Matter of Hilmer Leonel CUBOR-Cruz, Respondent
United States Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals
Decided April 29, 2011
25 I&N Dec. 470 (BIA 2011)
Interim Decision #3710
FOR RESPONDENT: Rаshmi N. Patel, Esquire, Stamford, Connecticut
BEFORE: Board Panel: GRANT, MALPHRUS, and MULLANE, Board Members.
GRANT, Board Member:
In a decision dated January 24, 2006, an Immigration Judge issued an in absentia order of removal against the respondent. On August 31, 2010, the respondent filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, requesting rescission of the removal order for lack of proper notice. The Immigration Judge denied the respondent‘s motion in a decision dated September 21, 2010. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondеnt is a 23-year-old native and citizen of Guatemala who left that country with his step-father and entered the United States on June 23, 2005, without being admitted or paroled. He was born on April 1, 1988, аnd was 17 years old at the time of entry.
The respondent concedes on appeal that he was served in person with a Notice to Appear (Form I-862) dated June 27, 2005, and thаt he failed to appear for his scheduled hearing before the Immigration Judge. However, he argues that he did not receive proper notice of the hearing and that his in absentia proceedings should therefore be reopened and the removal order rescinded. Specifically, he asserts that even though he was served in person, the service was not proper because the notice of the hearing should also have been given to his step-father or a legal guardian since he was only 17 years old at the time.
II. ANALYSIS
A removal order entered against an alien in absentia may be rescinded at any time if the alien files a motion to reopen and demonstrates that he or she did not receive notice of the hearing.
The respondent argues that this definition of a “minor” conflicts with the definition of a “juvenile” as a person “under the age of 18 years” in
In that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that if an alien under the age of 18 is released into the custody of an adult, the Notice to Appear should be served on the adult as well as the alien, because it “would be incоnsistent for the regulations to require that minors older than fourteen be released to a competent adult who takes responsibility for the minor but to not require that the adult be sеrved with notice.” Id. at 1163. Thus, the respondent asserts that to reconcile these regulations, they should be interpreted to require that when an alien under the age of 18 is served with a Notice to Appear, a copy must also be given to an adult.1
The regulations promulgated by the Attorney General have the force and effect of law. Section 103(a) of the Act,
Both the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits have decided that the regulatory provisions in question have different purposes and are not in conflict.2 The Fifth Circuit noted that the release provision does not cross-reference or address the service of notice provision and stated that “it would be a strained analysis indeed that would resolve this issue by deciding not only that the provisions were inconsistent but that the more general rеlease provision somehow negated the specific service provision despite making no reference to notification at all.” Lopez-Dubon v. Holder, 609 F.3d 642, 646 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3329, 2011 WL 1529750 (U.S. Apr. 25, 2011) (No. 10-658). The court thereforе affirmed our holding that notice must be served on an adult only for aliens under 14 years of age. Id. (citing Matter of Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I&N Dec. 784, 785 (BIA 1999)).
In Llapa-Sinchi v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 2008), the Eighth Circuit also deferred to our “reasonable interpretation” of the regulatiоns in upholding our conclusion that notice was properly served on a 14-year-old alien pursuant to
The purpose of the notice provision is to let individuals know the details of their legal proceedings. The purpose of the release provision, however, is not to provide knowledge, but to provide assistance to minors in a foreign land, perhaps for the first time. It is therefore logical for the regulations to provide that minors entering the country illegally can bе responsible for receiving notice regarding their court proceedings and yet also provide that minors may need assistance from adults to obtain basic necessities.
Llapa-Sinchi v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d at 900-01. We therefore conclude that personal service of a Notice to Appear on a minor who is 14 years of age or older at the time of service is effеctive, even though notice was not also served on an adult with responsibility for the minor.3 While nothing in the regulations or this decision precludes the Department of Homeland Seсurity, as a matter of policy or practice, from also serving an adult when a minor is between the ages of 14 and 18, we agree with the Immigration Judge that service of the Noticе to Appear on the respondent‘s step-father or another legal guardian was not required under the regulations.
The record reflects that the Notice to Appеar was served personally on the respondent. The document bears the respondent‘s signature and fingerprint to acknowledge his receipt. Furthermore, the Immigration Judge nоted that the respondent was given oral notice in Spanish of the time and place of his hearing and of the consequences of his failure to appear. Personal service of the Notice to Appear on the respondent and his acknowledgment of its receipt supports a finding that he was aware that he had been placed in removal proceedings. See section 239(a)(1) of the Act; see also Nolasco v. Holder, Nos. 09-5206-ag, 10-2780-ag, 2011 WL 668035 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2011) (stating that due process is generally satisfied where an alien received nоtice of the required information in the Notice to Appear and had a meaningful opportunity to participate in the removal proceedings). We thereforе conclude that the respondent failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he did not receive proper notice of the hearing.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
