COMPASSCARE, A NEW YORK NONPROFIT CORPORATION; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND LIFE ADVOCATES, DBA NIFLA, A VIRGINIA CORPORATION; FIRST BIBLE BAPTIST CHURCH, A NEW YORK NONPROFIT CORPORATION v. KATHY HOCHUL, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; ROBERTA REARDON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE LABOR DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; AND LETITIA JAMES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
No. 22-951-cv (L), 22-1076-cv
United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
January 02, 2025
August Term 2023. Argued: December 14, 2023.
CompassCare, the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates, and First Bible Baptist Church (collectively, “Plaintiffs“) challenge the constitutionality of New York Labor Law Section 203-e (“the Act“), which prohibits discrimination based on an employee‘s or a dependent‘s reproductive health decision making. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.) granted the State‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ expressive-association, speech, free exercise, religious autonomy, and vagueness claims. The District Court also permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act‘s Notice Provision, which required employers issuing employee handbooks to include certain information regarding employees’ rights and remedies under the Act.
Thereafter, this Court decided Slattery v. Hochul, which held that an employer may have an associational-rights claim if the Act “forces [the employer] to employ individuals who act or have acted against the very mission of its organization.” 61 F.4th 278, 288 (2d Cir. 2023) (emphasis added). In light of thаt decision, we vacate the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ expressive-association claim, the grant of summary-judgment to Plaintiffs as to the Act‘s Notice Provision, and the permanent injunction. We remand for the District Court to determine whether any Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an associational-rights claim under Slattery. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ free speech and free exercise claims.
JONATHAN CALEB DALTON, Alliance Defending Freedom, Lansdowne, VA (Kevin H. Theriot, Jacob P. Warner, John J. Bursch, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, AZ; John J. Bursch, Alliance Defending Freedom, Washington D.C.; James P. Trainor, Trainor Law, PLLC, Malta, N.Y., on the briefs) for Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
LAURA ETLINGER (Barbara D. Underwood, Galen Leigh Sherwin, Andrea Oser, on the briefs) for Letitia James, Attorney General of
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judge:
CompassCare, the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA“), and First Bible Baptist Church (“First Bible“) (collectively, “Plaintiffs“) challenge the constitutionality of New York Labor Law Section 203-e (“the Act“), which prohibits “discrimination based on an employee‘s or a dеpendent‘s reproductive health decision making.” Plaintiffs contend that the Act unconstitutionally infringes their First Amendment freedoms of expressive association, speech, and religion. They also argue that the Act compels speech in violation of the First Amendment by requiring them to notify employees, in their employee handbooks (should they choose to issue such handbooks), of the employees’ “rights and remedies” under the Act.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.) granted the State‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ expressive-association, speech, free exercise, religious autonomy, and vagueness claims. The District Court also enjoined enforcement of the Act‘s Notice Provision, which required employers issuing employee handbooks to include certain information
Thereafter, this Court decided Slattery v. Hochul, which held that an employer may have an associational-rights claim if the Act “forces [the employer] to employ individuals who act or have acted against the very mission of its organization.” 61 F.4th 278, 288 (2d Cir. 2023) (emphasis added). The District Court did not have the benefit of the Slattery opinion – which is now binding precedent – when it issued the orders challenged in this matter. In light of Slattery, we vacate the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ expressive-association claim, the grant of summary-judgment to Plaintiffs as to the Act‘s Notice Provision, and the permanent injunction. We remand for the District Court to determine whether any Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an expressive-association claim under Slattery. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ free speech and free exercise claims.
I. Background
A. The Act
The Act prohibits “discrimination based on an employee‘s or a dependent‘s reproductive health decision making.”
B. The Plaintiffs
CompassCare, NIFLA, and First Bible contend that the Act unconstitutionally “meddle[s] in the affairs of religious and pro-life organizations . . . by forcing them to employ and associate with those persons who do not share or live by the organizations’ beliefs regarding abortion,
1. CompassCare
CompassCare describes itself as “a pregnancy care center” that “provides clinical pregnancy testing to confirm the existence of pregnancy; ultrasound exams; gestational age determinations; complete pregnancy, abortion, and adoption оptions consultations; STD testing and treatment; abortion pill reversal services; and medical, insurance, and community support referrals.” Id. at 25 (Compl. ¶¶55, 58). CompassCare, according to the Complaint, “does not recommend, provide, or refer for abortions or abortifacient drugs or devices, holding it immoral for anyone to participate in these services.” Id. at 26 (Compl. ¶69). “In addition to functioning as a standalone pregnancy care center . . . CompassCare provides training and tools to other” centers, id. at 29 (Compl. ¶95), and makes public statements concerning “laws and cultural developments dealing with life, pregnancy, abortion, contraception, and other issues,” id. at 30 (Compl. ¶96).
