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Commonwealth v. Fladger
398 A.2d 707
Pa. Super. Ct.
1979
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*2 WATKINS, Before JACOBS, President Judge, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.

CERCONE, Judge: non-jury after a trial of involun- was convicted

Appellant intercourse,1 assault,2 recklessly sexual indecent deviate tary threats,4 and posses- another terroristic endangering person,3 of an instrument of crime This generally.5 sion direct motions and post-trial followed denial appeal sentence. imposition contends that a from his

Appellant gun retrieved and seizure of an unlawful search was the result apartment have admitted into evidence and, therefore, been should as relevant to this issue are follows. trial.6 The events climbing stairs April complainant On upon appellant, floor whеn she came apartment her fourth complainant superintendent. apartment building sink her bathroom. repair appellant requested at complainant’s apart arrived thereafter, appellant Shortly *3 the bath leaving As he was and examined the sink. ment the who arms around complainant, his room appellant placed to When entered stop. they asked him objected and ad apartment, appellant’s room of living complainant’s was threatening. When this conduct vances more grew head gun placed complainant’s rejected, appellant apartment him his accompany to basemеnt and her to forced com forced building. gun appellant At point, in the same him before her upon permitting to fellatio plainant perform Code, 1, 6, 1972, 1482, 334, No. 1. The Crimes Act of December P.L. § 18 Pa.C.S. 3123. § Code, supra, 3126. 2. The Crimes 18 Pa.C.S. § Code, supra, 2705. § 18 Pa.C.S. 3. The Crimes Code, supra, 2706. 4. The 18 Pa.C.S. § Crimes Code, supra, 5. The Pa.C.S. 907. § Crimes 18 permit argues (1) Appellant to the Common- it error also regarding the date of the wealth to Information amend Bills of trial; complainant’s testimony (2) offenses at the outset of credibility was impaired by prior that her so inconsistent statements fatally destroyed; (3) to establish failed and the Commonwealth custody gun. have examined chain of of the We aforementioned and merit. these contentions find them devoid of

541 her apartment returned to complainant to leave. After herself, police reported she contacted the and composed the incident.7 after the complainant reported two hours

Approximately detectives, to the police, the incident a statement gave to arrest apartment warrant, appellant’s without a went to loud music coming could hear him. the detectives Although no one to their apartment, responded from inside appellant’s on the door. Accordingly they knocks announcements or in search of apartment entered the forced the door open who appellant, search for appellant. course of their the detectives observed a premises, not to be on the proved view on bed.8 plain appellant’s pistol starter It lying contends sup- should have been appellant which gun of an unlawful search and seizure. pressed as the fruit that a officer is authorized “It is well established he has cause arrest without a warrant where believe been committed and that that a has felony States, v. United person Draper to be arrested is felon. 329, L.Ed.2d 327 307, 311, (1959); 358 3 Com U.S. 56, 66, 304, 190 A.2d 310 monwealth 411 Pa. Bosurgi, v. Jackson, 113, 117, 450 Pa. 299 (1963).” Commonwealth 213, States, 132, A.2d Carrоll v. United 267 (1973); U.S. 280, (1925); 69 L.Ed. 543 S.Ct. United States Watson, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 U.S. S.Ct.

Indeed, Rule of the Rules of Criminal 101(3) Pennsylvania empowers Procedure law enforcement officials specifically arrests where there is probable effectuate warrantless suspect cause believe the has committed a felony. See ALI, Pre-arraignment Procedure, also A Model Code *4 posed by appeal, however, 120.1 The question § is under the enter police what circumstances private premises to warrantless arrest of a felon. suspected make a 7. The following day, appellant apartment outside the victim’s stood reported had the incident. door and threatened her because she 10, 1976, April eventually apprehended Appellant when a 8. on was complainant’s appel- responding that uniformed alert officer— building attempted lant was in he to climb out the him as —arrested of a second floor window. 542 cause, to probable

More whether addition specifically, exigent with circumstanc- must confronted the also be police a home to effect a suspect’s es can enter they before warrantless arrest? Watson, 411, 423 U.S. 96 46 v. S.Ct. United States Santana, 427 U.S. (1976) 598 and United States

