DAIGREPONT v. TECHE GREYHOUND LINES INC.
No. 13045
Supreme Court of Georgia
FEBRUARY 13, 1940
189 Ga. 601
No one can truthfully claim to have been defrauded in a matter about which that one has full knowledge and opportunity to exercise his free choice. The law will protect the innocent against fraud, under the rules above stated; but it demands of every one that he make use of his own facilities to avоid being defrauded. No other rule could safely be adopted and enforced by the courts with reference to written instruments. It is essential to all business relationships that the validity and solemnity of written contracts, freely and voluntarily executed, be upheld. It would be tragic if all such contracts were jeopardized by a rule of law that would permit one of the parties thereto, because of dissatisfaction therewith, to go into court and by oral testimony establishing conduct short of fraud and reasonable diligence obtain nullification of a written contract. If the plaintiff signed the deed here involved without knowing its contents, it was due to her own negligence, and the responsibility is hers and she must abide by the contract as signed. It was not error to sustain the demurrer and dismiss the action.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
R. W. Martin, for plaintiff.
Lovejoy & Mayer, for defendant.
REID, Chief Justice. Mrs. Virginia Daigrepont filed suit against the Teche Greyhound Lines Inc., a motor common carrier of pas-
After a careful study of the authorities, we are of the opinion that the decision and judgment of the Court of Appeals is correct, and should be affirmed. It is the lеgal duty of a common carrier to receive and transport a person who has purchased a ticket over its lines, to the destination called for by the ticket, upon the purchaser‘s compliance with such reasonablе regulations as the carrier may adopt for its own safety and the benefit of the public.
While a person who has purchased a ticket for transportation over the lines of a common carrier has the right to use the facilities of the carrier to thаt end, it is a sine qua non to the exercise of that right that upon boarding the conveyance of the carrier, he deliver to the person in charge thereof his ticket, and, where the
According to the allegations of the petition, the plaintiff purchased a ticket frоm the defendant carrier at New Orleans, La., for transportation for herself and baggage from that point to LaGrange, Ga. At New Orleans she presented her ticket to the operator of the bus, who inspected and punched it. At Mobilе, Ala., she presented her ticket to the operator of the bus who took charge of it at that point. When the bus arrived at Montgomery, Ala., she alighted therefrom upon being ordered to do so by the defendant‘s agents. She went directly into thе rest-room in the bus station; and while she was washing her face her ticket to LaGrange and all of her money were stolen. She immediately reported this fact to the agents of the defendant, including the driver who was to operate the bus on to LaGrange. The agent of the defendant who had operated the bus from Mobile to Montgomery also informed said driver that the plaintiff had purchased a ticket on to LaGrange. She also presented to said driver her baggage checks, showing that they were checked to LaGrange. Nevertheless she was refused transportation. She alleged that by reason of the defendant‘s wrongful refusal to transport her on said bus to LaGrange she suffered great mortification, mental pain, humiliation, a serious physical shock, and physical and nervous impairment.
Since the question presented is the sufficiency of the petition to withstand a general demurrer, it must be construed most strongly against the plaintiff. Accordingly, since it is nоt otherwise alleged, it is proper to assume that the ticket purchased by the plaintiff was issued to bearer; that its use was not limited to that particular bus; and that the portion of the ticket entitling her to transportation from Montgomery to LaGrange had not been punched, and was subject to use by any other person who might present the same. Under such circumstances it is clear that the plaintiff was not entitled to transportation. “The loss of a ticket
This being true, it makes no difference that the agents of the defendant actually knew that the plaintiff had purchased a ticket to LaGrange and that she made it reasonably to appear that it had been stolen. Nor did the presentation of her baggage checks entitle her to transportation. It is not alleged that the ticket could not be used by another person without the baggage checks, and we must assume that it could be so used. The only purpose that the production of the baggage checks could serve would be to show that she had purchased a tiсket to LaGrange, and, as already pointed out, this would not be controlling on the carrier. Counsel for plaintiff recognizes the principles set forth, but points out that in the present case the plaintiff was recuperating from a seriоus operation and was in a weakened and feeble condition; that the agents of the defendant knew this; that notwithstanding the fact that she requested to be allowed to remain on the bus during the stop at Montgomery, she was ordered to alight; аnd that she immediately went to the rest-room to wash her face to avoid fainting, and while she was doing this her ticket was stolen. In this connection it was alleged that “the defendant‘s drivers, agents, and
It is expressly alleged that the plaintiff‘s ticket was stolen by some person in the rеst-room. Do the facts show that the defendant is responsible for such loss? It could not be contended that the defendant was an insurer of the plaintiff‘s personal effects while she was on the premises. The argument is that the agents of the defendant should have anticipated that plaintiff in her weakened condition would not be able to protect herself and her property. It is the well-settled general rule that a party is liable only for the proximate consequencеs of his wrongful act. “In a suit for damages, where it appears upon the face of the plaintiff‘s petition that there intervened between the alleged negligence of the defendant and the damage sustained by the plaintiff the indepеndent criminal act of a third person, which was the direct and proximate cause of the damage, the petition should be dismissed on general demurrer.” Andrews v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390 (40 S. E. 300, 88 Am. St. R. 25). In that case the plaintiffs rented
We are of the opinion that the facts alleged do not bring the case without the general principles stated in the first part of the opinion, and therefore that the petition stated no cause of action. The case of East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Ry. Co. v. King, supra, cited and much relied on by counsel for plaintiff, is not in point. There the agents of the carrier had themselves taken up thе ticket of the passenger, and for that reason he could not produce it. Nor is the present case analogous to “sleeping-car cases,” where the ticket sold is limited to a particular train and a particular berth. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125 (20, Am. R. 232); Bolles v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., supra.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
ATKINSON, Presiding Justice, concurs in the result solely because of the ruling in Harp v. Southern Ry. Co., 119 Ga. 927 (supra), concurred in by all the Justices.