Danny Snapp v. United Transportation Union
547 F. App'x 824
9th Cir.
2013
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Danny SNAPP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, Defendant, and Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-35714.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 10, 2013. Filed Nov. 5, 2013.

ditional facts they would plead if given leave to amend.... Accordingly, amendment would be futile.” .

(7) Rule 11 Sanctions

All aspects of a district court‘s Rule 11 determination are reviewed for abuse of discretion. . Here, appellants requested sanctions against appellees’ counsel for making legal arguments, and taking actions in litigation, with which appellants did not agree. As the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge demonstrate, appellants’ arguments are without legal merit. The district court appropriately exercised its discretion in refusing to grant appellants’ request for sanctions.

The central purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is “to deter baseless filings in District Court,” but courts must also be sensitive to the dangers of chilling vigorous advocacy. . Shea‘s complaint alleges, and the appellees do not dispute, that he is receiving social security disability payments. The substance and style of Shea‘s arguments for sanctions—in particular, accusing opposing counsel of “fraud“—are professionally irresponsible. Nonetheless, because the sanction imposed is more than sufficient to deter similar conduct in the future, we reduce the sanction against Shea from $2,760 to $500.

AFFIRMED IN PART and VACATED IN PART. Appellants’ requests for judicial notice are deemed MOOT.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

On occasion, the imposition of sanctions, though permissible, tends to increase rather than facilitate the litigation at issue. This, to me, is one of those instances in which the district court might best use its discretion to refrain from following the normal course, and ignore conduct that may well be worthy of reproach. Sometimes it is best simply to be practical and take into account the human frailties of litigants or even counsel. To the extent that Shea can learn from sanctions, he has probably reached his limit. I would recommend that Judge Phillips vacate the sanctions rather than reduce them and thus avoid any possibility of further misunderstanding.

Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Stephen L. Brischetto, George Pierce Fisher, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Richard Paul Lentini, Britenae M. Pierce, Esquire, James M. Shaker, Ryan, Swanson & Cleveland, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.

MEMORANDUM*

Danny Snapp appeals from the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (“BNSF“) on his discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA“), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, and related Washington state law claim for wrongful discharge. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Once a disabled employee has given an employer “notification of [his] disability and the desire for accommodation,” (citing (en banc), vacated on other grounds, ), “there is a mandatory obligation to engage in an informal interactive process ‘to clarify what the individual needs and identify the appropriate accommodation.‘” (quoting ). “[A]n employer cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage if there is a genuine dispute as to whether the employer engaged in good faith in the interactive process.” .

Prior to being terminated by BNSF for failure to secure a new position with the company following an extended disability leave, Snapp had sent BNSF a job application letter and a letter from his physician that referred to his ongoing disability and to his need for accommodations to perform certain tasks. While the purpose of the letter may be unclear, it would not be unreasonable for a fact-finder to determine that the letter was a notification of his disability and desire for accommodation, which may have included reassignment to an appropriate position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). Such a request would have obligated BNSF to engage in an interactive process with Snapp. Consequently, there is a genuine dispute over whether BNSF engaged in good faith in a required interactive process, and failure to do so would constitute discrimination under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). It was not possible to grant summary judgment to BNSF based on the conclusion that “BNSF did not terminate Snapp because of his disability” where there was a dispute over whether Snapp‘s termination resulted from BNSF‘s failure to engage in a mandatory interactive process.

Similarly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to BNSF on Snapp‘s wrongful discharge claim because BNSF offered a “justification ... for Snapp‘s termination [that] is completely divorced from any possible public policy at issue.” Terminating an employee because of his disability would “jeopardize the public policy against discrimination.” (citing Wash. Rev.Code § 49.60.180). Because there is a genuine dispute over whether Snapp‘s termination occurred as a result of BNSF‘s failure to respond appropriately to requested disability accommodations, summary judgment was not available to BNSF on this record.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

Notes

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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