Higgins v. Beyer, 99-5556

99-5556 | 3rd Cir. | Jun 12, 2002

ALARCON, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) Vincent M. Higgins appeals from the dismissal of his(cid:13) federal civil rights claim that Howard L. Beyer, the(cid:13) Assistant Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of(cid:13) Corrections, and 13 employees of the Adult Diagnostic and(cid:13) Treatment Center ("ADTC employees") violated 38 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 5301(a) by seizing money derived from a veteran’s(cid:13) disability benefits check from his inmate account to pay a(cid:13) state court-ordered fine, and that he was deprived of his(cid:13) constitutional right to due process because his request for(cid:13) a predeprivation hearing was ignored. He also seeks(cid:13) reversal of the dismissal of his claim, on the ground of(cid:13) mootness, that prison employees retaliated against him for(cid:13) exercising constitutionally protected rights.(cid:13) We reverse because we conclude that Higgins’s pro se(cid:13) complaint, when liberally construed, stated sufficient facts(cid:13) to state a cause of action for a violation of a federal right(cid:13) under S 5301(a), and a deprivation of his Fourteenth(cid:13) Amendment right to notice and hearing prior to the(cid:13) 2(cid:13) deprivation of his property interest in the proceeds of his(cid:13) veteran’s benefits. We also hold that the district court erred(cid:13) in dismissing his claim that the prison officials retaliated(cid:13) against him for asserting his rights under the Due Process(cid:13) Clause.(cid:13) I(cid:13) Higgins alleged the following facts in his complaint.(cid:13) Higgins served in the United States Army from 1974 to(cid:13) 1978. While in the Army, Higgins injured his left hand,(cid:13) leaving him partially disabled. This partial disability(cid:13) qualified Higgins to receive disability benefits from the(cid:13) Veteran’s Administration ("VA") for the remainder of his life.(cid:13) In 1992, Higgins pled guilty to the crime of First Degree(cid:13) Aggravated Sexual Assault in the Superior Court of New(cid:13) Jersey. The court sentenced Higgins to a 10-year term of(cid:13) imprisonment to be served at the ADTC in Avenel, New(cid:13) Jersey. The court also imposed a Victims of Crime(cid:13) Compensation Board ("VCCB") fine in the amount of(cid:13) $1,000, pursuant to section 2C:43-31 of the New Jersey(cid:13) Statutes Annotated. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:43-3.1 (West(cid:13) 1995). Section 2C:43-3.1 expressly requires a New Jersey(cid:13) Superior Court to order the Department of Corrections to(cid:13) collect a VCCB fine from the personal account of an inmate(cid:13) if the assessment was not paid at the time of sentencing.1(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. Section 2C:43-3.1 provides in pertinent part:(cid:13) In addition to any disposition made pursuant to the provisions of(cid:13) N.J.S. 2C:43-2, any person convicted of a crime of violence . . . shall(cid:13) be assessed at least $100.00, but not to exceed $10,000.00 for each(cid:13) such crime for which he was convicted which resulted in the injury(cid:13) or death of another person. . . . When a defendant who is sentenced(cid:13) to incarceration in a State correctional facility has not, at the time(cid:13) of sentencing, paid an assessment for the crime for which he is(cid:13) being sentenced or an assessment imposed for a previous crime, the(cid:13) court shall specifically order the Department of Corrections to collect(cid:13) the assessment during the period of incarceration and to deduct the(cid:13) assessment from . . . any personal account established in the(cid:13) institution for the benefit of the inmate.(cid:13) N.J. Stat. Ann S 2C:43-3.1(a)(1), (a)(3).(cid:13) 3(cid:13) At the time of sentencing, Higgins had not yet received any(cid:13) disability benefits from the VA.(cid:13) On April 7, 1993, Higgins was transferred from the(cid:13) Monmouth County Correctional Center Facility to the(cid:13) ADTC. On or about April 1, 1998, he received a notification(cid:13) from the VA that his claim for benefits for partial disability(cid:13) had been approved. He was advised that he would receive(cid:13) a check for benefits due from January 1, 1991 to March 31,(cid:13) 1998.(cid:13) On May 29, 1998, a United States Treasury Department(cid:13) check in the amount of $7,608, made out to Higgins as the(cid:13) payee, arrived at the ADTC. On the same date, Higgins was(cid:13) notified during mail call by an ADTC employee that the(cid:13) check had arrived. He was not handed the check nor did he(cid:13) authorize any prison employee to deposit it in his inmate(cid:13) account. The standard procedure at the ADTC when a(cid:13) check is received is to request the inmate to sign a form(cid:13) acknowledging receipt of the check and then endorse it "For(cid:13) Deposit Only." The ADTC employees did not follow this(cid:13) procedure.(cid:13) Later that day, Higgins wrote four "business remits,"(cid:13) which instructed prison employees to forward money in the(cid:13) amounts of $5,000, $2,000, and two for $200 apiece to(cid:13) various persons. A "business remit" is the term used at the(cid:13) ADTC for an inmate’s authorization that money be(cid:13) deducted from his account.