ANTHONY T. COLLYMORE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. KRYSTAL MYERS, RN; all defendants are being sued in their individual capacity, K. PHILLIPS, RN/MEDICAL SUPERVISOR; all defendants are being sued in their individual capacity, CHENA MCPHERSON, APRN; all defendants are being sued in their individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees, COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, All defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities, WARDEN, OF MACDOUGALL, All defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities, ROBERT MARTIN, All defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities, LIGHTNER, MS., H.S.A. OF MACDOUGALL, All defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities, JOHN DOE #1, All defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities, JOHN DOE #2, All defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities, JOHN DOE #3, All defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities, JANINE BRENNAN, All defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities, Defendants
No. 21-2292
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Decided: July 14, 2023
August Term, 2022
Argued: March 21, 2023
THOMAS J. PLUMRIDGE (Edward W. Mayer, Jr., on the brief), Danaher Lagnese, P.C., Hartford, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Chena McPherson, APRN.
JAMES M. BELFORTI, Assistant Attorney General (William Tong, Attorney General, Joshua Perry, Solicitor General, on the brief), Hartford, CT for Defendants-Appellees Myers and Phillips.
Anthony T. Collymore appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Covello, J.) dismissing his initial and amended § 1983 complaints alleging deliberate indifference to his painful scalp condition by several prison officials and medical providers. The district court dismissed several defendants identified in his initial complaint sua sponte under the prisoner screening statute,
We VACATE and REMAND.
Anthony T. Collymore, an inmate at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution, sued pro se under
The Initial Complaint is considered in Point I and the Amended Complaint, in Point II. Both were filed pro se, and are somewhat disordered; so too is the course of procedure. We do our best.
I
The facts adduced are drawn from the Initial Complaint, filed on March 8, 2021, which alleges that starting in 2014 or so, Collymore experienced “a serious condition of [the] scalp” that over time resulted in itching, irritation, and the formation of painful scabs and open sores that bled and oozed pus. Complaint at 8.
The treatments administered by the John Doe Defendants were allegedly ineffective, and requests to see a specialist were denied. One John Doe Defendant sent by the block officer at first refused to treat Collymore, and later prescribed a course of antibiotics that cleared up his infections only temporarily.
In the period 2014 to 2019, when Collymore was first at MacDougall, he told the warden (defendant Chapdelain) in writing and in person that he was receiving inadequate treatment.
In August and October 2020, Collymore sent more grievances to defendant health services review coordinator Janine Brennan (“HSRC Brennan“) which were “Returned Without Disposition.” Id at 8I. HSRC Brennan allegedly “obstruct[ed] . . . the grievance process” by failing to resolve his case or listen to his appeals. Id. During this grievance process, Collymore complained directly to Warden Martin about HSRC Brennan. Over the ensuing months, Collymore
On March 8, 2021, Collymore filed his Initial Complaint pro se against Commissioner Cook, Warden Chapdelain, Warden Martin, HSA Lightner, HSRC Brennan, and three John Does. The district court screened this Initial Complaint and dismissed it sua sponte via an initial review order, pursuant to
The initial review order stated that Collymore failed to state a cognizable claim but noted that “Collymore may file an amended complaint against Drs. Doe 2 and Doe 3 only if he can allege facts showing that one or both doctors
Collymore amended his complaint to name only the Nurse Defendants: Myers, McPherson, and Phillips. This appeal was filed after the District Court dismissed the Amended Complaint, and the Nurse Defendants argue that we should treat the appeal as pertaining only to the Amended Complaint, but we decline to do so. The form used by Collymore for the notice of appeal gives the appellant the option to select whether the appeal is from 1) the final judgment, or 2) a specific “order” of the court, with a blank space to specify the date of appealed ruling. Collymore, who had been appearing pro se up to that point, selected neither – that is, he did not specify whether he was appealing from the
Although a notice of appeal must “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed,” Elliott v. City of Hartford, 823 F.3d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting
Even if a notice of appeal is construed as specifying the district court‘s order dismissing the Amended Complaint, Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that “a notice of appeal encompasses the final judgment ... if the notice designates . . . an order that adjudicates all remaining claims and the rights and liabilities of all remaining parties.”
