Commonwealth v. StanleyCommonwealth v. Stanley
Lead Opinion
The instant appeal arises from appellant’s conviction of the crimes of escape,
The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows. On May 28, 1975, appellant was convicted of first degree murder. On October 1, 1975, he was taken to the Philadelphia General Hospital and placed in a cell in the hospital’s prison ward. Later that day it was discovered that appellant had escaped through a window from which the bars had been cut. Appellant and two others solicited a ride from an individual named Dominick Stella, who deposited them at various locations throughout the city of Philadelphia. Stella
A few days later, a woman named Jacqueline Keim told a man named Carmen Sperduto that appellant was at her apartment. Sperduto saw a newspaper item detailing appellant’s escape and telephoned the police telling them that he had seen appellant and might know where appellant was. Based upon this tip, the police obtained an arrest warrant. On October 3, 1975, they forcibly entered Keim’s apartment and discovered appellant hiding in a bedroom under a child’s crib. In addition, they seized a revolver that was lying on top of a dresser, a few feet from the crib. After conviction, appellant brought the instant appeal alleging that the court below committed the following errors:
(1) the lower court erred in not granting his motion to suppress the revolver;
(2) the lower court erred in not sustaining his demurrer to the firearms charges because the Commonwealth failed to prove that appellant was in possession of the revolver found in the bedroom in which he was captured;
(3) his conviction under18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a) should be reversed because a revolver does not constitute an instrument of crime;
(4) the Commonwealth failed to establish one of the elements of escape;
(5) the court erred in not permitting appellant to introduce evidence of the conditions at the Philadelphia prison as a defense to the charge of escape;
(6) the lower court erred in permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence regarding appellant’s prior conviction for first degree murder;
(7) the court erred in permitting the' prosecutor to amend the information to charge the offense under18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 .
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the court below.
The majority of this court embraces the analysis in the dissenting opinion regarding the first four assignments of error and, therefore, we will not expound upon those assignments.
V
Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is that the court below erred in excluding evidence regarding the conditions at the Philadelphia prison as a defense to the charge of escape. While agreeing with the lower court that the evidence was properly excluded, we wish to make clear our position on the use of duress as a defense to an escape charge.
Generally, Pennsylvania has refused to recognize a defense to a charge of escape based upon an illegality in one’s sentence or incarceration.
The general prohibition against escape defenses is, however, not absolute. At common law, a defense of necessity was recognized for factors beyond the control of the prisoner.
While of novel inquiry in Pennsylvania, courts in other jurisdictions have determined that the defense should be recognized, although they have disagreed at to what constitutes duress. The greatest source of disagreement has arisen with respect to whether the physical abuse of a prisoner by prison officials or other prisoners constitutes duress which justifies an escape,
“Since he was under lawful confinement, he had no legal right to resort to self-help as a method to assert his claim with respect to conditions in the prison.
*205 The judicial system, as well as the prison administration, has long been recognized as the normal channels for meritorious complaints relating to prison conditions. [The defendant] could have registered his claimed grievances via these accepted avenues of redress.” State v. Dyer,371 A.2d 1086 , 1090-91 (Me.1977).
In reaching this conclusion, it must be recognized that the prison environment is wholly unlike that in the general population at large. A person in the general population, confronted by a situation compelling the commission of a crime, will in most cases have little or no opportunity to secure immediate aid from the proper authorities.
An example of such a situation was advanced in People v. Wester,
Finally, we emphasize the requirement outlined in the dissent’s summary of People v. Lovercamp,
VI
Appellant’s sixth assignment of error relates to the admission into evidence of his prior conviction for first degree murder. As stated, appellant had been found guilty of first degree murder on May 28, 1975, and was incarcerated at the time he escaped on October 1,1975. In addition to escape, appellant was charged under
“[a]ny of the following crimes, or an attempt to commit any of the same, namely: murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, entering a building with intent to commit a crime therein, and kidnapping.” (emphasis added).
