CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU ET AL. v. COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, LTD., ET AL.
No. 22-448
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
May 16, 2024
601 U. S. 416
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU ET AL. v. COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, LTD., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-448. Argued October 3, 2023—Decided May 16, 2024
The Constitution gives Congress control over the public fisc subject to the command that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”
Held: Congress’ statutory authorization allowing the Bureau to draw money from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out the Bureau‘s duties satisfies the Appropriations Clause. Pp. 424-438, 441.
(a) Under the Appropriations Clause, an appropriation is a law that authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money for designated purposes. Pp. 424-435.
(1) The Bureau‘s funding is “drawn from the Treasury” and is therefore subject to the requirements of the Appropriations Clause. The issue is whether the Bureau‘s funding mechanism constitutes an “Appropriatio[n] made by Law.” The Court concludes that the answer is yes based on the Constitution‘s text, the history against which that text was enacted, and congressional practice immediately following ratification. Pp. 425-434.
(i) The Constitution‘s use of the term “appropriation” provides important insight into its meaning. The Appropriations Clause itself specifies that an appropriation must authorize withdrawals from a particular source, the “Treasury.” And, the proviso limiting Congress’
(ii) Pre-founding history supports the conclusion that an identified source and purpose are all that is required for a valid appropriation. The concept of legislative appropriations grew out of the broader struggle between Parliament and the Crown for popular control of the purse in England. Parliament had little claim to direct how the Crown‘s hereditary revenues were spent, but “extraordinary revenues” required parliamentary authorization because they were financed through various forms of taxation. In granting these revenues, Parliament began exercising an attendant power to specify how the Crown used the funds. The ensuing power struggle culminated in Parliament stripping away the remnants of the Crown‘s hereditary revenues. Subsequently, Parliament‘s usual practice was to appropriate government revenue to particular purposes and to limit the duration of its revenue grants. But, not all appropriations were time limited. Some statutes granting money gave the Crown broad discretion regarding how much to spend within an appropriated sum.
The appropriations practice in the Colonies and early state legislatures was much the same. Many early state constitutions vested the legislative body with power over appropriations, and state legislative bodies often opted for open-ended, discretionary appropriations. By the time of the Constitutional Convention, it was uncontroversial that the powers to raise and disburse public money would reside in the Legislative Branch. The origins of the Appropriations Clause confirm that appropriations needed to designate particular revenues for identified purposes, but beyond that limit, early legislative bodies exercised a wide range of discretion. Pp. 427-432.
(iii) The practice of the First Congress also illustrates the source-and-purpose understanding of appropriations. Many early appropriations laws made annual lump-sum grants for the Government‘s expenses. As in England, the appropriation of “sums not exceeding” a specified amount provided the Executive discretion over how much to spend up to a cap. Congress took even more flexible approaches to appropriations for several early executive agencies, allowing them to indefinitely fund themselves from revenue collected. For example, Congress adopted open-ended fee- and commission-based funding schemes for Customs Service and the Post Office. Pp. 432-434.
(b) The associations’ three principal arguments for why the Bureau‘s funding mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause are unpersuasive. Pp. 435-438.
(1) The associations argue that the Bureau‘s funding is not “drawn ... in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law” because the agency itself decides the amount of annual funding to draw from the Federal Reserve System. But, appropriations of “sums not exceeding” a certain amount were commonplace immediately after the founding. Congress did not violate the Appropriations Clause by permitting the Bureau to decide how much funding to draw up to a cap. Pp. 435-436.
(2) The associations suggest that the Appropriations Clause requires both Chambers of Congress to periodically agree on an agency‘s funding, which ensures that each Chamber reserves the power to unilaterally block those funding measures through inaction. While the Constitution expressly provides that “no Appropriation of Money” to support an army “shall be for a longer Term than two Years,”
(3) Finally, the associations contend that if the Bureau‘s funding mechanism is consistent with the Appropriations Clause, then Congress could do the same for any or every civilian agency, allowing the Executive to operate free of any meaningful fiscal check. But, the Appropriations Clause is simply a limitation on Congress’ power over the purse, and the associations err by reducing the power of the purse to only the principle expressed in the Appropriations Clause. They offer no defensible argument that the Appropriations Clause requires more
51 F. 4th 616, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, post, p. 441. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 445. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined, post, p. 447.
Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher, Benjamin W. Snyder, Ephraim A. McDowell, Mark R. Freeman, Melissa N. Patterson, and Steven Y. Bressler.
Noel J. Francisco argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Christian G. Vergonis, Hashim M. Mooppan, and Yaakov M. Roth.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New York et al. by Letitia James, Attorney General of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Ester Murdukhayeva, Deputy Solicitor General, and Dennis Fan, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Kris Mayes of Arizona, Rob Bonta of California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Joshua H. Stein of North Carolina, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Michelle A. Henry of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, Robert W. Ferguson of Washington, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin; for AARP et al. by Maame Gyamfi, William Alvarado Rivera, and Julie Nepveu; for Community Development Financial Institutions et al. by Richard A. Koffman; for Current and Former Members of Congress by Hyland Hunt and Ruthanne M. Deutsch; for Farm Action et al. by Rachel L. Fried and Jeffrey B. Dubner; for Financial Regulation Scholars by Gregory M. Lipper and
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of West Virginia et al. by Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General of West Virginia, Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General, and Michael R. Williams, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, by John Scott, Provisional Attorney General of Texas, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg Taylor of Alaska, Tim Griffin of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Chris Carr of Georgia, Raúl Labrador of Idaho, Todd Rokita of Indiana, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, John M. Formella of New Hampshire, Drew Wrigley of North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Jason Miyares of Virginia, and Bridget Hill of Wyoming; for ACA International by Christopher O. Murray; for America‘s Future et al. by William J. Olson and Jeremiah L. Morgan; for the Americans for Prosperity Foundation by Michael Pepson; for the Atlantic Legal Foundation by Lawrence S. Ebner and Herbert L. Fenster; for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John C. Eastman and Anthony T. Caso; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Cameron T. Norris and Jennifer B. Dickey; for the Credit Union National Association, Inc., et al. by Julian R. Ellis, Jr., and Leah C. Dempsey; for Former Members of Congress by Helgi C. Walker, Lucas C. Townsend, Russell Balikian, and Lochlan F. Shelfer; for the Foundation for Government Accountability by Stewart L. Whitson; for the Landmark Legal Foundation by Matthew C. Forys, Michael J. O‘Neill, and Richard P. Hutchison; for the New Civil Liberties Alliance et al. by Richard A. Samp, Margaret A. Little, and Mark S. Chenoweth; for the New England Legal Foundation by Mark
Robert M. Loeb filed a brief for the Mortgage Bankers Association et al. as amici curiae.
Opinion of the Court
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Our Constitution gives Congress control over the public fisc, but it specifies that its control must be exercised in a specific manner. The Appropriations Clause commands that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”
I
A
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in response to the 2008 financial crisis.
In addition to vesting the Bureau with sweeping authority, Congress shielded the Bureau from the influence of the political branches. To insulate the Bureau from the President‘s control, Congress put a single Director with a 5-year term at the Bureau‘s helm and made the Director removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance.
This case involves another one of the Bureau‘s novel structural features, one that limits Congress’ control. Congress supplies most federal agencies with the funds necessary for their operations only on an annual basis, so those agencies must ask Congress for renewed funding each year. For the Bureau, however, Congress diminished this accountability by providing the Bureau a standing source of funding outside the ordinary annual appropriations process. Each year, the Bureau may requisition from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System “the amount determined by the [Bureau‘s] Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out” its duties, subject only to a statutory cap.
B
In 2017, the Bureau promulgated a regulation focused on high-interest consumer loans. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans,
The District Court granted summary judgment to the Bureau. As relevant, the court explained that “[t]he Appropriations Clause ‘means simply that no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.‘” 558 F. Supp. 3d 350, 364 (WD Tex. 2021) (quoting Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U. S. 414, 424 (1990)). And, because “a statute authorizes” the disbursements from the Federal Reserve System‘s combined earnings to the Bureau “up to a certain cap,” the District Court concluded, “there is no Appropriations Clause issue.”
The Court of Appeals agreed with this argument and reversed. 51 F. 4th 616 (CA5 2022). Drawing on the Constitution‘s text and history, the court concluded that the Appropriations Clause “does more than reinforce Congress‘s power over fiscal matters; it affirmatively obligates Congress to use that authority ‘to maintain the boundaries between the branches and preserve individual liberty from the encroachments of executive power.‘” Id., at 637 (quoting Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 33 F. 4th 218, 231 (CA5 2022) (en banc) (Jones, J., concurring)). By giving the Bureau a “self-actualizing, perpetual funding mechanism,” the court reasoned, Congress in effect abandoned this obligation. 51 F. 4th, at 638–639. It was not enough that Congress enacted the law authorizing the Bureau‘s funding because a “law alone does not suffice—an appropriation is required.” Id., at 640. The court thus held that the Bureau‘s funding mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause. Id., at 642.
We granted certiorari to address the narrow question whether the statute that provides funding to the Bureau violates the Appropriations Clause. 598 U. S. 936 (2023). We now reverse.
II
Under the Appropriations Clause, an appropriation is simply a law that authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money for designated purposes. The statute that provides the Bureau‘s funding meets these requirements. We therefore conclude that the Bureau‘s funding mechanism does not violate the Appropriations Clause.
The Appropriations Clause provides that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”
As a threshold matter, the parties agree that the Bureau‘s funding must comply with the Appropriations Clause. The Appropriations Clause applies to money “drawn from the Treasury.”
The associations’ challenge turns solely on whether the Bureau‘s funding mechanism constitutes an “Appropriatio[n] made by Law.” This question divided the courts below. The District Court concluded that a valid appropriation is nothing more than a statute that “authorizes an agency to receive funds up to a certain cap.” 558 F. Supp. 3d, at 364;
Based on the Constitution‘s text, the history against which that text was enacted, and congressional practice immediately following ratification, we conclude that appropriations need only identify a source of public funds and authorize the expenditure of those funds for designated purposes to satisfy the Appropriations Clause.
1
The Constitution‘s text requires an “Appropriatio[n] made by Law.”
Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that, at a minimum, appropriations were understood as a legislative means of authorizing expenditure from a source of public funds for designated purposes.
2
Pre-founding history supports the conclusion that an identified source and purpose are all that is required for a valid appropriation. The concept of legislative “appropriations” grew out of the broader struggle for popular control of the purse in England. Throughout the Middle Ages, the King enjoyed near total fiscal independence. At that time, the King‘s revenues came largely from hereditary sources, sometimes called “ordinary” revenues. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 281 (1771) (Commentaries). These ordinary revenues flowed from many sources, including the “rents and profits of the demesne lands of the crown,” id., at 286, and the fines, forfeitures, and fees “arising from the king‘s ordinary courts of justice,” id., at 289. Because this revenue inhered in the King himself, Parliament had little claim to direct how it was spent. See F. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 430 (1908) (Maitland).
Conditions in the 17th century shifted the balance of power toward Parliament. A combination of rising prices and increasing demands made it so that the King‘s ordinary revenues could not satisfy the costs of royal governance, even in times of peace. D. Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485, pp. 180–181 (6th ed. 1960); P. Einzig, The Control of the Purse 57 (1959). The King‘s financial weakness, and Parliament‘s increasing assertiveness in appropriating extraordinary revenues, led to intragovernmental strife. The ensuing power struggle culminated in the Glorious Revolution, in which Parliament stripped away the remnants of the King‘s hereditary revenues and thereby secured supremacy in fiscal matters. Commentaries 306, 333; Maitland 434.
