COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. BYRON LAWRENCE
No. 928 EDA 2023
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MAY 30, 2024
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Aрpeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 1, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1100011-1991
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:
Byron Lawrence appeals pro se from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on March 1, 2023, dismissing his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA“),
On April 29, 1993, following a jury trial, Lawrence was convicted of multiple counts of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, first-degree murder, and related offenses. Following the denial of post-verdict motions, the trial court sentenced Lawrence to life imprisonment. We affirmed the
In May 1998, Lawrence filed his first PCRA petition, pro se. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition. The PCRA court subsequently denied the PCRA petition as lacking merit. We affirmed the denial, and our Supreme Court later denied allowance of appeal. Subsequent petitions filed in 2001 and 2010 were dismissed as untimely and affirmed by this Court on appeal.
On May 17, 2021, Lawrence filed the instant fourth pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant to
Prior to reaching the merits of Lawrence‘s claims on appeal, we must first consider the timeliness of his PCRA pеtition. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014).
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner‘s judgment of sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the three exceptions outlined in
42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1) . A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of the time for seeking such review. The PCRA‘s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three exceptions.
Lawrence‘s judgment of sentence became final in 1997, ninety days after his petition for allowance of appeal was dеnied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, when time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court expired. The instant petition - filed more than two decades later - is patently untimely. Therefore, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review Lawrence‘s petition unless he was ablе to successfully plead and prove one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA‘s time-bar. See
The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitutiоn or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
[a]lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rulеs of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251-52 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
Even liberally construed, Lawrence has failed to plead and prove that any of his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. Lawrence provided six paragraphs in support of his assertion that the claims raised in his petition are timely and properly before the court. Those paragraphs, reproduced verbatim, state as follows:
(6) Petitioners current petition is untimely on it‘s face. However, the proffered Newly Discovered facts is of such that can be litigated in an untimely PCRA petition in the interest of justice.
(7) This Petition is being filed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543 (a)(2)(iv) and 9545(b)(2)(ii) and is timely as it is filed within the one year of the date on which the exculpatory evidence herein was discovered. In addition to the timeliness factor, on October 27,2018, Governor Wolfe signed into Law Senate Bill 915 expanding the exception for filing claim based on previously unknown facts to one year from the date the claim could have been presented. Here, Newly-Discovered factual evidence is asserted by Petitioner.
(8) Petitiоner received notice of the proffered evidence on June 2020, from Co-defendant Eric Rogers from S.C.I. Mahony, who mailed transmitted proffered evidence of an affidavit of
Christopher Lester. Statement of Christopher Lester dated December 30th 2020 attached hereto as Exhibit “A“. (9) Petitioner also received notice of additional proffered exculpatory evidence on June 5, 2020, from Darryl Rain who mailed the transmitted proffered exculpatory evidence of an affidavit of himself on June 11, 2020, Statement of Darryl Raines attached hereto.Exhibit “B“.
(10) Petitioners PCRA petition is timely filed as it was filed within the one year of the discovery of a previously unavailability of two witnesses, whom are willing to come forth and testify as petitioners actual innocence, and in Mr.Raines account, He was threaten by aPhiladelphia Polce Detctive.
(11) Petitioners claims fit within subsection (a)(2)(i) since а violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth and the Constitution of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.
PCRA Petition, 5/17/21, at 5-6.
Lawrence asserts he meets the requirements of
First, Lawrence provides an affidavit from his co-defendant, Eric Rogers, in which Rogers states he is forwarding an affidavit that he received from Christopher Laster in December 2019. Rogers states he is forwarding the аffidavit to Lawrence because Laster‘s affidavit “shows both of our actual innocence from crimes that we are in prison for.” PCRA Petition, 5/27/21, at Exhibit A.
In his affidavit, Laster states that a fellow inmate, Byron Wise, admitted to him that Wise and another individual by the name of “Ray-Ray were the actual shooters involved in thе crimes Lawrence and Rogers were convicted of. See id. Laster claims Wise told him “the police mixed him up with [] Lawrence because [] Lawrence lived across the street on the same block as [] Wise and looked alike with the same name.” Id.