L.Ed.2d 300 Court (1976) Supreme L.Ed.2d the S.Ct. does the the Amendment not bar concluded Fourth in a public place arrest from a warrantless making Court, hоwever, spe- cause. provided probable there is The on of whether and judgment question reserved cifically suspect’s enter a police may what circumstances under to effect warrantless arrest. States a dwelling 418, n. 6, 96 S.Ct. Neverthe- Watson, at supra, U.S. less, issues, between a brief similarity in view of the order. review of Watson and Santana A of the Watson stated that the tradi- Court plurality involving the legality tional in cases warrantless inquiry was a there warrant or arrests has been “not whether one, but whether there get whether there time 417, 96 at 824. cause for the arrest.” Id. at S.Ct. probable Term, while further last “[j]ust Court observed ‍​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‍protection rights individual that maximum rеcognizing a review of by requiring magistrate’s could be assured arrest, we stated that ‘such any factual justification prior for intolerable handicap an would constitute requirement ‘has and noted that Court legitimate law enforcement’ cause supported by probable never invalidated an arrest ” failed Id. to secure warrant.’ solely because the officers Pugh, Gerstein v. 417-418, (quoting at 825 854, 43 Mr. (1975)). L.Ed.2d 54 103, 113, 95 U.S. S.Ct. White, then reviewed writing plurality, Justice arrest doctrine and noted felony of the origins historical both common law and of state statutes majority arrests felony probable on cause. permit solely warrantless wrote: Justice White further law in generally “The balance the common struck cause, without on but arrests authorizing felony *5 warrant, a has survived It appears intact. substantially express statutory in the form of almost all of the States 1963, the American Law Institute un- authorization. In a formulating governing dertook of model statute the task practice criminal law enforcement police powers procedure. aspects pretrial related after Code of discussion, Pre-arraignment A Model years its Among provisions Procedure proposed. a person officer take into an 120.1 which authorizes

§ to believe that if cause the officer has reasonable custody has сommitted a or has felony, arrested person to be or misdemeanor in his petty committed a misdemeanor The to this section ‘The presence.11 commentary said: almost universal adopts Code thus traditional a warrant.’12 without standard for arrest provides, pertinent part: Section 120.1 of the Model Code ‘(1) Authority to Arrest Without a Warrant. A law enforcement person officer reasonable cause to believe that such arrest a without a warrant if has the officer person has committed (a) felony; a (b) misdemeanor, a has reasonable cause to believe and the officer person

that such (i) arrested; apprehended immediately will not be unless or (ii) may injury damage property cause to himself or others or arrested; immediately unless or presence.’ (c) petty in the officer’s a misdemeanor or misdemeanor 12Id., (footnote omitted). commentary say goes at 289 on to respect with 120.1: § require This Section does not officer an to arrest under a warrant opportunity if even a reasonable obtain a warrant exists. As to entirely requirement arrests would be novel. on the street such a urgent, subsequent inquiry and the Moreover the need for isit requirement such a would authorize would be indeterminate and Id., (footnotes omitted). difficult. at 303 commеntary notes, id., As the statute in the State of at 289 n. Georgia general is more power restrictive of the arrest than 27-207(a) standard. (Supp,1975). Ga.Code Ann. See § also Colo. (1973), provides Rev.Stat.Ann. 16-3-102 § which that an arrest practicable,’ warrant should be obtained ‘when and Mont.Rev.Codes 95-608(d) (1969) Ann. § which authorizes a warrantless arrest if ‘existing require’ statute, circumstances it. A North Carolina N.C. (1965), statute, Georgia Gen.Stat. 15-41 § similar to the was re- placed by provision felony permitting in 1975 arrests warrantless 15A-401(b)(2) (1975).” on cause. N.C.Gen.Stat. § 421-22, 423 U.S. at Watson, supra, States v. Court in Watson then held A

at 827. majority *6 cause, in a be arrested person may provided there is probable first a failure to obtain warrant. thе notwithstanding public to Watson was confined sure, To be in holding the Court’s address the explicitly and did not warrantless arrests public Nonetheless, it would appear here reviewed. question in is Watson employed equally the and rationale analysis instant case the same conclu- compels applicable Marshall, who dissented vigorously Indeed, sion. Mr. Justice Watson, observe: in was constrained the answers question but raised in “First the all opinion 480-481, 91 [443], 403 U.S. at Coolidge v. New Hampshire, namely, at L.Ed.2d . . [2022], S. Ct. 2045 . 564] [29 circumstances an officer ‘whether and under what a to make warrantless arrest.’ enter a home suspect’s . Brothers Admittedly, my . . Pugh, Gerstein v. . opinion do not reаd the POWELL STEWART indeed, leave the Court purports resolve issue and the at 825. But Ante, it at n. S.Ct. open, 418 [96 820] here—reliance on the common of utilized mode analysis provides ready law and federal and state statutes — its extended discus answer, by hints as indeed the Court Pre-arraignment of sion of 120.6of the ALI Model Code § Ante, at commentary. 418 n. its relevant Procedure . of approach . . Unless the S.Ct. [96 820] it fundamentally rejected, will be opinion is be difficult, any to follow these sources to impossible, if not to effect a warrantless entry one conclusion—that but arrest permissible.” 453-54, (Mar- 842 Watson, supra,

United States shall, J., dissenting). Santana, had proba-

In United supra, policе States v. defendant, in standing who ble cause to believe possession her narcotics. dwelling, doorway themselves, and identified When the approached police her she into vestibule of residence where defendant fled a warrant. the warrant- approving was arrested without Court, writing with Mr. Justice Rehnquist, less arrest court, “that a suspect may concluded defeat an in public in motion place, arrest which has been set and is under Watson expedient of escaping therefore proper Santana, United States to a private place.” supra, Thus the permitted U.S. at at 2410. Court S.Ct. effecting to enter for the police private premises purpose attempt a warrantless arrest since the to arrest was begun in a area. supposed public White, Justice who authored the

Additionally, plurality Santana, Watson, opinion concurring opinion filed a 2406, in 43-44, expressed S.Ct. which he the view supra at cause to arrest and to that since the had residence, they believe that was in her could enter Santana arrest provided to effect a warrantless force premises *7 was not to their “This has necessary accomplish entry. been rule in judicial or longstanding statutory of majority ALI, States, see A Model of jurisdictions in the Code United 306-314, (1975), Procedure 696-697 and hаs Pre-arraignment constitutions, been deemed consistent with state as well as the Fourth It is also the Institute’s recom- Amendment. Santana, Id. 120.6.” States mended rule. supra § (White, J., at The ALI concurring). S.Ct. at rule appear provide which Justice White to would to refers the tension that necessarily accommodation adequate right and the privacy exists between the individual’s promoting effective law en- Commonwealth’s interest Code, forcement 120.6 the Model procedures. Section 19-20, addresses the issue at bar and supra, specifically states: Arrest: Private Place of Premises

“Section 120.6 (1) Demand to Enter onto Private Premises to Entry Make an Arrest. lаw enforcement If a officer has reason- able cause to believe that a whom he is authorized person to arrest is on he present any premises, may, upon private officer, an demand he be himself as such identifying admitted to for the purpose making such premises complied with, arrest. If not promptly such demand is make the enter premises such thereupon officer subject necessary, reasonably as is force arrest, such using the use of regarding 120.7 of Section provisions force. deadly The demand to be Demand.

(2) Without Prior Entry made, (1), need be if required admitted Subsection to believe that a person cause officer reasonable has or misde- felony arrest for a whom he is authorized if and that such premises, on such meanor is present made, were demand or escape; would

(a) the to be arrested person effecting to harm subject be the officer ‍​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‍would (b) arrest; or harmed, destroyed, or evidence would be

(c) any person or lost. damaged or property No law Night. Arrests at (3) Restrictions on Special any private prem- to enter seek enforcement officer shall between 10 m. and a. p. an arrest ises in order to make m. unless warrant arrest and the

(a) he is under a acting hours, during execution such or warrant authorizеs its that such action is cause to believe (b) he has reasonable necessary prevent of a for a crime

(i) escape person to be arrested harm or the threat bodily danger or serious involving thereof, or evidence, destruction of or

(ii) harm to any person, *8 property.” to or loss of damage only common law rule 120.6 the traditional Section modifies limitations on nocturnal special of imposing to the extent view, on these limitations arrests in In our the home. requirement with nighttime coupled arrests circumstances, first announce their police, exigent absent a com- provides demand admittance and identity, purpose, in protecting interest society’s mendable balance between right to freedom from unreasonable itself and the citizen’s require “To further and go intrusions. governmental the police may before showing necessity warrant or a

547 make a property daytime on even felony private arrest Moreover, from apart seems restrictive. unduly special- alarming nighttime entries and from ly quality apart considerations, search is far from it clear that an arrest one’s threatening home is so much more or than humiliating a street further arrest restrictions on the justify police.” ALI, Procedure, 120.6, A Model of Pre-arraignment Code § (1975). at 307 supra, Commentary Indеed, were we free to do so this Court would 120.6 of the judicially adopt Section Model Code it apply choice, however, the instant case. That is no longer ours.9 While the appeal instant pending Supreme Court of Pennsylvania down its decision in Commonwealth v. handed Williams, 293, 483 Pa. In Williams 396 A.2d 1177 court, drawing several upon decisions10 in the Federal courts, concluded that “an arrest warrant is required to arrest validly someone in his home unless exigent circum stances exist to the warrantless intrusion.” 483 Pa. justify 297, 396 A.2d at 1179. In reaching this conclusion the States, Dorman v. Court, United quoting from 140 supra, 320-21, 392-93, 435 F.2d at U.S.App.D.C. at held that decision were exigent whether there circumstances involved consideration of the factors: following

“First, involved, that a offense is grave one particularly is a e. Warden v. See, crime of violence. Hayden g., 294, 1642, U.S. 87 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)]; Mc S.Ct. [387 Donald v. States, United 451, 459, U.S. 69 191, 335 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (concurring opinion Jackson). Justice Parenthetically, 13, 1978, we observe that on December the Su preme probable jurisdiction Court of the United States noted in the People Payton People York, - U.S. -, cases of v. New Riddick, Payton S.Ct. 58 L.Ed.2d -. 45 N.Y.2d (1978), Appeals N.Y.S.2d 380 N.E.2d 224 the Court of of New York held that cause alone was sufficient to validate private premises. warrantless arrest on The Federal courts in New York, however, contrary have reached a result. See United States v. Reed, (2d 1978). 572 F.2d 412 Cir. Reed, 10. See United (2d 1978); States v. 572 F.2d 412 Cir. Shye, States v. (6th 1974); 492 F.2d 886 Cir. Dorman v. United States, U.S.App.D.C. 313, (1970); 435 F.2d 385 Vance v. North Carolina, (4th 1970). F.2d 984 Cir. *9 a warrant is the restrictive requirement Contrariwise retained, and the need for proceeding more to be likely when the offense is lacking, found without a warrant referred as one of the ‘com- what has been sometimes to. crimes, placent’ like gambling. inter-related,

“Second, süspect and obviously in arrest of an Delay armed. to be believed reasonably the community danger armed felon well increase ‍​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‍may This at time of arrest. meanwhile, or to the officers for a materially justification on the consideration bears warrantless entry.

“Third, there exists minimum merely has warrant cause, even when a requisite that is probable a clear issued, showing been but beyond information,’ to cause, ‘reasonably trustworthy including the crime committed involved. believe that the suspect that the suspect is in the “Fourth, reason to believe strong entered. premises being if not suspect escape will

“Fifth, a likelihood that apprehended. swiftly not con-

“Sixth, entry, though the circumstances that the Forcible in some entry may sented, is peaceably. made But fact that the entry be justified. instances atti- showing reasonableness not forcible aids their mis- police, identifying tude and conduct. to surrender himself sion, an give opportunity the person avoid the invasion of thus without a struggle home. into the entry involved privacy account, it wоrks though “Another factor to be taken into to time of direction, entry— relates in more than one hand, as we shall the one On at night. whether it is made underscore may (and hour the delay the late develop, later of) warrant, obtaining perhaps impracticability without one. On justify proceeding hence serve to raises night an is made at hand, entry other the fact reasonableness, indicated in its as concern over particular v. United States in Jones opinion Justice Harlan’s [357 (1958)], L.Ed.2d 1253, 2 U.S. *10 the degree elevate cause both as required, the and as that he is in the implicating suspect, showing omitted.)” place (Footnotes entered. Williams,

Commonwealth 297, v. 483 Pa. at 396 suрra, A.2d at 1179. In these criteria to the applying case at bar we find that were exigent and, therefore, circumstances present in police did not act unlawfully entering appellant’s apart- ment without a warrant.

First, it cannot be that gainsaid appellant charged was Second, with a serious offense. particularly offense was at two gunpoint only committed hours prior attempt- ed arrest and thus the police had reason good to believe Cf., Williams, suspect still armed. Commonwealth v. Third, supra. given victim’s prompt report descrip- tion of the incident to the police, there was unquestionably probable cause to appellant believe that was the felon. Fourth, in view of the emanating loud music from appel- lant’s the offense apartment and the fact that had allegedly occurred in the same apartment earlier, two hours there was suspect reason to is in “strong believe the premises entered.” Dorman v. being States, 140 U.S. supra, 320, Fifth, App.D.C. at 435 F.2d at 392. there existed “a likelihood escape that if not suspect swiftly [would] Dorman, Id. In apprehended.” which involved a nighttime offense, warrantless arrest four hours after the the court stated, was at least a to a possibility opposed [as “[t]here . delay might permit escape . .” Id. likelihood] 140 F.2d at 393. Thе court 435 further U.S.App.D.C. observed: with dealing “The were still police relatively crime, recent arrest locate might and recover prompt fruits of the instrumentalities and crime before other- wise are disposed of.” Id. We of the that these opinion same considerations are to the case at bar equally germane as Williams, contrasted to the situation in Commonwealth v. supra, where the warrantless arrest was effected almost three date of years Sixth, after the the crime. we find that police were justified forcibly entering appellant’s apartment after identified having themselves and not re-

550 for admission. Al- any

ceived to their demаnd response the officers failed ex- discloses though record we believe prior entry, their purpose announce pressly of any the absence re- justifiable given this omission and declarations of identity. to their knocks sponse repeated Marshall, People Cal.Rptr. v. Cal.2d See in mid-af- place the intrusion took (1968). Lastly, P.2d ternoon. circumstances, as exigent we defined

Thus conclude States, supra, applied in Common- Dorman United Williams, present were in the case at bar supra, wealth attempt and it was therefore proper Ac- apartment without a warrant. his appellant arrest *11 view on pistol plain whiсh in the starter’s cordingly, and admitted subject properly to seizure appellant’s bed into evidence. affirmed. of sentence

Judgments SPAETH, opinion. J., dissenting files and WATKINS, Judges, former President JACOBS and the ation or HOFFMAN, in consider J., participate did of decision this case.

SPAETH, dissenting: Judge, new I reverse and remand for a trial. believe we should -1- A.2d 1177 Williams, Pa. In Commonwealth the adopted reasoning the and (1978), Court cited Supreme District of the of Appeal of decisions the Courts Fourth, Circuits, which Columbia, Second, Sixth Amendment the that Fourth held because the home, an ‍​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‍one’s arrest of privacy substantial expectation in his home arrest someone validly warrant is required wаrrant- exist to justify exigent unless circumstances at 1179. 297, 396 A.2d Pa. less intrusion. 483 decide, therefore, we must is first whether in question were shown to case circumstances” present “exigent exist.1 question answering

I with the agree majority in Williams con- Supreme we should Court consider—as Dorman v. sidered—the six factors enumerated in United States, 435 F.2d 385 See also 140 U.S.App.D.C. Reed, 1978). (2d My 572 F.2d 412 Cir. States I consider is that when disagreement majority with circumstances were factors, exigent those I conclude not shown to exist. (1) wheth-