(cid:13) On May 31, 1998, Higgins asked the social worker(cid:13) assigned to his wing to find out what had happened to his(cid:13) check. The social worker informed Higgins that ADTC(cid:13) employees intended to use part of the proceeds of the VA(cid:13) disability benefits check to pay the outstanding VCCB fine(cid:13) ordered by the New Jersey Superior Court. On the same(cid:13) date, Higgins filed a written complaint addressed to ADTC(cid:13) Superintendent William F. Plantier in which Higgins stated(cid:13) that a VA disability benefits check is not attachable(cid:13) pursuant to 38 U.S.C. S 5301.(cid:13) On June 2, 1998, ADTC Assistant Superintendent Grace(cid:13) Rogers sent a letter to Higgins in which she stated that(cid:13) Higgins’s VA disability benefits check had been received(cid:13) and would be deposited in his inmate account. On June 3,(cid:13) 4(cid:13) 1998, Higgins received written confirmation that his check(cid:13) had been deposited in his inmate account. On June 9,(cid:13) 1998, Linda Cook, an ADTC social worker, notified Higgins(cid:13) that none of the checks that he had authorized would be(cid:13) sent out until he signed a business remit authorizing the(cid:13) withdrawal of $1,000 to pay the VCCB fine. Higgins refused(cid:13) on the ground that a VA disability benefits check is not(cid:13) attachable pursuant to 38 U.S.C. S 5301. He also stated(cid:13) that under the terms of his plea bargain, he was only(cid:13) required to pay an assessment of $30 and that he had filed(cid:13) a habeas corpus petition challenging the imposition of a(cid:13) VCCB fine in the amount of $1,000. Ms. Cook informed(cid:13) Higgins that only a portion of the checks he had authorized(cid:13) would be sent out so that there would be sufficient funds(cid:13) in his inmate account to satisfy the VCCB fine.(cid:13) On June 10, 1998, Daniel Barrajas, ADTC’s Assistant(cid:13) Mail Supervisor, asked Higgins to endorse the VA disability(cid:13) benefits check. Higgins refused. On the same date, Higgins(cid:13) wrote to Superintendent Plantier requesting a written(cid:13) explanation of the disposition of his VA disability benefits(cid:13) check. Higgins also stated that if he did not receive a(cid:13) written explanation by June 12, 1998, he would file an(cid:13) action in the United States District Court. Superintendent(cid:13) Plantier did not reply. Sometime thereafter, ADTC(cid:13) employees deducted $1,000 from Higgins’s inmate account(cid:13) to pay the VCCB fine ordered by the New Jersey Superior(cid:13) Court.(cid:13) II(cid:13) Higgins filed this S 1983 action on August 4, 1998. Prior(cid:13) to filing an answer, the ADTC employees moved to dismiss(cid:13) the complaint on October 14, 1998, pursuant to Rule(cid:13) 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting(cid:13) that Higgins had failed to state a claim upon which relief(cid:13) can be granted. Higgins filed his opposition to the Rule(cid:13) 12(b)(6) motion on November 9, 1998.(cid:13) While the motion to dismiss was pending, Higgins filed a(cid:13) pro se pleading styled as a "NOTICE OF MOTION IN(cid:13) SUPPORT OF AFFIDAVIT/DEPOSITION TO CONSOLIDATE(cid:13) THESE ARGUMENTS WITH THE ABOVE DOCKET CASE(cid:13) 5(cid:13) AND/OR ORDER OF PROTECTION/INJUNCTION." In this(cid:13) motion, Higgins alleged that ADTC employees brought false(cid:13) charges against him, resulting in his confinement in(cid:13) administrative segregation for 365 days and the denial of(cid:13) his access to the courts, in retaliation for the filing of this(cid:13) action for damages for the deprivation of his rights(cid:13) pursuant to 38 U.S.C. S 5301(a) and the Due Process(cid:13) Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.(cid:13) On June 10, 1999, without the benefit of oral argument,(cid:13) the district court granted the ADTC employees’ motion to(cid:13) dismiss this action, for failure to state a claim upon which(cid:13) relief can be granted. In a footnote to its memorandum(cid:13) opinion, the district court stated: "In light of this Court’s(cid:13) granting of the motion to dismiss plaintiff ’s complaint as to(cid:13) the fourteen individual defendants, the later-filed motion of(cid:13) pro se plaintiff Vincent Higgins for a preliminary injunction(cid:13) shall be denied as moot." The court did not explain how(cid:13) Higgins’s discrete claim that ADTC employees retaliated(cid:13) against him for asserting his right to access to the courts(cid:13) was rendered moot by his alleged failure to state a claim for(cid:13) the deprivation of his property in violation ofS 5301(a) and(cid:13) his constitutional right to a predeprivation hearing.(cid:13) Higgins has timely appealed the district court’s final(cid:13) judgment in this S 1983 action. Accordingly, we have(cid:13) jurisdiction over this appeal. 28 U.S.C. S 1291.