Cases are legion in which it is held that evidence is admissible if relevant to the matter under inquiry. E. g. Clark v. Essex Wire Corp.,
While appellant concedes that it was necessary to inform the jury that he had been convicted of a crime of violence,
In Scoggins, the defendant was charged, under The Penal Code,
Moreover, the instant case is distinguishable from Scoggins in one material respect. In Scoggins, the defendant was being tried for first degree murder and the evidence that was presented established that he had previously been convicted for the same offense. Because the general prohibition against the introduction into evidence of prior crimes is to prevent the jury from concluding that the accused has a propensity for criminal activity by reason of his prior conviction, see, e. g., Commonwealth v. Allen,
Finally, although no cases have been decided under
Therefore, we rule that the evidence was admissible as an essential part of the Commonwealth’s proof of
Finally, we are confronted with appellant’s contention that the court below erred in permitting the prosecution to amend the information to allege a violation of
“there is a defect in form, the description of the offense, the description of any person or any property, or the date charged, provided the information as amended does not charge an additional or different offense.” (emphasis added).
See also Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 427, §§ 12, 13,
Instantly, appellant was informed at the municipal court level of both the charge and the events giving rise to the offense of possession of a firearm by a former convict,
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Notes
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. See
. This court has also held that neither the negligence of prison officials in permitting an escape, nor the necessity of a prisoner to attend to certain family matters will suffice as a defense to an escape charge. See Commonwealth v. Longenberger,
. “If the prison be fired by accident, and there be a necessity to break prison to save his life, this excuseth the felony . . .” 1 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, 611 (1680).
. People v. Lovercamp,
. State v. Alberigo,
. Appellant’s proffered evidence did not entail allegations of physical abuse, but instead, related to actual conditions of imprisonment, i. e., overcrowding and lack of medical care.
. See State v. Ragland, 4 Conn.Cir. 424,
. Appellant offered to stipulate that the crime for which he had previously been convicted was a crime of violence. However, in Commonwealth v. Evans,
“The general rule is that a party to an adversary court litigation may prove his case by proper evidence and may not be required to accept, in lieu of such evidence, a stipulation as to what it would prove. . . . The Commonwealth has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt; it must be permitted to do that by whatever material it can muster.” Id.,465 Pa. at 17 ,348 A.2d at 94-95 .
Moreover, courts in other jurisdictions have held that the prosecution need not accept similar stipulations when defendants are being tried under analogous statutes. See United States v. Smith,
. In its brief, the Commonwealth poses an alternative argument and states that the evidence was also admissible to prove that appellant was under “official detention,” a necessary element in the crime of escape. We find this argument to be without merit since the jury was not required to know the exact nature of the prior crime in order to conclude that appellant was under “official detention” at the time he escaped from the Philadelphia General Hospital. Cf. Commonwealth v. Markle,
. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, §§ 101 et seq.,
.
. Id. at 710.2, as amended,
. The court went on to conclude that the admission of the exact nature of the prior crime was not prejudicial in as much as the jury would conclude that the prior crime was of “the most egregious sort” simply by being informed that the defendant had been sentenced to life imprisonment. In light of this necessary prejudice, no additional prejudice resulted from informing the jury that the prior crime had been first degree murder, and the evidence was merely cumulative. Commonwealth v. Scoggins, supra,
Although not raised by appellant, we note that a similar result would pertain to the instant case with respect to informing the jury as to the exact grade of appellant’s prior murder conviction. To satisfy the requirements of
. The need to detail to the jury the nature of the prior crime is perhaps underscored by the fact that appellant was acquitted of the charge of possession of a firearm by a former convict,
. See English v. State,
. United States v. Smith,
. See Mendoza v. State,
. Cf. People v. Lampkins, supra (adequate proof presented). See also Watson v. State,
. While the cases discussed infra are interpretive of
. Cf. Commonwealth v. Boone,
. Cf. Commonwealth v. Swint,
. Commonwealth v. Bruce,
. In Commonwealth v. Nelson,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
This is an appeal from judgments of sentence for escape, possession of implements of escape, possession of an instrument of crime generally, and carrying a prohibited offensive weapon.
On May 28, 1975, appellant was convicted of first degree murder. On October 1, 1975, he escaped from the detention room of Philadelphia General Hospital. He was recaptured when police with an arrest warrant forcibly entered a private apartment and discovered him hiding under a child’s crib. In the course of this recapture the police seized a revolver that they saw on top of a dresser a few feet from the crib.