The six factors be summarized as follows: may involved; is (2) suspect er whether the grave offense armed; clear, (3) be whether there is believed to reasonably minimum, just sufficient, or or merely and not strong, suspect believe committed the cause to offense; (4) there is reason to believe that strong whether entered; (5) is in the whether suspect premises being will if not suspect escape there is a likelihood that of the (6) entry. circumstances apprehended; swiftly point to bear considering important these factors to count to see how simply mind is that it is not enough exist, example, that if say, them and then many exist, found, four be but if may only circumstances exigent exist, two not be found. In- circumstances exigent *12 fifth stead, that the factor—the it must be borne in mind others, the or to the say likelihood of escape—dominates words, same in that the thing appropriate weight different according various factors will assigned vary be fifth factor. the weight assigned beyond deciding question, goes majority’s The discussion Watson, First, interprets respects. majority two United States v. 820, (1976), holding 423 U.S. that a S.Ct. 46 L.Ed.2d 598 as may only probable warrantless arrest in one’s home on be made cause; second, majority says recommended and rule Pre-arraignment the American Proce- Law Institute Model Code of rule, adopted, dure the arrest here was should be under that that Williams, proper. supra, Given the decision in Commonwealth only regarded this discussion can be as dictum. in which one by supposing This be seen two cases: may one in which great weight, is entitled to the fifth factor very strong a weight. Suppose little very it is entitled to ap- if not escape swiftly will suspect likelihood that even Then, may circumstances exist prehended. exigent exist, factors or even if other none a few of the though only is wanted for suspect if the example, of them exists. For armed, still, big gambler if he is a is not gambling, and —a to escape is about obviously crime —and kingpin organized be may in his home warrantless arrest to another a country, weak likelihood that very Now justified. suppose Then, it is apprehended. if not swiftly escape will suspect will exist. To be unlikely exigent most that circumstances will they whеre exist —for sure, imagined a case be may himself in has barricaded who a sniper the case of example, Usually, a case, however, will be unusual. a tower.2 Such determined exist be circumstances exigent whether that anything suggest there “Is asking, simply by is, “No,” If the answer escape?” intends immediate suspect well, warrant, if be, “Very get should then the response Supreme his home.” This is how the intend to enter you Williams, supra, as it Commonwealth proceeded Court I have describ- the several factors considered how to balance in favor of a weighed noted that five factors ed. Court effect) but in (not my words then arrest, warrantless but that anything suggest was asked itself whether there no there was escape. Since intended immediate suspect armed, since, suspect evidence that “[e]ven the date of pre-dated homicide the instant more importantly, 300, 396 483 Pa. at three years,” arrest by approximately Ac- escape. immediate suggest did nothing A.2d at little need of found the Court “[t]here cordingly, id., resulting with the conclusion swift apprehension,” exist, and that did circumstances exigent id. warrant, an arrest have obtained should therefore to believe cause have 2. “When law enforcement officers suspect presence and that the taking place an offense is in their evidence, exigent possession circumstanc at that moment in of the 411, 435, Watson, 423 U.S. es exist.” United States v. 833, J., dissenting.) (1976) (MARSHALL, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 *13 course, unless one Of will not be undertaken analysis home, to the which the I majority, sanctity attaches a special submit, do, does not as be seen from its extended may my adhere opinion, resolutely dictum.3 we should law, in our that the home is a tradition, so embedded deeply invaded in special by police except not to be place, Coolidge circumstances. v. New most limited stringently 443, 474, 484, 403 U.S. S.Ct. 29 L.Ed.2d Hampshire, Reed, supra; 564 (1971); United States Commonwealth v. Williams, Watson, And see States supra. U.S. 444-453, 820, 46 L.Ed.2d (1976) (MAR SHALL, J., dissenting).

If one applies considering present these prinсiples case, one will that entry conclude the warrantless readily was improper, into that accord- appellant’s apartment there, seized, saw ingly, the evidence the should police Nothing suggested have that appellant been suppressed. To escape. intended had contrary, immediate been that appellant told by complainant employed as his apartment building which superintendent The indication was that if the apartment plain was located. warrant, police obtained a would have they difficulty no finding arresting appellant. information supplied by ample the complainant of a basis for the issuance warrant, and as it was during day, obtain a warrant would not have much time.4 required 1, supra. 3. See footnote recognize I majority says that the that “there existed ‘a likelihood ” suspect swiftly apprehended.’ escape that if Ma- [would] jority however, slip opinion majority, any at 712. The fails to offer support statement, majority suggests for this believes which grave that the fact that a offense has been committed itself can support finding escape. there is a likelihood of If this is the belief, majority’s “possibility.” it confuses “likelihood” with No every possible doubt felon knows he It is be arrested. therefore try likely escape. hе he will It does not follow that it is indeed, try escape many will no we make know that felons —and homes, escape, effort but return to their and remain in their neighborhoods, police arrest until the them. *14 -2- starter should have pistol I have concluded