(cid:13) III(cid:13) Higgins contends that the district court erred in ruling(cid:13) that he failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that(cid:13) the ADTC employees violated S 1983. He argues that the(cid:13) complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim under(cid:13) S 1983 either for depriving him of money derived from a VA(cid:13) disability benefits check in violation of S 5301(a), or for(cid:13) denying him his constitutional right to a predeprivation(cid:13) hearing to challenge the threat to remove funds derived(cid:13) from his VA disability benefits check from his inmate(cid:13) account.(cid:13) Our review of the dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule(cid:13) 12(b)(6) is plenary. Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63" date_filed="1996-04-25" court="3rd Cir." case_name="Robert Nami Maurice Thompson Bart Fernandez Kenneth Thompson Kenneth Thompson v. William Fauver">82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 6(cid:13) 1996). This Court has described the nature of our review as(cid:13) follows:(cid:13) We must determine whether, under any reasonable(cid:13) reading of the pleadings, the plaintiffs may be entitled(cid:13) to relief, and we must accept as true the factual(cid:13) allegations in the complaint and all reasonable(cid:13) inferences that can be drawn therefrom. The complaint(cid:13) will be deemed to have alleged sufficient facts if it(cid:13) adequately put the defendants on notice of the(cid:13) essential elements of the plaintiffs’ cause of action.(cid:13) Since this is a S 1983 action, the plaintiffs are entitled(cid:13) to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges(cid:13) deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution. In(cid:13) considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we do not inquire(cid:13) whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, only(cid:13) whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support(cid:13) their claims. Thus, the district court’s order granting(cid:13) the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be affirmed only(cid:13) if it appears that the plaintiffs could prove no set of(cid:13) facts that would entitle them to relief.(cid:13) Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, as Higgins filed his(cid:13) complaint pro se, we must liberally construe his pleadings,(cid:13) and we will "apply the applicable law, irrespective of(cid:13) whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Holley(cid:13) v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244" date_filed="1999-01-21" court="3rd Cir." case_name="Holley v. Department of Veteran Affairs">165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1999).(cid:13) Section 1983 authorizes a person to file a private cause(cid:13) of action against state actors for a deprivation of rights(cid:13) protected by a federal statute or the United States(cid:13) Constitution. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:(cid:13) Every person who, under color of any statute,(cid:13) ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State(cid:13) or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or(cid:13) causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States(cid:13) or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the(cid:13) deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities(cid:13) secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to(cid:13) the party injured in an action at law, suite in equity, or(cid:13) other proper proceeding for redress . . . .(cid:13) 7(cid:13) 42 U.S.C. S 1983. It is undisputed that the ADTC(cid:13) employees were state actors who deprived Higgins of funds(cid:13) derived from his VA disability benefits check without his(cid:13) consent under color of a state court order issued pursuant(cid:13) to N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:43-3.1(a)(3).(cid:13) A.(cid:13) We must first consider whether Higgins alleged sufficient(cid:13) facts to demonstrate a violation of 38 U.S.C. S 5301(a).(cid:13) Section 5301(a) provides in relevant part:(cid:13) Payments of benefits due or to become due under any(cid:13) law administered by the Secretary shall not be(cid:13) assignable except to the extent specifically authorized(cid:13) by law, and such payments made to, or on account of,(cid:13) a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be(cid:13) exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be(cid:13) liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any(cid:13) legal or equitable process whatever, either before or(cid:13) after receipt by the beneficiary. The preceding sentence(cid:13) shall not apply to claims of the United States arising(cid:13) under such laws nor shall the exemption therein(cid:13) contained as to taxation extend to any property(cid:13) purchased in part or wholly out of such payments.(cid:13) . . .(cid:13) 38 U.S.C. S 5301(a).(cid:13) In order to state a claim under S 1983, a plaintiff must(cid:13) allege a "violation of a federal right, and not merely a(cid:13) violation of federal law." Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun,(cid:13) 283 F.3d 531" date_filed="2002-03-13" court="3rd Cir." case_name="Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun">283 F.3d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc) (quotation(cid:13) omitted). This Court recently explained that "a plaintiff(cid:13) alleging a violation of a federal statute may not proceed(cid:13) under S 1983 unless 1) the statute creates enforceable(cid:13) rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of(cid:13) S 1983 and 2) Congress has not foreclosed such(cid:13) enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself." Id.