DANNY KELLY VERSUS STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY
NO. 2014-CQ-1921
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
May 5, 2015
169 So. 3d 328
WEIMER, Justice
ON CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE UNITED STATES FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE
NEWS RELEASE #023
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 5th day of May, 2015, are as follows:
BY WEIMER, J.:
2014-CQ-1921 DANNY KELLY v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY (United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals)
We answer the certified questions as set forth in this opinion. Pursuant to
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED.
05/05/15
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2014-CQ-1921
DANNY KELLY
VERSUS
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY
ON CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE UNITED STATES FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
WEIMER, Justice
Invoking
(1) Can an insurer be found liable for a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim under Section 22:1973(A) when the insurer never received a firm settlement offer?
(2) Can an insurer be found liable under Section 22:1973(B)(1) for misrepresenting or failing to disclose facts that are not related to the insurance policy‘s coverage?
Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 582 Fed.Appx. 290, 296 (5th Cir. 2014). The specific sections of
(A) An insurer, including but not limited to a foreign line and surplus line insurer, owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the insured or the claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches these duties shall be liable for any damages sustained as a result of the breach.
(B) Any one of the following acts, if knowingly committed or performed by an insurer, constitutes a breach of the insurer‘s duties imposed in Subsection A of this Section:
(1) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to any coverages at issue.
We accepted certification2 and, for the reasons set forth below, answer the questions as follows: 1) A firm settlement offer is unnecessary for an insured to sustain a cause of action against an insurer for a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim, because the insurer‘s duties to the insured can be triggered by information other than the mere fact that a third party has made a settlement offer; 2) An insurer can be found liable under
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The certified questions stem from the claims handling by State Farm Fire & Casualty Company [State Farm] following an automobile accident. The facts of this case have been presented by the court of appeals, which observed that, except where specifically indicated, the parties did not dispute the court‘s narrative.3 Accordingly, to place the certified questions into
Danny Kelly (“Kelly“) was injured on November 21, 2005, during an automobile accident with Henry Thomas (“Thomas“), who had liability insurance with State Farm. Thomas and Kelly were driving in opposite directions, when Thomas turned left and struck Kelly. Both Kelly and a witness told police that Thomas had failed to yield to oncoming traffic, but Thomas maintained he was not at fault. Kelly was taken to a hospital by ambulance and treated for a fractured femur. He remained hospitalized for approximately six days. The cost of his medical care totaled $26,803.17.
On January 6, 2006, Kelly‘s attorney mailed a letter to State Farm regarding Kelly‘s injury. The letter included copies of Kelly‘s hospital records and stated:
Please find enclosed a copy of Danny Kelly‘s Medical Summary with attached medical records/reports and bills concerning his hospital treatment for the above referenced incident involving your insured. I will recommend release of State Farm Insurance Company and your insured, Henry Thomas, Jr., for payment of your policy limits.
Please give me a call in the next ten (10) days to discuss this matter.
State Farm did not respond to the letter.4 Kelly‘s attorney, however, conversed with State Farm representatives on March 8 and March 22, 2006. During the March 22 conversation, a State Farm representative offered to settle the case for $25,000, the policy limit,5 and sent Kelly‘s attorney a letter memorializing the offer. Kelly‘s attorney responded that the offer was rejected and later filed suit against Thomas. The same day State Farm received word that the offer was rejected, it sent Thomas a letter informing him of the possibility of personal liability and suggesting that he retain independent counsel. The letter from State Farm did not mention the January 2006 letter from Kelly‘s attorney, State Farm‘s offer to Kelly, or the amount of Kelly‘s medical bills.
Kelly‘s lawsuit against Thomas proceeded to a trial, in which Thomas was found liable for the accident and cast in judgment for $176,464.07, plus interest. State Farm paid Kelly the policy limit of $25,000.
After the judgment was rendered against him, Thomas entered into a compromise agreement with Kelly. Thomas assigned his right to pursue a bad faith action against State Farm to Kelly in exchange for Kelly‘s promise not to enforce the judgment against Thomas’ personal assets.
Kelly filed suit against State Farm, alleging State Farm was liable for bad faith practices under Louisiana law. State Farm removed the case to federal district court. The district court discerned two potentially actionable claims from the petition, which were described by the appeals court as: “(1) fail[ing] to notify Thomas of Kelly‘s January 2006 letter; and (2) fail[ing] to accept Kelly‘s January 2006 settlement offer.”6 State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking the dismissal of both claims.
On November 8, 2011, the district court partially granted State Farm‘s motion. The district court granted summary judgment in State Farm‘s favor on Kelly‘s first
State Farm moved the district court for reconsideration on November 23, 2011, arguing that State Farm could be liable for bad faith failure to settle only if it failed to accept an actual offer and acted in bad faith. According to State Farm‘s argument, the district court‘s finding that the January 2006 letter did not constitute an offer necessarily precluded liability on Kelly‘s second claim. The district court agreed and revised its opinion to grant a full summary judgment in State Farm‘s favor. Kelly appealed the summary judgment dismissal of his two claims.
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.7 The court affirmed dismissal of what the court would later identify as the second claim (i.e., the duty to settle claim), reasoning that “[b]ecause Kelly‘s purported settlement letter and medical receipts did not constitute ‘a satisfactory proof of loss from the insured,’ Kelly cannot maintain a claim under § 22:1892(A)(1) as a matter of law.”8 However, the court reversed dismissal of the first claim (i.e., the duty to inform claim), explaining:
The only communication between State Farm and Thomas alleged here consisted of a single letter in which State Farm told Thomas that he might face personal liability and that he should consider seeking independent counsel. At no point did State Farm inform Thomas the extent to which Kelly‘s medical bills exceeded his policy limits, nor did State Farm tell Thomas that it had made a settlement offer that was rejected by Kelly. In short, State Farm sent a single, cursory
communication to Thomas, and it cannot be said as a matter of law that this letter communicated the pertinent facts necessary for Thomas to determine what was in his best interest. Therefore, State Farm was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Kelly‘s claim under § 22:1973(B)(1).9
Both parties filed petitions for rehearing, which were granted. The appeals court withdrew its earlier opinion and issued another opinion certifying the two earlier-quoted “questions of Louisiana law on which there are no controlling precedents from the Supreme Court of Louisiana.”10
The appeals court divided its review of the pertinent jurisprudence into two categories, focusing only on “Thomas” claims [against State Farm] under Section 22:1973(A) and (B)(1).11 Accordingly, the first category of jurisprudence involved an interpretation of
“Despite the broad wording of Section 22:1973(A), it does not give a third-party
has taken one or more of the prohibited actions specified in Section 22:1973(B).”13
Because Kelly was not advancing his own claims, but Thomas’ claims assigned to him, Kelly had an available cause of action under
The appeals court‘s assumption that a cause of action was available under
The appeals court further explained the need to certify the first question to this court:
Section 22:1973(A)‘s imposition of an affirmative duty to make a reasonable effort to settle claims suggests that insurers must do more than simply rest on their laurels and wait for claimants to submit firm settlement offers. Particularly given Louisiana‘s civilian methodology, which treats jurisprudence as secondary to statutes, this statutory enactment casts serious doubt on our prior jurisprudence on this issue.
Again, the Supreme Court of Louisiana and the Louisiana intermediate appellate courts have never held that a firm settlement offer is required for a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim. But Kelly has not directed us to any Louisiana cases that find an insurer liable for bad-faith failure-to-settle in the absence of a firm settlement offer. The resolution of this issue is thus unclear under both Louisiana law and our own precedent. Moreover, this issue is determinative. Kelly‘s petition for rehearing does not claim that he made a binding settlement offer, and therefore Kelly will lose if he must show that he made such an offer.17
Turning next to
Aside from finding the jurisprudence of the intermediate state courts conflicting on the issue of whether an actionable misrepresentation must relate to coverage, the appeals court found its own jurisprudence only clouded any resolution of the issue.
