COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RONNIE
No. 41 WAP 2022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT
DECIDED: MARCH 21, 2024
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ. SUBMITTED: June 21, 2023
OPINION
JUSTICE BROBSON
Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code1 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] prisoner or inmate commits a felony of the second degree if he unlawfully has in his possession or under his control any controlled substance in violation of [S]ection 13(a)(16) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act” (Controlled Substance Act).2
Section 5123(e) of the Crimes Code3 defines “inmate” as “[a] male or female offender who is committed to, under sentence to or confined in a penal or correctional institution.” The question that we must decide in this case, in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim brought under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),4 is whether Ronnie Lehman (Lehman), who was residing at Renewal Center as a condition of his parole, was an “inmate” at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act. After careful consideration, we hold that, under the circumstances presented here, Lehman was an “inmate” as that term is used and defined in Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code, and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for a violation of Section 5123(a.2). Because the Superior Court concluded otherwise and granted Lehman post-conviction relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts and procedural history underlying this matter, which do not appear to be in dispute, are summarized as follows. Lehman was residing at Renewal Center located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as a condition of his parole from a state sentence of incarceration.5 On March 5, 2018, Renewal Center staff encountered Lehman unresponsive on a bathroom floor from an apparent drug overdose. In the course of rendering life-saving aid, Renewal Center staff performed a pat-down search of Lehman‘s person. During that search, Renewal Center staff discovered in the pocket of Lehman‘s pants a hypodermic needle and a bundle—i.e., ten stamp bags—of what was later determined to be a combination of heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine.
Based on the foregoing, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) charged Lehman with the following: (1) a violation of Section 5123(a) of the Crimes Code (providing a controlled substance to a confined person);6 (2) a violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act (possession of a controlled substance); and (3) a violation of Section 13(a)(32) of the Controlled Substance Act (possession of drug paraphernalia).7 Lehman filed a motion to dismiss all three charges pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the Drug Overdose Response Immunity Act (DORIA),8 which, inter alia, shields a person experiencing a drug overdose event from prosecution for certain enumerated offenses, including, but not limited to, possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. In response to that motion, the Commonwealth nolle prossed the possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia charges. The Commonwealth also filed a motion to amend the criminal information, wherein it sought to replace the charge of providing a controlled substance to a confined person with a charge alleging a violation of Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code (possession of a controlled substance by a prisoner or inmate). The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, acting in its capacity as the trial court, granted the Commonwealth‘s motion to amend. Thus, the sole remaining charge filed against Lehman was for a violation of Section 5123(a.2). While Lehman acknowledged that a violation of Section 5123(a.2) was not an offense enumerated within DORIA, he, nevertheless, maintained that DORIA shielded him from prosecution therefor, and, as a result, he was entitled to a dismissal of that charge. In support, Lehman contended that, because DORIA shielded him from prosecution for possession of a controlled substance, that same act of possession could not form the basis for a violation of Section 5123(a.2). The trial court disagreed and denied Lehman‘s motion to dismiss.
The matter proceeded to a stipulated, nonjury trial. At the conclusion thereof, the trial court found Lehman guilty of a violation of Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code and sentenced him to 35 to 90 months’ incarceration. Lehman filed a direct
Subsequent thereto, Lehman filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, now acting in its capacity as the PCRA court, appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition. Therein, Lehman asserted that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective10 for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction under Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code. In support, Lehman contended that his sufficiency claim had arguable merit because, given his status as a parolee who was voluntarily placed at Renewal Center as a condition of his parole, the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an “inmate” or “prisoner” at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. See Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code. Thus, Lehman maintained that, had his trial counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under Section 5123(a.2), the trial court would not have found him guilty of that charge, or, alternatively, had his appellate counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the Superior Court would have vacated his conviction. Lehman further contended that his trial and appellate counsel
The PCRA court, after providing the requisite notice of its intent to do so, dismissed Lehman‘s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. Lehman appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the PCRA court abused its discretion by doing so because he had established that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code insofar as he was not a “prisoner” or “inmate” at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. In its opinion issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), the PCRA court concluded that Lehman‘s trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective because his underlying sufficiency claim lacked arguable merit. To that end, the PCRA court explained that Lehman satisfied the definition of “prisoner” or “inmate” for the purposes of Section 5123(a.2) because he was involuntarily committed to Renewal Center as a condition of his parole and, if he left Renewal Center without express permission, he would have violated the terms and conditions of his parole.