The Complaint describes CompassCare as “a Christ-centered agency” and
In order to fulfill its espoused mission, CompassCare requires that all staff members “know Jesus Christ as their Lord and Savior . . . support CompassCare‘s religious mission, . . . personally conduct themselves consistent[ly] with the Christian faith,” and “believe in and agree to abide by its positional statements on abortion, birth control, religious faith, and organizational principles.” Id. at 28 (Compl. ¶¶81-83). CompassCare states that it “requires such assent because it believes that by associating with like-minded individuals, it will be able to spread an authentic message of love and hope that will be received more readily by patients, which will ultimately save more lives and reduce the perceived need for abortion.” Id. at 29 (Compl. ¶93).
2. NIFLA
According to the Complaint, NIFLA is an organization “comprised of
“NIFLA emphasizes the importance of statements of faith and codes of conduct to its member centers and strongly encourages that its centers implement such documents in their daily operations.” Id. (Compl. ¶104). “Many of NIFLA‘s New York member centers require their employees and all who serve them in any capacity to assent to and personally live by, among other things, their organizational codes of conduct, positional statements, and/or statements of faith regarding pregnancy, abortion, contraceptive use, and sexual conduct outside the context of a marriage between one man and one woman.” Id. at 31
3. First Bible
The Complaint describes First Bible as a Baptist church that operates an outreach center, a foster care ministry, a private day school, and a recreational sports center. See generally id. at 31-35 (Compl. ¶¶114-140). “First Bible believes and teaches that human life begins at conception . . . [and] that abortion constitutes the unjustified, unexcused taking of unborn human life, which violates the Bible‘s command against the intentional destruction of innocent human life.” Id. at 32 (Compl. ¶121). “First Bible expects its pastors, directors, employees, and volunteers – in other words all who minister or assist in any capacity - to abide by and agree with the church‘s moral and ethical standards... in both their work life and private life.” Id. at 33 (Compl. ¶130). First Bible states that it “will not hire or retain any... employee . . . who refuses to assent to its statement of faith, or refuses to live out thаt statement of faith in his or her personal life.” Id. (Compl. ¶131).
C. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed suit on November 14, 2019, against various New York officials in their official capacities (“the State“), seeking declaratory and
On June 5, 2020, the District Court granted the State‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ expressive association, speech, free exercise, religious autonomy, and vagueness claims, and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the core provisions of the Act.3 See CompassCare v. Cuomo (”CompassCare I“), 465 F. Supp. 3d 122, 167-68 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). The District Court denied the State‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims related to the Notice Provision – leaving it as the sole claim to proceed to summary judgment – and entered a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of that provision. See id. Following discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment with respect to the Notice Provision. The District Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, declaring the Notice Provision unconstitutional and entering a permanent injunction barring its enforcement. See CompassCare v.
The parties appealed, and the appeal was held in abeyance pending this Court‘s decision in Slattery, 61 F.4th 278. In Slattery, Evergreen Association, Inc. (“Evergreen“), a crisis pregnancy center, challenged the Act on the grounds that the Act violates its freedoms of expressive association, speech, and religion, and that it is void for vagueness. See id. at 284. This Court affirmed the dismissal of Evergreen‘s speech, exercise, and vagueness claims but reversed the dismissal of its expressive association claim, and remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 295. That matter is pending in the Northern District of New York.
II. Standard of Review
“Our standard of review for both motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment is de novo.” Guippone v. BH S & B Holdings LLC, 737 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under
We review the grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. See Almontaser v. N.Y.C. Dep‘t of Educ., 519 F.3d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see also Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmBH, 843 F.3d 48, 62 (2d Cir. 2016). “A district court abuses its discretion when it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or makes an error of law.” Almontaser, 519 F.3d at 508.
