CRUZ v. ARIZONA
No. 21-846
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
February 22, 2023
598 U. S. ____ (2023)
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
(Slip Opinion)
OCTOBER TERM, 2022
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CRUZ v. ARIZONA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
No. 21-846. Argued November 1, 2022—Decided February 22, 2023
Held: The Arizona Supreme Court‘s holding that Lynch was not a significant change in the law is an exceptional case where a state-court judgment rests on such a novel and unforeseeable interpretation of a state-court procedural rule that the decision is not adequate to foreclose review of the federal claim. Pp. 7-14.
(a) This Court does not decide a question of federal law in a case if the state-court
At issue here is the Arizona Supreme Court‘s decision that Cruz‘s motion for postconviction relief failed to satisfy
Arizona‘s interpretation generates a catch-22 for Cruz and other similarly situated capital defendants that only serves to compound its novelty. To obtain relief under
251 Ariz. 203, 487 P. 3d 991, vacated and remanded.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 21-846
JOHN MONTENEGRO CRUZ, PETITIONER v. ARIZONA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
[February 22, 2023]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz, a defendant sentenced to death, argued at trial and on direct appeal that his due process rights had been violated by the trial court‘s failure to permit him to inform the jury that a life sentence in Arizona would be without parole. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154, 161-162 (1994) (plurality opinion); id., at 178 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Those courts rejected Cruz‘s Simmons argument, believing, incorrectly, that Arizona‘s sentencing and parole scheme did not trigger application of Simmons. See State v. Cruz, 218 Ariz. 149, 160, 181 P. 3d 196, 207 (2008).
After the Arizona Supreme Court repeated that mistake in a series of cases, this Court summarily reversed the Arizona Supreme Court in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613 (2016) (per curiam), and held that it was fundamental error to conclude that Simmons
Relying on Lynch, Cruz filed a motion for state postconviction relief under
The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after concluding that Lynch was not a “significant change in the law.” 251 Ariz. 203, 207, 487 P. 3d 991, 995 (2021). The Arizona Supreme Court reached this conclusion despite having repeatedly held that an overruling of precedent is a significant change in the law. See id., at 206, 487 P. 3d, at 994 (The ““archetype of such a change occurs when an appellate court overrules previously binding case law“).
The Court granted certiorari to address whether the Arizona Supreme Court‘s holding that Lynch was not a significant change in the law for purposes of
I
A
Cruz argued at trial and on direct appeal that the trial court violated his due process rights under Simmons by not allowing him to inform the jury that the only sentencing alternative to death in his case was life without parole.
Prior to Cruz‘s trial, this Court had repeatedly reaffirmed Simmons’ holding. In case after case, the Court explained that when “a capital defendant‘s future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant ‘to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel.‘” Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U. S. 36, 39 (2001) (quoting Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U. S. 156, 165 (2000) (plurality opinion)); see also Carolina” cite=“534 U.S. 246” pinpoint=“248” court=“U.S.” date=“2002“>Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U. S. 246, 248, 251-252 (2002).
The same year this Court decided Simmons, Arizona amended its parole statute to abolish parole for all felonies committed after 1993.
Despite the elimination of parole for capital defendants, the Arizona Supreme Court held, in a series of cases commencing with Cruz‘s direct appeal, that Simmons did not apply in Arizona because the State‘s sentencing scheme was sufficiently distinct from the one at issue in Simmons.1 That line of cases culminated in State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 357 P. 3d 119 (2015). There, the Arizona Supreme Court refused
This Court summarily reversed in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613, holding that Simmons applies with full force in Arizona. The Court noted that ”Simmons expressly rejected the argument that the possibility of clemency diminishes a capital defendant‘s right to inform a jury of his parole ineligibility.” 578 U. S., at 615. The Court also observed that Simmons foreclosed the State‘s alternative argument that relied on the potential for future legislative reforms to Arizona‘s parole statute. 578 U. S., at 616.
