DR. ALVIS L. CORUM, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE V. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH ITS BOARD OF GOVERNORS; C. D. SPANGLER, PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY; AND JOHN THOMAS, CHANCELLOR OF APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY, AND HARVEY DURHAM, DEFENDANTS
No. 8924SC120
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
20 March 1990
97 N.C. App. 527 (1990)
Id. citing State v. Ross, 275 N.C. 550, 553, 169 S.E.2d 875, 878 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050, 90 S.Ct. 1387, 25 L.Ed. 2d 665 (1970).
Dеfendants’ exceptions pertain to their cross-examination of plaintiff and plaintiff‘s accountant. Defendants contend that their cross-examination efforts were hindered by the voluminous objections offered by plaintiff‘s counsel.
After careful review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion.
Because defendants failed to brief assignment of error numbers 5, 10, and 11, these assignments of error are deemed abandoned.
For the reasons stated, we find no error.
No error.
Judges PARKER and GREENE concur.
1. Appeal and Error § 6.8 (NCI3d) — denial of summary judgment — sovereign and qualified immunity — immediate appeal
The denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment made on grounds of sovereign and qualified immunity affected a substantial right and was immediately appealable.
Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Review § 104; Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 651.
2. Constitutional Law § 17 (NCI3d); State § 4 (NCI3d) — civil rights action against UNC and ASU — sovereign immunity
Plaintiff‘s
Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights §§ 268, 269.
3. Constitutional Law § 17 (NCI3d); State § 4.1 (NCI3d) — civil rights claims — university officials — official capacities — sovereign immunity
Plaintiff‘s
Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights §§ 268, 269.
4. Constitutional Law § 17 (NCI3d); Public Officers § 9 (NCI3d) — civil rights claims — violation of free speech — university officials — individual capacities — qualified privilege
Summary judgment was properly entered in favor of the Chancellor and a Vice Chancellor of Appalachian State University on the ground of qualified privilege in plaintiff‘s
Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 19; Colleges and Universities §§ 39, 41; Public Officers and Employees § 359.
5. Public Officers § 9 (NCI3d); State § 4.1 (NCI3d) — violation of state constitutional right — university officials — official capacities — sovereign immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity barred plaintiff‘s claims for money damages against the University of North Carolina, Appalachian State University, and the President of the University of North Carolina, the Chancellor of Appalachian State University and a Vice Chancellor of Appalachian State University in their offiсial capacities based on alleged violations of plaintiff‘s right to free speech guaranteed by the
Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 19; Colleges and Universities §§ 39, 41; Public Officers and Employees § 359.
6. Public Officers § 9 (NCI3d); State § 4.1 (NCI3d) — violation of state constitutional right — university officials — individual capacities — no immunity
The Chancellor and a Vice Chancellor of Appalachian State University did not have immunity from plaintiff‘s claim against them for money damages in their individual capacities based on allegations that they violated plaintiff‘s right to free speech under the
Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 19; Colleges and Universities §§ 39, 41; Public Officers and Employees § 359.
Judge GREENE concurring in part and dissenting in part.
APPEAL by defendants from order entered 21 October 1988 by Judge Marvin K. Gray in WATAUGA County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 September 1989.
This is a civil action in which plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and compensatory damages from defendants for allegedly violating his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech in relieving him of his duties as Dean of Learning Resources at Appalachian State University. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on various legal theories including sovereign immunity and qualified immunity. After hearing arguments of counsel and reviewing documents submitted, the trial court entered an order denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment. From this order, defendants appealed in apt time.
Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorneys General Laura E. Crumpler and Thomas J. Ziko, for defendant-appellants.
JOHNSON, Judge.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff (the nonmoving party) as we are required to do, the evidenсe tends to show the following: For approximately fourteen years prior to June of 1984, plaintiff, Dr. Alvis Corum, held the position of Dean of Learning Resources at Appalachian State University (“ASU“). His duties included supervision of a diversified collection of books, manuscripts, and artifacts known as the Appalachian Collection (the “Collection“). In 1983, various ASU administrators began discussing the possibility of relocating the Collection from its present location in Dougherty Library because of the need to use that space for other purposes. The move was the subject of faculty debate and received attention in the campus newspaper. ASU Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs Harvey Durham, a defendant in this action, was ultimately responsible for deciding where the Collection would be housed. Plaintiff, along with some other persons involved, felt strongly that the Collection should not be split in two, with the artifacts being separated from the written materials. He expressed this view to defendant Durham on occasion. During a meeting on 21 June 1984, defendant Durham informed plaintiff that the Collection would be moved immediately to University Hall and that responsibility for the Collection would be transferred to another department.
Plaintiff accepted the decision and set up a meeting, as requested by defendant Durham, to work out details of the move. This meeting, which occurred on 25 June, was attended by plaintiff, two ASU librarians,
Dr. Parker announced at the meeting that the artifacts and written materials would be moved to two separate ASU locations. The next day a second meeting was held. Exactly what took place at this meeting is somewhat in dispute. It appears, however, that plaintiff proposed an alternative relocation plan in which the entire Collection would be housed in one location. Dr. Parker stated that he did not have the authority to entertain an alternative proposal, but agreed to relay the plan to defendant Durham.
