Cox v. United States, 406 U.S. 934

Cox v. United States

406 U.S. 934

SCOTUS

1972

Check Treatment

VESTAL ET AL. v. HOFFA ET AL.

No. 71-1110

C. A. 6th Cir.

406 U.S. 934

Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

COX v. UNITED STATES

No. 71-5910

C. A. 10th Cir.

406 U.S. 934

Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL are of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted of bank robbery after a trial in which the Government introduced over objection tape recordings of his telephone communications. These tape recordings had resulted from a federal court order which was issued pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520, and which permitted federal agents to wiretap. Although the order was limited to seizures of communications relating to narcotics offenses, the eavesdroppers discovered that the subjects were discussing a bank robbery and those conversations were recorded despite the limited scope of the order.

The petitioner challenged the introduction of these tapes on the ground that their subject matter was outside the scope of the warrant. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that once the device was legitimately spliced into the designated telephone lines anything overheard was in “plain view” and therefore could be seized lawfully. Said the Court of Appeals: “Once the listening commences it becomes impossible to turn it off when a subject other than one which is authorized is overheard,”

449 F. 2d 679, 686-687. With all respect, that is precisely the point. As I said in :

“Such devices lay down a dragnet which indiscrim-inately sweeps in all conversations within its scope, without regard to the nature of the conversations, or the participants. A warrant authorizing such devices is no different from the general warrants the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit.”

I would grant this petition, reverse, and hold that Title III offends the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.

ROACH v. UNITED STATES

No. 71-6125

C. A. 5th Cir.

406 U.S. 935

Certiorari denied.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.

I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and either reverse out of hand or put the case down for argument.

By a 1903 treaty the United States obtained a corridor across the Republic of Panama from the Caribbean to the Pacific. 33 Stat. 2234. But Art. VI of the treaty provided that the grants to the United States shall not “interfere with the rights of way over the public roads passing through the said zone . . . unless said rights of way or private rights shall conflict with rights herein granted to the United States in which case the rights of the United States shall be superior.” 33 Stat. 2235; 3 Canal Zone Code 431.

Petitioner is a Panamanian who has been operating buses in Panama for 23 years. His license to operate was granted by the Republic of Panama and his area of operation begins and ends in the Republic of Panama. Under a reciprocal agreement between the Canal Zone and Panama any motor vehicle inspected in Panama will be accepted in the Canal Zone and vice versa.

The public road traveled by petitioner crosses the Canal Zone, and his operations in no way conflict with any rights “granted to the United States” under the 1903 treaty.