The appeals court observed it had “never made a direct holding on this issue,” but in Versai Mgmt. Corp. v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 597 F.3d 729, 739-40 (5th Cir. 2010), the appeals court “suggested in dicta that Section 22:1973(B)(1) only applies to misrepresentations about coverage-related facts.”19 However, just before that dicta, the appeals court “cited McGee, [which] held that the insurer breached its duty under Section 22:1973(B)(1) by failing to communicate the status of a claim, [McGee,] 840 So.2d at 1256, which was clearly not a coverage-related misrepresentation.”20 The appeals court summed up its rationale for certifying the second question:
Thus, if we apply McGee, Kelly should almost certainly win. As in McGee, Kelly‘s primary complaint under Section 22:1973(B)(1) is that State Farm failed to communicate the status of Kelly‘s claim and settlement negotiations to Thomas. Versai therefore cuts in two opposing directions in this case; Versai‘s reliance on McGee indicates that Kelly should win, but Versai‘s dicta suggests that Kelly should lose.21
Concluding its analysis, the appeals court explained that its own “precedent does not directly answer either of the [two certified] questions, and the State of Louisiana has a strong interest in ensuring the proper application of its insurer liability statute.”22 The appeals court further remarked that “[t]he Supreme Court of Louisiana is uniquely well-suited” to interpret
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Like the appeals court, we must emphasize that Kelly does not seek to recover directly for his own damages. Instead, Kelly has been assigned24 Thomas’ causes of action, as might have been available to Thomas, for State Farm‘s actions which allegedly subjected Thomas to the judgment in excess of Thomas’ insurance policy limits. Therefore, the causes of action asserted by Kelly are not those of a third-party claimant, but rather those of an insured. We also agree with the appeals
FIRST CERTIFIED QUESTION
The first certified question calls for an interpretation of
An insurer, including but not limited to a foreign line and surplus line insurer, owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the insured or the claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches these duties shall be liable for any damages sustained as a result of the breach.
For similar ease of reference, the specific question the appeals court posed is: Can an insurer be found liable for a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim under subsection A of
This question has two operative clauses and is indeed twofold. Before we can address the second clause, i.e., whether a firm settlement offer is required, we must address the first clause-Can an insurer be found liable for a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim under subsection A of
Third parties have no cause of action under
In Theriot, we expressly refused to hold that an insured was subject to the same exclusive list of insurer breaches contained in subsection B as a condition for recovery under subsection A of
So.2d at 192 n.15. We also observed fundamental differences between the relationship of insurer to third party and the relationship of insurer to insured:
It is generally agreed that an insurer‘s duties run primarily in favor of its insured as an outgrowth of duties that
have their foundation in the contract between the parties. It is the relationship of the parties that gives rise to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The relationship between the insurer and third-party claimant is neither fiduciary nor contractual; it is fundamentally adversarial.
Theriot, 95-2895 at 15, 694 So.2d at 193. Owing to the adversarial relationship of a third-party claimant to an insurer, we concluded that “a cause of action directly in favor of a third-party claimant against a tortfeasor‘s insurer is not generally recognized absent statutory creation.” Id. Presently, and unlike Theriot, we must approach
The plain language of
This leads us, of course, to the question of whether there is sufficient justification to find an insured has a cause of action under
parties can only recover under
Why only an insured may have a cause of action under
Indeed, although we are not bound by Stanley, we approve of its ruling just quoted. In response to both Stanley and Theriot, we now explain the basis for holding the legislature essentially codified within
“[I]t is presumed the Legislature enacts each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on
It therefore stands to reason that the legislature did not intend its remedial measures to take away any rights, but to add rights. We made a similar observation in Theriot, in which we found that the legislature added rights of third-party claimants to recover under
The availability of a cause of action for insureds to recover from a judgment in excess of policy limits has a long lineage, as we described in Smith v. Audubon Ins. Co., 95-2057, p. 8 (La. 9/5/96), 679 So.2d 372, 376, dating back at least to this court‘s “recogni[tion] in Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 250 La. 105, 194 So.2d 713 (1967) [of] the responsibility of a liability insurer to deal in good faith with a claim against its insured.” Moreover, in Smith we collected cases in which “the intermediate state courts and the federal courts have held liability insurers liable for an excess judgment when the insurer failed to deal in good faith with a claim against its insured.”26 Smith, 95-2057 at 8, 679 So.2d at 376.