B
In 2005, Cruz was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a Tucson police officer. Cruz‘s conviction occurred over a decade after the decision in Simmons, but became final before the decision in Lynch.
At trial, Cruz repeatedly sought to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. Citing Simmons, Cruz expressed concern that unless he had “the opportunity to present the mitigating factor that he will not be released from prison,” jurors would be left to “speculate” about Arizona‘s capital sentencing scheme and whether it allows for parole. App. 28-29. The trial court “conclude[d] that Simmons is distinguishable” and did not act on Cruz‘s concern. Id., at 41.
Cruz also informed the trial court of his intent to call as a witness the chairman of the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency to testify that the board no longer had authority to parole any capital defendants. In response, the State sought to prevent Cruz from offering evidence as to “the prospects of parole for an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment.” Id., at 45. The trial court precluded the testimony.
During the aggravation/mitigation phase of an Arizona capital trial, the jury must first determine whether an aggravating circumstance exists. The jury here found a single aggravating factor that Cruz knowingly killed a police officer. See
After counsel made closing arguments, the judge instructed the jury that Cruz was eligible for three penalties: (1) “Death by lethal injection“; (2) “Life imprisonment with no possibility of parole or release from imprisonment on any basis“; and (3) “Life imprisonment with a possibility of parole or release from imprisonment” after 25 years. App. 94. The reference to parole was plainly wrong. See Lynch, 578 U. S., at 615 (the only “release” available under Arizona law is executive clemency, not parole). The judge further instructed the jury that its only choice was whether or not to sentence Cruz to death; if the jury did not vote for death, the judge would then choose between the two remaining possible sentences. The jury sentenced Cruz to death.
Three jurors, unprompted by Cruz, issued a press release the next day. The jurors explained that this had been a “gut-wrenching decision” and that “[t]here was not one person on the jury who did not cry.” App. 144. They reported that they would rather have voted for life without the possibility of parole, but that they
Cruz thereafter moved for a new trial, arguing that the instructions did not give the jury “an accurate and complete understanding of the consequences of a non-death verdict.” Id., at 137. The trial judge denied the motion. He concluded, erroneously, that the jury had been “correctly instructed on the law,” and found it “entirely speculative” whether Cruz would be considered for parole after 25 years. Id., at 169-170.
On direct appeal, Cruz again pressed his Simmons claim. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected it. Repeating the same legal error made by the trial court, the court reasoned that Simmons was distinguishable because “[n]o state law would have prohibited Cruz‘s release on parole after serving twenty-five years.” Cruz, 218 Ariz., at 207, 181 P. 3d, at 160.
Having raised his Simmons claim on direct review, Cruz was precluded from raising it again in his initial state postconviction petition. See
C
After Cruz‘s conviction became final, this Court decided Lynch, thereby reaffirming that Simmons applies in Arizona. Cruz then filed a successive motion for state postconviction relief pursuant to
The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after holding that Lynch was “not a significant change in the law.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. As the Arizona Supreme Court itself noted, it had interpreted
In so holding, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Cruz‘s argument that Lynch should qualify as a significant change in the law under
This Court granted Cruz‘s petition for certiorari, 596 U. S. ____ (2022), limited to the question whether the Arizona Supreme Court‘s holding that
“This Court will not take up a question of federal law in a case ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.‘” See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U. S. 362, 375 (2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729 (1991) (emphasis added in Kemna)). Here the Court focuses on the second of these requirements: adequacy.
“The question whether a state procedural ruling is adequate is itself a question of federal law.” Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. 53, 60 (2009). Ordinarily, a violation of a state procedural rule that is ““firmly established and regularly followed” . . . will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim.” Lee, 534 U. S., at 376. Nevertheless, in “exceptional cases,” a “generally sound rule” may be applied in a way that “renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.” Ibid. This is one of those exceptional cases.
