Coyne v. TaberCoyne v. Taber
I. BACKGROUND
Consistent with the summary judgment standard, we limn the material facts in a light that flatters, but does not impermissibly distort, the plaintiff‘s claims. On July 8, 1992, a local union representing taxi drivers and tour operators frustrated by competition from hotel- operated taxis and other amateurs declared a strike that virtually paralyzed transportation services at San Juan‘s principal airport. Despite a beefed-up police presence, strikers congregated at various points, including Baldorioty de Castro Avenue (the main thoroughfare leading to and from the airport).2 The labor unrest was open and notorious; reports of the strike appeared, inter alia, in the July 9 edition of a major newspaper, the San Juan Star.
Carol Coyne, a resident of Massachusetts, blissfully unaware of the strike, flew into the airport
After the Ford reached Baldorioty de Castro Avenue, a man stepped in front of it and blocked its path. Other persons began hurling objects at the car.3 One such projectile shattered a window and injured the plaintiff. Marrero eventually managed to extricate the vehicle from this precarious situation and immediately sought medical attention for plaintiff.
Some time elapsed. Then, plaintiff, striking a blow of her own, sued Taber in Puerto Rico‘s federal district court. See
II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Civil Rules empower a court to grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Exercising de novo review, see Pagano, 983 F.2d at 347, and taking the facts (including the reasonable inferences therefrom) in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Rivera- Muriente, 959 F.2d at 352, we conclude that the evidence of record in this case is “sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the [liability] issue in favor of either side,” National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 735. Thus, the court below terminated the suit prematurely.
III. ANALYSIS
In granting summary judgment, the lower court found plaintiff‘s claim wanting in two ways. First, the court ruled that because the rock-throwing incident took place “outside the [hotel‘s] premises,” Taber did not owe “a duty to protect and provide reasonable security measures.” Second, the court reasoned that the harm of which plaintiff complained “was not foreseeable or causally related to any acts or omissions” attributable to Taber. We examine each theorem separately.
A. Duty.
The substantive law of Puerto Rico governs the issue of negligence in this diversity suit. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 689 (1st Cir. 1994). Under Puerto Rico law, negligence actions generally hark back to article 1802 of the Civil Code, which imposes liability upon a person who “causes damage to
It brooks no dispute that article 1057 imposes liability upon certain establishments, such as hotels, schools, and hospitals, that fail to provide security commensurate with the circumstances attendant to their operations. See Estremera v. Inmobiliaria Rac, Inc., 109 P.R.R. 1150, 1154-55 (1980) (stating that liability can be found when circumstances create a demand for greater protection, but the establishment nonetheless neglects to bolster security). The duty to furnish heightened security is thought to stem from the character of the enterprise in which the defendant engages and from the special nature of the
Notwithstanding these general principles, the magistrate judge, accepting artificial distinctions drawn by Taber, ruled that article 1057 landed wide of the mark, and that, on the facts reflected in the summary judgment record, Taber owed no duty to furnish security for plaintiff‘s protection. The magistrate advanced two theories. Neither holds water.
1. Cabdrivers’ Liability. Relying primarily on Jacob v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 640 F. Supp. 117 (D.P.R. 1986), the magistrate posited that, as a matter of law, cabdrivers (and, ergo, their employers) are not liable to passengers for crimes committed by third persons. Jacob is not a comfortable fit. In Jacob, an independent cabdriver transporting fares from the airport to a hotel paused at a red light. Thieves rushed the car, held the driver at gunpoint, and attempted to rob the passengers. In the commotion that ensued, a passenger was shot. See id. at 118. The district court concluded on the
Here, however, unlike in Jacob, the defendant is a hotel, albeit one that is being sued because it elected to furnish transportation services ancillary to its principal business. Moreover, unlike in Jacob, where the court emphasized that the cabdriver was “a public carrier for hire,” id., the operator of the vehicle rented to Taber was not a common carrier (or even a cabdriver) but an employee of the hotel, performing a private service for a private purpose. Thus, though Coyne was in a car, she was just as much a ward of the hotel as if she was in her suite or in the lobby. Even assuming, then, that taxicab operators are not within the reach of article 1057 a matter on which we take no position we are of the opinion that the defendant here must be viewed as an innkeeper rather than as a taxicab operator. It follows, therefore, that the magistrate‘s reliance on Jacob does not resonate with the issue of duty in the instant case.
