DAVID G. CRUM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIANNA J. DURAN, New Mexico Secretary of State, MAGGIE TOULOUSE OLIVER, Bernalillo County Clerk, REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEW MEXICO, and DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF NEW MEXICO, Defendants-Appellees, and STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel. HECTOR BALDERAS, Attorney General, Intervenor-Appellee.
Docket No. S-1-SC-36030
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
February 6, 2017
2017-NMSC-013
J. Edward Hollington & Associates, P.A. J. Edward Hollington Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
Holland & Hart, L.L.P. John C. Anderson Larry J. Montano Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee Republican Party of New Mexico
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Nicholas M. Sydow, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM
for Intervenor
OPINION
CHÁVEZ, Justice.
{1} Petitioner David Crum is a resident of Albuquerque, Bernalillo County, New Mexico and is registered to vote in New Mexico as a qualified voter who declines to designate or state his political party affiliation (DTS). He sought to vote during the 2014 primary election by selecting either a Democratic or a Republican ballot without having to amend his voter registration. Crum was not permitted to vote during the June 3, 2014 primary election because he was not registered as either a Democrat or a Republican1 on or before May 6, 2014. See
{2} Crum contends that the Free and Open Clause of
I. DISCUSSION
{3} Crum sued the Secretary of State and the Bernalillo County Clerk (Defendants), seeking an injunction to enjoin them from prohibiting DTS voters from voting during the primary election. The New Mexico Attorney General intervened on behalf of the State. The district court ordered that the Democratic Party of New Mexico (DPNM) and the Republican Party of New Mexico (RPNM), New Mexico‘s two major political parties, should be joined as party defendants under Rule 1-019 NMRA. Only RPNM entered an appearance. RPNM filed a motion to dismiss Crum‘s lawsuit for failure to state a claim under Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA, based on the contention that allowing DTS voters to vote in the primary election without designating a major political party would unconstitutionally infringe on RPNM‘s freedom of association.
{4} The district court granted RPNM‘s motion to dismiss, concluding that the Legislature had the authority to enact
{5} Whether New Mexico‘s closed primary system violates
A. The Free and Open Clause Provides a Broad Protection of the Right to Vote; However, the Legislature May Constitutionally Impose Safeguards to Protect the Integrity of Elections
{6}
{7} The Free and Open Clause is intended to promote—not restrict—citizen participation in New Mexico elections. State ex rel. Walker v. Bridges, 1921-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 27 N.M. 169, 199 P. 370 (clarifying that a citizen‘s supreme right is to vote in public elections, and therefore election regulations should be construed in favor of a citizen‘s right to vote). Whether the Free and Open Clause of
{8} What existed even before the adoption of the Free and Open Clause is the requirement that voters officially document their qualifications to vote either by registration or affidavit. See Bridges, 1921-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 9-11 (citing registration requirements that existed before the New Mexico Constitution‘s enactment, which required qualified voters to either register or demonstrate by affidavit, and corroborate by two qualified voters, that the affiant was a qualified voter). At the adoption of
{9} In Preisler v. Calcaterra, 243 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. 1951) (en banc), the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted a substantively identical Free and Open Clause to that of New Mexico to mean that “every qualified voter may freely exercise the right to . . . vote without restraint or coercion of any kind and that his [or her] vote, when cast, shall have the same influence as that of any other voter.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, in an earlier case, the Missouri Supreme Court had also acknowledged “[t]hat all elections shall be ‘free and open’ does not mean that there cannot be reasonable regulations of elections in the interest of good citizenship and honest government.” State ex rel. Dunn v. Coburn, 168 S.W. 956, 958 (Mo. 1914) (en banc). The United States Supreme Court has also held that the constitutional rights to vote in any manner and to associate for political purposes are not absolute. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
Although state legislatures cannot unduly infringe on a voter‘s right to vote, Richardson v. State Board of Elections, 697 F. Supp. 295, 297 (W.D. Ky. 1988), legislatures may reasonably regulate elections and impose voter qualifications. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (“There can be no doubt either of the historic function of the States to establish, on a nondiscriminatory basis, and in accordance with the Constitution, other qualifications for the exercise of the franchise. Indeed, (t)he States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
{10} When a court reviews a challenge to a state election law, it must weigh the asserted injury the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff‘s rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “If a statute imposes only modest burdens, . . . then the State‘s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on election procedures.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 452 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ” ‘[E]venhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself’ are not invidious.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-90 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
{11} In
{12} The stated purpose of the Election Code, and thus the preelection registration requirement, includes securing the purity of elections and providing for their efficient administration.
modest burden that furthers the State‘s interest in securing the purity of elections and efficiently administering them. For the following reasons, we conclude that it is.