In a divided, published opinion, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court vacated the PCRA court‘s order and remanded the matter to the PCRA court for further proceedings.11 Commonwealth v. Lehman, 278 A.3d 321 (Pa. Super. 2022). After noting that the parties seemed to agree that Lehman was not a “prisoner” or “confined” at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act and that, “[a]s a community corrections center, Renewal [Center] indisputably qualifies as a correctional institution,” the Superior Court indicated that the narrow issue before it was “whether a parolee may be considered an ‘inmate’ for the purposes of Section 5123(e) by virtue of being ‘committed to’ a halfway house.” Id. at 324-25. Observing that the phrase “committed to” is not defined in Section 5123 or elsewhere within the Crimes Code but, rather, is “simply part of the definition of an ‘inmate,‘” the Superior Court explained that, “as employed in Section 5123 and other relevant statutes and taken in full context, ‘committed to’ necessarily refers to a class of offenders held or incarcerated in correctional facilities against their will.” Id. at 325 & n.5 (emphasis added) (noting that “[t]he word[] ‘commit’ describes the process of sending a person somewhere without the latter‘s consent,” and citing Commit, Black‘s Law Dictionary 340 (11th ed. 2019) (“To send (a person) to prison or to a mental health facility, esp. by court order.“)). In the Superior Court‘s view, given that parolees are not similarly situated to pre-release inmates—i.e., parolees are “at liberty on parole” and pre-release inmates are in official detention—“parolees are not ‘inmates’ who are ‘committed to’ a community corrections center.” Id. at 325-26. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the Superior Court explained that “Lehman‘s option to leave Renewal [Center], his statutory
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bowes opined that “proper application of the rules of statutory construction to the language of” Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code should have required the majority to affirm the PCRA court‘s conclusion that Lehman was an “inmate” at Renewal Center at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act. Id. at 329 (Bowes, J., dissenting). In support, Judge Bowes noted that whether Lehman was “at liberty on parole” for purposes of credit for his time served at Renewal Center is irrelevant to a determination of whether Lehman was an “inmate” pursuant to Section 5123(a.2) because “the purposes for [Section 5123(a.2)] and those [statutes] governing time credit are distinct.” Id. at 332-33. Judge Bowes explained that, in defining the term “commit,” the majority “blatantly ignore[d] that the common usage of [that] term . . . includes a person‘s voluntary, consensual entrustment of himself to a place or a cause.” Id. at 334 (quoting Commit, Merriam-Webster.com, https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commit (definition 3) (last visited March 15, 2024) (setting forth five options to define “commit:” (1) “to put into charge or trust: ENTRUST;” (2) “to place in a prison or mental institution;” (3) “to consign or record for preservation;” (4) “to put into a place for disposal or safekeeping;” and (5) “to refer (something such as a legislative bill) to a committee for consideration and report“)). Applying this definition here, Judge Bowes noted that Lehman was “committed to” Renewal Center because he was “placed [there] by the [Pennsylvania Parole] Board [(Parole Board)] for safekeeping[] and entrusted to Renewal [Center] as a condition of his parole.” Id. at 335. Stated another way, “when [Lehman] opted to agree to the conditions of his parole, he voluntarily committed himself to [Renewal Center,] a
II. ISSUE
This Court granted discretionary review to consider the following issue, as stated by the Commonwealth:
Whether the Superior Court majority erred in concluding that prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to pursue on appeal a claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain [Lehman‘s] conviction under [Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code], because he was not an inmate at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance, where, pursuant to the relevant statute and legislation, he was an inmate?
Commonwealth v. Lehman, 289 A.3d 889 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam order). While the Commonwealth‘s issue itself is expressed in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel and sufficiency of the evidence, resolution of the issue requires us to engage in statutory interpretation and, therefore, presents a question of law. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Pa. Dep‘t of Lab. & Indus., 162 A.3d 384, 389 (Pa. 2017). Accordingly, “our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review plenary.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
This appeal requires us to interpret Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code, and, therefore, we are guided in our analysis by the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act),13 which provides that the object of all statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”
Additionally, the General Assembly, in Section 105 of the Crimes Code itself, instructed that “[t]he provisions of [the Crimes Code] shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in [the Crimes Code] and the special purposes of the particular provision involved.”
With these statutory construction principles in mind, we begin our analysis by reiterating the statute that we are called upon to interpret. Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code provides, in relevant part, that “[a] prisoner or inmate commits a felony of the second degree if he unlawfully has in his possession or under his control any controlled substance in violation of [S]ection 13(a)(16) of [the Controlled Substance Act].” The parties do not dispute that Lehman unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act. The parties also do not appear to dispute that Lehman was not a “prisoner” for purposes of Section 5123(a.2). We, nevertheless, note, for reasons that will become more apparent later, that Black‘s Law Dictionary defines “prisoner” as someone who: (1) “is being confined in prison;” (2) “has been apprehended by a law-enforcement officer and is in custody, regardless of whether the person has yet been put in prison;” or (3) “is taken by force and kept somewhere.”15 Prisoner, Black‘s Law Dictionary 1447 (11th ed. 2019).
The relevant provisions of the Crimes Code do not define “offender,” “committed to,” “under sentence to,” “confined in,” or “penal or correctional institution,” and Section 1991 of the Statutory Construction Act does not provide default definitions for those terms. We must, therefore, ascertain these words and phrases in accordance with their common and approved usage. See
The record, however, is wholly devoid of any facts or evidence that would suggest that Lehman was “under sentence to” or “confined in” Renewal Center at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. Black‘s Law Dictionary defines “sentence” as “[t]he judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.” Sentence, Black‘s Law Dictionary 1636 (11th ed. 2019). Although we do not know the specific facts surrounding Lehman‘s underlying conviction and subsequent incarceration, the parties agree that Lehman was residing at Renewal Center as a condition of his parole from a state sentence of incarceration. Hence, Lehman was “under sentence to” a state correctional institution for a specified term as a result of his underlying conviction. Lehman‘s subsequent release to Renewal Center from a state correctional institution was not part of that sentence but, rather, was a condition of his parole. Accordingly, Lehman was not “under sentence to” Renewal Center at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance.
Black‘s Law Dictionary defines “confinement” as “[t]he act of imprisoning or restraining someone; the quality, state, or condition of being imprisoned or restrained.” Confinement, Black‘s Law Dictionary 373 (11th ed. 2019). While not explicitly stated therein, this definition—more precisely its incorporation of the word “restrain”17—suggests that there is a compulsory and/or forcible aspect to confinement—i.e., to be “confined in” a certain place requires the individual to have no choice but to remain there at all times. There was no compulsory or forcible aspect to Lehman‘s residence at Renewal Center. Lehman had the option to serve the remainder of his state sentence of incarceration at a state correctional institution but, instead, chose to accept the Parole Board‘s terms and conditions that resulted in his mandated residence at Renewal Center. In addition, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Lehman was required to remain within the four walls of his room at Renewal Center or Renewal Center itself or that he was not able to come and go from Renewal Center subject to certain rules and restrictions. Thus, Lehman was not “confined in” Renewal Center for purposes of Section 5123(a.2), (e).
What we are left to determine, then, is whether Lehman was “committed to” Renewal Center at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. Black‘s Law Dictionary defines “commit” as “[t]o send (a person) to prison or to a mental health facility, esp. by court order.” Commit, Black‘s Law Dictionary 340 (11th ed. 2019). Arguably, the Parole Board only agreed to parole Lehman from his state sentence of incarceration if Lehman resided, at least initially, at Renewal Center. Stated another way, the Parole Board sent Lehman to reside at Renewal Center as a condition of his parole—i.e., in an official capacity. While Lehman could have refused to agree to the Parole Board‘s terms and conditions that resulted in his mandated residence at Renewal Center, to do so would have resulted in his continued incarceration at a state correctional institution. Moreover, while Lehman also could have abandoned his residence at Renewal Center
Lehman attempts to avoid this conclusion by relying heavily, if not exclusively, on his status as a parolee. He contends that, “as employed in Section 5123 [of the Crimes Code] and other relevant statutes, ‘committed to’ necessarily refers to a class of offenders mandated to be held or incarcerated in correctional facilities.” (Lehman‘s Br. at 6.) In so doing, Lehman makes a distinction between parolees, like himself, who are “at liberty” on parole, and pre-release inmates, who are “in official detention or incarceration.” (
As explained more fully above, the plain and unambiguous language of Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code establishes that Lehman was an “inmate” at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act—i.e., he was an offender “committed to” Renewal Center, a correctional institution. Just because the Superior Court reached a different conclusion does not automatically mean that Section 5123(a.2), (e) is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and, therefore, is ambiguous. For all the reasons stated herein, the Superior Court‘s interpretation—i.e., Lehman‘s interpretation—of Section 5123(a.2), (e) is not reasonable. Thus, the rule of lenity simply does not apply where, as here, the statutory language is unambiguous—i.e., not subject to two or more reasonable interpretations. See Gamby, 283 A.3d at 306; see also A.S. v. Pa. State Police, 143 A.3d 896, 905-06 (Pa. 2016) (“A statute is ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text.“).