2. Locus. Though Jacob is inapposite, the magistrate‘s opinion raises another question about the existence of an actionable duty. This question emanates from a dictum in Chapman v. E.S.J. Towers, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 571 (D.P.R. 1992). There, the court refused to grant summary judgment, finding the
It is not the physical locus of the act, stricto senso, that gives rise to the hotelier‘s duty to furnish heightened security. Rather, the touchstone of the duty consists in roughly equal parts of the hotel‘s special relationship with its guests, its knowledge of incipient peril, and its ability to exercise a meaningful degree of control over the situation, regardless of the situs. We think this approach is compelled by the reasoning of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in Elba. There, the court anchored the University‘s duty to provide adequate security to persons with whom it had a special relationship (students) in knowledge the “previous occurrence of similar criminal acts [and] the fact that university authorities knew or should have known about them” coupled with the nonperformance of acts within the defendant‘s control “the failure to eliminate conditions that may give rise to sexual assaults; the total absence of a priority system to protect the students; and lack of adequately trained security
So it is here. Affinity is a given; Taber and the plaintiff were admittedly in a host-guest relationship. Knowledge exists, at least to the extent that, as we demonstrate infra, a reasonable jury could find that Taber knew (or should have known) of the strike and the likelihood of violence that it portended. Similarly, a jury could find that Taber had the requisite degree of control; it employed the driver, rented the car, made the transportation arrangements with newly arriving guests, honored Coyne‘s reservation, dispatched the vehicle, and selected the route. This combination of affinity, knowledge, and control is sufficient to trigger a legally enforceable duty.
We have said enough on this score. Bearing in mind “the circumstances of the persons, time, and place,” we think a jury could supportably find that a duty to provide security arose under
B. Foreseeability.
Even if a jury could find that Taber violated a duty owed to plaintiff, a breach of duty is not actionable absent a causal relationship between the breach and the ensuing harm. See Elba, supra, slip op. at 12. “[F]or this causal relation to exist the damage must have been foreseeable and avoidable had the omitted action been timely taken.” Id.; see also Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 972 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that foreseeability serves as the “linchpin” for establishing tort liability under Puerto Rico law). In Puerto Rico, “the rule of foreseeability does not mean that the precise risk or the exact result which was encountered should have been foreseen. The essential factor is to be under a duty to foresee, in a general way, consequences of a particular type.” Gines v. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 86 P.R.R. 490, 496 (1962) (citing 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts 1147 (1956)) (emphasis supplied).
In most situations, causation questions are both factbound and case-specific. Thus, such questions ordinarily are grist for the factfinder‘s mill. See, e.g., Peckham v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 830, 837 (1st Cir. 1990); Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1st Cir. 1989); Springer v. Seamen, 821 F.2d 871, 876 (1st Cir. 1987). Puerto
This does not mean that foreseeability is always a jury question. To establish the foreseeable character of an event, the evidence must be such that the factfinder rationally can conclude that the risk complained of is among the universe of risks recognizable by reasonably prudent persons acting with due diligence under the same or similar circumstances. See Pacheco v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 112 D.P.R. 367, 372 (1982); Jimenez v. Pelegrina, 112 P.R.R. 881, 886 (1982). Because a defendant “will not be relieved of liability by an intervening cause which could reasonably have been foreseen, nor by one which is a normal incident of the risk created,” Widow of Andino v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 93 P.R.R. 168, 178 (1966), criminal acts of third parties sometimes can fall within the ambit of foreseeability. See Chapman, 803 F. Supp. at 573; Elba, supra, slip op. at 23; Negron, 113 P.R.R. at 927-28; Estremera, 109 P.R.R. at 1157 n.6. Accordingly, the issue we must decide is whether the facts and circumstances of this case permit a factfinder plausibly to infer a foreseeable risk of episodic violence. See Rivera Perez, supra, slip op. at 8 (“If the fault or negligence on which the liability of 1802 is predicated consists, pursuant to 1057, in the failure to be diligent
The magistrate concluded that violence was not reasonably foreseeable. Though he may, in the end, prove to be an accurate prophet as a matter of decided fact only a jury can answer that question definitively courts are constrained by Rule 56 to draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant‘s favor. See National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 735. On this basis, the current posture of the case demands that we reject the magistrate‘s conclusion as a matter of law. We explain briefly.
