” notwithstanding any arguably conflicting language in the Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Act or
{21} Thus, the trial court erred when it misinterpreted the relevant provisions of
B. Denial of Leave to Amend the Complaint
{22} In her second assignment of error, Danopulos argues that the trial court erred by denying her motions to amend the complaint. She argues that she should have been permitted to add the additional causes of action set forth in her proposed amended complaints.
{23}
{24} In ruling on a motion for leave to amend, the trial court should consider factors including whether the movant made a prima facie showing of support for the new matters sought to be pleaded, the timeliness of the motion, and whether the proposed amendment would prejudice the opposing party. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating.
{25} A trial court‘s decision is unreasonable and an abuse of discretion when it is not supported by a sound reasoning process. See AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
{26} Here, the trial court denied the motion after determining that any amendment would be futile because Danopulos could not succeed on the claims in light of the court‘s interpretation of
{27} The trial court, however, did not address the other reasons American Trading presented in opposition to Danopulos‘s request to amend. Therefore, we sustain the second assignment of error, but on remand the trial court must consider American Trading‘s other reasons for opposing Danopulos‘s request to add the two additional causes of action.
III. Conclusion
{28} Because the trial‘s court‘s grant of summary judgment to American Trading and denial of Danopulos‘s motions to amend the complaint were based on the court‘s erroneous interpretation of
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
DEWINE and MOCK, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.