Colorado Medical Board, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James Boland, MD, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 16CA1269
Colorado Court of Appeals
March 22, 2018
2018COA39
Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN; Furman, J., concurs; Taubman, J., dissents
City and County of Denver District Court No. 15CV30883; Honorable Ross B.H. Buchanan, Judge. Prior Opinion Announced January 18, 2018, WITHDRAWN. OPINION PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED AS “NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)” ON January 18, 2018, IS NOW DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
SUMMARY
March 22, 2018
2018COA39
No. 16CA1269, Colo. Med. Bd. v. Boland — Administrative Law — State Administrative Procedure Act — Colorado Sunshine Act — Open Meetings Law — Professions and Occupations — Colorado Medical Board — Disciplinary Procedures — Subpoenas
In this subpoena enforcement action, a division of the court of appeals considers whether a subpoena issued by the Colorado Medical Board (Board) in relation to an investigation of a physician‘s medical marijuana recommendations had a lawful purpose. The majority concludes that the subpoena was issued for the lawfully authorized purpose of investigating whether the physician had engaged in unprofessional conduct, even assuming that the subpoena arose from a policy adopted by a different agency in violation of the Open Meetings Law. Accordingly, the majority affirms the district court‘s judgment enforcing the subpoena.
The dissent agrees with the majority in Colorado Medical Board v. McLaughlin, 2018 COA 41, also announced today. Thus, the dissent would reverse the district court‘s judgment enforcing the subpoena because it concludes that the subpoena was issued without lawful purpose and solely as a result of a physician referral policy promulgated in violation of the Open Meetings Law and the State Administrative Procedure Act.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN
Furman, J., concurs
Taubman, J., dissents
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Eric Maxfield, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Hershey Decker PLLC, Carmen N. Decker, Matthew George, Lone Tree, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant
¶ 1 In this subpoena enforcement action, respondent, Dr. James Boland, appeals the district court‘s judgment enforcing a subpoena issued by plaintiff, the Colorado Medical Board (Board). The Board issued the subpoena after the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) referred Dr. Boland to the Board. On appeal, Dr. Boland contends the Board subpoena was not issued for a lawful purpose because CDPHE adopted the policy prompting the Board‘s
¶ 2 We recognize that another divided division of this court is announcing today Colorado Medical Board v. McLaughlin, 2018 COA 41, reversing the judgment of the district court enforcing a subpoena issued on the basis of the same challenged policy. In McLaughlin, the division concludes that the policy is invalid, and therefore that subpoena lacked a lawful purpose. For the reasons stated herein, we disagree with that analysis.
I. Background
A. The Subpoena
¶ 3 Dr. Boland is a physician licensed to practice in Colorado. In November 2014, Dr. Boland received a subpoena duces tecum from the Board. The subpoena ordered him to produce medical records for patients age thirty or under examined on three particular dates in 2013.
¶ 4 A letter accompanying the subpoena explained that the Board had received information regarding Dr. Boland‘s conduct as a physician and a possible violation of the Medical Practice Act. The letter requested a response from Dr. Boland within thirty days.
¶ 5 The letter also noted that the Board had received a complaint from CDPHE related to Dr. Boland‘s medical marijuana recommendations. Specifically, the letter stated that “the Medical Marijuana Registry‘s physician referral policy dictate[d] that [CDPHE] will refer physicians who are above the approved threshold for one or more of” three enumerated criteria: (1) a caseload of 3521 medical marijuana patient recommendations per year; (2) recommendations of an increased plant count for more than thirty percent of patients; or (3) a patient caseload in which over one-third is under the age of thirty. According to the letter, CDPHE referred Dr. Boland to the Board for investigation on the basis of the last two criteria.
¶ 6 When he received the subpoena and letter, Dr. Boland was unaware of any “physician referral policy.” He sent a written objection to the Board, arguing that CDPHE‘s referral policy was invalidly adopted. On that basis, Dr. Boland refused to produce the subpoenaed records.
¶ 7 In March 2015, the Board filed an application for an order enforcing the subpoena, citing
B. CDPHE and the Board
¶ 8 Pursuant to an executive order signed by Colorado‘s governor, CDPHE is the health agency designated to manage Colorado‘s medical marijuana program. See
¶ 9 For example, CDPHE must promulgate rules to establish a confidential registry of patients who are entitled to receive a medical marijuana identification card.