Following the Glorious Revolution, Parliament‘s usual practice was to appropriate government revenue “to particular purposes more or less narrowly defined.” Id., at 433. Additionally, Parliament began limiting the duration of its revenue grants. For example, the duties on tonnage and poundage were no longer granted to the King for life, but only for a term of years. See
Even with this newfound fiscal supremacy, Parliament did not micromanage every aspect of the King‘s finances. Not all post-Glorious Revolution grants of supplies were time limited. A notable exception involved what came to be known as the civil list. Despite its established power to limit the duration of revenue grants, Parliament deemed it proper to cover the expenses of the King‘s household and the civil government by appropriating revenue to that purpose for life. Maitland 435–436; see also E. Reitan, The Civil List in Eighteenth-Century British Politics, 9 Hist. J. 318, 319 (1966) (Reitan) (explaining that the “Crown was to meet the costs of the civil government” out of the civil list, including “the fees and salaries of the ministers and many other public officers, the salaries of many of the small fry in various government departments, the salaries and pensions of judges, the salaries and allowances of ambassadors and consuls, and the maintenance of buildings for Parliament and the public offices“). And, parliamentary grants of supplies ordinarily gave the Crown broad discretion regarding how much to spend within an appropriated sum. Statutes granting money often stated that the Crown could spend “any Sum not exceeding” a particular amount. See, e.g.,
The appropriations practice in the Colonies and early state legislatures was much the same. “When called upon to grant supplies,” the lower houses in the colonial assemblies “insisted upon appropriating them in detail.” J. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies 1689-1776, p. 88 (1963). Many early state constitutions vested the legislative body with power over appropriations. Rappaport 332-333. And, in exercising that authority, state legislative bodies often opted for open-ended, discretionary appropriations. See, e.g.,
By the time of the Constitutional Convention, the principle of legislative supremacy over fiscal matters engendered little debate and created no disagreement. It was uncontroversial that the powers to raise and disburse public money would reside in the Legislative Branch. The only disagreement was about whether the right to originate taxation and appropriations bills should rest in a legislative body with proportionate representation. Having reached a tentative agreement on that difference, the Committee of Detail reported a draft constitution giving the House of Representatives the power to originate all revenue and appropriations laws. This proposed draft contained the prototype of what later became the Appropriations Clause. It provided that “[a]ll bills for raising or appropriating money ... shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 178 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). Ultimately, the Convention agreed to grant the House an exclusive power to originate revenue laws but not for appropriations laws. Compare
In short, the origins of the Appropriations Clause confirm that appropriations needed to designate particular revenues for identified purposes. Beyond that, however, early legislative bodies exercised a wide range of discretion. Some appropriations required expenditure of a particular amount, while others allowed the recipient of the appropriated money to spend up to a cap. Some appropriations were time lim-
3
The practice of the First Congress also illustrates the source-and-purpose understanding of appropriations. This practice “provides contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution‘s meaning.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 723 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Many early appropriations laws made annual lump-sum grants for the Government‘s expenses. Congress’ first annual appropriations law, for instance, divided Government expenditures into four broad categories and authorized disbursements up to certain amounts for those purposes. For example, the law appropriated a “sum not exceeding two hundred and sixteen thousand dollars for defraying the expenses of the civil list,” which covered most nonmilitary executive officers’ salaries and expenses.
The appropriation of “sums not exceeding” a specified amount did not by itself mandate that the Executive spend that amount; as was the case in England, such appropriations instead provided the Executive discretion over how much to spend up to a cap. In 1803, for instance, Congress appro-
Congress took even more flexible approaches to appropriations for several early executive agencies and allowed the agencies to indefinitely fund themselves directly from revenue collected. Soon after convening, Congress enacted laws that imposed a detailed schedule of duties on imported goods and tonnage. See
These fee- and commission-based funding schemes were not an American innovation; they emulated the colonial precursors to the Customs Service and Post Office. Colonial customs officers, for instance, “were paid a percentage of total receipts in their area, the proportion varying from colony to colony depending on the estimated potential yield.” T. Barrow, Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America 1660–1775, р. 14 (1967). Although the customs service in the Colonies later transitioned to a salary system, each customs “official was allowed certain fees for almost every transaction.” Id., at 78. And, as to the postal service, the Continental Congress allowed postmaster deputies 20 percent “on the sums they collect and pay into the General post office annually,” up to $1,000, and 10 percent on sums over that amount. 2 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, p. 208 (W. Ford ed. 1905).
Postratification practice therefore confirms our interpretation of the Appropriations Clause. Early appropriations displayed significant variety in their structure. Each, however, adhered to the minimum requirements of an identifiable source of public funds and purpose.
The Bureau‘s funding statute contains the requisite features of a congressional appropriation. The statute authorizes the Bureau to draw public funds from a particular source-“the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System,” in an amount not exceeding an inflation-adjusted cap.
Further, the Bureau‘s funding mechanism fits comfortably with the First Congress’ appropriations practice. In design, the Bureau‘s authorization to draw an amount that the Director deems reasonably necessary to carry out the agency‘s responsibilities, subject to a cap, is similar to the First Congress’ lump-sum appropriations. And, the commission- and fee-based appropriations that supplied the Customs Service and Post Office provided standing authorizations to expend public money in the same way that the Bureau‘s funding mechanism does.
For these reasons, we conclude that the statute that authorizes the Bureau to draw funds from the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System is an “Appropriatio[n] made by Law.” We therefore hold that the requirements of the Appropriations Clause are satisfied.
III
The associations make three principal arguments for why the Bureau‘s funding mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause, each of which attempts to build additional requirements into the meaning of an “Appropriatio[n] made by Law.” None is persuasive.
A
At the outset, the associations argue that the Bureau‘s funding is not “drawn . . . in Consequence of Appropriations
B
Next, the associations suggest that the Bureau‘s funding statute is not a valid appropriation because it is not time limited. On their reading, the Appropriations Clause requires both Chambers of Congress to periodically agree on an agency‘s funding, which ensures that each Chamber reserves the power to unilaterally block those funding measures through inaction. The Bureau‘s funding mechanism, the associations insist, inverts this baseline by allowing it to draw funds—forever—unless both Chambers of Congress step in and affirmatively prevent the agency from doing so.
But, the Constitution‘s text suggests that, at least in some circumstances, Congress can make standing appropriations. The Constitution expressly provides that “no Appropriation of Money” to support an army “shall be for a longer Term than two Years.”
The First Congress’ practice confirms this understanding. Recall that the appropriations that supplied funding to the Customs Service and the Post Office were not time limited. Supra, at 433–434. The associations resist the analogy to the Post Office and other fee-based agencies, arguing that such agencies do not enjoy the same level of fiscal independence as the Bureau. Fee-based agencies, the associations reason, “could not demand funds from the federal fisc, but rather needed to persuade the people they served to pay them, and the public could refuse to purchase to influence their conduct.” Brief for Respondents 35. The associations, however, make no attempt to explain why the possibility that the public‘s choices could restrain fee-based agencies’ revenue is relevant to the question whether a law complies with the constitutional imperative that there be an appropriation.
