COUNTY OF BUTLER; COUNTY OF FAYETTE; COUNTY OF GREENE; COUNTY OF WASHINGTON; NANCY GIFFORD; MIKE GIFFORD, husband and wife doing business as Double Image Styling Salon; PRIMA CAPELLI INC, a Pennsylvania Corporation; MIKE KELLY; MARCI MUSTELLO; DARYL METCALFE; TIM BONNER; STEVEN SCHOEFFEL; PAUL F. CRAWFORD, trading and doing business as Marigold Farm; CATHY HOSKINS, trading and doing business as Classy Cuts Hair Salon; RW MCDONALD & SONS INC; STARLIGHT DRIVE IN LLC, a Pennsylvania Corporation; SKYVIEW DRIVE IN LLC, a Pennsylvania Limited Liability Company v. GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA; SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Appellants
No. 20-2936
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
August 11, 2021
2021 Decisions 649
Honorable William S. Stickman, IV
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2-20-сv-00677)
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 11, 2021)
J. Bart DeLone [ARGUED]
Sean A. Kirkpatrick
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Daniel B. Mullen
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1251 Waterfront Place
Mezzanine Level
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Claudia M. Tesoro
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1600 Arch Street, Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellants
Office of Attorney General of New Jersey
Division of Law
25 Market Street
Hughes Justice Complex
1st Floor, West Wing
Trenton, NJ 08625
Counsel for Amicus State of New Jersey
Thomas E. Breth
Ronald T. Elliott
Thomas W. King, III [ARGUED]
Jordan P. Shuber
Dillon McCandless King Coulter & Graham
128 West Cunningham Street
Butler, PA 16001
Counsel for Appellees
Lawrence J. Joseph
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 700-1A
Washington, DC 20036
Counsel for Amicus Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund
Christian D. Wright
Office of Attorney General of Delaware
Delaware Department of Justice
820 North French Street
Carvel Office Building
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Amicus State of Delaware
K&L Gates
17 North Second Street
18th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Counsel for Amici Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, Pennsylvania Administrator of the House Majority Caucus, Pennsylvania Chair of the House Appropriations Committee, Pennsylvania Chair of the House Majority Caucus, Pennsylvania Chair of the House Policy Committee, Pennsylvania House of Representatives Majority Whip, Pennsylvania Secretary of the House Majority Caucus, Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives
Matthew H. Haverstick
Joshua J. Voss
Kleinbard
Three Logan Square
1717 Arch Street, 5th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Amici Pennsylvania Senate Republican Caucus, Pennsylvania House Republican Caucus
David R. Kott [ARGUED]
McCarter & English
100 Mulberry Street
Four Gateway Center, 14th Floor
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Amicus New Jersey Business & Industry Association
Liberty Justice Center
141 West Jackson Street, Suite 1605
Chicago, IL 60604
Counsel for Amicus Liberty Justice Center
Shawn M. Rodgers
Goldstein Law Partners
11 Church Road
Hatfield, PA 19440
Counsel for Amicus Commonwealth Partners Chambеr of Entrepreneurs
OPINION OF THE COURT
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
On various dates between March and July 2020, the Governor and Secretary of Health of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“Defendants“) entered orders to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs, comprised of Pennsylvania citizens, elected officials, and businesses, challenge three pairs of directives: stay-at-home orders, business closure orders,
While the appeal was pending, circumstances changed. On the health front, society has learned more about how COVID-19 spreads and the efficacy of masks, therapeutics have been developed, and vaccines have been manufactured and distributed. In fact, more than 60% of Pennsylvanians have received a COVID vaccine.
There also have been changes on the legal front. An amendmеnt to the Pennsylvania Constitution and a concurrent resolution of the Commonwealth‘s General Assembly now restricts the Governor‘s authority to enter the same orders.
I2
The issue before us is whether those events moot this case. We hold that they do. “[A]n appeal is moot in the constitutional sense only if events have taken place during the pendency of the appeal that make it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatsoever.” In re World Imports Ltd., 820 F.3d 576, 582 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The parties agree that the Governor‘s orders are no longer in effect and that he has been stripped of his power to unilaterally act in connection with this pandemic. As a result, the “law no lоnger provides [him] a mechanism” to “repeat the alleged harm.” Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2007). Moreover, the Secretary‘s orders have expired and there is consequently no relief that this Court can grant concerning them. Thus, the case is moot.
No exception to mootness applies. As Plaintiffs have concеded, the voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply here because the orders expired by their own terms and not as a response to the litigation. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (Mem.) (stating that because the orders suspending the entry of aliens and refugees “expired by their own terms[,] the appeal no longer presents a live case or controversy” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)); Spell v. Edwards, 962 F.3d 175, 178-79 (5th Cir. 2020) (observing that an expired order is “off the books” and so “there is nothing injuring the plaintiff and, consequently, nothing for the court to do“). It is conceivable that the expiration of the executive orders could bе opportunistically timed to avoid an unfavorable adjudication, but we have no basis to conclude that has happened here. On the contrary, the Secretary maintained her orders for several months after Plaintiffs challenged their constitutionality, and
The “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to moоtness also does not apply. That exception is “narrow” and “applies only in exceptional situations,” Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 2017), where “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the samе complaining party will be subject to the same action again,” Id. There must be more than a theoretical possibility of the action occurring against the complaining party again; it must be a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982).