In particular, this case implicates this Court‘s rule, reserved for the rarest of situations, that “an unforeseeable and unsupported state-court decision on a question of state procedure does not constitute an adequate ground to preclude this Court‘s review of a federal question.” Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 354 (1964). “Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 457 (1958). This Court has applied this principle for over a century. See, e.g., Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157, 165 (1917) (holding that a state ground was adequate where it was not “without fair support, or so unfounded as to be essentially arbitrary, or merely a device to prevent a review of the other [federal] ground of the judgment“). And this Court has continued to reaffirm this important rule. See Walker v. Martin, 562 U. S. 307, 320 (2011) (““A state ground, no doubt, may be found inadequate when ‘discretion has been exercised to impose novel and unforeseeable requirements without fair or substantial support in prior state law‘” (quoting 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4026, p. 386 (2d ed. 1996) (Wright & Miller))).
At issue here is the Arizona Supreme Court‘s decision that Cruz‘s motion for postconviction relief failed to satisfy
Straightforward application of these principles should have led to the conclusion that Lynch was a “significant change in the law” under
Instead of reaching that conclusion, however, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Lynch was not “a significant change in the law.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. It reasoned that Lynch could not be a significant change because Lynch relied on Simmons, and Simmons “was clearly established at the time of Cruz‘s trial . . . despite the misapplication of that law by the Arizona courts.” 251 Ariz., at 206, 487 P. 3d, at 994. The court added that it was not enough that Lynch changed how Arizona courts applied federal law because “Rule 32.1(g) requires a significant change in the law . . . not a significant change in the application of the law.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995 (emphasis in original).
This interpretation of
What makes the interpretation so novel is the way in which it disregards the effect of Lynch on the law in Arizona. Ordinarily, Arizona courts applying
The consequences of the interpretation below compound its novelty. Arizona requires a petitioner seeking
Under these unusual circumstances, the Arizona Supreme Court‘s application of
III
The State and the dissent offer various reformulations of the argument that Lynch was not a “significant change in the law” for
Both the State and the dissent argue that the Arizona Supreme Court was justified in treating Lynch differently than other transformative decisions of this Court, such as Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), and Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356 (2010), because Lynch was a summary reversal and so did not “impos[e] a new or changed interpretation of state or federal law.” Brief for Respondent 12. As the dissent puts the argument: Lynch “did not change the law in Arizona.” Post, at 5 (opinion of BARRETT, J.).
These arguments miss the point. While Lynch did not change this Court‘s interpretation of Simmons, it did change the operative (and mistaken) interpretation of Simmons by Arizona courts. Lynch thus changed the law in Arizona in the way that matters for purposes of
Contrary to the dissent, post, at 3, it makes no difference that Lynch did not alter federal law. While Arizona Supreme Court decisions applying
The State next objects that a decision against it would forestall Arizona‘s ability to “flesh out” its
The dissent argues that this case did present a new context because the Arizona Supreme Court had never before applied
Finally, the dissent attempts to draw a parallel between
*
*
*
In exceptional cases where a state-court judgment rests on a novel and unforeseeable state-court procedural decision lacking fair or substantial support in prior state law, that decision is not adequate to preclude review of a federal question. The Arizona Supreme Court applied
It is so ordered.
BARRETT, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 21-846
JOHN MONTENEGRO CRUZ, PETITIONER v. ARIZONA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
[February 22, 2023]
JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE ALITO, and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting.
The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is the product of two fundamental features of our jurisdiction. First, this Court is powerless to revise a state court‘s interpretation of its own law. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 636 (1875). We thus cannot disturb state-court rulings on state-law questions that are independent of federal law. Second, Article III empowers federal courts to render judgments, not advisory opinions. Hayburn‘s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792). So if an independent state ground of decision is adequate to sustain the judgment, we lack jurisdiction over the entire dispute. Anything we said about alternative federal grounds would not affect the ultimate resolution of the case and would therefore be advisory. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 126 (1945).
