24-P-0229
Mass. App. Ct.
Oct 11, 2024
Opinion Summary

Facts

  1. James Nowlin was involved in a fatal car crash on September 2, 2021, which resulted in the death of Melba Yvonne Rose [lines="27-38"].
  2. Nowlin displayed signs of intoxication at the scene, with witnesses noting the smell of alcohol and his bloodshot eyes [lines="49-53"].
  3. Following the accident, Nowlin was treated at Ochsner LSU Hospital, where blood and urine samples were taken but labeled under the alias “Unknown Potomac 15” [lines="45-46"], [lines="90"].
  4. The Arkansas State Police obtained a search warrant to access Nowlin’s medical records, incorrectly citing Louisiana statutes rather than Arkansas laws [lines="56-60"], [lines="108-110"].
  5. Nowlin was convicted of negligent homicide while intoxicated and driving while intoxicated, resulting in an eighteen-year sentence and a one-thousand-dollar fine [lines="177-180"].

Issues

  1. Was the search warrant used to obtain Nowlin's blood sample valid despite citing Louisiana law instead of Arkansas law? [lines="107-109"].
  2. Did the circuit court err by admitting the blood-alcohol-test results as evidence given the alleged improper chain of custody? [lines="381-383"].

Holdings

  1. The court upheld the validity of the search warrant, ruling that the minor error regarding the Louisiana statute did not invalidate it and that there was sufficient probable cause based on the affidavit [lines="320-372"].
  2. The court affirmed the admissibility of the blood-alcohol test results, concluding that Nowlin did not preserve his chain-of-custody argument for appeal and suffered no prejudice from the evidence [lines="440-466"].

OPINION

COMMONWEALTH vs. CORY M. RUFO

24-P-229

APPEALS COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

October 11, 2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel‘s decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See .

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant, Cory M. Rufo, was convicted of improper storage of a firearm.1 On appeal, he contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that the firearm was unsecured as required under G. L. c. 140, § 131L. Where the Commonwealth concedes that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of improper storage of a firearm, and where nothing in the record before us otherwise contradicts the defendant‘s claim and the Commonwealth‘s concession, we agree.

We apply the familiar Latimore test to determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [Commonwealth], any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis and citation omitted). . “If, from the evidence, conflicting inferences are possible, it is for the [fact finder] to determine where the truth lies, for the weight and credibility of the evidence is wholly within their province.” , S.C., and . See (evidence need not require jury to draw inference; sufficient that evidence permits inference to be drawn).

A conviction of improper storage of a firearm requires proof that (1) the item in question was a firearm; (2) the defendant knowingly kept or stored that firearm; and (3) the firearm was unsecured. Instruction 7.630 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (2021). The present case centers on the third element. “A firearm is properly secured when it is either stored in a locked container or when it has an engaged tamper-resistant mechanical lock or other safety device.” Id. See G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a), as amended by St. 2018, c. 123, § 14.2

Here, the Commonwealth concedes that “even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence did not meet the Latimore standard.” “Notwithstanding [that] concession of error, we have an independent obligation to review the matter and satisfy ourselves that an error occurred.” . At trial, the evidence showed, in essence, that the defendant‘s firearm was on a table in the kitchen; the defendant‘s son and the defendant‘s girlfriend saw the firearm on the table; and the defendant‘s girlfriend took a photograph of the firearm. The photograph, admitted in evidence, depicted the firearm inside a nylon holster. It is undisputed that the holster covered the bulk of the firearm, including the trigger, from view, and that the Commonwealth introduced no further evidence whether a tamper-resistant lock or other safety device was on the firearm and engaged at that time. The remaining record before us sheds no further light on the issue whether the firearm was “secured” within the meaning of G. L. c. 140, § 131L.

Judgment reversed.

Verdict set aside.

Judgment for defendant.

By the Court (Vuono, Neyman & D‘Angelo, JJ.3),

Paul Little

Clerk

Entered: October 11, 2024.

Notes

1
The defendant was also charged with assault and battery on a family or household member (assault), stalking, intimidation of a witness, reckless endangerment of a child, and animal cruelty. At trial, the judge allowed the defendant‘s motion for a required finding of not guilty of the stalking and intimidation of a witness counts, and the jury found the defendant not guilty of reckless endangerment of a child and animal cruelty. The jury convicted the defendant of assault and improper storage of a firearm. However, following trial, the defendant filed a motion for new trial challenging the convictions. The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, allowed the motion on the assault count, and denied the motion on the improper storage of a firearm count. The assault count was later dismissed for “lack of prosecution.”
2
It does not change our analysis that the statute was amended after we took the case under consideration, because the relevant language remained the same. See G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a), as amended by St. 2024, c. 135, §§ 67-70.
3
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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