Crysteal Davis v. Trevor SpearCrysteal Davis v. Trevor Spear
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Jeffrey Dawson; Brad Youngblut; Josh Rhamy
Defendants
Trevor Spear; Ryan Neumann; Lucas Kramer
Defendants - Appellants
Ross Klein; Patrick Hickey
Defendants
Robert Clock
Defendant - Appellant
Dana Wingert; City of Des Moines, Iowa; Steven McCarville
Defendants
Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
Before BENTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
Des Moines Police officers, lacking probable cause, took relatives of a stabbing victim to the station, holding them for over three hours despite their repeated requests to leave. Meanwhile, the victim died. The family sued. The district court1 denied qualified immunity, ruling for the family on their claims of illegal seizure and false arrest. The officers appeal. Having jurisdiction under
I.
On August 5, 2017, Shawn E. Davis stabbed Preston Davis outside a gathering at his home. Several people—including Crysteal Davis (the victim‘s wife), Damon Davis (his brother), and Iisha Hillmon (his cousin)—witnessed the stabbing. Police secured the scene, taking Shawn into custody. Paramedics took the victim to the hospital.
Des Moines Police Department officers Trevor Spear, Ryan Neumann, and Lucas Kramer responded to the scene. Captain Robert Clock was the Watch Commander in charge of the officers. All the witnesses, including the family, told the officers that Shawn stabbed the victim, and they wanted to go to the hospital.
Crysteal and Damon tried to leave in their cars but the officers stopped them. At least three officers told the family they would take them to the hospital. They got in two patrol cars. Instead, the officers took them to the police station, where they waited more than three hours to be interviewed. Throughout the car ride and during their wait at the station, the family members demanded to go to the hospital.
In the patrol car, after being told they were going to the station to be interviewed instead of to the hospital, Crysteal repeatedly insisted that they needed to go to the hospital: “We have to go to the hospital, first. . . . If we‘re not going to the hospital right now, I‘m having my dad call a lawyer, because my husband is in critical condition. We can do that at the hospital . . . . I would have never gotten in this car had I known they were taking me for questioning.”
At the station Crysteal asked: “Are we like literally for real held captive? If we tried to walk out, would we be arrested?” An officer responded: “You guys are not free to leave. The detectives want to talk to you.” Damon repeatedly asked if Crysteal could go see her husband. But the family members were detained for over three hours while Preston died.
Crysteal Davis, Damon Davis, and Iisha Hillmon sued Officers Trevor Spear, Ryan Neumann, Lucas Kramer, and Captain
The district court denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity.2 The district court also entered judgment for the family members on their claims of illegal seizure and false arrest by Spear, Neumann, and Kramer.
This court has interlocutory jurisdiction over the denial of qualified immunity under
II.
Officers are “entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [the plaintiffs], establishes a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation, such that a reasonable official would have known that his actions were unlawful.” Blazek v. City of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2014), citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). A clearly established right is one that is “sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.‘” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (cleaned up), quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). For a right to be clearly established, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
First, this court considers whether the officers violated the family members’ constitutional rights. To establish a violation of the
“[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the
Once she and the other passengers were seated in the car, he announced the change of plans: “I‘m telling you where we‘re going, we‘re going to the station.” “I know you don‘t wanna . . . that‘s where we‘re going.” When Crysteal asked at the station if they were being “held captive,” the officer responded: “you guys are not free to leave.” The family members could reasonably assume they were not free to leave.
The question is then whether the seizure was reasonable. The Supreme Court in Dunaway v. New York said that with a few narrow exceptions “centuries of precedent” support “the principle that seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if supported by probable cause.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979).
The officers argue that their seizure of the family should be examined as a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Terry provides one narrow exception to the probable cause requirement of the
circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975).
Analyzing a seizure, this court “must undertake a qualified immunity analysis not just with respect to the fact of detention, but with respect to its quality and duration as well.” Seymour v. City of Des Moines, 519 F.3d 790, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2008). In Seymour, Des Moines police detained a father, preventing him from going to the hospital for about 45 minutes after his unresponsive child was hospitalized. Id. at 795. This court determined the detention violated the father‘s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures, because there was not reasonable suspicion he had committed a crime (but granted the officers qualified immunity on mistake-of-law grounds). Id. at 798. Here, all witnesses told the officers that Shawn Davis was the perpetrator; they had him in custody. Indeed, the officers admit there was no probable cause to believe the witnesses had committed a crime (acknowledging that “Appellees were being interviewed as solely witnesses to a homicide” and “never suspects.“).