(cid:13) (quotations omitted).(cid:13) To create a right enforceable under S 1983, the federal(cid:13) statute at issue must meet three conditions:(cid:13) 8(cid:13) First, Congress must have intended that the provision(cid:13) in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff(cid:13) must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected(cid:13) by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its(cid:13) enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third,(cid:13) the statute must unambiguously impose a binding(cid:13) obligation on the States. In other words, the provision(cid:13) giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in(cid:13) mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.(cid:13) Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329" date_filed="1997-04-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Blessing v. Freestone">520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997)(cid:13) (citations omitted). Once all three conditions are met, a(cid:13) rebuttable presumption arises that the right is enforceable(cid:13) under S 1983. Id. at 341; Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n, 283 F.3d(cid:13) at 535. "This presumption may be rebutted by showing that(cid:13) Congress expressly or impliedly foreclosed an action under(cid:13) S 1983." Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n, 283 F.3d 531" date_filed="2002-03-13" court="3rd Cir." case_name="Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun">283 F.3d at 535.(cid:13) Congress may impliedly foreclose a remedy underS 1983(cid:13) "by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is(cid:13) incompatible with individual enforcement under S 1983."(cid:13) Blessing, 520 U.S. 329" date_filed="1997-04-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Blessing v. Freestone">520 U.S. at 341. Section 5301(a) contains neither(cid:13) express language nor a comprehensive enforcement scheme(cid:13) that demonstrates that Congress intended to foreclose a(cid:13) remedy under S 1983 for a violation of S 5301(a). We are(cid:13) persuaded that S 5301(a) provides a federal right that is(cid:13) enforceable under S 1983.(cid:13) The purpose of the prohibition against the attachment,(cid:13) levy, or seizure of a veteran’s disability benefits in S 5301(a)(cid:13) is to "prevent the deprivation and depletion of the means of(cid:13) subsistence of veterans dependent upon these benefits as(cid:13) the main source of their income." Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S.(cid:13) 619, 630 (1987) (quotation omitted). Even though Higgins,(cid:13) because he is a prisoner, does not presently need or rely(cid:13) upon his disability benefits for subsistence, his right(cid:13) nonetheless to receive those benefits free from attachment,(cid:13) levy, or seizure is expressly set forth in clear, mandatory(cid:13) language in the statute. Section 5301(a) also precludes(cid:13) anyone from using any "legal or equitable process" to(cid:13) attach, levy, or seize these benefits. Thus, S 5301(a)(cid:13) satisfies the conditions set forth in Blessing v. Freestone for(cid:13) creating a federal right enforceable under S 1983.(cid:13) 9(cid:13) Our holding that a violation of a veteran’s rights under(cid:13) S 5301(a) is enforceable against state prison officials(cid:13) pursuant to S 1983 is supported by the Ninth Circuit’s(cid:13) decision in Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891" date_filed="2001-11-21" court="9th Cir." case_name="Tarza Nelson v. Barbara Heiss K.W. Prunty">271 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2001).(cid:13) In Nelson, the court held that future veteran’s benefits are(cid:13) exempt from a hold placed on an inmate’s account where(cid:13) the inmate consented to and the prison officials authorized(cid:13) the hold to cover purchases of medical-record copies and(cid:13) dental appliances when there were insufficient funds to(cid:13) cover the overdrafts. Id. at 893-96. The Ninth Circuit held(cid:13) that the holds placed on the veteran’s inmate account by(cid:13) the prison officials violated S 5301(a) because a veteran’s(cid:13) benefits are exempt from assignment, attachment, levy, or(cid:13) seizure. Id. In Nelson, the state actors were attempting to(cid:13) recoup funds advanced for the veteran’s medical needs. Id.(cid:13) at 893. In rejecting the contention of the state actors that(cid:13) they had a right to the funds after providing overdraft(cid:13) protection, the Ninth Circuit reasoned: "Section 5301(a) was(cid:13) designed to protect veteran’s benefits against their creditors(cid:13) so that the veterans themselves could spend those funds as(cid:13) they saw fit when they actually got them, and not before."(cid:13) Id. at 894.