¶ 10 The Board is a body created by the Medical Practice Act.
C. Development of the Physician Referral Policy
¶ 11 After receiving the subpoena and accompanying letter, Dr. Boland filed a Colorado Open Records Act request with CDPHE, the Board, and the Department of Regulatory Agencies, asking for public records related to the drafting of the physician referral policy. In response, the Board produced internal communications detailing the policy‘s evolution and adoption.
¶ 12 The correspondence revealed that in the fall of 2013, based on a recent state audit, “CDPHE officials reached out to the Board requesting assistance in developing reporting parameters for medical marijuana prescribers.” The Board and Office of Investigations (OI) (a subdivision of the Department of Regulatory Agencies) worked with CDPHE to identify and define potential reporting criteria. An email states that after a period of extended silence from CDPHE, the Board and OI took a leadership role and “frequently circled back” with CDPHE to promote progression of the project. CDPHE subsequently adopted an internal policy based on the criteria identified and/or defined by the CDPHE/Board/OI workgroup.
¶ 13 On May 15, 2014, CDPHE issued the physician referral policy, titled “Medical Marijuana Policy Number 2014-01” (Policy 2014-01). The policy states CDPHE will refer physicians to the Board for investigation based on the number of patients, the amount of marijuana recommended, and the age of the patients.
¶ 14 Dr. Boland alleges, and the Board does not dispute, that the policy was not available to the public until April 2015, nearly a year later, and that no public meeting was ever held on Policy 2014-01.
D. Related Litigation
¶ 15 In addition to the instant case, several other pending actions have challenged the validity of Policy 2014-01. Six other subpoena enforcement actions have been filed against individual physicians who were referred to the Board based on Policy 2014-01. Five of these cases have been stayed pending this appeal. The sixth action has been separately appealed to this court. Another division of this court decides that case today. McLaughlin, 2018 COA 41.
¶ 16 Dr. Boland and eight other physicians have directly challenged the validity of Policy 2014-01 in yet another action. In that case, however, the district court, in an order entered by Judge Hoffman on October 14, 2015, dismissed the relevant claims against the Board, stating as follows:
This claim fails because the secret policy at issue was, by plaintiff‘s own description, a policy involving the CDPHE‘s referral of cases to [the Board] for investigation. That is, it was CDPHE‘s policy, not [the Board‘s] policy. If this policy was in fact unlawfully adopted and is ultimately declared void, any injunctive relief would necessarily be aimed at CDPHE to prohibit it from referring cases to [the Board] under the void policy. Nothing at all about the policy prevents [the Board] from initiating
its own investigations based on whatever information that come to it from whatever source, proper or improper.
¶ 17 The district court in that case later ruled, in October 2016, that Policy 2014-01 was void and enjoined CDPHE from referring physicians to the Board under the policy. That decision is also the subject of an appeal to this court. See John Does v. Colo. Dep‘t of Pub. Health & Env‘t, No. 16CA2011 (Colo. App. filed Nov. 22, 2016).
¶ 18 However, in discussing available relief in that order, the district judge referred to Judge Hoffman‘s previous order dismissing the Board from the case, stating that it agreed with Judge Hoffman‘s analysis, finding “no case law or authority to support the position that this Court can or should order the Board to halt any investigations that were initiated as a result of those [CDPHE] referrals.”
E. District Court Opinion
¶ 19 In its order in this case enforcing the Board‘s subpoena, the district court noted that in the proceedings against CDPHE, the other district court had concluded that the alleged violation of the Open Meetings Law involved only CDPHE‘s Policy 2014-01. Because the policy was not promulgated by the Board, nothing about the policy prevents the Board from initiating its own investigations based on whatever information comes to it from whatever source. Accordingly, the court concluded that because the Board has a statutory duty to investigate a licensed physician who engages in unprofessional conduct, and is vested with authority to conduct investigations and issue administrative subpoenas, the subpoena to Dr. Boland was issued for a lawfully authorized purpose.
¶ 20 The district court also concluded the subpoenaed documents requested by the Board are relevant to the stated inquiry, and “the subpoena is sufficiently specific to obtain documents that are tailored to the Board‘s inquiry.”
