Lead Opinion
OPINION
Appeal was allowed to determine whether juvenile adjudications of delinquency qualify as “convictions” for purposes of grading within a particularized sentencing regime.
The case concerns Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6127. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. Subsection (a)(1) of this statute prohibits persons from possessing firearms if they have been convicted of certain crimes enumerated in subsection (b). See id. § 6105(a)(1). As relevant in the present case, one of the crimes specified in subsection (b) is aggravated assault, id. § 2702. See id. § 6105(b).
The proscription of subsection (a)(1) also extends to individuals who have engaged in specific conduct within a range of criteria described in subsection (c). See id. § 6105(a)(1), (c). As is also material to the present appeal, subsection (c)(7) extends the prohibition to those who were adjudicated delinquent based on conduct which would comprise one of a smaller grouping of enumerated offenses—also encompassing aggravated assault—if committed as an adult. See id. § 6105(c)(7).
Although a Section 6105 violation, by default, is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree, see id. § 6119, subsection (a.l)(l) elevates the offense grade to a felony of the second degree where the defendant was “convicted” of any felony offense enumerated in subsection (b). Id. § 6105(a.l)(l).
In 2011, Appellee was convicted, among other things, of a Section 6105 offense, apparently based upon his possession of a firearm and the fact of a previous juvenile adjudication in 2005 for conduct which would give rise to an aggravated assault conviction if committed by an adult.
The sentencing court found this to be appropriate, premised on a different rationale.
Furthermore, the Superior Court noted that a specific distinction is made, internally within the terms of Section 6105, between convictions and juvenile adjudications. For example, the statute initially keys the firearms prohibition to convictions, then separately extends the proscription, per subsection (c)(7), to certain individuals who have been adjudicated delinquent. Indeed, according to the intermediate court’s rationale, acceptance of the Commonwealth’s position would render subsection (c)(7) entirely superfluous. See Hale, 85 A.3d at 582 (“[Sjubsection (c)’s inclusion of juvenile adjudications subjecting a person to violations of the persons not to possess a firearm crime would be unnecessary if convictions under subsection (b) subsumed delinquent acts.”); accord Commonwealth v. Thomas, 743 A.2d 460, 468 (Pa.Super.1999) (holding that adjudications of delinquency were not convictions for purposes of a recidivist sentencing statute).
The Superior Court acknowledged this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Baker, 531 Pa. 541, 614 A.2d 663 (1992), which held that juvenile adjudications are admissible in capital sentencing proceedings in support of the aggravating circumstance that a defendant “has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9). The court reasoned, however, that the provision of the Juvenile Act distinguishing adjudications and convictions was enacted after Baker’s issuance; the capital sentencing regime entails the application of discretion in the fact-finding process; juvenile proceedings lack the trappings of criminal trials; and post-Baker proceedings have continued to distinguish between convictions and juvenile adjudications. See Hale, 85 A.3d at 584; accord Thomas, 743 A.2d at 465-68. While recognizing that sentencing courts may consider prior delinquency adjudications when selecting the
The Commonwealth sought allowance of appeal, which was granted to consider whether the Superior Court erred “by contradicting this Court’s precedent holding that prior adjudications of delinquency are relevant at sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Hale, 631 Pa. 458, 113 A.3d 1228 (2014) (per curiam ). Our review of this legal issue is plenary.
Presently, the Commonwealth vigorously maintains that Baker establishes a broad-scale, bright-line rule “that adjudications of delinquency are convictions for purposes of sentencing.” Brief for Appellant at 8. The Commonwealth highlights that Section 6105 repeatedly was amended after Baker’s issuance, yet the Legislature did not indicate that it intended a contrary approach to apply in the Section 6105 context. According to the Commonwealth, we should presume that the General Assembly intended the term “conviction” to subsume adjudications in all subsequent statutes addressing sentencing. See id. at 11 (citing, inter alia, Hunt v. PSP, 603 Pa. 156, 173 n. 15, 983 A.2d 627, 637 n. 15 (2009) (explaining that, “when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject intends the same construction to be placed upon such language”)). Furthermore, the Commonwealth observes, the Assembly otherwise has sanctioned the use of juvenile adjudications in sentencing, inter alia, by acquiescing in sentencing guidelines that require them to be used to calculate prior record scores for adult offenders. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) (requiring sentencing courts to consider guidelines for sentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing); 204 Pa.Code § 303.6(a) (explicitly providing for counting of certain “[pjrior juvenile adjudications” within a defendant’s Prior Record Score in discretionary sentencing determinations). The Commonwealth additionally complains
Appellee, on the other hand, contends that this appeal is based upon a false premise interposed by the Commonwealth, ie., that the Superior Court held that previous juvenile adjudications are irrelevant at sentencing. See Hale, 631 Pa. at 459, 113 A.Sd at 1228 (per curiam) (reflecting the question presented as framed by the Commonwealth in its allocatur petition). Rather, Appellee explains that the intermediate court explicitly held that previous adjudications of delinquency are relevant to certain aspects of sentencing. See, e.g., Hale, 85 A.3d at 585 (“[T]he court may sentence [Appellee] more harshly due to his prior juvenile record, but it must do so within the confines of a misdemeanor of the first-degree offense.”).