Having decided that the Court has jurisdiction over the dismissal of the Initial Complaint, we now conclude that that dismissal was improper. The Initial Complaint was dismissed sua sponte under the prisoner screening statute at
”Sua sponte dismissal of pro se prisoner petitions which contain non-frivolous claims without requiring service upon respondents or granting leave to amend is disfavored by this Court.” Moorish Sci. Temple of Am., Inc. v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing cases); see also Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d
“Our reluctance to dismiss [pro se] complaints at such an early stage of the proceedings stems in part from the limited legal knowledge and resources available to pro se plaintiffs, which may hamper their ability to articulate potentially valid claims in legally cognizable language.” McEachin, 357 F.3d at 201. “We have also noted the difficulties attendant to appellate proceedings where the defendant has not answered the plaintiff‘s allegations and the waste of
Collymore‘s Initial Complaint had “an arguable basis. . . in [both] law [and] fact.” Benitez, 907 F.2d at 1295. His pro se complaint is factually consistent and legally coherent: it alleges gruesome details about his scalp condition, and narrates how he frequently sought treatment over the course of five years without eliciting adequate care. Its flaws raise questions of supervisory liability that are not before us on this appeal. Rather, the question is whether “a liberal reading of [the Initial Complaint] gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” McEachin, 357 F.3d at 201 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Initial Complaint withstands that lenient test. Under these circumstances, the sua sponte dismissal of Collymore‘s claims against the Administrative Defendants on frivolousness grounds was erroneous, and the error was compounded by the denial of leave to amend. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that 1915A(b) “dismissals must accord the inmate an opportunity to amend the complaint unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim“).
After the district court granted leave to amend only as to two of the John Doe Defendants, Collymore filed a motion seeking to identify those two remaining John Doe Defendants as a “Dr. Feder” and nurse Kara Phillips. The court granted this motion on April 19, 2021. Collymore filed a second motion to amend and to stay the case on May 3, 2021, claiming that new information had come to light via the Freedom of Information Act, and that Collymore would now seek to name not a “Dr. Feder and Kara Phillips,” but rather two different treating nurses, Chena McPherson and Krystal Myers. The district court denied the request for a stay of proceedings but granted the part of the motion requesting leave to amend:
The plaintiff is hereby directed to file an amended complaint, including his claims against the two additional medical providers, within 20 days of the date of this order. The amended complaint shall allege facts showing that these defendants treated the plaintiff with some frequency and did not alter ineffective prior treatment.
D. Ct. ECF No. 12.
Collymore filed his Amended Complaint against McPherson, Myers and Phillips on May 20, 2021. (The amendment did not strictly conform to the
McPherson: During Collymore‘s first visit with McPherson in May 2019, he told her that a “sebex shampoo,” prescribed by the medical staff was ineffective and he asked to see a specialist. Am. Compl. at 7. McPherson examined his scalp and continued the sebex shampoo without referring him to a doctor. McPherson‘s medical report described the condition as a “rash” and did not mention the open sores. Id. at 8.
On a second visit, McPherson made Collymore choose between addressing his scalp or an unrelated heart condition. After he elected to be examined for the heart condition, her report omitted reference to his scalp. When Collymore again saw McPherson about his scalp in August 2019, she prescribed a different shampoo for two months and a cream for three months. However, he ultimately received the same sebex shampoo, and the cream ran out in a month.
Phillips: After his transfer to Corrigan, Collymore sent three letters to Phillips in February and March 2020, advising that his worsening condition required the attention of a doctor. She provided no treatment but ultimately said he would be seen by a dermatologist. In September, Collymore wrote again to Phillips, asking to go to the hospital for scalp treatment. Phillips responded that he was “on the list to see dermatology.” Id. at 14. She repeated that assurance in December when he reported to her that the pain and inflammation was such that he could no longer sleep.