III. Expressive Association
Plaintiffs assert that the Act violates their freedom of expressive association by prohibiting them from terminating or refusing to hire a person who has made a reproductive health decision, such as having used contraception or had an abortion, that conflicts with Plaintiffs’ beliefs. The District Court dismissed this claim, holding that the Act‘s burdens on Plaintiffs’ expressive activity are “incidental.” CompassCare I, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 149.
In Dale, the Court held that a New Jersey law prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation did not preclude the Boy Scouts from expelling a gay scoutmaster. See id. at 661. The Court set forth a three-part test to determine whether an anti-discrimination law violates a group‘s freedom of expressive association. First, a court must determine “whether the group engages in ‘expressive association,‘” id. at 648, giving “deference to an association‘s assertions regarding the nature of its expression,” id. at 653. Second, the court asks whether the presence of a certain member
The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed whether, and to what extent, an employer has a right of expressive association with respect to its paid employees. Rather, the Supreme Court‘s expressive-association decisions to date have considered the relationships among members of voluntary associations. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 649-50; Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 612-13 (civic association); N.Y. State Club Ass‘n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1988) (certain private clubs); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int‘l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 539-40 (1987) (association of professionals).4
In this appeal, the State argues for the first time that “the right of expressive association does not extend to the employment context.” State‘s Br. at 31 (capitalization altered). This Court has not previously been called upon to decide, expressly, the scope of an employer‘s right to expressive association. For example, in New Hope Family Services v. Poole, 966 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2020), the parties did not contest – and thus we implicitly assumed without deciding – that employers enjoy at least some right to expressive association. See id. at 178-80. Likewise, in Slattery, this Court applied Dale to hold that an anti-abortion pregnancy center plausibly stated a сlaim that the Act violates its freedom of
As was the case in New Hope, the parties in Slattery appealed following a ruling on a motion to dismiss, and did not explore or litigate, either before the trial courts or on appeal, the scope of an employer‘s freedom of expressive association, including whether it may differ from the freedom held by voluntary
In Slattery, the State did not argue, as it does here, that employers do not have the same expressive-association rights as voluntary membership organizations – and, consequently, the Slattery Court never separately examined
The scope of freedom of expressive association in the employment context is now at issue in this case and must be considered in light of Slattery.
There are meaningful differences between relationships among members of voluntary organizations and relationships between employers and employees.
Significantly, employment conditions and relationships are heavily regulated and closely scrutinized at both the state and federal levels, and have been so for many years. “In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the Legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that peace and good order may
In light of these significant differences between voluntary associations and employment relationships, and the long and complex history of regulation of employment relationships, the Supreme Court‘s decisions regarding the freedom of expressive association enjoyed by voluntary associations do not apply neatly to employers. For example, in Dale, the Supreme Court emphasized that an
association need not be formed for the “purpose” of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment,” and that “the First Amendment protects the Boy Scouts’ method of expression.” Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. If this approach were to be applied fully and broadly to employers, it could permit any employer to claim that it expresses its beliefs through its business activities, and that the retention of certain employees burdens that expression. As amici note, such a result could destabilize the protections that state and federal governments have established to protect employees from exclusions based on protected characteristics.7We do not go so far as to hold, as the State urges, that no employer may challenge the applicability of a law that the employer contends burdens its freedom of expressive association. As Slattery makes clear, an entity like CompassCare, or another mission-based organization that advocates for a particular cause or set of beliefs, could plausibly allege that the compelled
To sustain their challenge to the Act, each Plaintiff must adequately allege (and eventually prove) that the Act threatens “the very mission of its organization.” Slattery, 61 F.4th at 288. It is not enough for an employer to claim that it holds particular views or interests, or even that it expresses such views through its work. In the workplace, expressive association rights are not unlimited; the right to expressive association does not permit an employer generally to discriminate in its employment practices – potentially violating the statutory or constitutional rights of employees and applicants. “There is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union.” Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78. Rather, the right to expressive association is implicated only when the employment decision
For an employer to make the showing required by Slattery, it must show that the Act threatens its very mission not only in a vague and generalized sense, but in the context of a specific employment decision. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. This would presumably require assessment of (1) the responsibilities of the position at issue, including whether it is client-facing and whether it involves expressly or implicitly speaking for the organization, and (2) the particular conduct or attribute of the employee that renders the employment of that person, in that position, a threat to the employer‘s mission.8 In short, an employer must plausibly allege that the Act‘s impact on the specific employment decision “will impedе the organization‘s ability to engage in . . . protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.” Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 627.
On remand, each Plaintiff will have to demonstrate that it meets the relevant standard separately and independently of the others – the outcome may therefore vary for different Plaintiffs. The District Court shall evaluate, on
We therefore vacate the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ expressive-association claim and remand for further consideration by the District Court.10
IV. The Notice Provision
The State cross-appeals the District Court‘s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs as to the Notice Provision, which requires employers that choose to provide an employee handbook to “include in the handbook notice of employee rights and remedies under this section.”
The District Court concluded that the Notice Provision compels speech. It found that CompassCare and NIFLA12 use handbooks to explain to their employees “the rules that govern conduct in the workplace, the values of the organizations, and the religious perspective that guides the organizations’ operations.” CompassCare II, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 527. Relying on National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018) (”Becerra“), the District Court held that the Notice Provision was subject to strict scrutiny because “[r]equiring that Plaintiffs also include in those handbooks a statement that the law protects employees who engage in behavior contrary to that promoted by the Plaintiffs would compel them to promote a message about conduct contrary to their religious perspective.” Id. Applying strict scrutiny, the District Court concluded that the Notice Provision was not sufficiently narrowly tailored, because the State could have served the “compelling purpose of informing workers of their rights” through less restrictive means, such as producing posters
The State argues that the Notice Provision is “analogous to laws compelling the disclosure of commercial speech,” and is thus subject to (and survives) rational basis review. State‘s Br. at 50. Plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that the Notice Provision is subject to and fails strict scrutiny because “no matter whether [the Notice Provision‘s] requirement conveys commercial information, it compels Plaintiffs to speak against their beliefs.” Plaintiff‘s Reply Br. at 31.13 Nonetheless, Plaintiffs concede that the permanent injunction is overly broad and should be “tailor[ed] . . . to protect Plaintiffs in this as-applied challenge.” Id. at 35.
For the reasons stated below, we vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs as well as the permanent injunction.
We begin with the applicable level of scrutiny to be applied to a law that arguably compels speech. “The right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). Which level оf scrutiny applies to a particular compelled statement depends on the type of speech at issue. See Riley v. Nat‘l Fed‘n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 787 (1988).
“Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement thereon.” Id. at 796. Some laws compelling speech are subject to strict scrutiny. “Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes” the right of each person to “decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,” and is subject to “the most exacting scrutiny.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994). Even a law that mandates the disclosure of factual information may be subject to strict scrutiny if the mandated disclosure is “inextricably intertwined with
But not all laws compelling speech are subject to strict scrutiny.14 The Supreme Court has subjected mandatory disclosures in advertising – a form of “commercial speech” entitled to lesser First Amendment protection – to a level of scrutiny resembling rational basis review. See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Supreme Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). Advertising regulations are not subject to strict scrutiny because they do not “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
The Supreme Court has never defined “the precise bounds of the category of expression that may be termеd commercial speech,” id. at 637, but has held that it includes “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); see also Nat‘l Elec. Mfrs. Ass‘n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying the Zauderer standard to state-mandated mercury warning labels on light bulbs); N.Y. State Rest. Ass‘n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying the same standard to calorie information on restaurant menus).
