14 Wend. 116 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1835
By the Court,
This case does not show a composition of the defendants with all their creditors, and therefore the objection does not properly arise that one creditor cannot secretly stipulate for an amount beyond the composition agreed upon with all the others, and that the agreement
That a technical receipt can be explained by parol evidence, and is in this respect an exception to the general rule of evidence applicable to written instruments, has been repeatedly ruled and acted upon in this court. 1 Johns. Cas. 145. 2 Johns. R. 379. 3 id. 319. 5 id. 68. 8 id. 390. 9 id. 311. 2 T. R. 366. 5 id. 369. 5 Barn. & Ald. 606, Holroyd and Best, justices. 2 Stark. Ev. 571—702. 11 Mass. R. 32. The principle is strongly illustrated in the cases where the consideration money in a deed of land, though acknowledged to be received in full, may be recovered by the grantor; he being permitted to contradict the deed, and prove the money was not received. 14 Johns. R. 210. 20 id. 338. See also 12 Johns. R. 529, per Thompson, J. in error.
It appears to me that the only question arising in the case upon the facts disclosed is, whether the agreement to accept a sum less than the face of the note in satisfaction, rested in parol, or is to be considered as enbraced in the instrument endorsed on the back of the note. The agreement to compound for a less sum, if in writing, falls within the general rule, and cannot be contradicted or explained by parol evidence, nor can a different agreement be shown. The endorsement on the note is undoubtedly something more than a receipt. By it the plaintiffs acknowledge that on a compromise with the defendants, they received the Addington security “for the full payment of their note of $1627,44.” Had it been intended as nothing more than a technical receipt for so much paid or secured to be paid, the language would have been different. “ As a compromise for the full payment of this note” is language altogether inconsistent with such an intent, and is too plain and explicit to be misunderstood. The relaxation of the rule of evidence above referred' to should not be extended beyond the spirit of the terms in which it is expressed, and must he confined to the case of a receipt in the strict sense of that term. If the plaintiffs had agreed as follows—On receiving of Richards & Sherman a note of $431,40, made by S. H. Addington,
It is true there does not seem to be much, if any ground for distinction, between such a case and one where a less sum of money is paid and agreed to be accepted in full, which would not be a good plea. But the distinction is as sound as that which exists between the cases of receiving a less sum of money and an article of property just half the value, which would constitute a perfect defence. The rule that the payment of a less sum of money, though agreed by the plaintiff to be received in full satisfaction of a debt exceeding that amount, shall not be so considered in contemplation of law, is technical, and not very well supported by reason. Courts therefore have departed from it upon slight distinctions.
Judgment affirmed.