This long lineage of jurisprudence and the remedial intent of
liability.” See Smith, 95-2057 at 7-8, 679 So.2d at 376, citing Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 355 So.2d 1279 (La. 1978) (on reh‘g). Thus, to grant third-party claimants (who have an adversarial relationship to the insurer) a statutorily-recognized cause of action for an insurer‘s bad faith, while leaving insureds (whom the insurer is bound to protect) only a jurisprudentially recognized cause of action, would be an absurd and inequitable result. Our civilian mandate prohibits us from interpreting a statute in a manner that would lead to such absurd results. See
Therefore, in light of the jurisprudence and the remedial intent of
As we did with the first operative clause, in answering the second clause, we begin with the language of the statute. The relevant language provides: “The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the insured or the claimant, or both.”
Just as we observed when analyzing whether a cause of action exists in favor of an insured for an insurer‘s bad-faith failure-to-settle, the plain language sheds significant light on interpreting the provision of
affirmative duty to fully disclose all property and liabilities and all transfers of property which meet the criteria of Subsection C of this Section“).
State Farm would have us hold that the affirmative duty required by
State Farm‘s reliance on Smith has two shortcomings. The first is that we decided Smith under facts arising before the enactment of La. R.S. 22:1220 (now enumerated as
settlement offer. Sensebe, 10-0703 at 8, 58 So.3d at 446 (“The court‘s search for the public policy governing ... insurance policies ... must begin with the statutes enacted by the legislature.“).
The second shortcoming in State Farm‘s reliance on Smith is that we listed factors to be considered without including in the list that a settlement offer must be received by the insurer. Specifically, we held in Smith that the determination of whether the insurer acted in bad faith turns on the facts and circumstances of each case, and we articulated the following factors for making that determination:
The determination of good or bad faith in an insurer‘s deciding to proceed to trial involves the weighing of such factors, among others, as the probability of the insured‘s liability, the extent of the damages incurred by the claimant, the amount of the policy limits, the adequacy of the insurer‘s investigation, and the openness of communications between the insurer and the insured.
Smith, 95-2057 at 9-10, 679 So.2d at 377. Not only is a “firm settlement offer” not listed as a factor, but the case-by-case determination we described would necessarily and, hence, explicitly, have been conditioned by a “firm settlement offer” if that had been our intent. Thus, Smith does not stand for the proposition that a “firm settlement offer” is required as a condition for an insured‘s bad-faith failure-to-settle claim against an insurer.29
Having determined our ruling in Smith did not impose a requirement for a firm settlement offer, we return to the text of
two positive steps to meet that duty are listed. Particularly, an insurer is required “to adjust claims fairly and promptly” and also “to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the insured or the claimant, or both.”