(cid:13) In response to the prison officials’ argument that(cid:13) Congress could not have intended to prohibit the taking of(cid:13) a veteran’s disability benefits for his or her maintenance(cid:13) and care as allowed by a number of states, the Ninth(cid:13) Circuit observed: "But if Congress wanted to create(cid:13) exceptions to [non-attachment or seizure], it knew how to(cid:13) do so." Id. at 896. In Nelson, the Ninth Circuit applied(cid:13) S 5301(a), notwithstanding the fact that the prisoner had(cid:13) specifically consented to the future payment for the goods(cid:13) and services from his account when he received a VA check(cid:13) that would cover his depleted inmate account. Id. at 895.(cid:13) In this matter, Higgins did not consent to the taking of(cid:13) money from his inmate account. Instead, he warned the(cid:13) ADTC employees that the use of his disability benefits to(cid:13) satisfy the VCCB fine violated S 5301(a). Thus, the matter(cid:13) before us presents a more compelling factual basis for(cid:13) applying S 5301(a) to protect money derived from Higgins’s(cid:13) disability benefits from attachment, levy, or seizure than(cid:13) the circumstances before the Ninth Circuit in Nelson.(cid:13) 10(cid:13) The Supreme Court has not yet construed S 5301(a) to(cid:13) determine whether prison officials can attach or seize funds(cid:13) in an inmate’s account derived from a VA disability benefits(cid:13) check. In Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395" date_filed="1988-03-29" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Bennett v. Arkansas">485 U.S. 395 (1988), the(cid:13) Court was called upon to determine whether a State can(cid:13) attach Social Security benefits to help defray the cost of(cid:13) maintaining its prison system. Id. at 396. The State of(cid:13) Arkansas filed an action in state court seeking to attach(cid:13) Bennett’s Social Security benefits to defray the cost of(cid:13) maintaining its prison system pursuant to the State Prison(cid:13) Inmate Care and Custody Reimbursement Act, Ark. Stat.(cid:13) Ann. S 46-1701 et seq. (Supp. 1985). Id. The Arkansas(cid:13) statute expressly authorized the seizure of federal Social(cid:13) Security benefits for this purpose. Id. at 396 n.1.(cid:13) In his opposition to the State’s action, Bennett argued(cid:13) that the Arkansas statute violated the Supremacy Clause(cid:13) because it was in conflict with 42 U.S.C. S 407(a), which(cid:13) exempts Social Security benefits "from legal process." Id. at(cid:13) 397. Section 407(a) provides in relevant part that"none of(cid:13) the moneys paid or payable . . . under [the Social Security(cid:13) Act] shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment,(cid:13) garnishment, or other legal process." 42 U.S.C.S 407(a).(cid:13) The state trial court entered judgment in favor of the State(cid:13) and directed that a portion of Bennett’s Social Security(cid:13) benefits be seized. 485 U.S. 395" date_filed="1988-03-29" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Bennett v. Arkansas">485 U.S. at 397. The Supreme Court of(cid:13) Arkansas affirmed, holding that there was no conflict(cid:13) between the Arkansas statute and 42 U.S.C. S 407(a)(cid:13) because " ‘the [Social Security Act] contain[s] an implied(cid:13) exception to the exemption from legal process when the(cid:13) State provides for the care and maintenance of a(cid:13) beneficiary of social security . . . funds.’ " Id. at 397 (quoting(cid:13) Bennett v. State, 716 S.W.2d 755" date_filed="1986-09-29" court="Ark." case_name="Bennett v. State">716 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Ark. 1986)).(cid:13) The Court granted Bennett’s petition for certiorari and(cid:13) reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas.(cid:13) Id. at 397-98. The Court reasoned as follows:(cid:13) We think--contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme(cid:13) Court of Arkansas--that there is a clear inconsistency(cid:13) between the Arkansas statute and 42 U.S.C. S 407(a)(cid:13) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Section 407(a) unambiguously(cid:13) rules out any attempt to attach Social Security(cid:13) benefits. The Arkansas statute just as unambiguously(cid:13) 11(cid:13) allows the State to attach those benefits. As we see it,(cid:13) this amounts to a "conflict" under the Supremacy(cid:13) Clause--a conflict that the State cannot win.(cid:13) Id. at 397.(cid:13) We recognize that the language used by Congress in(cid:13) protecting Social Security benefits in S 407(a) is not(cid:13) precisely the same as the words it employed in S 5301(a)(cid:13) regarding the attachment or seizure of a veteran’s disability(cid:13) benefits. We agree with the Ninth Circuit, however, that "its(cid:13) reach is essentially the same." Nelson, 271 F.3d 891" date_filed="2001-11-21" court="9th Cir." case_name="Tarza Nelson v. Barbara Heiss K.W. Prunty">271 F.3d at 895.