In May 2021, he was still reporting that scalp pain prevented sleep, and was told he was being “added to see the doctor.” Id. at 15. A few days later, he again complained to a block officer, and he was sent back to the medical unit where he again received a short course of antibiotics.
Nurses Myers and Phillips were served with the Amended Complaint and promptly moved to dismiss. (Nurse McPherson did not receive service until later.) The District Court granted the motion on the grounds that all three Nurse Defendants were protected by qualified immunity, while ignoring Collymore‘s request for injunctive relief, which is not barred by qualified immunity. Sudler v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 159, 177 (2d Cir. 2012).4
In so ruling, the District Court acknowledged the Supreme Court‘s directive that “‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality‘” for the purposes of qualified immunity analysis. App‘x at 31 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)). Accordingly, the court then looked to “Supreme Court or second circuit cases [to] determine what a reasonable officer would understand in light of that law.” Id. at 32. Both the
We review a district court‘s dismissal order de novo, “accept[ing] as true all the material allegations of the complaint, and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor.” Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”
The District Court‘s analysis rested on the objective component of this standard: whether Collymore‘s medical needs were “sufficiently serious.” Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). And that analysis rested on the absence of “Supreme Court or second circuit cases holding that a scalp condition causing painful open sores is a serious medical need.” App‘x at 33.
However, Eighth Amendment claims for the deprivation of medical care are not analyzed body-part by body-part, as we have observed. See Rodriguez v. Manenti, 606 F. App‘x 25, 26 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order). A leg can be infected by gangrene as well as athlete‘s foot, but only one is serious. Conditions such as inflammation can be minor and treatable, or they can be agonizing and resistant. The question will be whether a plaintiff plausibly alleges a condition that produces severe and unmanaged pain. See Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66. So while “sufficiently serious” medical conditions “should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality,‘” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
In Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698 (2d Cir. 1998), this Court addressed painful, degenerative conditions such as Collymore‘s in the dental context:
Of course, not all claims regarding improper dental care will be constitutionally cognizable. Dental conditions, like other medical conditions, may be of varying severity. The standard for Eighth Amendment violations contemplates “a condition of urgency” that may result in “degeneration” or “extreme pain.” Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66 (quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1990) (Pratt, J., dissenting)). A prisoner who nicks himself shaving obviously does not have a constitutional right to cosmetic surgery. But if prison officials deliberately ignore the fact that a prisoner has a five-inch gash on his cheek that is becoming infected, the failure to provide appropriate treatment might well violate the Eighth Amendment. Compare Arce v. Banks, 913 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (small cyst-like growth on forehead not sufficiently serious), with Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373–74 (7th Cir. 1997) (large cyst that had become infected was a serious medical condition).
In sum, it is alleged that Collymore‘s scalp condition causes him “intolerable” pain that felt like his “scalp was on fire“, Complaint at 7-9; Am. Compl. at 9, 13-14, 16; has repeatedly become infected and required antibiotics, id; has produced scabs that ooze pus, Complaint at 20; has interfered with Collymore‘s daily life, including his ability to sleep, Complaint at 13; Am. Compl. at 6, 10, 15; has resulted in the formation of painful keloid scars, Complaint at 20; and has proven to be both degenerative and resistant to treatment for years, Am. Compl. at 7-9. The right to be free from such a condition is clearly established.
It was therefore error to dismiss Collymore‘s Amended Complaint for failure to satisfy the objective component of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard. While it may be that the defendants did not act with “deliberate indifference” or that some or all of the conduct can be classified as
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is VACATED and REMANDED with respect to the Eighth Amendment claims concerning Collymore‘s scalp condition. On remand, Collymore shall be allowed to further amend his complaint to restate his claims against the defendants named in his Initial Complaint.