DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. N. Am. v. HursellDaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. N. Am. v. Hursell
Dated: February 9, 2011
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Donald Hursell, appeals the order of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his “Second Motion for Void Judgment.” This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} In 2006, appellee, DaimlerChrysler Financial Services North America, LLC (“DaimlerChrysler“), filed a complaint against Hursell and Hursell Unlimited, Inc. for money due under a direct purchase money loan and security agreement. At most times during the pendency of the action below, Hursell represented himself pro se. On January 16, 2007, Hursell filed a “Reply to Complaint” which failed to respond to the allegations in the complaint. On March 7, 2007, Hursell filed an “Amended Reply to the Complaint” which again failed to respond to the specific allegations in the complaint. On March 23, 2007, on behalf of himself and purportedly on behalf of Hursell Unlimited, Inc., Hursell filed a “Second Amended Answer” to the complaint, along with counterclaims against DaimlerChrysler for negligence, intentional
{¶3} On March 22, 2007, DaimlerChrysler filed a motion for summary judgment solely on its claim for money due against Hursell. Hursell filed a brief in opposition. On May 21, 2007, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DaimlerChrysler. On June 5, 2007, Hursell filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment, invoking
{¶4} On May 30, 2007, DaimlerChrysler filed a motion to dismiss Hursell‘s counterclaims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to
{¶6} DaimlerChrysler filed various motions and other documents in furtherance of execution of its judgment. On December 10, 2007, the trial court referred the case to the magistrate to address pending issues.
{¶7} On December 26, 2007, Hursell, now represented by counsel, filed a motion to vacate the order granting summary judgment pursuant to
{¶8} On January 30, 2008, the magistrate held a hearing to determine whether any issues remained pending. On March 12, 2008, the magistrate issued a decision noting that the case was concluded and that no issues remained for determination. Nevertheless, on January 29, 2009, Hursell filed a pro se motion to dismiss DaimlerChrysler‘s claim pursuant to
{¶9} On April 20, 2009, Hursell filed a “Second Motion for Void Judgment” pursuant to
{¶10} Hursell raises 16 assignments of error which we decline to restate here. In most, he assigns error to the trial court‘s award of summary judgment in favor of DaimlerChrysler on its claim and its dismissal of his counterclaims against DaimlerChrysler. He raises various issues including a lack of evidence and the allowance of hearsay evidence. To the extent that Hursell challenges the trial court‘s orders granting summary judgment to DaimlerChrysler and dismissing his counterclaims, we decline to address those issues as he has not appealed from the final order disposing of those claims.
{¶11} The trial court issued a final, appealable order on July 12, 2007, wherein it resolved all the claims and counterclaims between DaimlerChrysler and Hursell. Although Hursell had filed “cross claims” against two other entities, the trial court entered a final judgment on July 12, 2007, pursuant to
{¶12}
{¶13} Hursell‘s next attempt to move for relief from judgment came on August 6, 2007, after the trial court issued its final, appealable order disposing of DaimlerChrysler‘s claim and all of Hursell‘s counterclaims and expressly determining that there was no just reason for delay. He filed two documents that day. In the first, captioned as a motion for reconsideration, he purportedly moved for relief from the final judgment dismissing his counterclaims pursuant to
{¶14} On December 26, 2007, Hursell, through counsel, filed a motion to vacate the award of summary judgment pursuant to
{¶15} Notwithstanding the pending {¶16} On March 30, 2009, the trial court issued an order arising out of a post-judgment discovery dispute. Within that order, however, the trial court further “note[d] that all motions filed by [Hursell] attacking the validity of the judgment rendered against him are, in effect, legal nullities.” The trial court, therefore, disposed of Hursell‘s pending {¶17} ” {¶19} Hursell, however, challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court for the first time in his April 20, 2009 “Second Motion for Void Judgment.” Any order issued disposing of a motion which is a nullity is itself a nullity. State v. Myers, 9th Dist. No. 08CA0041, 2009-Ohio-2082, at ¶9, citing Kauder v. Kauder (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 265, 267. Because any ruling by the trial court on Hursell‘s challenges to the substantive validity of the award of summary judgment raised in his motion would have been a nullity, this Court presumes that the trial court issued its ruling solely in regard to Hursell‘s challenges regarding subject matter jurisdiction. It that regard, neither the motion nor the order was a nullity. {¶20} In discussing subject matter jurisdiction, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: “Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived and may be challenged at any time. It is a condition precedent to the court‘s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, at ¶11. {¶21} Hursell argues on appeal that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because DaimlerChrysler failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to {¶22} This Court has stated: “The subject matter jurisdiction of a court is that power, conferred upon it by law, by which it is authorized to hear, determine, and render a valid, enforceable final judgment in a particular action. See 20 American Jurisprudence 2d (1995), Courts, Section 70. In Ohio, judicial authority flows generally from Section 1, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. The jurisdictional foundation for the courts of common pleas is specifically set forth in Section 4(B) of Article IV: “‘The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters ***’ “The Constitution itself does not confer jurisdiction upon the common pleas courts; they are only given the capacity to exercise whatever jurisdiction may be expressly granted to them by the legislature. In re Seltzer (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 220, 222.” Nielsen v. Ford Motor Co. (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 495, 499. {¶23} {¶24} Hursell‘s assignments of error are overruled. The May 27, 2009 order of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT MOORE, J. DICKINSON, P. J. CONCUR APPEARANCES: DONALD E. HURSELL, II, pro se, Appellant. JENNIFER M. MONTY, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
III.