CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, Plаintiff, v. CRAIG MANSETH et al., Defendants.
22-CV-29-LJV-HKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
September 2, 2025
For thе reasons that follow, Judge Schroeder‘s decision is affirmed.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
“[A] magistrate judge is afforded broad discretion [in resolving non-dispositive discovery disputes] which a court should not overrule unless this discretion is clearly
DISCUSSION
The defendants assert that Judge Schroeder‘s order limiting each of them to 40 RFPs is “clearly erroneous because it unnecessarily hamstrings [their] right to defend themselves against the CFPB‘s claims.” Docket Item 111 at 4. They say that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do[] not impose any limitations on how mаny RFPs each party may serve on another party.” Id. (emphasis omitted). And they argue that “while [c]ourts are permitted broad disсretion in determining the course of discovery,” they may not limit discovery merely based on the fact that the “volume of discovery [sought] is excessive or burdensome.” See id. at 4-5 (internal quotation marks omitted)
The defendants also say that Judge Schroeder‘s restriction on their ability to seek discovery is “entirely arbitrary” and ignores the fact that “the CFPB is a large governmental agency with at least eight attorneys of reсord in this litigation“—a force, they suggest, clearly equal to the task of responding to their requests. See id. at 5-8. Indeed, the defendants say, curtailing their ability to serve RFPs is simply unfair because the CFPB was able to “pursue[] nearly limitless discovery from [the d]efendants . . . pursuаnt to multiple civil investigative demands” before this case even began. See id. at 1-3; see also id. at 4 (“Despite the CFPB‘s unfettered access to four years of unchecked governmental investigations, . . . Judge Schroeder limits [the d]efendants to 40 RFPs each . . . .“).
The CFPB counters that Judge Schroeder‘s order “is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.” Docket Item 116 at 1. It argues that despite the dеfendants’ claims otherwise, Judge Schroeder properly recognized that courts may impose reasonable guardrails on the scope of discovery. Id. at 4. And based on his “review of the 812 RFPs that [the d]efendants [had] propounded to the [CFPB],” the CFPB says, Judge Schroeder reasonably found that “‘[i]t [was] apparent . . . that th[o]se requests could be reconfigured to more broadly grоup the type of information sought, resulting in fewer total requests.‘” Id. (quoting Docket Item 110 at 5).
The Court agrees with the CFPB. As Judge Schroeder correctly noted, “disсovery in federal court is ‘broad and permissive,’ [but] ‘not unfettered‘” and “[a] court ‘must limit discovery if it finds that the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
In fact, the defendants concede in their reply that “a сourt may limit discovery where appropriate.” Docket Item 119 at 4. But they vociferously assert that such a limitation was not аppropriate here, particularly in light of the sheer volume of information that the CFPB was able to obtain before commencing this action against them. See id. at 4-5.
In governing discovery, however, courts need not afford each side the exact same volume of documents, as if they were two sides of a scale that could never be out of balance. The defendants feel as though they were unjustly put upon by the government investigation that preceded this case. See Docket Items 111 аnd 119. That is understandable and perhaps true. But that does not mean that they now may
Here, Judge Schroeder reviewed the defendants’ 812 RFPs, concluded that they were both “excessive and unnecessarily granular,” and observed that they could be streamlined into 320 RFPs—40 RFPs for each of the eight defendants. See Docket Item 110 at 5-6. In other words, Judge Schroeder found not that the defendants were not entitled to the informatiоn they sought, but that they needed to consolidate their requests to get that information. Based on this Court‘s own review of the defendants’ RFPs, see Docket Items 102-1, 102-2, 102-3, 102-4, 102-5, 102-6, 102-7, and 102-8, it cannot and does not find that he abused his discretion in doing so. And that is particularly so given the “highly deferential” standard of review that applies. See Thai Lao Lignite, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Judge Schroeder‘s decision, Docket Item 110, is AFFIRMED. Consistent with this Court‘s previous order, the defendants shall serve their revised RFPs within 21 days of the date of this order, and the CFPB shall respond to those RFPs within 45 days of that service. See Docket Item 118. The case is referred back to Judge Schroeder for further proceedings consistent with the referral order of February 26, 2024, Docket Item 85.
Dated: September 2, 2025
Buffalo, New York
/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE