COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. EDWARD N. DANIELS
No. 2525 EDA 2017
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FILED JULY 19, 2018
J-S19019-18
SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT, J.*
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37; Appeal from the PCRA Order July 11, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012194-2009, CP-51-CR-0012199-2009; * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:
Appellant Edwards N. Daniels appeals pro se from the order dismissing as untimely his second petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
This Court previously set forth the facts of this case as follows:
During daylight hours on June 27, 2009, at the Piazza Navona apartments, located in [the] Northern Liberties section of Philadelphia, [Appellant] and co-defendants entered the building with semi-automatic weapons with the intention to carry out a robbery. Each floor of the apartment building contained surveillance cameras, which captured practically every move of
[Appellant] and his co-defendants, Keith Epps and Antonio Wright, and the murders of Rian Thal and Timothy Gilmore. Rian Thal was a party promoter, but was also involved in the selling of powder cocaine. She was specifically targeted because word had gotten out that she was to receive a shipment of approximately one half million dollars’ worth of powder cocaine, which amounted to eleven or twelve kilos of powder cocaine, which was being transported from Texas to Philadelphia.3 The two drug couriers, Timothy Gilmore and Edward Emerson, transported the drugs by way of a tractor-trailer to Philadelphia. On the Friday before the murders, Leon Woodard was moving the cocaine into Ms. Thal‘s apartment on the seventh floor of the Piazza Navona. Accompanying Mr. Woodard was a man named Vernon Williams who Ms. Thal did not permit into her apartment because she did not trust him. At trial, Mr. Woodard testified that Mr. Williams left his cell phone in Mr. Woodard‘s vehicle. After the murders occurred, Mr. Woodard saw text messages between Mr. Williams and Mr. Wright that indicated Mr. Woodard was being set up.6 Unbeknownst to Ms. Thal or Mr. Woodard, Mr. Williams contacted co-defendant, Mr. Epps, about the shipment of cocaine and the drug money tied to its purchase and a plan was hatched to steal it.
Mr. Epps then contacted a friend named Katoya Jones, who lived in the building, and asked her to help him enter the apartment in exchange for a cut of the profits should the robbery scheme succeed.7 [At] [a]pproximately 3:30 a.m., that Saturday, the 27th, the day of the murders, Mr. Epps called Ms. Jones to let him and his friend, Robert Keith, into the building. This attempted burglary failed because Mr. Epps and Mr. Keith entered the wrong apartment.
Instead of taking that as a sign that the scheme would go awry, the next afternoon, at about 2:00 p.m., Mr. Epps called Ms. Jones again to tell her to allow a friend of his into the building within the next hour. Mr. Epps had planned the robbery with three men, Donnell Murchison, Langdon Scott, and [Appellant]. Around 3:00 p.m., Ms. Jones opened the locked door for Mr. Murchison; Mr. Murchison then opened the door for Mr. Epps and Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott was under the impression that he was buying $4,500 worth of powder cocaine.
According to the testimony of Mr. Scott, once all three men were in the elevator,9 Mr. Murchison informed Mr. Scott that when he
went to buy the drugs from Mr. Gilmore and Ms. Thal, Mr. Murchison and [Appellant] were going to rob them. At that point, Mr. Scott decided not to go through with the buy and all three of them left the apartment building to report back to Mr. Epps, who was sitting in a white van outside of the apartment building. While Mr. Murchison waited outside of the van, Mr. Scott and [Appellant] entered the van to talk with Mr. Epps. A friend of Mr. Epps, Caesar Holloway, told him that he would take Mr. Scott home and get a replacement, who turned out to be co-defendant Wright. Around 5:00 p.m., Mr. Wright, [Appellant], and Mr. Murchison entered the Piazza Navona and proceeded to the seventh floor to wait for Ms. Thal and Mr. Gilmore to return. Mr. Wright and Mr. Daniels went to one end of the hallway while Mr. Murchison went to the other in order to box in the victims. Mr. Epps called Mr. Murchison as the two entered the apartment building. As Ms. Thal and Mr. Gilmore exited the elevator, [Appellant] and his co-defendants pulled out guns and announced a robbery. When Mr. Gilmore resisted, Mr. Wright shot him. Mr. Murchison then shot Ms. Thal behind the head killing her instantly. As the three men exited the building, Mr. Murchison noticed that Mr. Gilmore was still alive and shot him twice in the head killing him. All of the men then entered Mr. Epps’ van, and fled the scene without the money or the drugs. Police later discovered four kilos of cocaine and over $100,000 in Ms. Thal‘s apartment.
Later that evening police identified Ms. Jones as a person of interest because she was observed on a surveillance video opening the doors for Mr. Murchison twice. Initially, Ms. Jones lied to police about being involved in the incident and was freed. However, police picked her up again once police reviewed another surveillance video, which showed her letting Mr. Keith into the building. Upon being taken into custody, Ms. Jones gave a statement to the detectives and later pleaded guilty to two counts of third-degree murder, one count of conspiracy, two counts of robbery in the first-degree, and one count of burglary.
Police used Ms. Jones’ cell phone records and learned that she and Mr. Epps had been in contact with one another. After police obtained Mr. Epps’ cell phone records, the detectives found numerous phone calls to the individuals involved: [Appellant], Mr. Wright, Mr. Scott, Mr. Murchison, Mr. Holloway, and Ms. Jones. According to Detective Ron Dove of the Homicide Unit, on the day of the murders, June 27th of 2009, Mr. Holloway and
Mr. Epps communicated with each other 53 times, Mr. Williams and Mr. Epps 34 times, Mr. Keith and Mr. Epps spoke 52 times, Ms. Jones and Mr. Epps spoke to each other 29 times, Mr. Scott and Mr. Epps communicated with each other 11 times, Mr. Wright and Mr. Epps spoke with each other 4 times, and 36 communications were made between Mr. Murchison and Mr. Epps.10 The detective was unable to find any calls placed between Mr. Epps and [Appellant]. The investigation continued and ballistic tests revealed that the bullets in Mr. Gilmore and Ms. Thal‘s heads belonged to the weapon used by Mr. Murchison. Detectives also arrested Mr. Wright, and he confessed to being involved in the conspiracy to commit the robbery and shooting Mr. Gilmore multiple times. He did not mention anyone else involved in the murders. During trial, surveillance tapes shown to Mr. Scott allowed him to identify Mr. Murchison and [Appellant] as the men with whom he entered the building. After giving testimony at a preliminary hearing, Mr. Scott was stabbed numerous times in prison.11
In addition thereto, at trial Mr. Woodard identified Mr. Wright in a surveillance video; Ms. Jones identified Mr. Wright, as well as, Mr. Epps and Mr. Halloway as being part of the criminal conspiracy. Testimony from Mr. Murchison was stricken from the record after he refused to undergo cross-examination.12
[Appellant]‘s probation officer, Akaga Campbell, testified and identified [Appellant] as one of the men depicted on the surveillance video and still photographs from the video. She based her opinion on [Appellant]‘s recognizable facial features and choice of clothing. During cross-examination she testified that from February of 2009, until his arrest on July 10, 2009, she saw the [Appellant] four to six times a month.
On December 1, 2011, following several days of trial, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of each of second-degree murder, robbery — serious bodily injury, and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. Appellant was also convicted of one count of carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia. On that same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment for the second-degree murder convictions. The trial court also imposed concurrent terms of ten to twenty years’ incarceration for the conspiracy convictions, and a concurrent term of two and a half to five years’ incarceration for the firearm conviction. The
Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. On December 19, 2011, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a mistrial and in admitting the identification testimony of his probation officer. See Daniels, 2013 WL 11253764, at *4. Appellant also argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of two counts of conspiracy. Id. This Court affirmed Appellant‘s convictions but vacated one count of conspiracy as the evidence demonstrated only one single continuing conspiracy. Id. at *8. We did not remand for resentencing, however, as vacatur of one of the concurrent conspiracy sentences did not affect the overall sentencing scheme. Id. Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on February 19, 2014.
On April 14, 2014, the PCRA court docketed Appellant‘s first pro se PCRA petition. The court appointed counsel who filed an amended PCRA petition on May 25, 2015. On January 19, 2016, the PCRA court filed a notice of intent to dismiss Appellant‘s petition pursuant to
On June 16, 2017, the PCRA court filed a notice of intent to dismiss Appellant‘s second PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to
On July 3, 2017, Appellant filed a response to the court‘s Rule 907 notice. In Appellant‘s response, he stated that he invoked the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA time bar alleging as newly-discovered facts the guilty plea and allegations of misconduct of Detectives Dove, Jenkins, and Pitts. See Resp. to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 7/3/17, at 1-2. He claimed that under Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017), the presumption of knowledge as to information in public records does not apply to him. Resp. to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 7/3/17, at 2.
On July 11, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed his petition. Appellant timely appealed. The PCRA court did not order a
During the pendency of this appeal, Appellant filed pro se application for remand which this Court received on January 10, 2018. Appellant claimed he received additional new evidence regarding Detective Pitts.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
- Whether [Appellant] sufficiently pled an exception to the time-bar to excuse the filing of his PCRA [p]etition after the date his judgment became final[.]
- Whether [Appellant] can demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on the basis of newly-discovered evidence[.]
Appellant‘s Brief at 4.
Our standard of review from the dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to “whether the record supports the PCRA court‘s determination and whether the PCRA court‘s decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
Courts may consider a PCRA petition filed more than one year after a judgment of sentence became final only if the petitioner pleads and proves one of the following three statutory exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
Because Appellant failed to file the instant PCRA petition within one year of his conviction becoming final,2 he must satisfy one of the exceptions to the PCRA time bar. Appellant claims that he meets newly-discovered facts exception. See
I. Newly-Discovered Facts Exception
Appellant argues that he meets the newly-discovered facts exception because he learned of: (1) a guilty plea of one of the detectives involved in his case, Detective Dove; and (2) newspaper articles involving two other detectives involved in his case, Detectives Jenkins and Pitts. Appellant‘s Brief at 10-11.
To successfully raise the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA time bar, a petitioner must show that: (1) “the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown” and (2) the facts “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”
Further, this “new-facts” exception does not require us to analyze the merits of the case or the “underlying after-discovered evidence claim.” Brown, 111 A.3d at 177. “Once jurisdiction has been established, a PCRA petitioner can present a substantive after-discovered-evidence claim.” Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
A. Detective Dove
Appellant claims that Detective Dove “pled guilty to several charges related to assistance he provide[d] to help someone flee from arrest after they committed a murder on April 26, 2017.” Appellant‘s Brief at 10.
Here, Appellant filed the instant petition on June 2, 2017, thirty-seven days after Detective Dove‘s guilty plea on April 26, 2017. Although the Commonwealth and the PCRA court state that Detective Dove was first accused of improprieties in 2013, the new fact Appellant is alleging is the guilty plea. See PCRA Pet., 6/2/17, at 4. While Appellant did not provide when he learned of Detective Dove‘s guilty plea, he still filed his PCRA petition within sixty days of when his claim could have been presented. See
B. Detectives Jenkins and Pitts
Appellant claims that Detectives Jenkins and Pitts “were involved in, at least, three cases in which witnesses, or suspects, were coerced to make statements.” Appellant‘s Brief at 11. He argues that these detectives were involved in “taking statements from codefendants in his case.” Id. He contends that while the articles are dated November 6, 2013, and
Here, Appellant did not provide when he learned of the information regarding these two detectives. Appellant merely states that he “was informed about the articles when discussing his case with another inmate” and that he “heard rumors about the allegations.” Id. at 11, 13. Going by the only dates Appellant provided — November 6, 2013 and September 9, 2016 – Appellant‘s claim is well past the sixty days of when he could have presented this claim. See
II. After-Discovered Evidence Claim
Appellant claims that he is entitled to relief as for his after-discovered evidence claim regarding Detective Dove. He argues that Detective Dove pled guilty on April 26, 2017 and, thus, Appellant could have not learned of this new fact earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Appellant‘s Brief at 15. He claims the evidence will not be merely cumulative or corroborative of other evidence presented at trial because “[t]here was no substantial information presented at trial to undermine the detective[‘]s credibility and reliability of [his] investigation.” Id. Appellant contends that he will not present this evidence for impeachment purposes, rather, to undermine the reliability of the investigation. Id. at 16. Finally, Appellant contends, the evidence will likely return a different verdict if a new trial were granted because the evidence against him is not overwhelming given that only two witnesses implicated him in the crime. Id.
Here, the PCRA court‘s Rule 1925(a) opinion, it explained that even if Appellant had raised his issues in a timely manner, he would not be entitled to relief as to his after-discovered evidence claim. PCRA Ct. Op., 8/15/17, at 6-7. First, the court stated, the accusations against the detective is “years old,” thus, Appellant did not act diligently. Id. at 7. Second, Appellant “failed to provide any indication that the [Detective Dove] altered evidence or committed any wrongdoing in the instant matter.” Id. Third, the court reasoned that Appellant had not indicated how, other than impeachment, he would use the information. Id. at 8. Fourth, the court stated, Appellant “cannot show that the information set forth in his PCRA petition would have let to a different outcome as the Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence of [Appellant]‘s guilt.” Id. “There is not reasonable probability that the information [Appellant] here provided could undermine confidence in his conviction. Id.
While Appellant established that he could not have obtained the information regarding Detective Dove‘s guilty plea earlier through the
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant‘s substantive after-discovered evidence as to Detective Dove claim lacks merit.
Order affirmed. Application for remand denied without prejudice.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/19/18