¶ 21 On appeal, Dr. Boland again asserts that Policy 2014-01 was promulgated in violation of the Open Meetings Law. The Board does not expressly dispute that the policy was promulgated in violation of the Open Meetings Law, but rather asserts that the “taint, if any, would be on CDPHE‘s conduct” because “the policy is CDPHE‘s and not the Board‘s.”
II. Applicable Law
¶ 22 The Board is authorized to conduct investigations into complaints of unprofessional conduct by a medical licensee through “inquiry panels.” Written complaints relating to the conduct of a medical licensee may be made by any person or may be initiated by an inquiry panel of the Board on its own motion.
¶ 23 A licensee about whom a complaint has been filed must be given written notice of the complaint, and an opportunity to respond. Id. Upon receipt of the licensee‘s response, or after thirty days, whichever comes first, the inquiry panel may take further action as set forth in the statute. One of the actions that may be taken is to conduct a further investigation, and in connection with such investigation the panel may issue subpoenas for relevant records.
¶ 24 Under Colorado‘s Open Meetings Law, “[n]o resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, or formal action of a state or local public body shall be valid unless taken or made at a meeting” open to the public pursuant to
III. Standard of Review
¶ 25 The seizure of records under an administrative subpoena may be an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. But an administrative subpoena‘s seizure of records is reasonable if (1) the subpoena and investigation are for a lawfully authorized purpose; (2) the information sought is relevant to the inquiry; and (3) the subpoena is sufficiently specific to obtain documents
¶ 26 The issuing agency must demonstrate the propriety of an issued subpoena. Colo. State Bd. of Accountancy v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 116 P.3d 1245, 1248 (Colo. App. 2005). “If the agency fails to demonstrate that the subpoena issued is for an authorized purpose, the court must refuse to enforce it.” Id.
IV. Analysis
¶ 27 Dr. Boland limits his appeal to the first prong of the Charnes test: whether the subpoena was issued for a lawful purpose. He contends that, because CDPHE based its referral on Policy 2014-01, and because CDPHE unlawfully adopted Policy 2014-01, the Board‘s subpoena caused by CDPHE‘s referral had no lawful purpose.
¶ 28 In contrast, the Board contends that, even if Policy 2014-01 is invalid, it nevertheless had the authority to issue the subpoena to investigate whether Dr. Boland engaged in unprofessional conduct. The district court adopted this argument.
¶ 29 We agree with the district court that the subpoena was issued for a lawful purpose, even assuming Policy 2014-01 was adopted in violation of the Open Meetings Law. “Purpose” is “an objective, goal or end.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 1356 (9th ed. 2009). It is a forward looking term, which here describes the Board‘s objective to investigate possible unprofessional conduct. Whatever the source of the Board‘s initiating step, the purpose of the subpoena and the investigation is lawful.
¶ 30 We will assume, for purposes of this appeal, that the other district court correctly concluded in its October 2016 order that CDPHE adopted Policy 2014-01 in violation of the Open Meetings law, although we are not bound by that decision. That policy is not a Board rule. As Judge Hoffman found, the policy is CDPHE‘s, not the Board‘s.
¶ 31 And, although the Board helped CDPHE create Policy 2014-01, the Board never induced CDPHE to, or suggested it should, adopt the rule without public notice or public meetings, or otherwise complying with the Open Meetings Law.
¶ 32 CDPHE apparently referred Dr. Boland to the Board in the summer of 2014, although the exact date is not in the record. This was long before any district court found CDPHE violated the Open Meetings Law and enjoined enforcement of Policy 2014-01.
¶ 33 Accordingly, CDPHE‘s conduct does not determine whether the Board acted lawfully in issuing the subpoena to Dr. Boland.
¶ 34 A “written complaint” about a medical licensee “may be made by any person.”
¶ 35 Upon receiving a complaint, the Board‘s inquiry panel “may take further action” after giving the licensee an opportunity to answer or explain the matters described in the complaint.
¶ 36 If the Board decides to investigate, it may issue subpoenas to produce relevant records.