(cid:13) We next turn to the question whether the New Jersey(cid:13) statutes are preempted under the Supremacy Clause(cid:13) because they are inconsistent with S 5301(a). The ADTC(cid:13) employees argue that the doctrine of preemption is not(cid:13) applicable on several grounds. They first maintain that(cid:13) there is no conflict between N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:43-3.1 and(cid:13) S 5301(a). They assert that S 5301(a) is inapplicable because(cid:13) the VCCB is not Higgins’s creditor and the deduction from(cid:13) his inmate account was not accomplished by an(cid:13) attachment, levy, or seizure under legal or equitable(cid:13) process. We disagree. This contention ignores the(cid:13) unambiguous intent of the New Jersey legislature in(cid:13) enacting the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1971(cid:13) ("CICA"). See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 52:4B-1 et seq. (West 2001).(cid:13) The CICA created the Violent Crimes Compensation Board.(cid:13) Id. S 52:4B-3.2 Under the provisions of the CICA, the VCCB(cid:13) may order the payment of compensation for personal(cid:13) injuries suffered by the victim of an aggravated sexual(cid:13) assault. Id. SS 52:4B-2; 52:4B-11(b)(9).(cid:13) Section 2C:43-3.1 provides for the collection of funds for(cid:13) the VCCB through court-ordered fines assessed against(cid:13) persons convicted of a crime of violence which resulted in(cid:13) the injury of another person. The imposition of the VCCB(cid:13) assessment is mandatory. Id. S 2C:43-3.1(a)(1). As noted(cid:13) above, if the assessment is not paid at the time of(cid:13) sentencing, the court must order the Department of(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. The name of the Violent Crimes Compensation Board was changed in(cid:13) 1995 to the Victims of Crime Compensation Board. N.J. Stat. Ann.(cid:13) S 52:4B-3.1.(cid:13) 12(cid:13) Corrections to collect the assessment during the period of(cid:13) incarceration by deducting funds from the defendant’s(cid:13) inmate account. Id. S 2C:43-3.1(a)(3). Under such(cid:13) circumstances, employees of the Department of Corrections(cid:13) are required to forward the amount collected to the VCCB.(cid:13) Id.(cid:13) The ADTC employees rely on the Fifth Circuit’s decision(cid:13) in Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Davis,(cid:13) 616 F.2d 828" date_filed="1980-05-08" court="5th Cir." case_name="Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida, Plaintiff v. Rachel G. Davis, as Guardian of the Estate of Arthur Grady Glasscock">616 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1980), in support of their(cid:13) proposition that the VCCB is not a creditor within the(cid:13) meaning of S 5301(a). Their reliance on Davis is misplaced.(cid:13) In Davis, the Florida Department of Health and(cid:13) Rehabilitative Services filed an action seeking an order(cid:13) granting it reimbursement of $12,000 for the care and(cid:13) maintenance of an incompetent in the Florida State(cid:13) Hospital. Id. at 829. During the years that the incompetent(cid:13) was hospitalized, his guardian accumulated $40,000 in(cid:13) Social Security and veteran’s benefits. Id. His guardian(cid:13) refused to reimburse the Florida Department of Health and(cid:13) Rehabilitative Services on the basis that the moneys(cid:13) received from federal Social Security and veteran’s benefits(cid:13) statutes were exempt from a creditor’s claims. Id. The(cid:13) district court denied relief. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Id.(cid:13) It concluded that since the purpose of each federal statute(cid:13) was to provide for the care and maintenance of its(cid:13) beneficiaries, it was consistent with that goal to reimburse(cid:13) a state agency that provided for an incompetent person’s(cid:13) care and maintenance. Id. at 831-32.(cid:13) In the matter sub judice, the intent of the New Jersey(cid:13) Legislature in enacting the CICA was not aimed at(cid:13) providing for the care and maintenance of persons(cid:13) convicted of violent crimes. The CICA’s purpose is to(cid:13) compensate victims of violent crimes for their injuries.(cid:13) Moreover, subsequent to Davis, the Supreme Court(cid:13) rejected, in the context of Social Security benefits, the very(cid:13) argument the state made in Davis. Bennett, 485 U.S. at(cid:13) 397-98. As we have explained, the Supreme Court(cid:13) interpreted the language of 42 U.S.C. S 407(a) as barring(cid:13) Arkansas from retaining an inmate’s Social Security(cid:13) benefits, regardless of its purpose in doing so. The very(cid:13) similar mandatory and all-inclusive language ofS 5301(a)(cid:13) requires the same conclusion here.(cid:13) 13(cid:13) A creditor is a person or entity to whom a debt is owed.(cid:13) Black’s Law Dictionary 375 (7th ed. 1999). A debtor is a(cid:13) person who owes an obligation to another. Id. at 411.(cid:13) Pursuant to the CICA, a court must order a person(cid:13) convicted of a violent crime to pay an assessment to the(cid:13) VCCB. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:43-3.1(a)(1). The judgment is(cid:13) enforceable by requiring employees of the New Jersey(cid:13) Department of Corrections to seize the amount owing to the(cid:13) VCCB from the inmate’s account. Id. S 2C:43-3.1(a)(3).(cid:13) Thus, contrary to the position of the ADTC employees, the(cid:13) VCCB is a creditor within the meaning of S 5301(a). The(cid:13) CICA has created a creditor-debtor relationship between a(cid:13) person convicted of the crime of aggravated sexual assault(cid:13) and the VCCB that is enforceable by a court order.