-1-
Appellant first argues that the lower court erred in not granting his motion to suppress the revolver.
At the suppression hearing the Commonwealth offered testimony to this effect: that a woman named Jacqueline Keim told a man named Carmen Sperduto that appellant was at her apartment; that Sperduto saw a newspaper item about appellant’s escape and telephoned the police, telling them that he had seen appellant and might know where appellant was; and that it was on the basis of this tip that the police and Sperduto went to the apartment. Appellant argues that this testimony was insufficient to show that the police had probable cause to believe that he would be in the apartment;
Constitutional rights under the fourth amendment are personal in nature. Brown v. United States,
(1) his presence on the premises at the time of the search and seizure; (2) a possessory interest in the evidence improperly seized; (3) that the offense charged include as an essential element of the prosecution’s case, the element*216 of possession at the time of the contested search and seizure; or, (4) a proprietory [sic] or possessory interest in the searched premises.
Commonwealth v. Treftz, supra,
Thus is may be seen that if the police had improperly entered the apartment in order to search it, and had found the revolver, appellant would have had standing to move to suppress the revolver as evidence, his standing being based on the fact of “his presence on the premises at the time of the search and seizure.”
This said, we must ask whether the result should be different where, as here, the police do not enter to search the premises but to make an arrest.
We believe the result should be different. The reason a search is forbidden is to protect someone’s right of privacy. When the police set out to make a search, they intend to invade someone’s right of privacy. Here, when the police entered the apartment to look for appellant, they did not intend to invade appellant’s right of privacy but, if they found him, to arrest him. Nor, in fact, did the police invade appellant’s right of privacy. To be sure, they invaded his right of liberty, but they had proper authority to do that, in the form of the arrest warrant. The invasion of appellant’s right of liberty, however, was not an invasion of his right of privacy; a fugitive does not have a right of privacy if by “privacy” is meant a right to hide from, or to resist, proper arrest.
-2-
Appellant next argues that his motion for a demurrer as to the firearms charges should have been granted because the Commonwealth failed to prove possession of the revolver seized at the time of his arrest.
In deciding the sufficiency of evidence, we must first accept as true all the evidence upon which the trier of fact could properly have based the verdict, and then ask whether that evidence, with all reasonable inferences from
Here, appellant correctly argues that evidence of his mere proximity to the revolver would be insufficient to prove possession. Commonwealth v. Tirpak,
-3-
Appellant next argues that his conviction for possession of the revolver should be reversed because he was convicted under
Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove one of the elements of the crime of escape. Appellant was originally tried on the escape charge in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, the jurisdiction of which is limited to misdemeanors. When appellant appealed for a trial de novo in the Court of Common Pleas, he again was tried for escape as a misdemeanor. The Crimes Code, supra, 18 C.P.S.A.
(d) Grading.—
(1) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree where:
(i) the actor was under arrest for or detained on a charge of felony or following conviction of crime;
(2) Otherwise an offense under this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree.
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove the crime of escape as a misdemeanor because it failed to prove that he was detained for something other than “a charge of felony or following conviction of a crime,”
The difficulty with this argument is that the elements of the crime of escape are set out, not in
(a) Escape. — A person commits an offense if he unlawfully removes himself from official detention or fails to*220 return to official detention following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period.
The Commonwealth was required to prove, and did prove, that appellant unlawfully removed himself from official detention. The grading section, on which appellant relies, does not add or subtract to this definition of the crime but only defines its severity, as a felony or misdemeanor. Compare Commonwealth v. McKennion,
-5-
Appellant next argues that the lower court erred in not permitting him to introduce evidence of the conditions of his confinement in prison as a defense to the charge of escape. Here, the majority and I differ.
As the majority notes, the law is clear that even if a prisoner’s conviction would be reversed or set aside on appeal or writ of habeas corpus, he has no right to escape. It does not necessarily follow from this law that duress is not available as a defense to a charge of escape. In People
Recently in United States v. Bailey,
I should not decide which of these several analyses is the most persuasive, for here appellant did not offer enough evidence to make out a prima facie case under any of them.