¶ 37 In Board of Medical Examiners v. Duhon, 895 P.2d 143, 146-47 (Colo. 1995), the supreme court invalidated a Board subpoena. The court construed the prior version of the section authorizing subpoenas with the section authorizing investigations. Neither differs substantially from the provisions at issue here.
¶ 38 The Duhon court ruled the Board may only issue a subpoena in connection with a Board hearing, or in connection with an investigation. Id. at 147-49. Duhon invalidated a subpoena issued to investigate a physician‘s
¶ 39 No timing issue is present here. The Board received a complaint, gave Dr. Boland an opportunity to respond, which he did, and then issued the subpoena. The purpose of the investigation is to ascertain whether he acted unprofessionally. Under these circumstances, we conclude the Board subpoena had a lawful purpose, and we affirm the district court‘s order.
¶ 40 We note that ordering enforcement of the subpoena does not confirm, or even suggest, that Dr. Boland acted unprofessionally. Nor does producing documents requested by the subpoena preclude Dr. Boland from arguing that conduct covered by the standards contained in Policy 2014-01 is not indicative of unprofessional conduct. At this point, Dr. Boland‘s only obligation is to produce documents to permit the Board‘s investigation.
V. Other Arguments
¶ 41 Dr. Boland also argues that referral by CDPHE violated his rights under the
VI. Conclusion
¶ 42 Accordingly, the district court‘s judgment enforcing the subpoena is affirmed.
JUDGE FURMAN concurs.
JUDGE TAUBMAN dissents.
Colorado Medical Board, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James Boland, MD, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 16CA1269
Colorado Court of Appeals
March 22, 2018
JUDGE TAUBMAN, dissenting.
¶ 43 Can a subpoena issued solely as a result of an invalid agency policy nevertheless have a lawful purpose? While the majority answers this question in the affirmative, I dissent because I conclude that the subpoena here, which was based only on an unlawfully adopted referral policy, had no lawful purpose.
¶ 44 In November 2014, respondent, Dr. James Boland, received a subpoena duces tecum from the petitioner, Colorado Medical Board (Board). The subpoena directed him to produce the medical records concerning medical marijuana recommendations for certain patients examined on three dates. A letter delivered with the subpoena explained that the Board had received a complaint from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) regarding Dr. Boland‘s medical marijuana recommendations. CDPHE had referred Dr. Boland for investigation based on the “Medical Marijuana Registry‘s physician referral policy.”
¶ 45 According to the Board‘s letter, that physician referral policy enumerated three bases on which CDPHE would refer physicians to the Board for investigation: (1) a caseload of 3521 or more medical patient recommendations per year; (2) recommendations of an increased plant count for more than thirty percent of patients; or (3) a patient caseload in which over one-third is under the age of thirty. According to the letter, CDPHE referred Dr. Boland to the Board for investigation on the basis of the last two criteria.
marijuana patient recommendations per year; (2) recommendations of an increased plant count for more than thirty percent of patients; or (3) a patient caseload in which over one-third of patients are under the age of thirty. Dr. Boland had no knowledge of any such referral policy when he received the subpoena. He refused to produce the subpoenaed documents, leading the Board to file an application for an order enforcing the subpoena. The district court granted the Board‘s application, a decision that Dr. Boland now appeals.1
¶ 46 Agency records obtained by Dr. Boland via a
¶ 47 Dr. Boland asserts on appeal, as he did in the district court, that Policy 2014-01 was promulgated in violation of Colorado‘s
¶ 48 An administrative subpoena is valid if (1) the subpoena and investigation are for a lawfully authorized purpose; (2) the information sought is relevant to the inquiry; and (3) the subpoena is sufficiently specific to obtain documents that are adequate but not excessive for the inquiry. Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 101, 612 P.2d 1117, 1122 (1980). Dr. Boland challenges the subpoena‘s validity on the basis of the first Charnes factor — whether the subpoena and investigation had “a lawfully authorized purpose.” Id. Unlike the majority, I conclude that the Board‘s subpoena was not issued for a lawful purpose because the policy that prompted the investigation of Dr. Boland is void.