(cid:13) The ADTC employees also maintain that the deduction of(cid:13) funds derived from Higgins’s VA disability benefits check(cid:13) did not violate S 5301(a) because it was not effected by(cid:13) attachment, levy, seizure by or under any legal or equitable(cid:13) process. As discussed above, the CICA requires a New(cid:13) Jersey court to "specifically order the Department of(cid:13) Corrections to collect the assessment during the period of(cid:13) incarceration and to deduct the assessment . . . from any(cid:13) personal account established in the institution for the(cid:13) benefit of the inmate." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:43-3.1. The(cid:13) term "levy" is defined as the seizure of property to satisfy a(cid:13) judgment. Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 919. We are(cid:13) persuaded that the collection of funds from Higgins’s(cid:13) inmate account by the ADTC employees was clearly a levy(cid:13) or a seizure required by New Jersey law.(cid:13) The ADTC employees further assert that N.J. Stat. Ann.(cid:13) S 2C:43-3.1(a)(3) does not conflict with S 5301(a) because(cid:13) New Jersey law "mandates the care, government and(cid:13) maintenance of inmates by the Commissioner of the(cid:13) Department of Corrections, thereby fulfilling the(cid:13) Congressional intent of 38 U.S.C. S 5301(a)." Appellees Br.(cid:13) at 19-20. The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument(cid:13) in Bennett. There, the Court noted thatS 407(a) of the(cid:13) Social Security Act does not contain "an ‘implied exception’(cid:13) that would allow attachment of otherwise exempted federal(cid:13) payments simply because the State has provided the(cid:13) recipient with ‘care and maintenance.’ " 485 U.S. 395" date_filed="1988-03-29" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Bennett v. Arkansas">485 U.S. at 397.(cid:13) 14(cid:13) Likewise, S 5301(a) does not contain an implied exception(cid:13) which would allow the collection of funds derived from a VA(cid:13) disability benefits check to compensate his or her crime(cid:13) victim merely because New Jersey law requires the(cid:13) Department of Corrections to provide for an inmate’s care(cid:13) and maintenance.(cid:13) As noted previously, Congress’s purpose in enacting(cid:13) S 5301(a) was to "prevent the deprivation and depletion of(cid:13) the means of subsistence of veterans dependent upon these(cid:13) benefits as the main source of their income." Rose, 481(cid:13) U.S. at 630. Section 2C:43-3.1(a)(3) expressly allows the(cid:13) deduction of any funds located in an inmate’s personal(cid:13) account. To the extent this statute allows the deduction of(cid:13) funds derived from a VA disability benefits check, its(cid:13) provisions conflict with S 5301(a). "A state law is in conflict,(cid:13) and void under the supremacy clause, if it stands as an(cid:13) obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full(cid:13) purposes and objective of Congress." Finberg v. Sullivan,(cid:13) 634 F.2d 50" date_filed="1980-10-27" court="3rd Cir." case_name="Finberg v. Sullivan">634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (quotation(cid:13) omitted). To the extent N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:43-3.1(a)(3)(cid:13) authorizes prison officials to deduct funds derived from a(cid:13) prisoner’s VA disability benefits check, it conflicts with the(cid:13) purpose and objectives of Congress in enacting S 5301(a)(cid:13) and is void under the Supremacy Clause.(cid:13) B.(cid:13) Higgins also challenges the dismissal of his claim that(cid:13) the ADTC employees took his VA benefits without notice or(cid:13) a hearing, in violation of his procedural due process rights(cid:13) under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth(cid:13) Amendment prohibits the States from depriving "any person(cid:13) of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.(cid:13) Const. amend. XIV, S 1. This Court has previously held that(cid:13) "[i]nmates have a property interest in funds held in prison(cid:13) accounts. Thus, inmates are entitled to due process with(cid:13) respect to any deprivation of this money." Reynolds v.(cid:13) Wagner, 128 F.3d 166" date_filed="1997-10-22" court="3rd Cir." case_name="Reynolds v. Wagner">128 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations(cid:13) omitted). The Supreme Court has explained the(cid:13) requirements of the Due Process Clause as follows:(cid:13) In situations where the State feasibly can provide a(cid:13) predeprivation hearing before taking property, it(cid:13) 15(cid:13) generally must do so regardless of the adequacy of a(cid:13) postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the(cid:13) taking. Conversely, in situations where a(cid:13) predeprivation hearing is unduly burdensome in(cid:13) proportion to the liberty interest at stake, or where the(cid:13) State is truly unable to anticipate and prevent a(cid:13) random deprivation of a liberty interest,(cid:13) postdeprivation remedies might satisfy due process.(cid:13) Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113" date_filed="1990-02-27" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Zinermon v. Burch">494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990) (citations(cid:13) omitted).