Dr. Parker relayed the proposal to defendant Durham by teleрhone that evening. The following morning defendant Durham removed plaintiff from his position as Dean of Learning Resources. Plaintiff retained his position as a tenured faculty member.
[1] Before turning to the merits of this case, we are obliged to address a threshold issue not raised in the briefs of either party, namely, the appealability of the denial of a summary judgment motion. Generally, the denial of summary judgment does not affect a substantial right and is not appealable. Hill v. Smith, 38 N.C. App. 625, 248 S.E.2d 455 (1978); Oil Co. v. Smith, 34 N.C. App. 324, 237 S.E.2d 882 (1977). In the instant case, however, we hold that the denial of summary judgment affected а substantial right and is subject to review. We reach this conclusion in light of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), a case in which the defendant federal official‘s summary judgment motions, on the grounds of absolute and qualified immunity, had been denied in District Court. In Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that “denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment, for the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor‘s entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action.” 472 U.S. at 525, 86 L.Ed.2d at 424 (citations omitted). Similarly, the Court concluded that denial of a public official‘s claim of qualified immunity from suit, to the extent that it turns on the legal questions of whether the conduct complained of violated “clearly established law” (a standard set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)), is also appealable as a “final decision” within the meaning of
entitlement [to qualified immunity] is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Accordingly, the reasoning that underlies the immediate appealability of an order denying absolute im-munity indiсates to us that the denial of qualified immunity should be similarly appealable: in each case, the district court‘s decision is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
An appealable interlocutory decision must satisfy two additional criteria: it must “conclusively determine the disputed question,” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 57 LEd2d 351, 98 S.Ct 2454 (1978), and that question must involve a “clai[m] of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,” [Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 93 L.Ed. 1528, 69 S.Ct. 1221 (1949).] The denial of a defendant‘s motion for dismissal or summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity easily meets these requirements.
472 U.S. at 526-27, 86 L.Ed.2d at 425-26.
In the case sub judice, the dеfendants advance a substantial claim of absolute immunity as well as qualified immunity as grounds for their summary judgment motion. Further, the qualified immunity argument turns on the issue of whether “clearly established law” has been violated. Harlow, supra. In accord with Mitchell v. Forsyth, these contentions, if successful, entitle defendants to “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell, supra. They could not, therefore, be vindicated after a trial and are appealable at this stage. We do not find it distinguishable that the defendants in the instant case are asserting state rather than federal immunities. We therefore hold that denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion on the grounds of sovereign and qualified immunity is immediately appealable.
We first address defendants’ assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying their summary judgment motion on grounds of sovereign immunity. Plaintiff‘s complaint alleges that defendants violated
We find that many of the issues raised in this assignment of error have previously been addressed by this Court in Truesdalev. University of North Carolina, 91 N.C. App. 186, 371 S.E.2d 503 (1988), disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 706, 377 S.E.2d 229 (1989), and we are bound by the holding of Truesdale.
[2] The doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents the State or its agencies from being sued without its consent. Id. The Truesdale Court observed that
We are unpersuaded that the case sub judice is controlled by Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976), in which our Supreme Court abolished the defense of sovereign immunity in breach of contract actions. Plaintiff‘s action is based upon defendants’ alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff‘s complaint makes no reference to any employment contract or allegation that one was breached. We do not believe that statements in plaintiff‘s brief that he served as Dean pursuant to a contract is sufficient to bring this case under the rule of Smith v. State when the aсtion is clearly based on alleged constitutional violations and plaintiff‘s complaint makes no mention of a contract.
[3] We turn now to the issue of whether plaintiff‘s claim for monetary damages, including back pay, against individual defendants Spangler, Thomas and Durham, named in their official capacities, is barred by sovereign immunity. Again, pursuant to Truesdale, supra, we hold that this action is barred. The rationale for this is that an action against a State employee in his official capacity for monetary damages would actually be an award agаinst the State since the award would be paid from the State treasury. Insurance Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Com., 217 N.C. 495, 8 S.E.2d 619 (1940); Truesdale, supra, at 193, 371 S.E.2d at 507.
As to these same three defendants in their official capacities, however, plaintiff‘s section 1983 claim, as it relates to prospective injunctive relief, is not barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 194-95, 371 S.E.2d at 508. In this situation, sovereign immunity is preempted by federal law, Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988), so that the outcomes of section 1983 actions will not vary predictably with whether the action was brought in state or federal court. Id. This issue is more fully treated in Truesdale and need not be repeated here.
[4] We turn now to the issue of denial of summary judgment concerning monetary awards against defendants Thomas аnd Durham named in their individual capacities. It is recognized that governmental
government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. [Citations omitted.]
. . . On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to “know” that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.
Id. at 818, 73 L.Ed.2d at 410-11 (emphasis added).
The Court has further described a “clearly established” right by stating that
[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is dоing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, see Mitchell [v. Forsyth], 472 U.S. 511, 535 n. 12, 86 L.Ed.2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806; but it is to say that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 97 L.Ed.2d 523, 531 (1987) (emphasis added).