On the merits, Appellee’s arguments adhere closely to the Superior Court’s rationale. He highlights the explicit distinction, made within Section 6105’s own terms, between juvenile adjudication and convictions; the Juvenile Act’s specific admonition that an adjudication “is not a conviction,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6354(a); and the principle of statutory construction requiring penal provisions to be construed narrowly, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1). Appellee distinguishes Baker as discrete to the capital sentencing arena, involving a discretionary sentencing determination as opposed to a mandatory enhancement, and pertaining to a sentencing regime which does not internally distinguish between adjudications and convictions. Appellee observes that this Court has been careful to discuss Baker’s holding in terms specific to the death-penalty regime. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 330, 865 A.2d 761, 795 (2004) (discussing the Baker holding as pertaining “[i]n the context of the Death Penalty Statute” and “for purposes of
Finally, Appellee alludes to this author’s concern, as expressed in other cases, that Baker’s approach does not represent a narrow construction of the term “conviction,” as is peculiarly required under federal constitutional principles regulating capital punishment. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 20 n.4 (citing Commonwealth v. Daniels, 628 Pa. 193, 285-86 n. 3, 104 A.3d 267, 322 n. 3 (2014) (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting)). Although Appellee maintains that it is unnecessary to address Baker on its own terms in order to resolve the present dispute, he asserts that “it is a decision ripe for reconsideration, for all the reasons stated by Chief Justice Saylor in Daniels as well as in the dissenting opinions of Justices Nix and Cappy” in Baker. Id.
Upon review, we agree with the Superior Court and Appel-lee on all of the material points discussed above. As noted, Baker arose in the context of a discretionary sentencing determination—not a mandatory grading enhancement—and certainly not an enhancement reposited within a statute that, on its terms, expressly distinguishes between convictions and adjudications.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently discussed considerations relevant to determining the constitutionally appropriate range of legal consequences attaching to the acts of minors in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464-68, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (touching upon a litany of empirical information supporting the Court’s conclusion that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purpose of sentencing”). As a corollary, the case highlights the substantial policy considerations involved in determining culpability and the boundaries of attendant legal consequences for the actions of minors. In Pennsylvania, subject to the limits of the Constitution, such matters are generally reserved, in the first instance, to the General Assembly. See, e.g., Lance, 624 Pa. at 264-65 & n. 26, 85 A.3d at 454 & n. 26 (recognizing that the General Assembly’s ability to examine social policy issues and to balance competing considerations is superior to that of the judicial branch). For this reason, as well, we decline to superimpose the policy considerations underlying the Baker decision onto the mandatory enhancement requirement repo-sited in Section 6105(a.l)(l).
Here, we agree with the Superior Court and Appellee that the plain language of Section 6105(a.l)(l) should be enforced according to its terms. While this author maintains his own reservations about Baker, the present case is resolved more simply.
We hold that the concept of convictions, as embodied in Section 6105, does not encompass juvenile adjudications.
The order of the Superior Court is affirmed.
Justices EAKIN and BAER and TODD join this opinion.
Justice STEVENS files a dissenting opinion.
. Parenthetically, subsection (a.l)(l) extends the same treatment to persons convicted of a felony under the Controlled Substance, Drug,
. The one exception pertains to violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, which gives rise to the firearms disability where punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(3), and also to the subsection (a.l)(l) enhancement when the drug crime was a felony, see id. § 6105(a.l)(l).
. The trial record presented to the Court is not clear as to the basis for the Section 6105 conviction, given that the transcribed jury instructions provided in the original record submission do not reference the offense. See N.T., September 30, 2011, at 34-63. It is unclear whether a supplemental charge ensued, since the proceedings carried over to another day, but no corresponding transcript has been provided.
. The arguments on this point were apparently developed during an off-the-record proceeding alluded to at the sentencing hearing. See N.T., December 19, 2011, at 4.
. The court reasoned, in essence, that felony grading was the default requirement per Section 6105. See Commonwealth v. Hale, No. CP-51CR-0007307-2010, slip op. at 15 (C.P.Phila. Jan. 8, 2013). This reasoning has not been pursued by the Commonwealth on appeal and is beyond the scope of the present allocatur grant.
. This Court oftentimes has explained that the holding of a decision must be read against its facts. See, e.g., Lance v. Wyeth, 624 Pa. 231, 264, 85 A.3d 434, 453 (2014).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s decision to affirm the Superior Court’s order holding that a defendant’s past
This Court has held that a conviction is defined as “the ascertainment of the guilt of the accused and judgment thereon by the court.” Commonwealth v. Kimmel, 528 Pa. 107, 565 A.2d 426, 428 (1989). However, in the context of the Death Penalty Statute, this Court has accorded the term a broader reach, encompassing instances in which there has been a finding of guilt, even though a judgment of sentence has not yet been imposed. Commonwealth v. Beasley, 505 Pa. 279, 479 A.2d 460 (1984). A juvenile delinquency adjudication, which involves a finding that a juvenile committed a criminal act, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a), (b), has been treated as a conviction at the sentencing phase of a death penalty case to establish an aggravating circumstance.
The Commonwealth requests that this Court give the word “convicted” the same meaning in the instant statute as we have in the Death Penalty Statute. I agree with the Commonwealth’s viewpoint in this regard, and therefore, I would reverse the Superior Court’s order.
. 42 Pa.C.S, § 9711(d)(9) provides that, in death penalty cases, the following shall be considered an aggravating circumstance: "The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.”