Case Information
*2 Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 4, 2013)
Elinor L. Merberg, Esquire
Dexter E. Sutton, Sr., Esquire
Laura T. Vazquez, Esquire
Nаtional Labor Relations Board, Room 10532 1099 14th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20570
Saulo Santiago, Esquire
Michael P. Silverstein, Esquire
National Labor Relations Board
Region 22
20 Washington Place
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellant /Cross-Appellee Rosemary Alito, Esquire
George P. Barbatsuly, Esquire
K&L Gates
One Newark Center, 10th Floor
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellee/Crоss-Appellant Ellen Dichner, Esquire
William S. Massey, Esquire
Gladstein, Reif & Meginniss
817 Broadway, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10003
Amicus Counsel for Appellee ________________ OPINION OF THE COURT ________________ AMBRO, Circuit Judge
I.
In 2010 Appellee/Cross-Appellant J. Michael Lightner, the Regional Directоr of Region 22 of the National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB” or “Board”), brought charges of unfair labor practices before the NLRB against Appellant/Cross-Appellee 1621 Route 22 West Operating Co., LLC, d/b/a Somerset Valley Rehabilitation and Nursing Center (“Somerset Valley”). While administrative proсeedings were pending on that complaint, the Board brought a petition in federal court under § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act” оr “NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), seeking temporary injunctive relief to prevent Somerset Valley from engaging in behavior that violates the Act and to reinstate certain еmployees.
After discovery and eight days of hearings, the District Court filed a 129-page opinion coupled with an order granting in part and denying in part thе Board’s petition. In that comprehensive and well-crafted opinion, the Court enjoined Somerset Valley from interfering with its employees *4 assоciating with the labor union, and required the reinstatement of two discharged employees. The Court refused to order Somerset Valley to reinstate two other employees or to order the rescission of notices of discipline filed against certain employees.
Somerset Vallеy appealed the parts of the order enjoining it and requiring it to reinstate the employees, and the Board filed a cross-appeal challenging the Court’s refusal to order reinstatement of the discharged employees not reinstated. Those appeals were consolidated before us. Before the merits of the cross-appeals were fully briefed, the Board issued a decision and order in the administrative action that rendered moot the temporary injunctive relief order by the District Court. The Board then filed this motion to dismiss the cross-appeals and to instruсt the District Court to vacate its opinion and order. Somerset Valley agrees that the appeals are moot and should be dismissed, but opposes vacatur.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The purpose of NLRA § 10(j) is to preserve the
Boаrd’s powers to decide violations of the Act “by giving the
NLRB an opportunity to seek an injunction of alleged
violations before an injury becomes permanent or the Board’s
remedial purpose becomes meaningless.”
Chester ex rel.
NLRB v. Grane Healthcare Co.
, 666 F.3d 87, 96 (3d Cir.
2011). It gives a district court authority to enter temporary
interim relief while retaining “the Board’s exclusive authority
to decide the merits of the case[].”
Id.
Because the Board has
decided the merits of the complаint against Somerset Valley,
*5
we agree with the parties that the Board’s pursuit of
temporary relief is moot. Yet there remains the dispute
whether thе District Court’s opinion should be vacated.
Although the judgment has become moot, we retain the
authority “to enter orders necessary and appropriate to the
final disposition of a suit that is before us.”
U.S. Bancorp
Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship
,
III.
When a civil case becomes moot while an appeal is
pending, the normаl practice is to vacate the district court
judgment “because doing so ‘clears the path for future
relitigation of the issues between the parties.’”
Alvarez v.
Smith
, 558 U.S. 87, 94 (2009) (quoting
United States v.
Munsingwear
, 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950)). This equitable rule
prevents “‘a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness,
from spawning any legal consequences.’”
Rendell v.
Rumsfeld
, 484 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd.
,
In U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. , the Supreme Court recognized an exception to this general practice when “mootness results from settlеment.” 513 U.S. at 25. If the parties settle the dispute while the case is pending on appeal, “the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy . . . , therеby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur.” Id.
The Supreme Court recognized the limited nature of the exception created by Bancorp in Alvarez . There plaintiffs brought a due process challenge to the State of Illinois’s hearing procedures following the seizure of personal property suspected of being used to facilitate a drug crime. 558 U.S. 89–90. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to *6 dismiss. Id. at 91. On appeal, the Court of Appеals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari , but before the case was argued the State voluntarily dismissed the proceedings agаinst the plaintiffs and returned the property, thereby mooting the underlying dispute. Id. at 91–92. The Supreme Court concluded that the mootness resulted from the “happenstance” of the separate State court proceedings, and not by the choice of either party to relinquish the appеal. Id. at 94. Although the State played a role in resolving the property disputes, those cases were decided on substantive grounds, and “the presence of [the] federal case played no significant role in the termination of the separate state-court proceedings.” Id. at 96–97. As such, the Court vacated the Circuit Court’s opinion. Id.
Mootness in our case arose when the Board issued its
decision and order on the merits of the complaint against
Somerset Valley. As in
Alvarez
, the underlying dispute was
resolved on the merits in an administrative proceeding
separate from the temporary injunction spawning the cross-
appeals. The Board therefore did not voluntarily forfeit its
right to a legal remedy on appeal. In addition, as bоth parties
challenged the District Court’s ruling, there is no evidence of
“manipulation of the legal system, or an attempt to erase an
unfavorable precedent” through seeking vacatur.
Rendell
,
Somerset Valley argues that the Court’s opinion has continuing relevance, although no legal effеct, because the NLRB took judicial notice of the testimony offered before the District Court and the Board has asked that Court to rely on testimony presented at the hearing in another action involving these parties. Vacating the opinion and order entered by the District Court, however, will have no effect on the existence or record of the proceedings before it. Indeed, we know of no *7 ruling that would hinder Somerset Valley frоm relying on appropriate facts in the District Court record.
In this case, neither party has relinquished its challenge to the District Court’s opinion and оrder giving temporary injunctive relief, but we are unable to review the decision because, by the Board’s subsequent ruling on the merits, the Court’s prior ruling is now moot. Hence, all that vacating the prior opinion and order does is protect the parties from any adverse legal consequencеs of that unreviewed opinion.
For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal and cross- appeal as moot and remand with the direction thаt the District Court vacate its April 16, 2012 opinion and order. Our decision to direct that Court to vacate its opinion is based solely on the mootness of the appeals before us and the governing Supreme Court law. We undertake no review of the District Court’s very careful and well-articulated opinion in this case. Indeed, we deeply appreciate the exceptionally hard work of Judge Cooper.