The dissent suggests that we “want[] to have it both ways” because we “insist[] the statute is unambiguous, thus rendering the rule of lenity inapplicable,” but then “root[] around for tools of statutory construction that are only available when a statute is ambiguous.” (Dissenting Op. at 6 (Wecht, J., dissenting).) In so doing, the dissent acknowledges that we discuss the fair import and legislative purpose behind Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code “as an instrument to refute Lehman‘s argument” relative to the fact that he, as a parolee who is “at liberty on parole” and in good standing, should be treated differently than other offenders residing with him at Renewal Center. (
an “inmate“—i.e., “committed to” Renewal Center—for purposes of Section 5123(a.2), (e). There is absolutely nothing within the plain and unambiguous language of Section 5123(a.2), (e) that requires parolees to be treated differently from other offenders or that suggests that if a parolee is “at liberty on parole” he cannot also be “committed to” a community corrections facility, such as Renewal Center. We simply cannot and will not insert words or phrases into Section 5123(a.2), (e) that are plainly not there. See Frazier, 52 A.3d at 245. Moreover, while we concede that the Parole Code‘s use of the phrase “recommitment” in the context of a parole violation may necessarily imply that the parolee was previously “committed,”
Additionally, by suggesting that he, as a parolee who is “at liberty on parole” and in good standing, should be treated differently from other offenders, such as parole violators, residing with him at Renewal Center, Lehman blatantly ignores the fair import and legislative purpose behind Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code. Although this Court has not previously spoken to the fair import of or legislative purposes behind Section 5123(a.2), the fair import of and legislative purpose behind Section 5123(a) rightly extends to Section 5123(a.2). That is, there are certain places—e.g., prisons and mental hospitals—where controlled substances should just not be and where absolute abstinence is required. See Williams, 579 A.2d at 871; see also Gerald, 47 A.3d at 862. It is also entirely reasonable to include community corrections facilities, such as Renewal Center, as one of those places. To conclude that different types of offenders residing in the same community corrections facility should be treated differently based on their individual status and circumstances would undermine the General Assembly‘s purpose to keep controlled substances and other contraband out of correctional institutions.
Furthermore, if we were to adopt Lehman‘s interpretation of the word “inmate“—and, more specifically, the phrase “committed to“—we would render Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code‘s use of the term “prisoner” in addition to the term “inmate” and, arguably, the remainder of Section 5123(e)‘s definition of “inmate,” superfluous. In other words, the only offenders who would likely meet Lehman‘s definition of “inmate” would be those offenders confined within a state correctional institution, prison, or jail. Indeed, had the General Assembly intended to limit Section 5123(a.2) in such a fashion, it would not have chosen the rather expansive language set forth in Section 5123(a.2), (e). “Prisoner” has to mean something different than “inmate” or the General Assembly would not have chosen to employ both words in Section 5123(a.2). In addition, as detailed above, “committed to,” “under sentence to,” and “confined in” have separate and distinct meanings: (1) an offender is “under sentence to” a correctional institution when he is placed there following a conviction as a means of punishment; (2) an offender is “confined in” a correctional institution when he is restrained there and has no choice but to remain; and (3) an offender is “committed to” a correctional institution when he is sent there to reside in an official capacity—e.g., as a condition of his parole. While there is some overlap between “under sentence to” and “confined in” and “confined in” and “committed to,” each definition has at least some distinguishing feature—i.e., a confinement, unlike a sentence, can occur before an offender is convicted of a crime and a confinement, unlike a commitment, requires some form of restraint. If we were to ignore the General Assembly‘s use of this rather expansive language, we would not, as we are required to do, give effect to the entirety of Section 5123(a.2). See Berner, 217 A.3d at 245 (quoting
In sum, we conclude that Lehman was an “inmate” as that term is
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue and McCaffery join the opinion.
Justice Mundy files a concurring opinion in which Justice Dougherty joins.
Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion.
Notes
(a) The following act[] and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth [is] hereby prohibited:
. . . .
(16) Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription order or order of a practitioner, or except as otherwise authorized by this act.