MILTON COTTON v. CARL ANDERSON
C.A. No. 10CA009830
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
August 8, 2011
[Cite as Cotton v. Anderson, 2011-Ohio-3885.]
STATE OF OHIO COUNTY OF LORAIN ss: APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 04CV138081
BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Milton Cotton appeals from the trial court‘s overruling of his motion for summary judgment regarding his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
{¶2} In 1991 and 1992, Mr. Cotton was convicted of various crimes for which he received definite and indefinite sentences. Because this is the third time this matter is before us, Mr. Cotton‘s convictions and sentences are detailed in Mr. Cotton‘s prior appeal. See Cotton v. Anderson, 9th Dist. No. 04CA008536, 2005-Ohio-994, at ¶¶4-5 (“Cotton I“). At issue in this case is Mr. Cotton‘s indefinite sentence from August 14, 1992, which ranges from 55 years and 6 months to 170 years.
{¶3} While incarcerated, Mr. Cotton asked the records manager for clarification on his sentence. In an interoffice communication to Mr. Cotton, the records manager wrote, “THE
{¶4} In 2004, Mr. Cotton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that appellеe Carl Anderson, Warden of the Grafton Correctional Institution, was “knowingly implementing an unlawful liberty restraint without jurisdiction to do so[.]” Warden Anderson filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Cotton‘s petition, attaching an affidavit of Mary Oakley, the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Sentence Computation for the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrеctions, and a memorandum addressing the calculation of Mr. Cotton‘s sentence. The trial court granted Warden Anderson‘s motion, and Mr. Cotton appealed.
{¶5} This Court reversed, concluding that the trial court had considered evidence outside of the petition when granting Warden Anderson‘s motion. By considering the other evidence, the trial court had converted Warden Anderson‘s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without informing the parties or allowing Mr. Cotton an opportunity to respond. See Id. at ¶¶11-12. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. Id. at ¶13.
{¶6} On remand, Warden Anderson again moved for dismissal, arguing that Mr. Cotton had failed to comply with
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
“THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE APPELLANT[.]”
{¶8} Mr. Cotton, in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raised three grounds for his writ: that thе Department of Rehabilitation illegally calculated his sentence, that the Department of Rehabilitation illegally “‘correct[ed]‘” and “interpret[ted]” his sentence, and that the trial court never made an express finding of guilt. However, Mr. Cotton has not advanced any argument in his merit brief concerning his third ground for relief.
{¶9} We review a trial court‘s awarding summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105. Pursuant to
“(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.” Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327.
{¶10} To succeed on a summary judgment motion, the movant “bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning an essential element of the opponent‘s case.” (Emphаsis sic). Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292. If the
{¶11} Mr. Cotton does not point to any dispute of material fact, and we find none in this case. He concedes that, on August 14, 1992, the trial court sentenced him tо definite prison terms of 3 and 8 years and to an indefinite prison term ranging from 55 years and 6 months to 170 years. Mr. Cotton suggests that the Department of Rehabilitation has modifiеd his sentence and reduced the minimum term to 15 years. However, the Department of Rehabilitation had no authority to modify his sentence. Furthermore, its reference to 15 years as “the most you can serve” did not constitute a modification of his sentence. Rather, it simply recognized the effect of former
{¶12} “Habeas corpus is generally appropriate in thе criminal context only if the prisoner is entitled to immediate release from prison.” Ridenour v. Randle (2002), 96 Ohio St.3d 90, 2002-Ohio-3606, at ¶7. “[A] convicted person has no constitutional right to be conditionаlly released prior to the expiration of a valid sentence.” State v. Parsons, 9th Dist. No. 22200, 2005-Ohio-268, at ¶13, quoting Velasquez v. Ghee (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 409, 411. See, also, State ex rel. Henderson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 267, 268 (A defendant “has no constitutional or statutory right to parole, [and] he has no similar right to еarlier
{¶13} The trial court correctly overruled Mr. Cotton‘s motion for summary judgment. Mr. Cotton‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
“THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICAL ERROR AND DENIED THE APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT DID NOT GIVE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.”
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
“THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND DENIED THE APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT WAS PRECLUDED BY THE DOCTRINE OF THE LAW OF THE CASE[.]”
{¶14} Mr. Cotton‘s second and third assignments of error are related, and we consider them together. Mr. Cotton argues that the trial court‘s granting of summary judgment to Warden Anderson was precluded by res judicata or, in the alternative, by the law-of-the-case doctrine. We disagrеe.
{¶15} The doctrine of res judicata provides that “[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of thе transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, at syllabus. The law-of-the-case doctrine is similar to res judicata, providing that “the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal
{¶16} Mr. Cotton argues that the trial court erroneously failed to give preclusive effect to this court‘s prior decisions, thereby suggesting that this court previously determined the matter before us in this appeal. However, Mr. Cotton‘s previous appeals solely addressed procedural issues. In his first appeal, this Court reversed the trial court‘s dismissal of his petition because it had considered evidence outside the pеtition, thus converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without providing Mr. Cotton an opportunity to respond. In his second appeal, this Court reversed the triаl court‘s dismissal, which had been based upon a failure to comply with
III.
Mr. Cotton‘s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
EVE V. BELFANCE FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J. MOORE, J. CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
MILTON COTTON, pro se, Appellant.
THELMA THOMAS PRICE, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.