{13} Generally, “registering as a member of a political party is not particularly burdensome, and it is a minimal demonstration by the voter that he [or she] has some commitment to the party in whose primary he [or she] wishes to participate.” Ziskis v. Symington, 47 F.3d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Not only is this burden minimal, but “[s]tates have valid and sufficient interests in providing for some period of time—prior to an election—in order to prepare adequate voter records and protect its electoral processes from possible frauds.” Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680 (1973) (per curiam) (emphasis added). “The registration laws are designed to settle beforehand the question as to who is eligible to vote at any given election [so that] the turmoil and inconvenience of controversies about the qualifications of voters at the polls on election day are eliminated.” Bridges, 1921-NMSC-041, ¶ 8.
{14} In Rosario v. Rockefeller, the United States Supreme Court analyzed a registration requirement that voters claimed abridged their right to vote in a primary election. 410 U.S. 752, 756 (1973). At issue in Rosario was the constitutionality of a New York state election law that required voters to register with a political party at least thirty days before the previous general election to be able to participate in the state‘s subsequent closed primary election. Id. at 760. Under the New York scheme, voters had to be registered approximately eight months before a presidential primary election and eleven months before a non-presidential primary election to participate in the primary. Id. at 760. The Court held that this registration requirement did not disenfranchise the voters because it merely provided a deadline for registering with which the voters could have complied to exercise their right to vote. See id. at 757-58. The Rosario Court noted that the voters could vote in a different political party primary election every year as long as they were properly registered. Id. at 759. The Court also held that the registration deadline was not too onerous because (1) states are “justified in imposing some reasonable cutoff point for registration or party enrollment,” id. at 760, and (2) such a deadline reasonably deters political
{15} The Rosario petitioners sought to affirmatively associate with a political party, id. at 755-756, unlike the DTS voters in this case. We find Rosario persuasive insofar as the act of voting in a party‘s primary is, in itself, an act of affiliation. Miller v. Cunningham, 512 F.3d 98, 107 (4th Cir. 2007) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Like the registration requirement in Rosario, New Mexico‘s twenty-eight-day
registration requirement does not unconstitutionally infringe on the right to vote because it does not “totally den[y] the electoral franchise to [any] particular class of residents.” Id. at 757 (noting that courts which have held that a registration requirement was unconstitutional found that “there was no way in which the members of that class could have made themselves eligible to vote“). Crum and other DTS voters could have made themselves eligible to vote by timely registering with the political party that offered candidates and policies that more favorably addressed the issues with which they were immediately concerned. Unlike the Rosario Court, we cannot justify the New Mexico registration deadline as a deterrent to political party raiding because that deadline occurs after the candidates and their platforms are known. There is no evidence that political party raiding is a concern in New Mexico.
{16} New Mexico‘s registration deadline is also defensible because it is not too burdensome. The registration requirement permits qualified voters to vote in a different political party primary election each year because it does not require them to be locked into their party affiliation. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 52-53, 58, 60-61 (1973) (holding that the State‘s legitimate interest in preventing political party raiding was not sufficient to justify the substantial restraint of a statute prohibiting voters from voting in a party primary if they had voted in another party‘s primary within the preceding twenty-three months); see also
{17} It is also significant that New Mexico voters who desire to participate in the primary elections have a reasonable time to determine whether a political party offers candidates and platforms that comport with their beliefs and principles. If so, they may register with that particular party and vote in the primary election. Primary elections are held “on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in June of each even-numbered year.”
{18} Candidates in New Mexico must declare a political party by January and file their declarations of candidacy by either February or March. Crum and other DTS voters are not required to register until May. Therefore, they have two to three months to decide which political party‘s candidates are more appealing to them before registering with that party.
And, as previously stated, the very act of voting in a party‘s primary is itself the act of affiliating with that party. If
{19} The registration law incidentally furthers the interest in assuring that primary elections reflect the will of political party members. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 846-47 (D. Conn.), aff‘d, 429 U.S. 989 (1976). In Nader, a federal district court upheld Connecticut‘s closed primary system and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, including that the law forced them to enroll in a party in order to participate in the state‘s primary elections. 417 F. Supp. at 844-45. The Nader court reasoned that “a state has a more general, but equally legitimate, interest in protecting the overall integrity of the . . . electoral process [, which] includes preserving parties as viable and identifiable interest groups [, and] insuring that the results of primary elections . . . accurately reflect the voting of party members.” Id. at 845. The same legitimate interests support the constitutionality of the modest burden on voters that was challenged in this case. We therefore hold that requiring voters to designate their affiliation with a major political party at least twenty-eight days before the primary election, and only allowing voters to vote for candidates of a party which is designated on their voter registration, are reasonably modest burdens which further the State‘s interests in securing the purity of and efficiently administering primary elections.
{20} Finally, we note that the instant case calls upon this Court to determine only whether New Mexico‘s current closed primary system is constitutional and not whether it is the only constitutional option available to the Legislature. Our holding in this case should in no way be interpreted as foreclosing the possibility that a different primary system adopted by the Legislature—an open primary, for example—could also be constitutional. See Cunningham, 512 F.3d at 106-12 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (comparing the relative constitutional merits of open and closed primary systems).
II. CONCLUSION
{21} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
{22} IT IS SO ORDERED.
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
WE CONCUR:
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice