COMMUNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLEE.
No. 00-771
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Submitted January 30, 2001—Decided July 25, 2001.
92 Ohio St.3d 376 | 2001-Ohio-208
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-746.
MOYER, C.J.
{¶ 1} Rachelle Dronebarger suffered catastrophic and permanent injuries in a one-vehicle automobile accident when her motor vehicle collided with a pole on Interstate 77 in northeast Ohio. She suffered spinal cord and other injuries resulting in partial quadriplegia and partial amputation of the right leg. After the accident, Community Mutual Insurance Company (“Community“)1 paid medical and hospital expenses of over $245,000 pursuant to an employee health plan under which Dronebarger was insured.
{¶ 2} In 1994, Community filed a complaint, as Dronebarger‘s subrogee, in the Court of Claims, seeking judgment against appellee, Ohio Department of Transportation (“ODOT“), for the same amount it had paid on Dronebarger‘s claim. Community asserted that ODOT had been negligent in placing and maintaining the unguarded fixed-based pole with which Dronebarger сollided rather than placing a breakaway or frangible-base pole, in violation of ODOT‘s own rules and regulations,
{¶ 3} Dronebarger filed a separate lawsuit against ODOT, also alleging negligence, and also seeking damages. The court there found that Dronebarger‘s damages, representing future medical expenses, lost wages, and loss of enjoyment of life, including pain and suffering, totaled $8.3 million. It entered judgment in her favor in thе amount of sixty percent of that total, for an actual award to Dronebarger of nearly $5 million.
{¶ 4} Similarly, in the subrogation case at bar, the court tried the issues of liability and damages separately, and determined that Dronebarger‘s negligence had combined with the negligence of ODOT to produce her injuries. It allocated forty percent of the fault to Dronebarger and sixty percent to ODOT.
{¶ 5} Community argued that it was entitled to recover sixty percent of its paid claims from ODOT, or just over $147,000. The trial court agreed, and entered judgment against ODOT and in favor of Community in that amount.
{¶ 6} In a split decision, the court of appeals overruled its prior holding in Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1976), 2 O.O.3d 27. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Claims, and remanded the cause with instructions that judgment be rendered in favor of ODOT, thereby rejecting Community‘s subrogation claim.
{¶ 7} The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
{¶ 8} The parties disagree as to the proper construction of
“(D) Recoveries against the state shall be reduced by the aggregate of insurance proceeds, disability award, or other collateral recovery received by the claimant.”
{¶ 9} Community argues that
{¶ 10} Implicit in Community‘s argument is the premise that it is a “claimant” as that term appears in
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} Community contends that the state should bear the medical costs incurred by an injured person as between it (a medical insurer) and thе state (here adjudicated to be a tortfeasor). It bases this contention on its belief that the purpose of
{¶ 13} We have previously recognized that the state‘s purpose in waiving political subdivision immunity was twofold: to compensate uninsured victims while also preserving public resources. The “state can make the rational determination to permit recovery by an unprotected victim but deny subrogation to insurance carriers who can make actuarial computations and adjust premiums to compensate for payments to policyholders who suffer damage at the hands of a political subdivision.” Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d 181, 183.
{¶ 14} Even if it were appropriate in this case to inquire into legislative intent tо resolve a statutory ambiguity, we find no support for concluding that the General Assembly intended that subrogation claims against the state should be treated differently from subrogation claims against political subdivisions. Nor do we believe that
{¶ 15} We therefore hold that an insurer who has been granted a right of subrogation by a person on whose behalf the insurer has paid medical expenses incurred as the result of tortious conduct of thе state is subject to
{¶ 16} The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment only.
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent.
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.
{¶ 17} I must respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that
I
{¶ 18} The majority states that it finds “no support for concluding that the General Assembly intended that subrogation claims against the state should be treated differently from subrogation claims against political subdivisions.” (Emphasis added.) However, today‘s decision ignores the state‘s waiver of immunity in
“The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties, except that the determination of liability is subject to the limitations set forth in this chapter * * *.”2 (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} Thus, it is difficult to understand why the majority would draw a parallel between suits against the state to those against political subdivisions, when we are clearly directed by
{¶ 20} As set forth in the majority opinion,
{¶ 21} In order to bring a cause of action, a claimant (Community in the case now before us) must satisfy
{¶ 22} There is no dispute that Community has a real interest in $147,000 of the $245,000 that it paid in benefits on Dronebarger‘s behalf. Pursuant to Dronebarger‘s contract of insurance with Community, Community was entitled to recover the payments it made on her behalf. Thus, Community is a real party in interest, pursuant to
{¶ 23} Disregarding the rationale of Lumbermens, the majority relies upon Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 550 N.E.2d 181, a case in which the defendant was a political subdivision—not the state. In addition, the majority implicitly relies upon
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} In addition,
” ‘State’ means the state of Ohio, including, but not limited to, the general assembly, the supreme court, the offices of all elected state officers, and all departments, boards, offices, commissions, agencies, institutions, and other instrumentalities of the state of Ohio. ‘State’ does not include political subdivisions.”