The clearest indicator is that a firm settlement offer is not listed anywhere in the statute. To impose the requirement of a firm settlement offer would essentially amount to adding words not included in the statute. As we understand State Farm‘s brief, not only would we have to essentially add wording requiring a “‘firm’ or ‘actual’ offer to settle,” but State Farm would have us further qualify that an offer must be “within the available policy limits.” The wording proposed by State Farm amounts not to statutory interpretation, but to a wholesale rewriting of
insured in every settlement.” Pareti, 536 So.2d at 423, citing, inter alia, Holtzclaw, 355 So.2d at 1279. Therefore, we see no practical reason why the insurer‘s obligation to act in good faith should be made subject to the tenuous possibility that an insurer will receive a firm settlement offer. Instead, the insurer‘s obligation to act in good faith is triggered by knowledge of the particular situation, which knowledge “[t]he insurer has an affirmative duty” to gather during the claims process. See
As another practical consideration, we reject State Farm‘s concern that requiring a firm settlement offer would serve as a bright line rule, without which an insurer faces great uncertainty as to its duties. Although we disagree with State Farm‘s interpretation of Smith inasmuch as we do not find such a rule in Smith, we believe Smith is instructive. The five non-exclusive factors we articulated as part of a case-by-case determination should adequately address State Farm‘s desire for clearly defined ways to measure whether an insurer has made “a reasonable effort to settle claims” (
In sum, having now addressed both components of the first certified question, we answer it fully: an insurer can be found liable for a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim under
SECOND CERTIFIED QUESTION
The second certified question asks us to decide whether an insurer can be found liable under
person to another that, under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the facts.“).
The appeals court declined to answer the second question, finding no ruling from this court and differing answers within the Louisiana appellate jurisprudence.32 As the appeals court noted, two appellate courts found that an actionable misrepresentation is limited to a misrepresentation that “relate[s] to a coverage issue” and “[a] misrepresentation relating to a coverage issue would involve facts about the policy itself, such as the amount of coverage, lapse or expiration of the policy, or exclusions from coverage.” Talton, 06-1513 at 20, 981 So.2d at 710, quoting Strong, 32,414 at 5, 743 So.2d at 953. Two other appellate courts found that an actionable misrepresentation was not factually limited to dealing with a coverage issue. First, in McGee, the appellate court ruled that, in the context of evaluating the possibility of settlement, “[m]isrepresentation can occur when an insurer either makes untrue statements to an insured concerning pertinent facts or fails to divulge pertinent facts to the insured.” McGee, 02-1012 at 11, 840 So.2d at 1256. Then later, in Arvie, the appellate court cited the preceding ruling from McGee with approval. Arvie, 06-1266 at 2, 951 So.2d at 1286.
Although none of the four cases just cited explicitly addressed the issue, our review reveals a different approach to applying the word “or” in
second phrase. Stated differently, under Talton and Strong, the following underscored language is imported from the phrase following the word “or,” such that the statute prohibits: “Misrepresenting pertinent facts [relating to any coverages at issue] or insurance policy provisions
The courts in McGee and Arvie took a different interpretative approach. Tacitly, McGee and Arvie confined the phrase “relating to any coverages at issue” to the phrase following the word “or.” Thus, under McGee and Arvie, the first phrase would prohibit only “[m]isrepresenting pertinent facts.”
State Farm argues we should disregard McGee and Arvie, in favor of Talton and Strong, because Talton and Strong took the most restrictive view of
Because the interpretation of
if “clearly indicated by the context.” Accord LOUISIANA SENATE DRAFTING MANUAL, Vol. 1, p. 102 (2007) (“Remember ‘or’ is generally disjunctive.“).
The context does not clearly indicate that “or” should be interpreted to mean anything other than “or.” Even though the introductory word “[m]isrepresenting” applies to the phrase before and after the word “or,”
To the extent the intermediate appellate courts held a misrepresentation of “pertinent facts” must also “relat[e] to any coverages at issue” in order to be
actionable, their holding contravenes the use of the word “or” required by
In sum, we provide the following answer to the second certified question. An insurer can be found liable under
CONCLUSION
We answer the certified questions as set forth in this opinion. Pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII, the judgment rendered by this court on the questions certified shall be sent by the clerk of this court under its seal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and to the parties.
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED.
Notes
When it appears to ... any circuit court of appeal of the United States, that there are involved in any proceedings before it questions or propositions of law of this state which are determinative of said cause independently of any other questions involved in said case and that there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state, such federal court before rendering a decision may certify such questions or propositions of law of this state to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for rendition of a judgment or opinion concerning such questions or propositions of Louisiana law. This court may, in its discretion, decline to answer the questions certified to it.