C
Finally, the associations contend that the Bureau‘s funding mechanism provides a blueprint for destroying the separation of powers, and that it invites tyranny by allowing the Executive to operate free of any meaningful fiscal check. If the Bureau‘s funding mechanism is consistent with the Appropriations Clause, the associations reason, then Congress could do the same for any—or every—civilian executive agency. And that, they conclude, would be the very unification of the sword and purse that the Appropriations Clause forbids.
The associations err by reducing the power of the purse to only the principle expressed in the Appropriations Clause. To be sure, the Appropriations Clause presupposes Congress’ powers over the purse. But, its phrasing and location in the Constitution make clear that it is not itself the source of those powers. The Appropriations Clause is phrased as a limitation: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”
IV
The dissent‘s theory fares no better. The dissent accepts that the question in this case is ultimately about the meaning of “Appropriations.” Post, at 452. It faults us for consulting dictionaries to ascertain the original public meaning of that word, insisting instead that “Appropriations” is a “term of art whose meaning has been fleshed out by centuries of history.” Ibid. But, as we have explained at length, both preratification and postratification appropriations practice support our source-and-purpose understanding. Supra, at 427–434. What is more, the dissent never offers a competing understanding of what the word “Appropriations” means. After winding its way through English, Colonial, and early American history about the struggle for popular control of the purse, the dissent declares that “the Appropriations Clause demands legislative control over the source and disposition of the money used to finance Government operations
The dissent‘s rendition of history largely ignores the historical evidence that bears most directly on the meaning of “Appropriations” at the founding—preratification appropriations laws. For example, the dissent spends pages recounting how Parliament secured fiscal supremacy and wielded that power to superintend the King. See post, at 453–458. Although that history is a helpful starting point, see supra, at 427–428, it at most explains why appropriations must be “made by Law”—not what it means for the legislature to make an “Appropriation.” The dissent does not meaningfully grapple with the many parliamentary appropriations laws that preserved a broad range of fiscal discretion for the King. See supra, at 428–430. It makes no attempt to explain “sums not exceeding” appropriations. See ibid. And, the dissent brushes aside the civil list, asserting that it “presented a constitutional problem in the conflict between the principle of the independence of the Crown and the principle of parliamentary control of finance.” Post, at 458 (quoting Reitan 320). The problem was that the King claimed absolute power to use the sums granted in the civil list as he pleased and regularly spent in excess of the allotted amount. See id., at 320, 324–329. But, the dissent never explains why the reforms that Parliament adopted in response to these abuses bear on whether the law establishing the civil list was an “appropriation.”
The dissent‘s treatment of early American history does not advance its point either. It highlights the undisputed point that colonial and state legislative bodies exercised the
When the dissent turns to postratification history, it engages with several appropriations laws enacted by the First Congress. The dissent acknowledges, as it must, that the fee- and commission-based funding schemes for the Customs Service and Post Office show that Congress exercised broad discretion over how to appropriate money. Post, at 461–462. To square these funding schemes with its understanding of the Appropriations Clause, the dissent points out that Congress required “fees in excess of what was needed to defray the cost of providing services be turned over to the Treasury.” Post, at 462. This requirement, the dissent reasons, “ensured that Congress maintained control over the purposes for which [the appropriated] money was spent.” Ibid. But, if what matters is that Congress controls how funds are spent, then we are all in agreement—appropriations must designate the purposes for which money can be spent.
Even under the dissent‘s “legislative control” theory, its attempt to distinguish the Customs Service and the Post Office from the Bureau is not convincing. The dissent points out that Congress had control over the Customs Service, for instance, because Customs had a “carefully delineated mission” and “early tariff Acts spelled out in excruciating detail the various fees” customs officers could collect, as well as the salaries the officers could be paid from those receipts. Post,
V
The statute that authorizes the Bureau to draw money from the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out its duties satisfies the Appropriations Clause. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, and JUSTICE BARRETT join, concurring.
I join in full the Court‘s opinion holding that the funding mechanism for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau complies with the Appropriations Clause. As the Court details, that conclusion emerges from the Clause‘s “text, the history against which that text was enacted, and congressional practice immediately following ratification.” Ante, at 426. At its inception, the Clause required only that Congress “identify a source of public funds and authorize the expenditure of those funds for designated purposes.” Ibid. The Clause otherwise granted Congress “a wide range of discretion.” Ante, at 431. The result was “significant variety” in appropriations—most notably, as to their specificity, duration, and funding source. Ante, at 434; see ante, at 432–434.
The CFPB‘s funding scheme, if transplanted back to the late-18th century, would have fit right in.
I write separately to note that the same would have been true at any other time in our Nation‘s history. “‘Long settled and established practice’ may have ‘great weight‘” in interpreting constitutional provisions about the operation of government. Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U. S. 578, 592–593 (2020) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 689 (1929)); see also The Federalist No. 37, p. 229 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). And here just such a tradition supports everything the Court says about the Appropriations Clause‘s meaning. The founding-era practice that the Court relates became the 19th-century practice, which became the 20th-century practice, which became today‘s. For over 200 years now, Congress has exercised broad discretion in crafting appropriations. Sometimes it has authorized the expenditure of a sum certain for an itemized purpose on an annual basis. And sometimes it has departed from that model in one or more ways. All the flexibility and diversity evident in the founding period has thus continued unabated, making it ever more obvious that the CFPB‘s funding accords with the Constitution.
For one thing, Congress has never thought it necessary to designate specific amounts for specific items. Over the years, many appropriations have instead given the Executive leeway to decide how to allocate funds, up to a ceiling, among a set of activities. As the Court shows, the First Congress made appropriations of “sums not exceeding” stated amounts for “broad categories” of purposes; the Executive then decided the level of funding it would use for all things within a category. Ante, at 432. In instituting those “lump-sum grants,” the First Congress created a template for later ones to follow. Ibid. Examples of such grants “abound in our history.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U. S. 417, 467 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). During the Civil War, Congress author-
Similarly, Congress has never thought appropriations must be annual, or even time-limited. (Appropriations that are time-limited themselves show variety: Most are annual, but some last for longer periods—say, two or five years.
And “flexible approaches to appropriations” have been particularly common in the sphere of financial regulation. Ante, at 433. There, Congress‘s adoption of assessment-based funding mechanisms (similar to those the First Congress used for the Customs Service and Post Office, see supra, at 443) has meant that regulators do not have to seek yearly legislative funding. And they generally may devote the funds they collect to any of a range of activities. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has authority to levy assessments on banks as “necessary or appropriate to carry out [its] responsibilities.”
I would therefore add one more point to the Court‘s opinion. As the Court describes, the Appropriations Clause‘s text and founding-era history support the constitutionality of the CFPB‘s funding. See ante, at 426. And so too does a continuing tradition. Throughout our history, Congress has created a variety of mechanisms to pay for government operations. Some schemes specified amounts to go to designated items; others left greater discretion to the Executive. Some were limited in duration; others were permanent. Some relied on general Treasury moneys; others designated alternative sources of funds. Whether or not the CFPB‘s mechanism has an exact replica, its essentials are nothing new. And it was devised more than two centuries into an unbroken congressional practice, beginning at the beginning, of innovation and adaptation in appropriating funds. The way our Government has actually worked, over our entire experience, thus provides another reason to uphold Congress‘s decision about how to fund the CFPB.
JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.
Today, the Court correctly concludes that, based on the plain meaning of the text of the Appropriations Clause, “an appropriation is simply a law that authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money for designated purposes.” Ante, at 424. The statute that Congress passed to fund the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau easily meets the Appropriations Clause‘s minimal requirements. See ante, at 435. It authorizes the Bureau to withdraw money from “the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System,”
Indeed, there are good reasons to go no further. When the Constitution‘s text does not provide a limit to a coordinate branch‘s power, we should not lightly assume that Article III implicitly directs the Judiciary to find one. The Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis deleted). An essential aspect of the Constitution‘s endurance is that it empowers the political branches to address new challenges by enacting new laws and policies—without undue interference by courts. To that end, we have made clear in cases too numerous to count that nothing in the Constitution gives federal courts “some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 829 (1997) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). Put another way, the principle of separation of powers manifested in the Constitution‘s text applies with just as much force to the Judiciary as it does to Congress and the Executive. See Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 90–91 (1947).
This case illustrates why. As the Court explains, in response to the devastation wrought by the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed and the President signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. See ante, at 421. In that statute, Congress chose to fund the Bureau outside of the annual appropriations process. See ante, at 422. Drawing on its extensive experience in financial regulation, Congress designed the funding scheme to protect the Bureau from the risk that powerful regulated entities might capture the annual appropriations process. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 111–176, pp. 162–164 (2010); A. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1991, 2056–2058 (2014); R. Barkow, Insulating Agencies, 89 Texas L. Rev. 15, 42–45, 67, 77 (2010); see also ante, at 444 (KAGAN, J., concurring) (describing long
Respondents, two associations of payday lenders, represent exactly the type of entity the Bureau‘s progenitors sought to regulate and whose influence Congress may have feared. See O. Bar-Gill & E. Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 44–45, 55–59, 68–70 (2008). In urging us to find the Bureau‘s funding scheme unconstitutional, then, respondents would not only have us find unstated limits in the Constitution‘s text, they would have us undercut the considered judgments of a coordinate branch about how to respond to a pressing national concern.
Of course, to say that Congress had reasons for designing the Bureau‘s funding scheme in the manner it did is not to endorse those policy choices. “With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal.” Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934). Instead, the Constitution places primary responsibility for checking the political branches with the People. See King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 498 (2015) (“In a democracy, the power to make the law rests with those chosen by the people”). It is to them that the Court rightly returns any remaining policy questions posed by today‘s case.
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dissenting.
Since the earliest days of our Republic, Congress‘s “power over the purse” has been its “most complete and effectual weapon” to ensure that the other branches do not exceed or abuse their authority. The Federalist No. 58, p. 359 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The Appropriations Clause protects this power by providing that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”
Unfortunately, today‘s decision turns the Appropriations Clause into a minor vestige. The Court upholds a novel statutory scheme under which the powerful Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) may bankroll its own agenda without any congressional control or oversight. According to the Court, all that the Appropriations Clause demands is that Congress “identify a source of public funds and authorize the expenditure of those funds for designated purposes.” Ante, at 426. Under this interpretation, the Clause imposes no temporal limit that would prevent Congress from authorizing the Executive to spend public funds in perpetuity. Contra, Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, bk. XI, ch. VI, p. 160 (O. Piest ed., T. Nugent transl. 1949) (warning that a legislature will lose its power of the purse if it passes an appropriation that lasts “forever”). Nor does the Court‘s interpretation require Congress to set an upper limit on the amount of money that the Executive may take. Today‘s decision does not even demand that an agency‘s funds come from the Treasury. As the Solicitor General admitted at argument, under this interpretation, the Appropriations Clause would permit an agency to be funded entirely by private sources. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34–35. In short, there is apparently nothing wrong with a law that empowers the Executive to draw as much money as it wants from any identified source for any permissible purpose until the end of time.
That is not what the Appropriations Clause was understood to mean when it was adopted. In England, Parlia-
I
In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress created the CFPB, an independent regulatory agency with “vast rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory authority over a significant portion of the U. S. economy.” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. 197, 203 (2020); see id., at 222, n. 8. And in designing the CFPB, “Congress deviated from the structure of nearly every other independent administrative agency in our history.” Id., at 203. At every turn, the statute attempted to insulate the CFPB from control by any official answerable to the people. First, “Congress provided that the CFPB would be led by a single Director, who serves for a longer term than the President,” and Congress attempted to protect the Director from removal by the President “except for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance.” Ibid. In Seila Law, we struck down this restriction because it placed “potent” power in the hands of an official who was “neither elected by the people nor meaningfully controlled by someone who is.” Id., at 206, 224–225.
Elected in the atmosphere that followed the financial crisis of 2008, the Congress that created the CFPB also sought to free the CFPB from supervision by subsequent Congresses that might wish to superintend the Bureau‘s exercise of its vast powers. To achieve that end, the CFPB was given an unprecedented way of obtaining funds that was expressly designed to make it totally “independent of the Congressional appropriations process.” S. Rep. No. 111–176, p. 163 (2010).
Under that scheme, the CFPB is not funded by appropriations enacted by Congress. Instead, each year, the CFPB
In addition, the CFPB, unlike most agencies, does not have to return any unspent funds to the Treasury.
In devising this novel scheme, Congress appears to have anticipated that it might be challenged under the Appropriations Clause, and Congress therefore attempted to shield its new creation by providing that “[f]unds obtained by or transferred to the [CFPB] shall not be construed to be Government funds or appropriated monies.”
The Framers would be shocked, even horrified, by this scheme. Beginning with the First Congress, agencies
A
The Appropriations Clause is found in Article I, § 9, clause 7, of the Constitution, which provides:
“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”
The first part of this provision is customarily called the Appropriations Clause, and the second is referred to as the Statement and Account Clause.
The Appropriations Clause contains two key terms—“Money . . . drawn from the Treasury” and “Appropriations”—both of which require a little explanation. As the Government acknowledges, “Money . . . drawn from the Treasury” is synonymous with the term “public Money,”
The Court answers that question by consulting a few old dictionaries, which it says establish that “[i]n ordinary usage, . . . an appropriation of public money would be a law authorizing the expenditure of particular funds for specified ends.” Ante, at 427. It accordingly concludes that the Appropriations Clause requires no more than a law, a fund, and a purpose. Ante, at 426–427.
This analysis overlooks the fact that the term “Appropriations,” as used in the Constitution, is a term of art whose meaning has been fleshed out by centuries of history. To
B
1
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention did not invent the appropriations requirement. Rather, that important safeguard arose from centuries of “British experience.” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 33 F. 4th 218, 224 (CA5 2022) (en banc) (Jones, J., concurring). The Framers were aware of the requirement‘s deep roots and the critical role it had played in “the history of the British Constitution.” The Federalist No. 58, at 359. By steadily asserting the power to condition appropriations, the House of Commons, originally “an infant and humble representation of the people[,] gradually enlarg[ed] the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reduc[ed], as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government.” Ibid.
A short summary of this process illustrates the important role of the appropriations requirement. During the Middle
The Crown‘s financial independence gave it the ability to govern with little parliamentary interference. As Maitland puts it, “throughout the Middle Ages the king‘s revenue had been in a very true sense the king‘s revenue, and parliament had but seldom attempted to give him orders as to what he should do with it.” Id., at 309. “Under the Tudors, parliament hardly dared to meddle with such matters.” Ibid.
In the 17th century, however, this pattern began to change. Id., at 309–310. By that time, “the king‘s ordinary revenues were no longer even remotely sufficient to cover the normal costs of royal governance,” and the heavy expenditures of James I and Charles I exacerbated the problem. J. Chafetz, Congress‘s Constitution 47 (2017) (Chafetz). Rather than seeking appropriations from Parliament, the early Stuart kings engaged in controversial efforts to obtain additional ordinary income through the use of various royal “prerogative[s].” G. Smith, A Constitutional and Legal History of England 315 (1955) (Smith). Among other things, they unilaterally imposed duties on imports, stepped up the collection of feudal dues, sold monopolies, and forced individuals to loan money on pain of imprisonment. See id., at 315, 318.
These measures aroused opposition and, in any event, did not yield sufficient funds. As a result, James I and Charles I periodically found it necessary to ask Parliament to impose new taxes in order to obtain the funds they wanted. When they did so, the Commons began to flex the power of the purse and to demand a measure of royal accountability. Dis-
A few incidents illustrate this dynamic. In 1621, the power of the purse played a central role in disputes between the Crown and Parliament over religious, geopolitical, and judicial authority. For some months, Parliament ignored requests from James I for more tax revenue. T. Taswell-Langmead, English Constitutional History From the Teutonic Conquest to the Present Time 532 (3d ed. 1886) (Taswell-Langmead). Though Parliament finally expressed “willing[ness] to grant a moderate subsidy,” it insisted “first” on redress for “grievances.” Id., at 533; see also Smith 315-316. Parliament‘s petition infuriated James I, who ultimately dissolved Parliament and sent several of its leaders—including Sir Matthew Hale—to the Tower of London. Taswell-Langmead 534, 536.
Under Charles I, the situation worsened. At the beginning of his reign, the Commons refused to grant him the life-time power to impose tonnage and poundage duties, i. e., duties on imports and exports, as had been the custom, but instead granted the power for only one year. Id., at 539. The members of Commons “had no intention of refusing a further supply, but were resolved to avail themselves of their Constitutional right to make it dependent upon redress of grievances.” Ibid. Indignant about this temerity, the King hastily dissolved Parliament before the Lords passed the bill. Id., at 540; Smith 318. But as a consequence, the King once again then found himself without sufficient funds. So he took matters into his own hands by resorting to the monarchy‘s “old illegal methods of raising money.” Taswell-Langmead 543.
This reignited a power struggle between the two branches. As a result, when Charles I again turned to Parliament in 1628, the Commons refused to grant funds until he agreed to the Petition of Right, which demanded that he
This constitutional crisis restored the English Government‘s financial separation of powers for a season. During the Commonwealth, the Commons exercised “complete authority . . . over the whole receipts and expenditure of the national treasury.” Taswell-Langmead 626. But shortly after the Restoration, the war for the supremacy of the purse reignited. Starting in 1665, “Parliament was largely unwilling to grant [the King] additional money without specifying in some measure how it was to be used.” Chafetz 50. “This precedent was followed in some, but not all . . . cases under Charles II.” Maitland 310. Charles II, “fed up with parliamentary interference, ruled without Parliament, and therefore without any parliamentary taxation, for the rest of his reign.” Chafetz 50.
After the Revolution of 1688, Parliament took strong measures to curb the Crown‘s financial independence. The 1689 Bill of Rights declared “[t]hat levying Money for or to the Use of the Crowne by pretence of Prerogative, without
These steps, however, did not cement Parliament‘s power of the purse. Royal officers continued to collect revenue and to evade the appropriations requirement by exaggerating collection costs, giving very little in “net receipts” to Parliament, and keeping the rest for the use of the Crown. P. Einzig, The Control of the Purse 164, 188 (1959) (Einzig). So Parliament took steps to crack down on this practice. Id., at 188. In 1711, for example, Parliament passed a resolution declaring that “‘applying any sum of un-appropriated money, or surplusages of funds to usages not voted, or addressed for by parliament, hath been a misapplication of the public money.‘” 6 Cobbett‘s Parliamentary History of England 1025 (1810).