Here, there was no minimally-intrusive Terry stop. Both the duration and the nature of this seizure exceed the bounds of the Constitution. Cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004) (finding constitutional a traffic checkpoint seeking information about a week-old, hit-and-run accident because motorists had to wait “a very few minutes at most” and “[c]ontact with the police lasted only a few seconds“). As this court determined in Seymour, even a 45-minute
Second, this court considers whether the constitutional right violated was clearly established. It is a “settled principle that while the police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to answer.” Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969). The Court in Dunaway held that “police violated the
Officers of the Des Moines Police Department, in particular, were on notice that they could not detain someone for questioning against their will, even in a homicide investigation, absent probable cause. This court determined in Seymour that officers from that department violated a father‘s rights when they detained him without probable cause while investigating his young son‘s sudden hospitalization and death. See Seymour, 519 F.3d at 797-98.
The officers cite a district court case with similar facts to support that the law is not clearly defined. See Magnan v. Doe, 2012 WL 5247325, at *5 (D. Minn. 2012). In that case, the officers detained family members of an attempted-homicide victim at the crime scene despite their protestations that they needed to go to the hospital to be with him. Id. at *4. The district court, however, found that based on the circumstances the officers formed a reasonable suspicion that the family
members “were somehow involved with the homicides.” Id. Here, by contrast, the officers denied having any such reasonable suspicion that the family was involved in the homicide. Further, the district court in Magnan denied qualified immunity as to the duration and conditions of detention once the scene was secure because it was not clear that detention in the squad cars was the “least intrusive means available.” Id. at *8.
There is also a robust consensus that seizing witnesses to a crime in similar circumstances is a clearly established constitutional violation. See, e.g., Lincoln, 887 F.3d at 198 n.5 (reiterating that the right not to be seized and transported for interrogation is “clearly established” by Davis v. Mississippi and Dunaway, but distinguishing
III.
The officers claim that the district court should have granted “all-due-care immunity” on the state law claims against Spear, Neumann, and Kramer. “All-due-care immunity is a constitutional immunity that bars suit and damages only for constitutional claims and only when the government official proves ‘that he or she
exercised all due care to conform with the requirements of the law.‘” Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Iowa 2019), quoting Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 915 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (Iowa 2018) (”Baldwin I“). Lack of due care is equivalent to negligence. Baldwin I, 915 N.W.2d at 280.
Iowa courts “generally interpret the scope and purpose of the Iowa Constitution‘s search and seizure provisions to track with federal interpretations of the
The same evidence establishing the officers’ violation of
IV.
This court reviews an entry of judgment de novo. United States ex rel. Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992).
The district court granted partial summary judgment to the family on their common-law false arrest or false imprisonment claim. The family argues that this
court does not have jurisdiction over the claim because a grant of partial summary
“An issue is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with properly presented issues only when the appellate resolution of the collateral appeal necessarily resolves the pendent claims as well.” Lockridge v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark., 315 F.3d 1005, 1012 (8th Cir. 2003).
False arrest and false imprisonment are legally indistinguishable. Kraft v. City of Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Iowa 1984). Under Iowa law, a false arrest claim “has two elements: ‘(1) detention or restraint against one‘s will, and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint.‘” Thomas v. Marion County, 652 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Iowa 2002), quoting Kraft, 359 N.W.2d at 469. As discussed, the detention of the family here was unlawful.
In a civil suit for false arrest, “[i]f the officer acts in good faith and with reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the person arrested committed it, his actions are justified and liability does not attach.” Children v. Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 680 (Iowa 1983). As discussed, the officers had no reasonable belief that the family committed a crime.
The officers took the family to the police station, where they did not agree to go, when they clearly wanted to go to the hospital. Officers then expressly prohibited them from leaving the station. The family members were unlawfully
detained against their will, and the resolution of the qualified immunity claims necessarily resolves the common-law false arrest claim as well.
*******
The order denying qualified immunity is affirmed, the partial summary judgment is affirmed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
STRAS, Circuit Judge, concurring.
Rarely do rights come more clearly established. The Des Moines Police Department apparently thinks it is constitutional to seize, transport, and interrogate innocent witnesses based on “societal needs.” Appellants’ Br. 30. This type of “forcible and compulsory extortion of a [person‘s] own testimony“—frequently a feature of writs of assistance and general warrants—was repudiated by the
I.
“Government is instituted to protect property of every sort[,] as well that which lies in the various rights of individuals.” James Madison, Property, Nat‘l Gazette (Mar. 29, 1792); see also Alexander Hamilton, Americanus No. II (Feb. 7, 1794)
of Englishmen . . . are Personal Security, Personal Liberty[,] and Private Property” and the “Colonists are intitled” to these rights “by [their] Charters, by Common Law[,] and by Acts of Parliament.“). This basic principle, universally recognized at the time of the Founding, is why “‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance‘” were so “reviled.” See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)); see also Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 1 (1985) (“Patriots were agreed that the proper ends of government were to protect people in their lives, liberty, and property and that these ends could best be obtained through a republican form.“).