In Becerra, the Court left open the possibility that conversations between staff of an anti-abortion crisis pregnancy center and a prospective client could amount to commercial speech, if the disclosures required by the statute had been “limited to ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms
B. The Notice Provision‘s Requirements
Applying these principles, we conclude that while the Notice Provision is a content-based regulation of speech, it is subject to the rational basis review standard articulated in Zauderer. The required disclosure of the existence and basic nature of an otherwise-valid statute is similar to the mandated commercial disclosures at issue there, and a far cry from the sort of mandated “confess[ion]” of “what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion” at issue in other cases. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. The Notice Provision
Of course, the policy judgment that motivated the Act may be “controversial” in the same way that the policy judgments underlying Title VII, or minimum wage laws, are controversial. But the existence and contents of the
Furthermore, we have considered the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement, and we conclude that the speech compelled by the Notice Provision is not “inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech” such that strict scrutiny would apply. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. The handbooks at issue here contain statements of the organizations’ missions and values, which are themselves “fully protected.” Id. The handbooks also contain a wide variety of information about the terms and conditions of employment, such as medical leave, payroll, and information technology policies. The handbooks even include provisions designed to comply with other disclosures mandated by law. See Joint App‘x at 200, 230-31 (notices of sexual harassment prevention policy, in compliance with
Requiring Plaintiffs to include among these wide-ranging provisions a notice informing employees of their available rights and remedies under a valid statute is not akin to requiring a crisis pregnancy center to distribute a notice about state-sponsored reproductive health services “at the same time [the centers] try to dissuade women from choosing that option.” Becerra, 585 U.S. at 766.17
We conclude that the required notification does not interfere with Plaintiffs’ greater message and mission. The Notice Provision does not require alterations of other portions of the handbook, nor does it require any statement
Furthermore, an еmployer cannot insulate itself against required legal notifications – in a handbook or otherwise – simply because the employer chooses to use the handbook, bulletin board, or other mechanism to communicate its own views, as well as required notices.18 Taking Plaintiffs’
We are also satisfied that the Notice Provision is limited to “purely factual and uncontroversial information about” the terms of employment under New York law; we therefore also apply the standard of rational basis review set out in Zauderer. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. Applying that standard, we easily conclude that the Notice Provision is “reasonably related to the State‘s interest in preventing deception of” employees as to their statutory rights, and that the Notice Provision‘s prescribed method of notification is not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.” Id.
As Plaintiffs themselves explain, handbooks are often used to “convey details critical to achieving . . . organizational goals.” Plaintiffs’ Reply Br. at 35. The State has reasonably determined that requiring employers who use a handbook to include a “notice of employee rights and remedies under” the Act,
To be sure, in the event that one or more of the Plaintiffs succeeds on remand in stating an expressive-association claim, the District Court will need to determine whether the required notice is factually accurate and not misleading as applied to each Plaintiff so as to pass muster under Zauderer. See id. Accordingly, in light of Slattery, we vacate the grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the Notice Provision and the permanent injunction barring its enforcement. We remand for the District Court to determine, in the event that any of the Plaintiffs has plausibly alleged an expressive-association claim, whether the Notice Provision should apply to such Plaintiffs.
IV. Plaintiffs’ Remaining Claims
Plaintiffs raise two other arguments. First, they argue that the Act‘s Discrimination Provision and Waiver Provision violate their First Amendment freedom of speech. Second, they argue that the Act violates their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. Plaintiffs acknowledge, however, that this Court rejected these arguments in Slattery, 61 F.4th at 291-93.
A. Freedom of Speech
Plaintiffs argue that the Act‘s Discrimination Provision amounts to a content-based restriction on speech because it forces them to retain employees who cannot convey their message credibly. Similarly, they argue that the Waiver Provision restricts their speech by prohibiting them from ensuring that their employees follow their beliefs.
These arguments fall short because Plaintiffs do not adequately allege that their employee hiring and retention decisions amount to protеcted expression. See id. at 291-92. “It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes – for example, walking down the street or meeting one‘s friends at a shopping mall – but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.” City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). “In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether an intent to convey a particularized message was present,
Plaintiffs allege that the Act “forbids them from maintaining and communicating employment standards of conduct in accordance with organizational beliefs.” Joint App‘x at 52 (Compl. ¶ 264). But they do not allege that their action in hiring or firing employees is itself expressive. They also do not allege that terminating an employee who made a particular reproductive health decision is intended to convey a particularized message, or that listeners will understand it as such. See Slattery, 61 F.4th at 291-92. We therefore affirm the District Court‘s dismissal of this claim.
B. Free Exercise
Plaintiffs further argue that the Act intrudes on their religious practice by forcing them to retain employees whose actions are at odds with their beliefs. We have been clear that “the Free Exercise Clause ‘does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).‘” of Health & Mental Hygiene” cite=“763 F.3d 183” pinpoint=“193” court=“2d Cir.” date=“2014“>Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Canada v. N.Y.C. Dep‘t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Empl. Div., Dep‘t of Hum. Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)).
“A law is not neutral . . . if it is specifically directed at a religious practice.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Act challenged here is facially neutral, applying to religious and non-religious employers alike. See
“The general applicability requirement prohibits the government from in a selective manner imposing burdens only on conduct motivated by religious
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court dismissing Plaintiffs’ free speech and free exercise claims. We VACATE the judgment of the District Court dismissing Plaintiffs’ expressive-association claims and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.