Coon v. . KnapCoon v. . Knap
It is in the nature of a release, and in evidence of a satisfaction of the claim of the person making it, and unless shown to have been obtained by fraud bars it.
The cases of Egleston v. Knickerbocker, 6 Barb. 458 and White v. Parker, 8 Barb. 48, compared.
Thе plaintiff in this action and her sister were passengers in a stage coach owned by the defendants, who used it for the carriage of passengers for hire between Bridgewater and New-Berlin. On the 13th of June, 1849, while рassing from Bridgewater towards New-Berlin, it was carelessly overturned and the plaintiff‘s leg was badly broken and her side injured. On the 11th of July thereafter, the defendant called at the plaintiff‘s residence and inquired of the twо sisters what the damages were. Their father, who was present, replied that if she got right along, he
Rec‘d, Brookfield, July 11th, 1849, of Wm. D. Knap, $40, in full, for damages done to us by the stage accident of the 13th of June last.
The plaintiff told the defendant that she would not take the $40 in full, unless she got able to walk in three months, but consented that her sister might write her name to the receipt, and she wrote the names of both. The sister understood it to be a receipt in full up to the time it was given.
The injury proving to be a more serious one than it was supposed to be, and the plaintiff not recovering from it so as to be able to walk, she brought her action against the defendant for her damages. The defendant pleaded the payment оf the $40 and the receipt as a satisfaction of her claim. The cause was tried at Madison circuit in December, 1850, before Mr. Justice MASON. He charged the jury that the receipt of the plaintiff to the defеndant for the damages for the injury complained of, upon its face constituted a perfect defence to this action, and should be so held by the jury unless the plaintiff had succeeded in showing by his parol еvidence that there was a condition annexed to said receipt which does not appear in the receipt itself: that the plaintiff claims that she has shown by her evidence in the case that this receipt was given to the defendant upon the express parol agreement and understanding that it should not be considered a full satisfaction unless the plaintiff got well in three months; or, in other
The jury thereupon found a vеrdict for the plaintiff for $340. The questions arising upon the validity of the receipt as a bar to the action was reserved by the justice for consideration, and he subsequently gave judgment thereon for the plaintiff. Upon appeal this was affirmed at a general term of the supreme court in the fifth judicial district. The defendant appealed to this court.
Southward and Pritchard, for appellants.
J. B. Eldredge, for respondents.
WILLARD, J. The plaintiff after receiving her injury gave the defendant a receipt in these words: Rec‘d, Brookfield, July 11, 1849, of Wm. D. Knap, forty dollars in full for damage done to us by the stage accident on the 18th June last; signed by plaintiff, and the judge at the circuit held that this receipt constituted a bаr to the action, and should be so held by the jury, unless the plaintiff has shown by parol evidence that there was a condition annexed to the receipt which did not appear in the receipt itself. The jury found there was such a condition, and gave a verdict for
The supreme court of the fourth district in Egleston v. Knickerbocker, (6 Barbour, 458,) gave to this subject an elaborate examination. We held to the general rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or explain a written agreement. We showed that a receipt is so far an exception to this rule, that it may be explained as to the consideration part, when the explanation is not contradictory to, but consistent with the instrument. We held, also, that a receipt absolute in its terms can not be shown by parol evidence to be upon a condition, except on a proceeding to reform the instrument for fraud or mistake. And we observed that whеn a receipt was in the nature of a contract, it fell within the general rule applicable to contracts. If that decision be law, the judgment under review was erroneous and should be reversed. The lеading cases are reviewed in Egleston v. Knickerbocker, supra; and the whole subject is fully considered in Dart on Venders, 451, and notes, where various other cases to the same effect are cited. (See Houstin v. Shindler, 11 Barb. 36, as to explaining Receipts.)
Justice PRATT, who gave the prеvailing opinion in this case, disregards the opinion of the court of the fourth district in Egleston v. Knickerbocker. He admits that the opinion might create some little embarrassment, had it not been overruled by the supreme court in the eighth district in White v. Parker, (8 Barbour, 48.) With dеference be it said, Justice Pratt has misrepresented the opinion in Eglestone v. Knickerbocker, and is wholly mistaken when he says that the opinion of Mullet, J., in White v. Parker is at
It is possible that the defendant obtained thе advantage of the plaintiff in the settlement for her damages; but she can not be relieved in this way without unsettling principles which have long been firmly established.
The jury were not asked to inquire whether the receiрt was obtained by fraud, or that the plaintiff gave it under any mistake or misapprehension of her rights. They were simply instructed to inquire whether a parol condition was made not appearing in the receipt. This, in my judgment, was wrong. The sympathy which the jury could not fail to find for the plaintiff, a young lady, in her misfortune, should not influence the court to pervert the law for her advantage.
The judgment of the supreme court and of the сircuit court should be reversed, and a new trial ordered with costs to abide the event.
TAGGART, J. I have tried faithfully to find some ground
The instrument in question in this action is evidence of a compromise оr settlement of the damages occasioned by the accident. It is not, technically, a receipt for money on account, which may be explained by parol, by showing that some particular itеm was not intended to be included. It was in full for damages occasioned by a particular transaction. It is in effect a release of the defendant from all liability occasioned by that transaction. This subjеct has been so elaborately discussed in various decisions that I deem it unnecessary to go fully into a consideration of the authorities. The case of Kellogg v. Richards, (14 Wend. 116,) is much like this. The receipt in that case was аs follows: Received of Richards & Sherman, S. H. Addington‘s note, dated July 30, 1828, payable four months from date, for $431-40, as a compromise for the full amount of the note. The amount of the note referred to was $1629-44. The cоurt decided that the paper was more than a simple receipt, it was an agreement of compromise, by which the plaintiff agreed to take Addington‘s note for $431-40, as a compromise for the full рayment of defendant‘s note, and being made bona fide and without fraud, could not be con-
The receipt in this case although not expressed to be upon a compromise, clearly was so upon its face. It is, therefore, in the nature of a contract, and is so far within the general rule that it is not liable to be varied by parol evidence.
All the judges excepting MASON, J., concurring.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered