COMMONWEALTH оf Pennsylvania DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Secretary of Corrections John E. Wetzel SCI Pittsburgh Accounting Manager SCI Camp Hill Accounting Manager SCI Chester Accounting Manager SCI Benner Accounting Manager Erie County Court of Common Pleas Judge John Garhart Erie County Common Pleas Clerk of Record John Catalde, Respondents v. Amos TATE, Petitioner.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Filed Feb. 8, 2016.
Submitted on Briefs Aug. 14, 2015.
350
Jeffrey M. Paladina, Assistant Counsel, Mechanicsburg, for respondents.
BEFORE: DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge1, MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge2, and ANNE E. COVEY, Judge.
Amos Tate (Tate), pro se, filed an Amended Petition for Review (Amended Petition) in this Court‘s original jurisdiction, wherein he challenges deduсtions the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) made from his inmate account and seeks damages for emotional distress.3 The Department filed preliminary objections to dismiss Tate‘s Amended Petition pursuant to
This Court‘s review of preliminary objections is limited to the pleadings. Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police v. Dep‘t of Conservation & Natural Res., 909 A.2d 413 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), aff‘d, 592 Pa. 304, 924 A.2d 1203 (2007).
[This Court is] required to accept as true the well-pled averments set forth in the ... complaint, and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Moreover, the [C]ourt need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferеnces from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery, and, where any doubt exists as to whether the preliminary objections should be sustained, the doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections.
Id. at 415-16 (citations omitted).
Tate is incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution in Benner Township, Centre County, Pennsylvania (SCI-Benner). According to Tate‘s Amended Petition, on July 25, 2012, the Erie County Common Pleas Court (trial court) sentenced Tate to 9 to 24 months’ incarceration for simple assault under Docket No. 874 of 2011, and ordered him to pay court costs and fines totaling $636.15, plus $60.00 to the Crime Victim Compensation Fund (Crime Victim Fund). Amended Pet. at ii. On that same day, the trial court sentenced Tate to 12 to 24 months’ incarceration for simple assault under Docket No. 226 of 2012 and ordered him to pay costs and fines totaling $943.35, plus $60.00 to the Crime Victim Fund. Amended Pet. at ii.
Although Tate‘s Amended Petition does not specify exactly when, it appears that in early August 2012,4 the Department began
(3) The county clerk of courts shall, upon sentencing, ... transmit to ... the [Department] ... copies of all orders for restitution ..., reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties. This paragraph also applies in the case of costs imposed under [S]ection 9721(c.1) [of the Sentencing Code] (relating to sentenсing generally).6
...
(5) The ... [Department] shall be authorized to make monetary deductions from inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other court-ordered obligation or costs imposed under [S]ection 9721(c.1) [of the Sentencing Code]. Any amount deducted shall be transmitted by the [Department] ... to the probation department of the county or other agent designated by the county ... in which the offender was convicted. The [Department] shall dеvelop guidelines relating to its responsibilities under this paragraph.
Collection of Restitution, Reparation, Fees, Costs, Fines and Penalties 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728, Act 84 of 1998 (Act 84)
1. When the County Clerk of Courts provides a copy(s) of an order(s) for restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines, and/or penalties associated with the criminal proceedings, the records office shall file the original and shall forward a copy of the order to the business office of the facility having custody of the inmate. The court order, the DC-300B, Court Commitment Form, or supporting information, must indicate the status of the debt including the current balance due and any special conditions, which would [a]ffect payments.
2. The business office, through inmate account deductions, makes:
a. payments of 20% of the inmate‘s aсcount balance and monthly income for restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines, and/or penalties associated with the criminal proceedings pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S. § 9728 , Act 84 of 1998,provided that the inmate has a balance that exceeds $10.00; and b. payments of 10% of all the inmate‘s account balance and monthly income, for the Crime Victim‘s Compensation and Victim/Witness Services Funds, provided that the inmate has a balance that exceeds $10.00.
3. The business office shall send the funds deducted to the county probation department or other designated agency.
(Bolded in original); see Amended Pet. at 11.
Tate initially sought relief from the deductions and for return of monies from his inmate account through the Department‘s inmate grievance system.7 On August 17, 2012, he filed Grievance No. 430224 regarding the allegedly improper Act 84 deductions, and appears to have completed the grievance review process. See Amended Pet. at ii-iii, 3-4.
Although not the model of clarity,8 we can glean from the Amended Petition that Tate alleges that his due process rights were violated because: (1) the trial court did not afford him the opportunity to object to the costs, fines and Crime Victim Fund assessments (see Amended Pet. at 1-2, 8-10); (2) the Crime Victim Fund deductions were not statutorily authorized (see Amended Pet. at 2); (3) he was deprived of a pre-deduction hearing (see Amended Pet. at 3-4, 11-12); and, (4) deductions were made from earned income and gifts (see Amended Pet. at 2, 5-6, 13). Tate requests this Court to order the Department to discontinue the deductions and reimburse him those funds that wеre illegally deducted. See Amended Pet. at iii, 17-18. He also seeks $200,000.00 in damages for emotional distress, headaches and resultant outbursts he contends are related to the deductions. See Amended Pet. at 6-7, 16.
Tate first appears to claim that his due process rights were violated because the trial court ordered the payment of costs, fines and the Crime Victim Fund assessment in absentia and he was not afforded the opportunity to object thereto. We disagree.
It is unclear if Tate is allеging that he was not present during sentencing, or that he was present, but was not advised by the trial court that it was ordering him to pay costs, fines and restitution, so that he could contest the trial court‘s action at that time. A plaintiff is required to “plead all the facts that must be proved in order to achieve recovery on the alleged cause of action.” Commonwealth v. Peoples Benefit Servs., Inc., 895 A.2d 683, 689 n. 10 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). Tate‘s averment that he was ordered to pay costs, fines and restitution in absentia, without any facts regarding the circumstances thereof, is insuffiсient to support his alleged claim or that what occurred was improper. Moreover, the law is clear that “[w]hile in custody under sentence, the avenue to challenge the payment of criminal fines is in a direct appeal or in post[-]conviction relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act,
Accordingly, Tate‘s Amended Petition fails to state facts sufficient to support his claim that his due process rights were violated. Further, Tate may not challenge the trial court‘s order by requesting this Court to enjoin the Department from fulfilling its statutory obligations.
Tate also argues that deductions for the Crime Victim Fund are not statutorily authorized. We disagree. Section 1101 of the Crime Victims Act9 expressly provides:
(a) Imposition.
(1) A person who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or who is convicted of a crime shall, in addition to costs imposed under
42 Pa.C.S. § 3571(c) (relating to Commonwealth portion of fines, etc.), pay costs, of at least $60 and may be sentenced to pay additional costs in an amount up to the statutory maximum monetary penalty for the offense committed....
(b) Disposition.
(1) There is established a special nonlapsing fund, known as the Crime Victim‘s Compensation Fund. This fund shall be used by the Office of Victims’ Services for payment to claimants and technical assistance. Thirty-five dollars of the costs imposed under subsection (a)(1) and (2) plus 30% of the costs imposed under subsection (a)(1) which exceed $60 shall be paid into this fund. All costs imposed under subsection (a)(3) shall be paid into this fund.
(c) Payment. This cost shall be imposed notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary.
...
(e) Court order. No court order shall be necessary in order for the defendant to incur liability for costs under this section. Costs under this section must be paid in order for the defendant to be eligible for probation, parole or accelerated rehabilitative disposition.
Tate next contends that the Department‘s inmate account deductions violated his due process rights because he did not receive a pre-deduction hearing. We disagree. We acknowledgе that
[P]ursuant to
Section 9730(b) of the Sentencing Code , when a defendant is in default, the court of common pleas conducts a hearing to determine the defendant‘s ability to pay, and then may order an appropriate payment plan.Section 9730(b) [of the Sentencing Code] directs the court to consider the defendant‘s financial resources. However, we agree ... that in granting to the Department the supplementary power to collect court-ordered financial obligations from inmate accounts, the Legislature recognized that the deducted amounts were relatively small and that it was impractical and burdensome for trial courts to conduct an ability to pay hearing anytime the funds in an inmate‘s aсcount fluctuated....Section 9728(b)(5) [of the Sentencing Code, Act 84] provides an additional procedure for deducting restitution, fines, and costs directly from inmate accounts pursuant to a legally[-]imposed sentence.
Buck v. Beard, 583 Pa. 431, 879 A.2d 157, 161 (2005).
[Section 9728](b)(5) [of the Sentencing Code, Act 84] authorizes [the Department] to make monetary deductions from an inmate‘s account to pay court ordered fines and costs and does not impose prior court authorization as a threshold condition. As noted, [Tate] concedes that fines and cоsts were imposed as part of his criminal sentence. [Amended Pet. at ii]. It is the judgment of sentence which enables [the Department] to deduct the funds. Thus, [Tate] may not challenge that judgment by seeking to enjoin [the Department] from carrying out its statutorily[-]mandated duty to deduct the funds.
Nor is [Tate] entitled to reimbursement from [the Department] for funds deducted from his account. Pursuant to
George, 824 A.2d at 396-97 (citations omitted).
Tate bases his due process violation claim on Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 773 F.3d 472 (3rd Cir.2014), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See Amended Pet. at 8, 10-11, 14-15. The Montanez Court held:
Procedural due process claims are governed by the standard first enunciated in [Mathews]. Under that standard, a court is to weigh three factors: (1) ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action‘, (2) ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used’ and the value of ‘additional or substitute procedural safeguards‘, and (3) the governmental interest, ‘including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.’ Id.
State prisoners plainly have a property interest in the funds in their inmate accounts. See, e.g., Reynolds [v. Wagner], 128 F.3d [166,] 179 [(3rd Cir.1997)]. As other courts have held, however, this interest is reduced because inmates ‘are not entitled to complete control over their money while in prison.’ See Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d 951, 954 (8th Cir.1996). Further, the government has an ‘important state interеst’ in collecting restitution, costs, and fines from incarcerated criminal offenders to compensate victims. See id. at 956.
Id. at 483. However, the Montanez Court acknowledged that “considering the factors required by Mathews, the government‘s interest in collecting restitution, fines, and other costs from convicted criminals does not overcome the default requirement that inmates be provided with process before being deprived of funds in their inmate accounts[,]” and that sentencing hearings and post-deprivation grievance procedures alone may be insufficient to comply with the standard established in Mathews. Montanez, 773 F.3d at 485.
The Montanez Court expounded:
In Buck, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania and federal Constitutions did not require the [Department] to obtain a judicial determination of ability to pay prior to deducting funds from an inmate account. Id. at 159-60. As the prior Third Circuit panel in this very case noted, the ‘Court‘s reasoning in Buck informs our analysis,’ but ‘it is not dispositive.’ Montanez [v. Beard], 344 Fed.Appx. 833, 835 [ (3d Cir.2009) ].
Id.
The Court continued:
At a minimum, federal due process requires inmates to be informed of the terms of the [Department] Policy and the amount of their totаl monetary liability to the Commonwealth. See Higgins [v. Beyer], 293 F.3d [683,] 694 [ (3d Cir.2002)]. In particular, the [Department] must disclose to each inmate before the first deduction: the total amount the [Department] understands the inmate to owe pursuant to the inmate‘s sentence; the rate at which funds will be deducted from the inmate‘s account; and which funds are subject to deduction. Further, inmates must have a meaningful opportunity to object to the application of the [Department] Policy to their inmate accоunts before the first deductions commence. This opportunity to object is required to protect against the possibility of error in the application of the [Department] Policy, such as mistakes in reporting of an inmate‘s total liability or to ensure that deductions are not made from funds that are exempt. See Id. at 693 (Veterans Administration disability benefits are not subject to deduction to satisfy criminal fines).
To be clear, we do not suggest that the [Department] must provide each inmate with a formal, judicial-like hearing before the onset of deductions. Moreover, we find nothing substantively unreasonable about the [Department‘s] refusal to provide exceptions to its across-the-board 20% rate of deduction, in light of the fact that the [Department] will not make deductions when an inmate‘s account falls below a certain minimum. Because we find the deduction rate to be reasonable, the [Department] need not entertain a challenge to the rate оf deduction, though it must provide an opportunity for inmates to object to potential errors in the deduction process.
We also do not mean to suggest that inmates must have an opportunity to be heard prior to each deduction. Rather, after providing the required initial notice the [Department] could provide inmates with an informal opportunity to supply written objections to prison administrators prior to the first deduction. See, e.g.,
Iowa Code § 904.702(1) ;Ohio Admin. Code 5120-5-03(C) . We need not set forth specific procedures, and the[Department] retains discretion, consistent with its constitutional obligations, to implement such procedures in a flexible and cost-effective manner.
Montanez, 773 F.3d at 486 (emphasis added).