Parliament also appointed a commission to prevent the Crown from defying the appropriations requirement. In that commission‘s very first report, it recommended that “[r]evenue should come from the Pocket of the Subject directly into the Exchequer.” Report Relative to the Balances in the Hands of the Receivers General of the Land Tax, Nov. 27, 1780 (First Report), reprinted in 1 Reports of the Commissioners Appointed To Examine, Take, and State the Public Accounts of the Kingdom 14 (W. Molleson ed. 1783). Permitting revenue departments to retain or divert any public funds, the Commissioners concluded, would create a “private Interest . . . in direct Opposition to that of the Public.” Ibid. Finally, Parliament took an increasingly “firmer line . . . against virement, that is, the transfer of
2
The Court‘s treatment of this history begins by conceding most of what I have recounted. The Court notes that after the Revolution of 1688, “Parliament‘s usual practice was to appropriate government revenue ‘to particular purposes more or less narrowly defined,‘” and “Parliament began limiting the duration of its revenue grants.” Ante, at 428 (quoting Maitland 433). “Every year,” the Court continues, the King and his ministers “had to come, cap in hand, to the House of Commons, and more often than not the Commons drove a bargain and exacted a quid pro quo in return for supply.” Ante, at 429 (quoting G. Trevelyan, The English Revolution of 1688-1689, pp. 180-181 (1939)).
In an effort to find a trace of helpful precedent in pre-founding British constitutional history, the Court turns to laws appropriating funds for the “civil list,” which it touts as a particularly “notable exception” to the centuries-long understanding of appropriations. Ante, at 429, 432, 439. In truth, however, Parliament‘s treatment of the civil list actually undermines the Court‘s position. The civil list, although renamed in 2012, remains to this day, and it consists of the money needed to cover the expenses of the royal family.9 By the end of the 17th century, “the Civil List was a relatively small share of the total public expenditure,” but the independence it afforded the Crown “presented a constitutional problem in the conflict between the principle of the independence of the Crown and the principle of parliamentary control of finance.” E. Reitan, The Civil List in Eighteenth-Century British Politics: Parliamentary Supremacy Versus the Independence of the Crown, 9 Hist. J. 318, 320, 322 (1966) (Reitan).
C
1
“The conflicts between Parliament and the Crown over the power of the purse . . . were replayed in the American colonies in struggles between the royal governors and provincial assemblies.” R. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1998); see also P. Wolfson, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional? 96 Yale L. J. 838, 841-842 (1987). But learning from Parliament‘s experiences with the monarchy, some of the American Colonies assumed appropriations authority “greater even than that of the British House of Commons,” exercising significant auditing powers and legislative oversight. J. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies 106 (1963). Indeed, by 1787, all but one of the 11 State Constitutions provided their respective legislatures with some control over appropriations; and no State allowed the executive to draw money from the state treasury without legislative approval. Chafetz 55, and nn. 119-120 (citing provisions); see also The Federalist No. 48, at 310
The Framers built on this legacy at the Constitutional Convention when they adopted the Appropriations Clause, which they “well understood” would “complet[e] the power vested in Congress over money.” 7 Annals of Cong. 1124 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin). The Clause not only “gives to the Legislature an exclusive authority of raising and granting money,” but it also obligates Congress to keep that authority from “the hands of the Executive” at all times thereafter. Ibid. It makes the President “depen[d] on the will of [Congress] for supplies of money” in the first instance and puts him continually “in a state of subordinate dependence” to the people‘s elected representatives. 3 Debates on the Constitution 17 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (statement of Wilson Nicholas). The Appropriations Clause enables Congress, “without the concurrence of the other branches, to check, by refusing money, any mischief in the operations carrying on in any department of the Government.” 5 Annals of Cong. 509 (1796) (statement of Rep. William Branch Giles) (emphasis added).
Early budgets illustrate how the appropriations power was understood. Although the Constitution does not require that appropriations be limited to a single year, that was the dominant practice in the years immediately following the adoption of the Constitution. See ante, at 432. And while the first few appropriations laws were brief and lacked details about how the money was to be spent, the amounts approved closely tracked the estimates submitted by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. See Chafetz 58-59. Indeed, the second appropriations act expressly incorporated the estimates of specific expenses contained in Hamilton‘s report to Congress. Compare Appropriations Act, § 1, 1 Stat. 104, with 5 American State Papers: Finance
In the mid-1790s, appropriations laws became even more specific. Chafetz 59. And when Thomas Jefferson became President, he urged Congress “to multiply barriers against” the “dissipation” of public funds by “appropriating specific sums to every specific purpose susceptible of definition,” and “by disallowing applications of money varying from the appropriation in object, or transcending it in amount.” First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1801), reprinted in 9 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 336 (P. Ford ed. 1905); see also Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 1801), reprinted in 1 The Writings of Albert Gallatin 68 (H. Adams ed. 1879) (“Congress should adopt such measures as will effectually guard against misapplication of public moneys“).
To be sure, not all early funding laws followed the dominant model of specified short-term appropriations. Agencies that provided services to a particular segment of the public were funded by fees that were paid by the recipients of those services. See, e. g.,
As the Government notes, Brief for Petitioners 21-22, this practice had deep historical roots, see N. Parrillo, Against the Profit Motive 65 (2013) (Parrillo),11 and was presumably based on the idea that the cost of providing certain services should be borne by the recipients of those services rather than the general public. At the same time, the requirement that fees in excess of what was needed to defray the cost of providing services be turned over to the Treasury ensured that Congress maintained control over the ways in which this money was spent. Under these arrangements, therefore, Congress exercised close control over both the amount of money that the agencies in question obtained and the way in which that money was used. The agencies received and were allowed to use the amount of money necessary to provide their narrowly prescribed services. All the rest was sent to the Treasury and could then be used only as authorized by a congressional appropriation.