See, e.g., Domangue v. Henry, 394 So.2d 638 (La.App. 1st Cir.1980), cert. denied, 399 So.2d 602 (La. 1981) (after a tentative agreement to a settlement for the $10,000 liability policy limits, the compromise fell through when the insurer sought further negotiation of the victim‘s demand for $600 for automobile depreciation under the property damage coverage; the court held the insurer liable for the excess judgment of $23,000 over the policy limits, noting that the excess exposure, in a case with a “great preponderance of evidence” of the insured‘s fault, hinged on a dispute of less than $600); Fertitta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 439 So.2d 531 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), amended on other grounds and aff‘d., 462 So.2d 159 (La. 1985) (in a case of clear liability with about $8,000 in special damages and $10,000 policy limits, the insurer was liable for an excess judgment
of almost $39,000 because of bad faith in failing to investigate the claim thoroughly, in failing to consider properly the extent of the insured‘s excess exposure, and in requiring that the settlement include a $2,668 medical payments subrogation claim by the tort victim‘s insurer); Hodge v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 486 So.2d 233 (La.App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 489 So.2d 917 (La.1986) (the insurer was in bad faith and liable for an excess judgment of $40,000 for failing to tender its $10,000 policy limits when an adverse judgment was inevitable and the insurer grossly disregarded its insured‘s interests despite repeated warnings from its attorney); Keith v. Comco Ins. Co., 574 So.2d 1270 (La.App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 577 So.2d 16 (La. 1991) (the court held the insurer in bad faith in a case of clear liability when the insurer arbitrarily refused to accept the treating physician‘s findings and rejected reasonable offers that would have totally protected the insured); Roy v. Glaude, 494 So.2d 1243 (La.App. 3d Cir.1986) (insurer was liable for excess judgment for arbitrarily refusing to settle within policy limits). See also Parich v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991) (the insurer was in bad faith by arbitrarily refusing to pay interest in addition to the policy limits when the judgment clearly would exceed the policy limits).Smith, 95-2057 at 8-9, 679 So.2d at 376-77 (footnote omitted).
Anyone involved in handling claims quickly learns that the evaluation of liability and amount of damages is not an exact science, and reasonable professional judgment may vary (substantially in larger claims) on where to draw the line in settlement negotiations. It is suggested that the insurance company should disregard its policy limits in evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement offer. The insurer should not be motivated by how much it stands to gain or lose, thus disregarding the insured‘s exposure. Instead, the insurance company should analyze the claim from the viewpoint of how much it would be willing to pay in settlement of the case if its policy limits were adequate to cover the insured‘s full exposure. Then, it should be prepared to fund such reasonable settlement up to its policy limits. On the other hand, if the insurer reasonably would risk its own funds
in litigation of the claim, then it should not be required to pay more simply because the insured has purchased inadequate insurance protection. [Footnotes omitted.]15 WILLIAM MCKENZIE & H. ALSTON JOHNSON, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.9, pp. 658-59 (4th ed. 2012) (citing, inter alia, Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So.2d 417, 423 (La. 1988); Holtzclaw, 355 So.2d at 1283-1284; Commercial Union, supra.
When the appeals court stated it was bound by its earlier decision in Smith (finding an insured can maintain a cause of action under
Any person convicted of a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:542(E) or of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor as defined in R.S. 15:541(14) after July 1, 1997 shall have the duty to register and report under the provision of this Chapter.
This court explained that the first part of the sentence dealing with a “sex offense” was “separated by the disjunctive ‘or,‘” such that the date restriction “after July 1, 1997,” applied only to the second part of the sentence following the word “or.” Id. Thus, this court held the first part of the sentence preceeding the word “or” was not restricted by the phrase “after July 1, 1997,” and the offender was required to register for his 1995 sex offenses. Id.