In the case sub judice, plaintiff alleges that he was relieved of his duties as Dean because of the statements he made at the 26 June 1984 staff meeting in which he proposed an alternative relocation plan. He asserts that this discharge violated his guaranteed right of free speech. To determine whether defendants violated a “clearly established” right of which a reasonable person would have known, we examine the substantive law applicable to plaintiff‘s claim. The Supreme Court has set forth the necessary elements for a state employee‘s section 1983 action for violation of freedom of speech in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). In that case, the Court stated that the first issue is whether “an employee‘s speech addresses a matter of public concern” and this must be “determined by the content, form, and context” of the statement in question. Id. at 147, 75 L.Ed.2d at 720. If the speech does comment on a matter of public concern, then the court must balance the employee‘s interest as a citizen in commenting on the public issue against “the government‘s interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public.” Id. at 150, 75 L.Ed.2d at 722; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968).
It is unnecessary to the disposition of the qualified immunity issue before us to fully apply the criteria of Connick to the instant case and we decline to do so. We shall, however, examine the process sufficiently to determine whether qualified immunity exists.
On review of denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion, we are obliged to view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the plaintiff, giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Bradshaw v. McElroy, 62 N.C. App. 515, 302 S.E.2d 908 (1983). In doing this, we conclude, for purposes of evaluating the summary judgment motion only, that the relocation of the Appalachian Collection was an issue of some public interest to the local community. Further, for purposes of this analysis only, we may resolve the conflicting allegations of the parties and conclude that plaintiff was discharged in order to prevent him from raising public concerns about the move, rather than for insubordination as defendants assert.
These and other factors must weigh in the balance to determine whether plaintiff‘s right to speak out was outweighed by ASU‘s need for efficient provision of service to the public. Although we decline to reach a final balance of interests under Connick, supra, we believe the recitation of some of the factors involved shows the complexity of balancing the interests to determine whether plaintiff‘s rights were violated. It is apparent to us that when defendants acted they were not violating a “clearly established” right of which a reasonable person would have known. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment as it concerns possible monetary awards against defendants Thomas and Durham named in their individual capacities pursuant to
[5] Last, we address the denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion as it concerns plaintiff‘s claims for violations of his right to free speech as protected by
The doctrine of sovereign immunity — that the State may not be sued without its consent — is firmly rooted in thе jurisprudence of North Carolina. Harwood v. Johnson, supra; Orange County v. Heath, 282 N.C. 292, 192 S.E.2d 308 (1972); Electric Co. v. Turner, 275 N.C. 493, 168 S.E.2d 385 (1969); Schloss v. Highway Commission, 230 N.C. 489, 53 S.E.2d 517 (1949). Also, an action brought against individual state officers or employees in their official capacities is considered to be an action against the State for purposes of applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Insurance Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Com., supra. Therefore, we must conclude that plaintiff can seek no relief of any kind from UNC, ASU, or the three individual defendants named in their official capacities, and we reverse that part of the trial court order.
[6] We turn now to the question of whether the two defendants named in their individual capacities are protected from plaintiff‘s state action for monetary damages.
[Our Supreme] Court said in Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 7, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1952), “It is settled law in this jurisdiction that a public official, engaged in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, may not be held personally liable
for mere negligence in respect thereto. The rule in such cases is that an official may not be held liable unless it be alleged and proved that his act, or failure to act, was corrupt or malicious (cites omitted), or that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties.” (Emphasis added.) As long as a public officer lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his official authority, and acts without malice or corruption, he is protected from liability. Carpenter v. Atlanta & C.A.L. Ry., 184 N.C. 400, 406, 114 S.E. 693, 696 (1922). As to the personal liability of a governor, see 28 Am. Jur. 2d Governor [sec.] 11 (1968).
Smith v. State, supra, at 331, 222 S.E.2d at 430; see also Mazzucco v. Board of Medical Examiners, 31 N.C. App. 47, 228 S.E.2d 529 (1976), disc. rev. denied, 291 N.C. 323, 230 S.E.2d 676 (1976).
In the instant case, plaintiff has alleged and come forward with some evidence that the two defendants acted in violation of law, and therefore outside the scope of their duties in discharging plaintiff. The defendants have failed to disprove plaintiff‘s claim as a matter of law. We express no opinion whatsoever as to whose version of events and motivation is correct. However, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff as we must in this posture, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that plaintiff would be unable at trial to prove a set of facts which would entitle him to relief from defendants. We therefore hold that the two individually named defendants are not immune from a suit for monetary damages.
In summary, we hold that concerning plaintiff‘s
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.
Judge EAGLES concurs.
Judge GREENE concurs in part and dissents in part.
Judge GREENE concurring in part and dissenting in part.
On the
I
Section 1983 Claims
The
A
II
N.C. Constitutional Claims
In plaintiff‘s second claim, he asserts a private right of action under the North Carolina Constitution. While North Carolina does not have an enabling statute similar to
III
As our Rules of Civil Procedure permit parties to assert inconsistent and alternative pleadings and claims, plaintiff should not be required to elect at this stage of the proceeding between his