Since admission whether its I must consider been suppressed, lower In this regard, trial. a new evidence requires have been should pistol the starter that court also concluded conclude, however, that its admis- went it on suppressed; error. harmless sion in evidence was April as follows. On testified At the trial the complainant building stairs in her apartment 1, 1976, way up on her told She superintendent. building she saw appellant, sink, her bathroom with him problem she a having did, to fix it. Appellant apartment him to come to her asked her. sink, made advances toward looking but after these, gun a appellant produced rejected When she in the base- apartment him to his accompany forced her to sodomy, her at There, gun point perform ment. he forced went back to her to leave. She and then allowed her the inci- reported went outside and up, cleaned apartment, came to her door next day appellant dent to the The police. and threatened her. the use of was impeached complainant’s testimony day On the police.

her inconsistent statements prior to Detective Frank statement incident, gave of the she when she entered the she said: in which Margerum whom she assumed to appellant, saw she apartment building obtain a new him if he could she asked be the janitor; hers off box, ripped as someone had her mail plate name apart- come down to his should box; she her that he said did, that she plate; her a new name would get ment and he her, on her, held a gun grabbed and there appellant other There were various sodomy. commit forced her to and her complainant’s testimony inconsistencies between and also between her Margerum, statement to Deteсtive 10, on gave police April she testimony and statement occurred on 1 or April the incident whether including 5, 1976. April sowas testimony the complainant’s

Appellant argues trial statements that the her inconsistent impaired by prior of law her. as a matter should have disbelieved So judge concerned, however, the is not wheth- question far as we are disbelieved the complainant, should have judge er the trial her, whether, having believed we should judge say but answering question, we must he was bear wrong. judge of fact is the sole the credibility mind that the trier witness; will therefore not be dis- finding of a the trier’s on evidence so unreliable or contra- turbed unless it is based but say that we can it is the result not reason dictory 467 Pa. Farquharson, conjecture. Commonwealth 457 Pa. Smith, A.2d 545 Commonwealth (1976); A.2d 60 Here the trial “the essen- judge found that *15 tial testified point complainant credibily [sic] [is] offense, court as to the whatever date and differ- any to be material.” Lower ence as to date not here shown was acknowledge given court’s complain- at 4. I opinion ant’s two different versions of how the incident considerably began, judge’s problem restriction the inconsistency troubling. Nevertheless, one of is somewhat it merely dates is clear that as to the essential elements of the offenses threats, force or charged use of the sexual assaults —the found ‍​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​​‍the credible. I judge complainant themselves—the cannot were so say prior that her inconsistent statements related these elements as to reduce closely essential However, judge’s finding conjecture. to a matter prior do show that the admission inconsistent statements was not harmless evidence of the starter error. The pistol case, crucial and the complainant’s credibility The assistant district rec- pistol attorney corroborated her. this, to the trial ognized for in his he summary judge argued: would up

If she make as the story, complainant] [the is, Defense we are left with attorney alleges, question how would she ever learn about the unless the gun gun used on her? actually N.T. at 102.

Thus the as evidence regarded pistol Commonwealth complainant’s that was to bolster the essential credibility, state- her inconsistent prior been by as she had impeached harmless, beyond must be harmless Error, to be ments. 391, 383 Story, 476 Pa. Commonwealth reasonable doubt. here.5 cannot be said That A.2d 155 reversed, and a new be should of sentence judgment trial ordered. A.2d 716 Pennsylvania

COMMONWEALTH BOUIE, Appellant. Herbert A. Pennsylvania. Superior Court of 20, 1978. March Submitted Decided March *16 unnecessary the chain whether to decide 5. This conclusion makes it insufficient, judge custody pistol the trial and whether n allowing amend the information at erred in the Commonwealth April rather than on time of trial to read that the offense occurred April

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Fladger
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Mar 2, 1979
Citation: 398 A.2d 707
Docket Number: 745
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
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