{¶ 26} Clearly,
{¶ 27} Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 550 N.E.2d 181, does not support the majority‘s conclusion that
“If a claimant receives or is entitled to receive benefits for injuries or loss allegedly incurred from a policy or policies of insurance or any other source, the benefits shall be disclosed to the court, and the amount of the benefits shall be deducted from any award against a political subdivision recovered by that claimant. No insurer or other person is entitled to bring аn action under a subrogation provision in an insurance or other contract against a political subdivision with respect to such benefits.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 28} Finding that
{¶ 29} In relying on Menefee herein, the majority states, “We have previously recognized that the state‘s purpose in waiving political subdivision immunity was twofold: to compensate uninsured victims while also preserving public resources.” Id. This statement clearly spells out the majority‘s confusion on the subject of immunity. First, the statement is irrelevant to the case at bar, as neither party is a political subdivision. Second, the state has not waived political subdivision immunity. Quite the contrary. The state, by enacting
{¶ 30} ODOT argues that the purpose of
{¶ 31} Thus, as a result, Community can recover from Dronebarger the entire amount of past medical expenses it has paid on her behalf. In light of this, Dronebarger would no longer be made whole or have full compensation as contended by ODOT. Contrary to ODOT‘s assertions, Community collects a windfall only if ODOT prevails. Accordingly, the result of the majority‘s decision is that Community may now recover, through reimbursement from Dronebarger, the entire amount paid by it to Dronebarger for past medical payments made. Conversely, if Community had prevailed in this claim, it could collect only to the extent that it was a real party in interest, that is, $147,000, which is sixty percent of the past medical expenses paid by Community. Thus, Dronebarger, the victim of ODOT‘s negligence, may now have to pay the entire amount of past medical expenses out of her recovery against ODOT. Finally, ODOT, the tortfeasor, pursuant to
II
{¶ 32}
III
{¶ 33} While I am troubled by the majority‘s misguided interpretation of
“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 34} The second sentence of
{¶ 35} Thus, I believe that
{¶ 36} The delegates to the 1912 Ohio Constitutional Convention intended, through the amendment of
{¶ 37} A determination that
“Why should the state demand of her citizenship a certain line of conduct in the settlement of disputes between individuals, partnerships or corporations, and hold herself аloof from the operation of her laws? * * *
“Let the state exemplify by this constitutional provision her willingness to submit to every enactment she imposes on the citizen. Let the state indicate by the adoption of this proposal that the same restrictions—the demands of the industrial establishments within her borders—must apply to the numerous charitable and penal institutions under her management. The thousands of employes in these institutions are entitled to the same protection of life and limb in their various avocations—many of them hazardous—аs are the workmen in any manufacturing plant in the state, and, in case of injury, just compensation determined after a fair and impartial trial, and not as such cases are usually disposed of by the legislature—a settlement based upon charity and doubt.
“If we want to get the government back to the people, make it responsive to their ideals of equal and exact justice. Let the humblest citizen feel that while the state
can impose on him all the duties of citizenship, taxation, obedience to law and the common defense, he is the equal of the sovereign before the law.” Id. at 1431.
{¶ 38} During the third reading of the amendment to
{¶ 39} Nevertheless, within five years after the amendment was adopted, this court held in Raudabaugh v. State (1917), 96 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102, paragraph two of the syllabus, that the amendment to
{¶ 40} Raudabaugh relied exclusively upon the interpretation of other similar state constitutional provisions as interpreted by their state supreme courts. However, entirely absent from the analysis in Raudabaugh was reference to the proceedings and debates of the 1912 Ohio Constitutional Convention. Raudabaugh found that since
{¶ 41} Krause v. State (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 132, 60 O.O.2d 100, 285 N.E.2d 736, paragraph one of the syllabus, followed the holding of Raudabaugh. However, Krause did recognize that
{¶ 42} In Garrett v. Sandusky (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 139, 142-143, 624 N.E.2d 704, 707-708, Justice Pfeifer recognized the error. Discussion by the delegates at the convention “confirms that the right to sue the state was conveyed to Ohioans in the amendment, and that the legislature would have no role in determining the scope of this right.” Id. at 144, 624 N.E.2d at 708 (Pfeifer, J., concurring). See, also, Fahnbulleh v. Strahan (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 666, 670, 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). While I agree with the conclusions Justice Pfeifer reached in Garrett and Fahnbulleh, I must gently part ways with the analysis he applied.
{¶ 43} In both Garrett and Fahnbulleh the state of Ohio was not a defendant. The defendants were political subdivisions. As set forth above, clearly the state and political subdivisions are not interchangeable. In Garrett and Fahnbulleh, Justice Pfeifer refers to the second sentence in
{¶ 44} In the case now before us, the General Assembly, pursuant to
{¶ 45} In conclusion, what precedents have we set with this decision? Today‘s decision will be used for the proposition that the General Assembly enacted
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
Kreiner & Peters Co., L.P.A., and Gilbert E. Blomgren, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, William C. Becker and Susan M. Sullivan, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.