2
In discussing this early American history, the Court begins by essentially conceding the principal lesson outlined above. As the Court candidly puts it, “‘[w]hen called upon to grant supplies,’ the lower houses in the colonial assemblies ‘insisted upon appropriating them in detail.‘” Ante, at 430.12 The best the Court can muster to support its assertion that “state legislative bodies often opted for open-ended, discretionary appropriations” are a few minor state laws that, when understood in relation to the Constitutions of the
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In sum, centuries of historical practice show that the Appropriations Clause demands legislative control over the source and disposition of the money used to finance Government operations and projects.14
III
A
As the previous discussion shows, today‘s case turns on a simple question: Is the CFPB financially accountable to Congress in the way the Appropriations Clause demands? History tells us it is not. As we said in Seila Law, “‘[p]erhaps the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem’ with an executive entity ‘is [a] lack of historical precedent’ to support it.” 591 U. S., at 220 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 505 (2010)). And the Government agrees with this principle. In its briefing and at argument, the Government admitted that an utterly unprecedented funding scheme would raise a serious constitutional problem. Reply Brief 18; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, 26. The Government therefore attempts to show that there is ample precedent for the CFPB scheme, but that effort fails.
The CFPB‘s funding scheme contains the following features: (1) it applies in perpetuity; (2) the CFPB has discretion to select the amount of funding that it receives, up to a statutory cap; (3) the funds taken by the CFPB come from other entities; (4) those entities are self-funded corporations that obtain their funding from fees on private parties, “not departments of the Government,” Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 426 (1928); (5) the CFPB is not required to return unspent
The Government points to the Post Office and the Customs Service as founding-era precedents for the CFPB, but the analogy is flawed. As noted, funding Government agencies with fees charged to the beneficiaries of their services has long been viewed as consistent with the appropriations requirement. And both the Post Office and the Customs Service fell comfortably into that category.
A quick look at the laws that set up the Post Office and the Customs Service shows that they were nothing like the CFPB. In the Act establishing the Post Office, Congress gave that agency a narrow and specific mission: to “provide for carrying the mail of the United States.” See, e. g.,
Much the same is true with respect to the Customs Service, which the Government claims “best” resembles the
The CFPB, by contrast, is an entirely different creature. Its powers are broad and vast. It enjoys substantial discretionary authority. It does not collect fees from persons and entities to which it provides services or persons and entities that are subject to its authority. And it is permitted to keep and invest surplus funds. In short, the Government‘s “best” argument fails.
The Government‘s next-best analogs fare no better. Moving to modern agencies, the Government claims that the CFPB‘s funding scheme is not materially different from the funding schemes of a list of other currently existing agencies. See Brief for Petitioners 22-23, 29-36 (comparing the CFPB to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National
But unlike the CFPB, the agencies cited by the Government are funded in whole or in part by fees charged those who make use of their services or are subject to their regulation. This is true for the OCC, see
For these reasons, it is undeniable that the combination of features in the CFPB funding scheme is unprecedented. And it is likewise clear that this assemblage was no accident. Rather, it was carefully designed to give the Bureau maximum unaccountability. Our decision in Seila Law addressed part of the problem posed by this arrangement. It made the CFPB accountable to the President, but that decision did nothing to protect Congress‘s power of the purse. Indeed, standing alone, Seila Law worsens the appropriations problem. The appropriations requirement developed to ensure that the Executive (in England, the monarch) would be accountable to the people‘s elected representatives.
B
Left with no analog in history, the Government employs a divide-and-conquer strategy to defend the CFPB‘s funding scheme. It argues that even if no prior agency had a funding scheme with all the features of the CFPB‘s, the funding schemes of other presumptively constitutional agencies contain one or more of the features found in the CFPB‘s scheme. It then reasons that the combination of these features in the CFPB‘s scheme must be constitutional as well.
This argument founders for two reasons. First, the CFPB‘s scheme includes an important feature never before seen. As explained, the CFPB‘s money does not come from Congress, from private recipients of its services, or from private entities that it regulates. It does not even originate with another Government agency. Instead, the CFPB gets its money via a three-step process: The Federal Reserve Banks earn money from the purchase and sale of securities, as well as from the fees they charge for providing services to depository institutions. The Federal Reserve Banks then deliver these earnings to the Federal Reserve System. Finally, the CFPB requests an amount from the Federal Reserve Board. That feature of the CFPB scheme is entirely new.
Second, the Government‘s argument fails “to engage with the Dodd-Frank Act as a whole.” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 230. By addressing the individual elements of the CFPB‘s setup one-by-one, the Government seeks to divert attention
The Federal Reserve‘s earnings represent “specific charges for specific services to specific individuals or companies.” FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U. S. 345, 349 (1974). It would be “a sharp break with our traditions” to allow the CFPB to use these earnings to fund a broader array of governmental activities that have little-to-no relationship with those specific charges, services, and regulated entities. National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336, 341 (1974). By allowing the CFPB to use the Federal Reserve‘s earnings to enforce and implement broader consumer protection laws, Congress impermissibly removed the CFPB “from its customary orbit” as an agency, authorizing the Bureau to appropriate funds obtained from private sources “in the manner of an Appropriations Committee.” Ibid. In other words, Congress abdicated its appropriations authority, an exclusively legislative prerogative. Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 149, 156 (1877). But Congress lacks the authority to “transfer to another branch powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.” Gundy v. United States, 588 U. S. 128, 135 (2019) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In sum, the CFPB‘s unprecedented combination of funding features affords it the very kind of financial independence that the Appropriations Clause was designed to prevent. It is not an exaggeration to say that the CFPB enjoys a degree of financial autonomy that a Stuart king would envy.
This autonomy has real-world consequences. The CFPB is a powerful agency with the authority to impose “substantive rules [on] a wide swath of industries” and “lev[y] knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 222, n. 8. In the last several months alone, the Bureau has announced plans to effectuate not one, but three major changes in consumer protection law. The CFPB has issued guidance cautioning financial institutions from “denying credit to individuals based on their [illegal] immigration status, regardless of their personal circumstances and demonstrated ability to repay.”17 It has also begun “a rulemaking process to remove medical bills from Americans’ credit reports”18 and to cap overdraft fees “at an established benchmark—as low as $3.”19 These may or may not be wise policies, but Congress did not specifically authorize any of them, and if the CFPB‘s financing scheme is sustained, Congress cannot control or monitor the CFPB‘s use of funds to implement such changes. That is precisely what the Appropriations Clause was meant to prevent.
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The Court holds that the Appropriations Clause is satisfied by any law that authorizes the Executive to take any amount of money from any source for any period of time for any lawful purpose. That holding has the virtue of clarity, but
REPORTER‘S NOTE
The attached opinion has been revised to reflect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the official United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or filed briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None