¶ 49 The majority assumes that Policy 2014-01 is invalid. In my view, Policy 2014-01 is invalid because it was adopted in violation of Colorado‘s
I. Validity of Policy 2014-01 Under Open Meetings Law
¶ 50 Under Colorado‘s
¶ 51 “No resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, or formal action of a state or local public body shall be valid unless taken or made at a meeting” open to the public pursuant to the
¶ 52 Dr. Boland maintains that Policy 2014-01 was promulgated in violation of the
¶ 53 The purpose of the
II. Validity of Policy 2014-01 Under the APA
¶ 54 Moreover, I similarly find the policy invalid under Colorado‘s
¶ 55 While the Board has statutory authority to “[a]dopt and promulgate” rules, it is required to follow the provisions of the
¶ 56 My conclusion would not inhibit CDPHE and the Board from promulgating a policy concerning the criteria for referring a physician to the Board for suspected misconduct under the medical marijuana program. Indeed, it is possible that CDPHE and the Board might have arrived at the same policy even after taking into account public comment. Nevertheless, the agencies must comply with the statutorily required procedures in adopting a physician referral policy concerning physicians’ medical marijuana recommendations. Policy 2014-01 was adopted without regard to those statutory procedures and is thus void.
III. Enforceability of Subpoena
¶ 57 In light of my determination that Policy 2014-01 is invalid, I would further conclude that the subpoena at issue here had no lawful purpose and is therefore unenforceable. An issuing agency has the burden of demonstrating the propriety of an issued subpoena. Colo. State Bd. of Accountancy v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 116 P.3d 1245, 1248 (Colo. App. 2005). “If the agency fails to demonstrate that the subpoena issued is for an authorized purpose, the court must refuse to enforce it.” Id. The subpoena here was based solely on the void policy. Because I conclude that — after setting aside the invalid Policy 2014-01 — there is no lawful purpose for the investigation or subpoena, I would reverse the district court‘s order.
¶ 58 The
¶ 59 Despite its broad investigatory power, the Board‘s authority is circumscribed by statute. In Board of Medical Examiners v. Duhon, the supreme court concluded that a subpoena issued to investigate a physician‘s allegedly unprofessional conduct was invalid because the Board had failed to comply with procedural requirements concerning the timing of its investigation. 895 P.2d 143, 147, 149 (Colo. 1995); see also Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam‘rs v. Khan, 984 P.2d 670, 673-74 (Colo. App. 1999) (noting that the holding in Duhon had been superseded by later statutory amendment but finding no fault with the Duhon court‘s logic). Notwithstanding the Board‘s concerns about the physician‘s use of a particular treatment therapy, the supreme court invalidated the Board‘s subpoena because it failed to adhere to the procedural requirements for a proper investigation. Duhon, 895 P.2d at 149-50.
¶ 60 The majority reads Duhon as narrowly holding that the Board cannot issue a subpoena until it has commenced a disciplinary investigation. Although Duhon specifically addressed the proper timing of a Board subpoena, I read it more broadly to conclude that the Board‘s power to issue subpoenas, while expansive, nonetheless remains limited by the other provisions of the
¶ 61 Here, the Board‘s subpoena must find some lawful purpose in the
Given my conclusion that Policy 2014-01 is void, those provisions cannot support the Board‘s subpoena here. Without Policy 2014-01, there was no basis for CDPHE to refer Dr. Boland to the Board; in my view, the policy was void, the referral was void, and it is thus as if there were no complaint at all to prompt the Board‘s investigation.
¶ 62 Looking to the Board‘s disciplinary powers under section
¶ 63 Further, the majority agrees with the district court‘s assessment that Policy 2014-01 was CDPHE‘s, not the Board‘s, and accordingly concludes that “CDPHE‘s conduct does not determine whether the Board acted lawfully in issuing the subpoena to Dr. Boland.” Supra ¶ 34. Essentially, then, the majority would permit the Board to issue a subpoena subsequent to launching any investigation regardless of the source or propriety of the complaint that initiated that investigation.
¶ 65 CDPHE and the Board worked together to create and adopt Policy 2014-01, which I conclude is void. That policy was the sole basis for CDPHE‘s referral. I therefore further conclude that, because the referral was invalidly based on the invalid policy, the Board‘s investigation and subpoena had no lawful purpose and cannot be enforced. Because I would reverse the district court‘s order enforcing the Board‘s subpoena, I respectfully dissent.