The Court holds that the Arizona Supreme Court‘s application of
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson illustrates how unprincipled a state-court decision must be before we treat it as inadequate. 357 U. S. 449 (1958). There, the NAACP asked the Alabama Supreme Court to vacate a civil contempt order as unconstitutional. That court denied review on the ground that the NAACP had improperly pursued a writ of certiorari, when it should have sought a writ of mandamus. Id., at 454-455. We held this procedural ruling inadequate because it was irreconcilable with the Alabama Supreme Court‘s “past unambiguous holdings.” Id., at 456. Though a multitude of that court‘s own precedents contradicted its ruling, one in particular stood out: The court had evaluated similar constitutional claims brought by a petitioner in cahoots with the Ku Klux Klan, even though he had also pursued a writ of certiorari. Id., at 456-457. The subtext of the Alabama Supreme Court‘s decision unmistakably revealed its hostility toward the NAACP‘s federal rights. See also Ford v. Georgia, 498 U. S. 411, 425 (1991) (Georgia Supreme Court decision was inadequate because it applied precedent that was inapplicable “by its own terms“); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 146, 149-150 (1964) (South Carolina Supreme Court ruling was inadequate because that court had proceeded differently in an “identical” case a few weeks later).
Today‘s Court, while admitting that the novelty prong of inadequacy is “reserved for the rarest of situations,” ante, at 7, concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court‘s application of
The ordinary rule in Arizona is that criminal defendants must present any constitutional challenges on direct review or in a timely postconviction-review petition.
On several occasions, the Arizona Supreme Court has addressed whether an intervening judicial decision constitutes a “significant change in the law” for purposes of
Cruz‘s case, however, raised a question of first impression: whether a “significant change” occurs when an intervening decision reaffirms existing law, but rectifies an erroneous application of that law. That was the effect of Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613 (2016) (per curiam), which corrected the Arizona Supreme Court‘s application of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion), and its progeny. An intervening decision like Lynch, which undisputedly did not change any legal doctrine, has no analog in Arizona‘s
The Court criticizes the “novelty” of the Arizona Supreme Court‘s law versus application-of-law distinction, as it does not appear in any other Arizona precedent. Ante, at 9. A point that deserves emphasis at the outset: Novelty does not mean that a rule is inadequate merely because a state court announced it for the first time in the decision under review, and I do not understand the Court to suggest otherwise. Legal systems based on precedent depend on cases to present novel fact patterns, which enable courts to articulate new principles of law or to clarify old ones with greater precision. Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. 53, 65 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring). We do a disservice to that mode of legal development when we “disregard a state procedural ground that was not in all respects explicit before the case when it was first announced“—unless, of course, the decision demonstrates “a purpose or pattern to evade constitutional guarantees.” Ibid. That is why we have been careful to explain that, in the inadequacy context, a decision is ““novel” only when it was wholly ““unforeseeable” and lacked any
The Court‘s real objection is that it thinks the Arizona Supreme Court violated its own
The Court also asserts that Arizona courts typically analyze how an intervening decision affects the law in Arizona, so by that logic, decisions like Lynch that change the law‘s on-the-ground application in Arizona constitute grounds for relief under
If the Arizona Supreme Court‘s distinction between a change in law and a change in the application of law seems familiar, it should—federal habeas law draws the same line. Take everything about this case and transplant it to federal court: A federal defendant is wrongfully denied a Simmons instruction, the Court of Appeals‘s understanding of Simmons is later summarily reversed in Lynch, and the defendant (now a prisoner) then tries to obtain the benefit of Lynch through a successive or delayed motion for postconviction relief.1 In this scenario, the federal prisoner faces the same dilemma that Cruz faces in Arizona. Pre-Lynch, the Court of Appeals was unreceptive to the Simmons claim.
The Court makes a case for why the Arizona Supreme Court‘s interpretation of its own precedent is wrong. If I were on the Arizona Supreme Court, I might agree. But that call is not within our bailiwick. Our job is to determine whether the Arizona Supreme Court‘s decision is defensible, and we owe the utmost deference to the state court in making that judgment. Cases of inadequacy are extremely rare, and this is not one. I respectfully dissent.