On April 5, 1989, an Essex County grand jury indicted the defendant, Alfred D. Bakoian, on a charge of possession of heroin with intent to distribute. At a pretrial hearing, the defendant moved to suppress the heroin, asserting that the warrantless search of the vehicle in which he was a passenger and the consequent seizure of the heroin were illegal for lack of probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying the search. The motion judge ruled that the police had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband, but he concluded that no exigent circumstances existed which disposed of the requirement of obtaining a warrant prior to conducting the search. The judge entered an order suppressing the heroin. The Commonwealth applied to a single justice of this court, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (b) (2),
We set forth the facts of this case as found by the motion judge. On February 9, 1989, at approximately 3 p.m., a confidential informant telephoned Detective Kenneth Avery of the Lynn police department and told him that Alfred Bakoian, the defendant, and an individual named John Walsh were en route from Rhode Island to Lynn with a shipment of heroin. The informant stated that these individuals were traveling in a black Thunderbird automobile with a beige roof, bearing Massachusetts registration number 420TCZ. The confidential informant further informed Detective Avery that the defendant and Walsh soon would arrive at the defendant’s apartment. Detective Avery had previously arrested the defendant at Logan Airport for a heroin offense and thus knew his address to be 20 Surfside Road in Lynn.
*297 Detective Avery thereafter communicated with other Lynn police officers and directed them to set up a surveillance at the defendant’s residence. For his part, Avery parked on the General Edwards Bridge in Lynn and waited for the passing of the automobile. At approximately 4 p.m., Avery saw an automobile fitting the description he received from the confidential informant. He recognized the driver and passenger of that automobile as John Walsh and the defendant, respectively. Avery radioed the surveillance officers and told them of his observation. Avery then drove to the defendant’s apartment.
The surveillance officers detained the defendant and John Walsh in the rear parking lot of the defendant’s apartment building. Moments later, Avery arrived and noticed that the hood of the automobile was “ajar.” Avery searched under the hood and retrieved a quantity of heroin from underneath the air filter.
1.
Probable cause.
The motion judge found that the Lynn police had probable cause to search the subject vehicle, based on the precise information provided to them by the confidential informant and the independent police corroboration of the details of that information.
Commonwealth
v.
Robinson,
In order successfully to establish probable cause to search the vehicle on the basis of information supplied by a confidential informant, the Commonwealth had to “demonstrate some of the underlying circumstances from which (a) the informant gleaned his information (the ‘basis of knowledge’ test), and (b) the law enforcement officials could have concluded the informant was credible or reliable (the ‘veracity’ test).” Cast, supra at 896, citing Robinson, supra at 164-165. Deficiencies in the proof required under either or both prongs of the test may be compensated for by police corroboration of an informant’s detailed tip. Cast, supra.
In support of its claim that the Lynn police had probable cause to search the vehicle, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective Avery, which described the informant’s past reliability and the independent police corroboration of the details of the informant’s tip in the instant matter. The Commonwealth did not present direct testimony as to the confidential informant’s basis of knowledge, stating that such testimony would reveal the informant’s identity, which the government is privileged to withhold.
1
See
Commonwealth
v.
Amral,
The defendant argues that the information supplied by the confidential informant did not provide the police with probable cause to search the vehicle.
2
Specifically, the defendant
*299
contends that the Commonwealth’s failure to introduce evidence of the informant’s basis of knowledge precluded a finding of probable cause.
3
See
Commonwealth
v.
Upton,
In Lyons, we considered whether police justifiably conducted an investigatory stop of a vehicle traveling on a public way on the basis of a tip received from an anonymous informant. The unidentified caller in Lyons reported that two white males, one of whom was named Wayne, were in route from Chelsea, Massachusetts, to Bridgton, Maine, in a silver Hyundai automobile with Maine registration number 44044T, transporting a quantity of narcotics. Lyons, supra at 17. In evaluating “the tip’s indicia of reliability [the court] focused on the informant’s reliability and his or her basis of knowledge.” Id. at 19. The court noted that “police corroboration [of the informant’s tips] may make up for deficiencies in one or both of these factors.” Id.
*300
The court concluded in
Lyons
that the tip failed to provide any information on which the informant’s reliability could sufficiently be established because “[t]he tip provided no information regarding either the basis of the informant’s knowledge or his reliability.”
Lyons, supra
at 20. The information provided by the informant, we observed, related solely to “obvious details” and did not suggest that the informant had “any special familiarity with the defendant’s affairs that might substitute for explicit information about the basis of the caller’s knowledge.”
Id.
at 20-21 & n.5. In this respect, the court distinguished the circumstances in
Lyons
from the situation presented in
Alabama
v.
White,
In our view, the tip in the present case is distinguishable from the tip considered in
Lyons
and meets the standard for reliability set forth in that case. As an initial matter, we deal in this case with an informant who revealed his or her identity at the time he or she provided the tip to the police. Detective Avery testified that he knew this person previously had provided reliable information to the Lynn police. We do not here confront, therefore, as we did in
Lyons,
a situation involving an anonymous informant and the concern that “[a]nyone can telephone the police for any reason.”
Lyons, supra
at 21. The identification of the instant informant to the police strengthened his or her credibility and “carne [d] with it indicia of reliability of the informant.”
Commonwealth
v.
Atchue,
Our inquiry does not end here, however, since we must further decide whether the informant’s tip supplied the police with probable cause to search the vehicle and seize the contraband located therein. To this end we consider whether'the tip provided the police in this case with sufficient information “to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing” that the vehicle contained heroin.
Commonwealth
v.
Gullick,
As we stated in
Commonwealth
v.