(cid:13) Higgins alleged in his complaint that the ADTC(cid:13) employees took money from his inmate account without(cid:13) providing him with a predeprivation hearing. The ADTC(cid:13) employees argue that they did not improperly deny Higgins(cid:13) a predeprivation hearing because the New Jersey Torts(cid:13) Claims Act provides Higgins with an adequate(cid:13) postdeprivation remedy to seek money damages for the(cid:13) seizure of his property. Higgins did not allege facts that(cid:13) demonstrate that his funds were seized as the result of a(cid:13) random, negligent, or unauthorized act of an ADTC(cid:13) employee. Rather, Higgins alleged that the ADTC employees(cid:13) were acting under the authority of an established state(cid:13) procedure for seizing a prisoner’s funds to satisfy court-(cid:13) ordered fines. The ADTC employees have argued before this(cid:13) Court that they were acting pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann.(cid:13) S 2C:43-3.1(a)(3) when they deducted funds from Higgins’s(cid:13) account. Thus, under Zinermon, Higgins was entitled to(cid:13) notice and hearing before the ADTC employees deducted(cid:13) money from his account.(cid:13) Higgins has alleged sufficient facts to establish that he(cid:13) was entitled to a predeprivation notice and hearing. 3(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. We note that the alleged violation of Higgins’s Fourteenth Amendment(cid:13) right to due process occurred at the moment he was deprived of his(cid:13) property interest without notice and a predeprivation hearing (i.e., when(cid:13) the ADTC employees seized the money in his inmate account). Thus,(cid:13) Higgins’s procedural due process claim would not be rendered moot even(cid:13) if he is ultimately successful in recovering the $1,000 under his(cid:13) S 5301(a) claim. In such a situation, Higgins would still be entitled to(cid:13) nominal damages on a successful procedural due process claim despite(cid:13) the fact that he may be unable to prove actual injury from the(cid:13) 16(cid:13) Moreover, Higgins’s procedural due process rights are(cid:13) enforceable under S 1983. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. 113" date_filed="1990-02-27" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Zinermon v. Burch">494 U.S. at 125(cid:13) ("A S 1983 action may be brought for a violation of(cid:13) procedural due process . . . ."). The district court erred in(cid:13) dismissing Higgins’s procedural due process claim under(cid:13) Rule 12(b)(6).(cid:13) IV(cid:13) The district court did not disclose the basis for the(cid:13) dismissal of Higgins’s claim that the ADTC employees(cid:13) retaliated against him because he exercised his federal(cid:13) constitutional right to seek access to the courts for an(cid:13) adjudication of his claims that he was deprived of his rights(cid:13) under S 5301(a) and the Due Process Clause. A person may(cid:13) state an independent cause of action for retaliation for the(cid:13) exercise of his or her right of access to the courts,(cid:13) regardless of whether the allegations of a deprivation of(cid:13) federal statutory or constitutional rights are meritorious.(cid:13) See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103" date_filed="1990-02-23" court="3rd Cir." case_name="Norwood White v. John Napoleon. Appeal of Norwood White">897 F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1990)(cid:13) ("Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected(cid:13) rights is itself a violation of rights secured by the(cid:13) Constitution actionable under section 1983."). The district(cid:13) court erred in dismissing Higgins’s claim for retaliation for(cid:13) the exercise of his rights under federal law.(cid:13) Conclusion(cid:13) Higgins’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to support a(cid:13) S 1983 claim that he was deprived of his rights under(cid:13) S 5301(a) and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth(cid:13) Amendment. Accordingly, we VACATE the dismissal of this(cid:13) action. Upon REMAND, the district court is directed to(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) deprivation of his property interest in the $1,000. See Carey v. Piphus,(cid:13) 435 U.S. 247" date_filed="1978-03-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Carey v. Piphus">435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (stating that "[b]ecause the right to procedural(cid:13) due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the(cid:13) merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of the(cid:13) importance to organized society that procedural due process be(cid:13) observed, we believe that the denial of procedural due process should be(cid:13) actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury" (citations(cid:13) omitted)).(cid:13) 17(cid:13) permit Higgins to amend his complaint so as to attempt to(cid:13) allege a S 1983 retaliation claim for the exercise of his(cid:13) federal rights.(cid:13) Costs are awarded to Higgins.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 18