Lawrence filed his petition after learning about Laster‘s claims of Wise and “Ray-Ray” being the shooters, as outlined in the Rogers/Laster affidavit. However, the affidavit itself is not a new fact. See Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1269; Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 745 (Pa. Super. 2020). The actual “fact” for purposes of
It is clear from a review of the record that the affidavit is merely a new conduit for information already known by Lawrencе. The underlying assertion that Lawrence was not the shooter is not a “new fact” to Lawrence, as that has been the defense theory since trial. The specific argument that Wise, and “Ray-Ray“, i.e. Ray Adams, were the actual shooters was included in Lawrence‘s first three PCRA petitions. See PCRA Petition, 5/5/1998, at 2; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended PCRA Petition, 5/15/2001, at 10; see also PCRA Petition, 7/15/2010, at Exhibit A; see also Amended PCRA Petition, 12/20/2010, at Exhibit B.
Accordingly, Lawrence‘s allegation of a newly discovered fact based on the Rogers/Laster affidavit does not qualify his petition for an exception to the PCRA‘s time-bar.
Next, Lawrence attempts to invoke the newly-discovered fact exception based on an affidavit from Darryl Raines, in which Raines states that Lawrence was not at the scene of the crime because Lawrence was with Raines all day helping friends move. See PCRA petition, 5/27/21, at Exhibit B. Raines also
Here, the first “fact” for purposes of
Notably, Lawrence makes it clear that he did not offer Raines‘s affidavit to prove there was an alibi witness who was willing to testify. Rather, he claims on appeal that the affidavit was solely offered to establish a Brady1 viоlation, referring to the alleged witness intimidation committed by the police against Raines.
Lawrence appears to rely entirely on Raines’ unsubstantiated claim that police officers threatened Raines not to testify on the day of trial in order prove
indefinite period to raise that claim by invocation of the government interference exсeption.
“Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with thе exercise of due diligence.” Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1268 (citation omitted);
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i) . “In other words, a petitioner is required to show that but for the interference of a government actor he could not have filed his claim earlier.” Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing Stokes, 959 A.2d at 310)).
Lawrence fails to allege that government officials impeded him in any way from presenting a claim cognizable under the PCRA within the required time frame.
Lawrence also failed to explain why he could not have obtained the information earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Lawrence states he had no way of contacting Raines after his failure to appear at trial as an alibi witness. However, Lawrence fails to explain why he and his attorney had no means or avenue to contact Raines.
It is simply not clear to us why it was not possible for him to secure an affidavit for over two decades from Raines, a witness he has admittedly known about since trial. As Raines was a friend of his, it is unclear why he, or a friend
In any event, even if we are to believe Lawrenсe was unable to get in touch with Rogers and Raines on his own, Lawrence still fails to demonstrate due diligence in obtaining either affidavit. Almost three decades have passed since Lawrence‘s convictions. Lawrence states that in 2009, with the help of family and friends, he constructed a flyer enlisting the рublic‘s help with any information related to the June 29, 1989 shooting. Lawrence claims this process resulted in many affidavits being sent to him over the years, including the affidavits from Rogers, Laster, and Raines. However, Lawrence does not explain why he was not able to create the flyers in the decade between his conviction and when he started printing the flyers in 2009, or for that matter, why he was unable to search for information in any other way in that past decade.
As the PCRA court properly concluded Lawrence‘s PCRA petition was untimely and does not fall under an exception to the PCRA time bar, we affirm the PCRA court‘s order dismissing the petition.
Order affirmed.
Judge Beck joins the memorandum.
Judge Nichols concurs in the result.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/30/2024
Notes
As this claim was not raised in Lawrence‘s PCRA petition, it is waived. See Burton, 936 A.2d at 525; see also
There are three components of a true Brady violation: [t]he evidence must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 25-26 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). The burden rests on the defendant to “prove, by reference to the record, that evidence was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Porter, 728 A.2d 890, 898 (Pa. 1999).
At no point does Lawrence suggest that the prosecutor knew or should have known that the Commonwealth knew of the alleged witness intimidation, much less that “the police scared [Raines] into not testifying” and withheld that information from Lawrence.