Cast,
2.
Exigent circumstances.
In support of his motion to suppress, the defendant argued that, even assuming the exis
*303
tence of probable cause to search the vehicle, the Commonwealth failed to present evidence of exigent circumstances justifying the failure of the police to obtain a warrant prior to searching the vehicle. The Commonwealth responded that the search and seizure were permissible pursuant to the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement.
Commonwealth
v.
Ortiz,
The motion judge suppressed the heroin, agreeing with the defendant that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of establishing exigent circumstances. The motion judge found that the Lynn police had ample time to seek and obtain a warrant at a nearby District Court, that the police could have guarded the vehicle during this time, that both suspects were in police custody, that no known associates lurked in the area, and that the vehicle was located safely on the defendant’s residential premises. In reaching this deci
*304
sion, the judge relied on
Coolidge
v.
New Hampshire,
The motion judge’s determination that Coolidge is controlling law in this case was clearly erroneous. Coolidge is simply not apposite.
Where the police have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, the feasibility of posting a police guard so that a warrant may be obtained before a search is conducted is not a heavily weighted factor militating against the finding of exigent circumstances.
Commonwealth
v.
A Juvenile (No. 2), supra
at 165, and cases cited. See
Commonwealth
v.
Ortiz,
. The opportunity to obtain a search warrant, moreover, will not render an otherwise valid search unconstitutional, unless the opportunity is “plain and ample.”
Commonwealth
v.
Bongarzone,
With respect to the scope of the warrantless search conducted by the police in this case, we observe that the Lynn police had probable cause to believe that the vehicle in this case contained contraband. The informant’s tip did not specify the packaging of the contraband or its precise whereabouts in the vehicle. The police therefore had probable cause to search the
entire vehicle
for the presence of narcotics.
Commonwealth
v.
Wunder,
We do not suggest that, under Massachusetts law, there is no requirement of exigent circumstances to justify an immediate, warrantless search of an automobile based on probable cause. Contrast
United States
v.
Johns,
*306
.3.
Informer privilege.
At the outset of the argument on the motion to suppress, the prosecutor invoked the government’s privilege to withhold the informant’s identity in this case and announced that the Commonwealth would not present any direct evidence of the informant’s basis of knowledge, since to do so would effectively disclose the informant’s identity.
Commonwealth
v.
Amral,
On cross-examination, the defendant attempted to elicit testimony from Detective Avery as to exactly what the informant stated about his or her basis of knowledge. The prosecutor objected to the questioning and requested that the defendant be prevented from inquiring into this area on the basis of the informer privilege.
The defendant did not challenge the Commonwealth’s right to invoke the privilege or attempt to prove the informant’s basis of knowledge by inference. The defendant argued, however, that the Commonwealth could not prevent the defendant from cross-examining the government witnesses as to what the informant told them about his basis of knowledge. Any limitation on his right to cross-examine the witnesses on this point, the defendant asserted, robbed him of his right to rebut the inference that the informant had a legitimate basis of knowledge and violated his right to confront the witness under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The motion judge disagreed with the defendant’s argument and precluded him from pursuing this line of questioning on cross-examination. The judge allowed the defendant, however, to explore fully the issue of the informant’s credibility and to cross-examine Detective Avery as to the facts the Commonwealth claimed supported an inference of the informant’s basis of knowledge. There is no error in the judge’s decision.
As the defendant concedes, the government was privileged not to disclose the identity of the informant in this case.
*307
Roviaro
v.
United States,
The defendant contends that the Commonwealth somehow benefited from invoking the privilege because the prosecutor was allowed to prove by inference a more reliable basis of knowledge than what may truly have existed. The defendant argues that the only effective means by which he could rebut the inference was to explore the actual basis of the informant’s knowledge. The defendant’s argument is without merit.
“In deciding whether a defendant’s constitutional right to cross-examine and thus confront a witness against him has been denied because of an unreasonable limitation of cross-examination, a court must weigh the materiality of the witness’s direct testimony and the degree of the restriction on cross-examination.”
Commonwealth
v.
Kirouac,
The Commonwealth’s proof of the informant’s basis of knowledge was only as strong as the inferences to be drawn from the facts recited by Detective Avery on direct examination. The defendant was afforded the opportunity to undermine those facts on cross-examination and thereby refute the validity of the inferences they purported to support. That the defendant did not succeed in doing so is not the result of having been foreclosed from probing facts not testified to on direct examination. The limitation on the scope of the cross-examination was in no way an “unreasonable limitation” of the defendant’s rights. Kirouac, supra. We hold, therefore, that the defendant’s right to confront the Commonwealth’s witness under art. 12 was not impeded in any material respect.
The order of suppression is vacated and an order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress is to enter.
So ordered.
Notes
See discussion of informer privilege, infra at 306-308.
The Commonwealth contends that the defendant is not entitled to raise this argument, since he failed to seek leave for review of the judge’s ruling on probable cause pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (b) (2),
At the hearing, the defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence to establish the veracity of the informant. (Detective Avery testified that the confidential informant previously had provided the Lynn police with information which led to the arrest of an individual and the seizure of heroin.) The defendant conceded at oral argument before this court, however, that the evidence allows for a finding of the informant’s veracity, in light of decisions rendered by this court subsequent to the time of the motion hearing. See
Commonwealth
v.
Perez-Baez,
In
Alabama
v.
White,
In
Lyons,
the informant did not provide the last name of the defendant or the name of the defendant’s companion. Moreover, the police officer could not verify the first name of the defendant until after he stopped the vehicle and requested the defendant’s driver’s license.
Commonwealth
v.
Lyons,