They were the historical equivalent of a “blank check.” Starting out as a way of enforcing English smuggling laws, they initially allowed so-called “customs men” to search homes for stolen or smuggled imports. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that “‘[w]rits of assistance’ were ‘general warrants’ that gave customs officials blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of the British tax laws” (quotation marks omitted)); see also M.H. Smith, The Writs Of Assistance Case 17-19 (1978) (describing the origins of the writ of assistance). But they soon expanded to other situations and conferred breathtaking powers on the government officials who held them. Among their features were the authority to conduct indiscriminate searches of people and property, and in certain cases, conscript individuals to “‘aid[] and assist[]’ the Sheriff.” Smith, supra, at 95 n.1 (quoting Commissions Issued by the Province of Pennsylvania 36 (W.H. Egle ed., 1896) (describing a “writ of assistance” that was common in colonial Pennsylvania)); see also James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance (Feb. 24, 1761) (observing that “a person with this writ . . . may enter all houses, shops, etc., at will, and command all to assist him“). They were premised on the notion that the Crown‘s interests stood above all others. See Smith, supra, at 426 (“[A]ll his Majesty‘s good Subjects are required to be aiding and assisting in the due Execution of said Writ or Warrant of Assistance.” (citation omitted)).
The colonists resolved to stop these “unrestrained” practices. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 403); see also
II.
Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, English courts issued a series of decisions that only sharpened colonial opposition. There were a number that had an impact, see, e.g., Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (C.P. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); Leach v. Money, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001 (K.B. 1765), but perhaps none more so than Lord Camden‘s opinion in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765). See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626 (noting that the Founders
considered Lord Camden‘s opinion in Entick to be “the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law“).
A.
The warrant in Entick “act[ed] against every man, who [was] so described in the warrant, [even] though he be innocent.” 19 How. St. Tr. at 1064 (emphasis added). The officers, who broke into Entick‘s home and seized his papers, defended their actions by arguing that this warrant, and others like them, were critical for “detecting offenders [and] discovering evidence.” Id. at 1030, 1073.
This argument, echoed today by the Des Moines Police Department, was no more successful then. Lord Camden pointed out that general warrants arose “from a decree of the Star-Chamber,” giving them less-than-noble origins, and then “crept into the law by imperceptible practice.” Id. at 1067, 1069. No “authority in [the] book[s],” including the “written law,” supported them. Id. at 1066, 1072. Nor could “such a power be justified by the common law.” Id. at 1072. The warrant was, in Lord Camden‘s words, “illegal and void,” and Entick had an action for trespass against the officers, who had invaded his right to be “secure [in his] property.” Id. at 1066, 1074.
Entick was “welcomed and applauded by the lovers of liberty in the colonies.” Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626 (chronicling its support). Many regarded Lord Camden‘s decision “as one of the permanent monuments of the British constitution.” Id.
B.
A Massachusetts case elicited a similar reaction. See Paxton‘s Case (Mass. 1761), in Josiah Quincy, Jr., Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Superior Court of Judicature of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, Between 1761 and 1772 480 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1865). In what later became known as Paxton‘s Case, a customs man applied to the Massachusetts Superior Court for a writ of assistance.
Id. at 479-480. Although there was never a formal decision, id. at 482, an oral pronouncement by Chief Justice Hutchinson questioned the “foundation for such a writ,” 10 The Works of John Adams, supra,
A little more than a decade after Entick and Paxton‘s Case, the colonies “thr[e]w off the yoke of Parliament,” “declare[d] general warrants unconstitutional in express terms,” and “put an end . . . to general Writs of Assistance.” Quincey, supra, at 540; see also 10 The Works of John Adams, supra, at 248 (observing that “fifteen years” after Paxton‘s Case, “the child Independence . . . grew up to manhood, and declared himself free“). In 1776, for example, Virginia ratified its Declaration of Rights, which stated that
general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
Officer or Messenger may be commanded . . . to seize any person or persons not named whose offences are not particularly described and supported by evidence are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be granted.“);
III.
The Framers eventually incorporated these state-level changes into the
These principles have stuck. In one nineteenth century case, for example, the Supreme
roughly thirty years after Dunaway, we put those principles into practice by holding that a “detention violat[ed] [the] constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures,” even though police tried to “justify” it “in terms of the state‘s interest in investigating a possible crime.” Seymour v. City of Des Moines, 519 F.3d 790, 796, 798 (8th Cir. 2008).
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Some things never change. We once again reject the argument that investigatory need justifies suspicionless seizures. No