The majority recognizes that the extent of the duress defense is “not directly presented in the instant case,” Majority slip opinion at 1171, yet goes on to say, “we hold that . . . .” I submit that the majority’s discussion is not a holding but mere dictum.
-6-
Appellant finally argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of evidence that the crime he had been convicted of was first degree murder. Here, too, the majority and I differ.
The Commonwealth introduced the evidence that appellant had been convicted of murder in order to prove escape, which, as just discussed, requires proof that the defendant was under official detention, and also in order to prove possession of a firearm by a former felon, in violation of the Crimes Code, supra.
At trial, objecting to this evidence, appellant’s counsel argued that the Commonwealth had to prove only that appellant had committed a crime (for escape) and a crime of violence (for possession of a firearm by a felon). It was unnecessary, counsel argued, to prove exactly what the crime of violence was; further, counsel offered to stipulate that the crime appellant had been convicted of was a crime of violence.
I acknowledge that elsewhere the law is as the majority says — that the Commonwealth could insist upon proving that the crime of violence in question was first degree murder. Perhaps we should adopt — the majority does adopt — this view. It seems to me, however, that we should remember the principle that otherwise admissible evidence may be inadmissible if it is not essential but cumulative, and
The same cannot be said here. To be sure, as appellant and counsel recognized, the jury necessarily had to be exposed to the fact that appellant had committed a crime of violence.
There remains, however, the question whether the evidence was harmless, i. e., whether it prejudiced appellant by exposing him to the danger of “the tendency of a normal juror to accept testimony of prior convictions as a basis for finding a predisposition to commit the crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Scoggins, supra,
. The Crimes Code, Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334,
. Sperduto pointed out the correct apartment, but was not present during the recapture of appellant. Instead he went with some officers to police headquarters where he gave a long statement telling where he had seen appellant and how he had learned where appellant was staying. This statement, however, may not be considered in
. In United States v. Cravero, supra, the court suggested that one reason a search warrant was not required was that
there is no need to particularize the search — the arrest warrant has already done that. There is not the same danger of the “general writ” which is the reason for requiring that a search warrant described what specific items police are allowed to search for.545 F.2d at 421 n. 1.
. This is not to say that the subject of an arrest has no right of privacy. While the police may search him incident to his arrest, that search is of limited scope. See Chimel v. California,
. In United States v. Cravero,
The arrest warrants represent judicial sanction of the deprivations of the suspects’ liberties. Possession of the warrants was a completely self-validating justification for the arrests regardless of the circumstances under which the police reached the location where they served the warrants. To hold otherwise would mean that a suspected felon could claim what amounts to temporary sanctuary in the home of another and would require us to contemplate with equanimity the prospect of a section 1983 suit by him against the officers who arrested him on a valid warrant, which seems self-evidently absurd. Thus, the arrests are valid, though the method of effecting them be not.
545 F.2d at 417 (footnote omitted).
. Appellant has argued that the entry by the police was unlawful because the police failed to announce their purpose. However, standing to make this argument also depends upon proof of an invasion of one’s right of privacy.
Although appellee was, in the most literal sense, a “fugitive,” our discussion is not limited to escapees but applies to anyone for whom a warrant of arrest has been issued. As for the tenants of the apartment, their right of privacy stands untouched; if the police had found evidence and attempted to use it against the apartment tenants, they would certainly have had standing to argue that the police had no probable cause to believe that appellant was there.
. Furthermore, if one were to accept the analysis of the author of this opinion (who dissented in McNear, supra ), still the loaded revolver in possession of appellant, an escaped convict, would come under § 907(a) as something “commonly used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have,” and therefore an “instrument of
It may also be mentioned at this point that appellant makes two other arguments regarding his convictions incident to possession of the revolver. First, he argues that the Commonwealth did not prove that he had the intent to employ the revolver criminally, as required by § 907(a). Second, he argues that we should vacate his conviction under
. Appellant argues that this necessity should not have arisen because the charge of a felon possessing a firearm was improperly before the jury in the first instance as the result of an impermissible amendment to the information. However, I need not consider this argument.