A plaintiff bears the burden to shоw that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception applies, see Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 648 (3d Cir. 2003) (placing the burden on the party seeking to have their claim excepted from mootness based on the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception); N.J. Turnpike Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 25, 33 (3d Cir. 1985) (“It is the burden оf the moving party to establish that the issue is ‘capable of repetition yet evading review.‘“). Plaintiffs have not carried that burden. Plaintiffs have pointed only to the fact that the Secretary of Health still claims the power to issue orders of the sort before us now. That observation, however, does not satisfy both elements of the test. The executive orders before us were the subject of a full evidentiary record developed and
Thus, no exception to mootness applies, and we will dismiss the appeal.
When a case becomes moot while an appeal is рending, appellate courts generally follow the “established practice” of vacating a district court‘s judgment with directions to dismiss. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950); Khodara Env‘t, Inc. ex rel. Eagle Env‘t L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 2001). Guided by considerations of judicial fairness, the Supreme Court in Munsingwear observed that a judgment that is “unreviewable because of mootness” should not “spawn[] any legal consequences” for the party who sought reversal on appeal. 340 U.S. at 41. A directive to vacate a judgment under Munsingwear is an exercise of discretion that should occur “only after a consideration of the equities and the underlying reasons for mootness.” Humphreys v. Drug Enf‘t Admin., 105 F.3d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1996). In this regard, courts consider whether the action became moot due to the appealing party‘s own conduct or circumstances beyond the party‘s control. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P‘ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1994); see also Rendell, 484 F.3d at 242 (vacating the judgment because “mootness . . . occurred through happenstance—circumstances not attributable to the parties” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, even in circumstances where claims challenging legislation become moot due to the legislative body‘s subsequent amendment, vacatur is appropriate if there is no evidence that the change was made with an intent to manipulate the judicial system. See Khodara, 237 F.3d at 195.
Here, the claims became moot for reasons outside the parties’ control and, even assuming they did not, there is no evidence that Defendants intended to manipulate the judicial system by allowing the orders to expire. Instead, the
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal, vacate the judgment, and remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss the Complaint as moot.
County of Butler, et al. v. Governor of Pennsylvania, et al.
No. 20-2936
Jordan, J., concurring
As described in the Court‘s opinion today, one of those exceptions is found in the “voluntary cessation” doctrine. If the person responsible for the challenged action stops it but can readily start it again, the dispute can rightly be said to still be live. But, as also noted in the Court‘s opinion, the Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that the voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply in this case. (Id. at 51:57-54:12.)
That leaves the other exception to mоotness, which reaches behavior that is capable of repetition yet evading review. I agree with my colleagues that the Plaintiffs have failed to show that the orders at issue satisfy the requisites for application of that doctrine. In particular, I doubt that “there is a reasonable exрectation that the same complaining part[ies] will be subject to the same action again.” United Steel Paper & Forestry Rubber Mfg. Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int‘l Union v. Virgin Islands, 842 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016)). The Plaintiffs insist that this case is not moot because the orders at issue are indeed capable of repetition yet evading review, but we have only their speculation that the same kind of heavily restrictive orders will be issued once more. Given the recent, wide-spread reporting that the Delta variant of the COVID-19 virus is causing increased concern among many public health authorities, the Plaintiffs’ position ought not be rejected out of hand, and it has not been. Nevertheless, as noted in our оpinion today, we have been given little reason to doubt the representations by the Governor and Secretary that the public health circumstances have changed so dramatically since the time the challenged
Which leads to the second and final point I want to make. The Plaintiffs have argued this case with an understandable vigor, believing, as they obviously do, that fundamental rights are at stake and were not properly respected by Pennsylvania‘s gоvernmental officials. Without in anyway signaling a view on the merits – something I and the panel have assiduously avoided doing – I note simply that our ruling today should not be read as reflecting a lack of appreciation for the feelings generated by this case, nor as indicating a failure to understand that there are real-world consequences flowing from governmental responses to the unprecedented (at least in our lifetime) pandemic we are yet working our way through. The legal arguments of the Plaintiffs, of the elected and appointed officials on the other side of the “v.“, and of the amici aligned on either side have all been carefully considered, with full sympathy for the parties’ good faith and sincerity. For all of that, though, a merits decision cannot be given because there is simply no longer a case or controversy to be decided. The boundaries of our jurisdiction are set, and the case-or-controversy requirement embedded in Article III of the Constitution serves as a bulwark against judicial overreach. That is to everyone‘s benefit, even if it can at times be frustrating to those who have worked for and want an answer from the courts.
We are not through with COVID, and the unexpеcted may yet occur, but, under the rules governing our jurisdiction, considering the merits of this appeal or leaving the District Court‘s decision extant would be a mistake. I therefore concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court.