Both parties place great weight upon the fact that Marrero drove to and from the airport three times on July 9, in the same red Ford, transporting other, earlier-arriving hotel guests without incident. Taber argues that, since the driver had traversed the route in safety on these previous occasions, it could not have foreseen the violent reception that awaited the plaintiff. Coyne parries this thrust by asserting that, in ordering Marrero to drive through the airport a fourth time in the same easily recognizable automobile, on the very sort of errand that prompted the strike, the hotel should have realized that it was tempting fate. In short, defendant uses the earlier trips as evidence that peril was not foreseeable, whereas plaintiff uses them not only as evidence of discernible danger but also to show that Taber‘s activity in fact catalyzed the
Taber has a fallback position. It argues that the incident was not foreseeable because it lacked knowledge of the strike‘s explosive nature. This, too, seems sufficiently factbound to warrant jury consideration. To be sure, the attack on the Ford may have been the first incident of its kind during the July strike but that happenstance is not dispositive. If a dog has vicious propensities, even the first bite may well be foreseeable. “It is no defense to allege that the precise course or the full extent of the consequences could not be foreseen, the consequences being of such kind, which in fact happened.” Gines, 86 P.R.R. at 496. Here, the strike was no secret. The strikers’ propensities were fairly evident. The jury could find that the article in the San Juan Star furnished constructive notice of the
Another piece of evidence is potentially significant. In opposing summary judgment, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Capt. Hector Mercado Santini, a security consultant. Plaintiff‘s expert noted that violence commonly accompanies labor disputes in Puerto Rico and that this tendency is well known. He cited violent incidents that had occurred during earlier strikes at the airport (including strikes called by the taxi drivers’ union). He expressed the opinion that Taber acted irresponsibly in thrice sending the same driver in the same car on the same errand on the same day across the picket line.7
These items of evidence, taken collectively, distinguish this case from Rivera Perez, supra, slip op. at 8 (finding wife not liable for ex-husband‘s attack on house guest because she lacked knowledge of his criminal predisposition) and Estremera, 109 P.R.R. at 1158 (finding criminal attack would have occurred regardless of whether defendant provided stairwell lighting), and make it more akin to Elba, supra, slip op. at 20 (concluding that circumstances made sexual assault of female student foreseeable because school officials had knowledge of high-risk rape area) and Negron, 113 P.R.R. at 928 (holding that a reasonable person would have foreseen criminal act in police station, given the known presence of a violent individual).
Taking the facts favorably to the plaintiff, we believe that a jury reasonably could find that plaintiff‘s injuries were a generally foreseeable consequence of Taber‘s decision repeatedly to shuttle guests between the airport and the hotel in the same distinctive private car, chauffeured by the same lone driver, at the height of the strike, without taking any particular security precautions. Put another way, the case at hand yields an issue of foreseeability upon which reasonable minds might differ. Summary judgment is, therefore, inappropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. Viewing the evidence in the light most congenial to the plaintiff, a rational jury could find all the elements of a viable cause of action: duty, breach,
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Notes
The fault or negligence of the debtor consists of the omission of the steps which may be required by the character of the obligation and which may pertain to the circumstances of the persons, time, and place . . . .