COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DARRYL RICHARD
No. 282 EDA 2019
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
September 11, 2020
2020 PA Super 222
McCAFFERY, J.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.:
FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2020
The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting in part a motion to suppress evidence filed by Darryl Richard (Appellee). The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in suppressing evidence recovered from a vehicle because the officers possessed probable cause to search the vehicle. Because we agree the initial traffic stop of Appellee was proper, and Appellee‘s nervous behavior coupled with the strong smell of marijuana еmanating from his vehicle provided the requisite probable cause to search the vehicle, we reverse the order of the trial court, and remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On November 5, 2017, at approximately 2:10 a.m., Philadelphia Police Officer Abdel Kanan was on patrol in his marked vehicle when he observed a blue Ford traveling eastbound on Kingsessing Avenue. N.T. Suppression Hr‘g,
Officer Kanan approached Appellee, and explained that he was conducting a vehicle investigation. N.T., Suppression Hr‘g, at 8. Appellee “appeared nervous, he couldn‘t tell [Officer Kanan] the address he was going to[, and] was pointing to different houses on the block.” Id. at 9. As Officer Kanan approached Appellee, he smelled the odor of marijuana on Appellee, but did not ask him about it. Id. at 9, 10-11. When Appellee asked Officer Kanan why he was stopped, the officer informed him that “the vehicle came back unregistered and [Appellee] pulled into a parking spot without using a turn signal[.]” Id. at 9. Officer Kanan asked Appellee who owned the car, and Appellee responded that he had paperwork for it. Id. at 10.
Officer Kanan then asked Appellee to go back to the vehicle and retrieve the paperwork. N.T., Suppression Hr‘g, at 10. As soon as Appellee opened the car door, “[Officer Kanan] smelled more marijuana coming from inside the
Appellee was subsequently charged with possession of marijuana, possession of an instrument of crime, and violations of the Uniform Firearms Act.1 On June 29, 2018, Appellee filed a motion to suppress all physical evidence recovered during the encounter, as well as his statement to the officers, claiming that the officers did not have probable cause to stop and
The Commonwealth presents one issue for our review:
Did the lower court misapply the law in suppressing the gun and drugs found in the unregistered car [Appellee] was driving where police lawfully stopped him for violating the motor vehicle code, he smelled of marijuana, he was behaving nervously, an even stronger smell of marijuana emanated from the car, and [Appellee] admitted he had marijuana on his person?
Commonwealth‘s Brief at 4.
Our standard of review is as follows:
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant‘s witnesses together with the
evidеnce of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court‘s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court‘s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 56 A.3d 1276, 1278-79 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court misapplied the law, and failed to address whether the warrantless search of the car was justified by probable cause. Commonwealth‘s Brief at 9-15. Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that the officers’ аctions were justified during each stage of their interaction with Appellee.
First, Commonwealth maintains that the officer‘s traffic stop was justified due to the officer witnessing two traffic violations by Appellee. Commonwealth‘s Brief at 10. Appellee first turned into a parking lane without using a turn signal, in violation of Section 3334 of the Motor Vehicle Codе (MVC). Id. See
Second, the Commonwealth argues the search of Appellee‘s car was supported by probable cause. Commonwealth‘s Brief at 11. The
As noted above, the trial court granted Appellee‘s motion to suppress the evidence recovered inside his vehicle, but denied the motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his person, as well as his voluntary statement made outside of the vehicle. In its opinion, the court concluded that Appellee‘s failure to signal before pulling into a parking spot was not, in fact, “a violation under the MVC that would amount to probable cause to stop a vehicle.” Trial
We begin with a brief discussion of the vehicle stop. A police officer‘s statutory authority to stop a motor vehicle is codified in Sectiоn 6308(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code, which provides:
Whenever a police officer . . . has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle‘s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehiclе identification number or engine number or the driver‘s license, or to secure such other information as the officer may be reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
We note that the trial court‘s opinion focuses solely on whether Officer Kanan had probable cause to stop Apрellee‘s vehicle for a turn signal violation. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5. However, it is clear from the testimony at the suppression hearing that the officer did not activate his lights and siren until
Next, we must determine whether thе warrantless search of the vehicle was proper. Generally, “a search conducted without a warrant is presumed to be unreasonable unless it can be justified under a recognized exception to the search warrant requirement.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 188 A.3d 454, 457 (Pa. Super 2018) (citation omitted). One such exception exists when a police officer possesses probable cause to search a lawfully stopped motor vehicle. Id. at 457-58. See also Gary, 91 A.3d at 138 (“The prerequisite for a warrantless search of a motor vehicle is probable cause to search; no exigency beyond the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle is required.“).
Thus, we proceed to an examination of whether such probable cause existed in the present case.
The level of probable cause necessary for warrantless searches of automobiles is the same as that required to obtain a search warrant. The well-established standard for evaluating whether probable cause exists is the “totality of the circumstances” test. This test allows for a flexible, common-sense approach to all circumstances presented. Probable cause typically exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer‘s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. The evidence required to establish probable cause for a warrantless search must be more than a mere suspicion or a good faith belief on the part of the police officer.
Commonwealth v. Lechner, 685 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citations omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Stoner, 344 A.2d 633 (Pa. Super. 1975), this Court first set forth the doctrine of plain smell. In that case, a state trooper stopped the defendant-driver because of a traffic violation. Id. at 633. Threе co-defendants were passengers in the car at that time. Id. “Upon request, [the defendant-driver] produced his operator‘s license, but when one of the passengers opened the glove compartment to take out the vehicle registration card, a .38 caliber semi-automatic pistol dropped out as the passеnger reached into the compartment.” Id. The trooper then arrested all four occupants of the vehicle for a violation of the Uniform Firearms Act. Id. at 634. When the trooper returned to the car to retrieve the pistol, he noted “a very distinct odor of marijuana about the interior of the vehicle.” Id. “The trooper testified that he was very familiar with marijuana, and although he saw numerous marijuana seeds and leaves on the floor, seats, and clothing in the car, he was certain that the odor was too strong to be coming from the
On appeal, this Court concluded the warrantless search of the trunk was permissible, finding probable cause existed based on the following factors present in that particular case – marijuana seeds and leaves on the car floor in plain view, and the strong smell of marijuana coming from inside the car. Id. at 635. See also Commonwealth v. Stainbrook, 471 A.2d 1223, 1225 (Pa. Super. 1984) (holding police officer was justified in conducting seаrch of vehicle after observing furtive behavior of occupant and detecting odor of burning marijuana); Commonwealth v. Trenge, 451 A.2d 701, 705, 710 (Pa. Super. 1982) (observations by “highly trained and experienced police officer” of marijuana pipe stem protruding from defendant‘s pocket, in addition to the odor of burning marijuana in defendant‘s immediate vicinity, provided officer with probable cause to arrest).
In the present case, we conclude Officer Kanan had probable cause to search Appellee‘s vehicle. The officer testified that while Appellee was speaking to him, “[Appellee] appeared nervous, he couldn‘t tell [Officer Kanan] the address he was going to[, and Appellee] was pointing to different houses on the block.” N.T., Suppression H‘rg, at 9. Moreover, although Officer Kanan first detected an odor of marijuana on Appellee outside the vehicle, he testified the odor was “stronger” inside the vehicle. Id. at 43.
Accordingly, because we conclude the trial court erred in granting, in part, Appellee‘s prеtrial motion to suppress, we reverse the order on appeal and remand for further proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/11/20