Even if we view Montanez as instructive,11 it does not support Tate‘s claim that the Department‘s inmate account deductions violated his due process rights because he did not receive a pre-deduction hearing. The decision has little value when determining whether Tate‘s Amended Petition alone sets forth a due process violation against the Department to withstand preliminary objections bеcause the Amended Petition, on its face, reflects that Tate was aware of what he owed in costs, fines and restitution, and that he sought review under the Department‘s grievance procedures. Moreover, the Amended Petition does not state that he was deprived of pre-deduction notice by way of the inmate handbook or written notice, but rather that he was not afforded a pre-deprivation hearing which, even the Montanez Court acknowledged, was not required. Accordingly, the Amended Petition fails to state facts sufficient to support a claim that the Department‘s failure to afford Tate a pre-deduction hearing violated his due process rights.
Tate further asserts that the Department improperly made deductions from his earned income and gifts. We disagree.
[t]he Legislature has not provided an exception for gifts placed in an inmate‘s personal account, and it does not require the Department to account for the source of all funds in an inmate‘s personal account before making deductions. The personal account of an inmate may be derived from various sources, including wages, gifts and government benefits. The source of funds is of no moment.
Danysh v. Dep‘t of Corr., 845 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (emphasis added), aff‘d, 584 Pa. 122, 881 A.2d 1263 (2005). Moreover, although wages in an employer‘s hands are exempt from garnishment under
[i]t has long been settled that an inmate at a correctional facility is not an employee of the correctional facility because there is no employer/employee relationship as an inmate‘s labor belongs to the prison, аnd the remuneration paid to the inmate is a gratuitous payment authorized by the state as a rehabilitative tool rather than wages.
Heffran v. Dep‘t of Labor & Indus., 863 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) aff‘d, 584 Pa. 540, 886 A.2d 222 (2005) (holding that an inmate was not an employee with standing to file a complaint for violations of the Worker and Community Right-to-
Tate finally argues that he is entitled to damages for mental anguish and mental distress stemming from the deductions. We disagree. In the Amended Petition, Tate specifically avers that his reduced inmate account funds left him with “no money to buy[] basic cosmetic[s] for personal hygiene for pеrsonal usage,” which caused emotional distress. Amended Pet. at 16. He contends that the emotional distress caused headaches and increased blood pressure, and that he “[h]ad numerous irrational outbursts, ... lashing out towards commissary workers, counselors, unit managers and [Department] staff.” Amended Pet. at 7; see also Amended Pet. at 16, 18.
It is unclear whether Tate is alleging negligence or Department employees intentionally and unlawfully took his money. The law is well settled that under
[S]overeign immunity may be overcome where the party can establish: (1) a common law or statutory cause of action under which damages could be recoverable if not for the immunity defense, and (2) the alleged negligent act falls within one of the nine specific exceptions provided in
42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b) .14However, state employees do not lose their immunity for intentional torts, provided they are acting within the scope of their employment.
Id. at 157 (citation omitted; emphasis added). Arguably, only the exception pertaining to the care, custody or control of personal property applies to Tate‘s claim. This Court has held that the Commonwealth may be liable to an inmate for damage to or negligent handling of personal property under its care, custody or control, Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007). However, this Court has also held that the taking of the property is not сonduct that falls within that exception. See Goodley v. Folino (Pa.Cmwlth. No. 2376 C.D. 2010, 2011 WL 10858491, filed July 1, 2011). Thus, Tate may not recover in negligence for the alleged taking of money from his inmate account. Moreover, because the Department employees’ deductions from Tate‘s inmate account and transfer to the clerk of courts were statutorily mandated, sover-
Based upon the foregoing, the Department‘s preliminary objections are sustained and Tate‘s Amended Petition is dismissed.
Corrections’ preliminary оbjections are sustained, and Amos Tate‘s Amended Petition for Review is dismissed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of February, 2016, the Pennsylvania Department of
ANNE E. COVEY
JUDGE
Notes
Mandatory payment of costs.-Notwithstanding the provisions of [S]ection 9728 [of the Sentencing Code] (relating to collection of restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties) or any provision of law to the cоntrary, in addition to the alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the court shall order the defendant to pay costs. In the event the court fails to issue an order for costs pursuant to [S]ection 9728 [of the Sentencing Code], costs shall be imposed upon the defendant under this section. No court order shall be necessary for the defendant to incur liability for costs under this section. The provisions of this subsection do not alter the court‘s discretion under Pa.R.Crim.P. No. [sic] 706(C) (relating to fines or costs).