S26A0426, S26A0427

Ga.

Jun 16, 2026

Miles Chatezal Collins v. The State and Josiah Hughley, Jr. v. The State

No. S26A0426

No. S26A0427

Supreme Court of Georgia

June 30, 2026

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Gwinnett County No. 22B040724

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

Appellants Miles Collins and Josiah Hughley, Jr., appeal their convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Bradley Coleman.¹ On appeal, Collins contends that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions on Counts 10, 11, and 12 (hijacking a motor vehicle and related street gang charges); that the trial court erred by failing to give a charge on accomplice corroboration; that the introduction of a statement that Hughley made to law enforcement officials violated Bruton v. United States, 391 US 123 (1968); that the trial court’s charge on aggravated assault was not tailored to the indictment or the evidence; and that the rule of lenity requires a sentence of no more than ten years on Count 10. Hughley contends that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to sustain his convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle and related charges; that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to assert that his statement should have been suppressed under OCGA § 24-8-824; and that the trial court committed structural error when it deviated from the statutory oath required to be given to panels of prospective jurors For the reasons that follow, we affirm in both cases.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed that, at 12:34 p.m. on July 10, 2022, Coleman drove his car to a gas station in Gwinnett County and parked next to the air pump, which was located away from the gas pumps and store.

Surveillance footage from cameras at the gas station showed that a few minutes later, a black Mercedes sedan parked next to Coleman’s car. A passenger from the Mercedes got into the driver’s seat of Coleman’s car, and about 30 seconds later, the Mercedes began to drive away from Coleman’s car. Coleman’s car, however, quickly backed up and struck another vehicle, coming to a stop. The Mercedes then stopped; it was still in the gas station parking lot, a short distance away from Coleman’s car. The car that was struck by Coleman’s car drove away. At that point, a man got out of the front passenger door of the Mercedes and approached the front passenger door of Coleman’s car with a gun drawn. The man in the driver’s seat of Coleman’s car opened the driver’s side door, pulled Coleman out of Coleman’s car, and shot Coleman in the head as he was kneeling on the ground. The man who had approached the front passenger seat of Coleman’s car then ran to the Mercedes, and the man who shot Coleman ran to Coleman’s car, leaned into it, and ran to the Mercedes, which immediately left the scene. Although the gas station surveillance cameras captured the killing, the faces of the persons depicted were not discernable. In addition, a witness who was at the gas station testified that, although she saw one of the assailants pull Coleman out of his car, she did not see who fired the gun and could not identify any of the assailants. Coleman died from a gunshot wound to the top of his head.

When law enforcement officials arrived at the gas station shortly after the shooting, they found a blue surgical mask near Coleman’s body, and blood was found on it. DNA extracted from that blood matched Hughley’s DNA. Coleman owned a Smith & Wesson 9mm handgun, which he often carried with him, and an empty holster designed for such a handgun was found on the front passenger seat of Coleman’s car. A 9mm shell casing was also found near the body.

From the gas station surveillance videos, law enforcement officers determined that the assailants were driving a black Mercedes E350. Using a license-plate reader system, law enforcement officers also determined that there was one black Mercedes around the gas station at the time of the shooting and that it was a rental car that had been rented to Booker and Collins two days before the shooting. The license-plate reader system captured the Mercedes entering a shopping center “directly across the street from the [gas station]” at 11:26 a.m. on the day of the shooting and a block away from the gas station at 11:53 a.m. that day. Moreover, investigators obtained cell-site location information (“CSLI”) for Booker’s, Collins’s, and Hughley’s cell phones. This information showed that, on the morning of the shooting, Booker’s cell phone moved northwest in the general direction of the gas station in Gwinnett County; that at 11:50 a.m., 12:30 p.m., and 12:32 to 12:39 p.m., the cell phone was in the same area as the gas station; that at 12:40 p.m., the device began to move away from the gas station; and that at 1:13 p.m., it was close to Turnberry Place in DeKalb County, the street on which the car rental company was located. CSLI also showed that Booker’s cell phone accepted incoming calls from 12:22 to 12:24 p.m. near the gas station and that at 12:56 p.m. on July 10, his cell phone accepted an incoming call near the location of the rental car company. Similarly, CSLI showed that Collins’s cell phone made an outgoing call at 10:06 a.m. on July 10 from the area of his home in Lithonia and then accepted a call at 11:23 a.m. from an area near the gas station. At 12:51 p.m., Collins’s cell phone placed an outgoing call to Collins’s girlfriend, and at 1:02 p.m., it received an incoming call from her near the same location as the 12:56 p.m. call on Booker’s cell phone, near the car rental company. Between 1:24 p.m. and 1:26 p.m., Collins’s cell phone placed calls from near the car rental company location. For Hughley’s cell phone, CSLI showed that, from 10:00 a.m. to 11:25 a.m. on July 10, it moved from Lithonia to a location near the gas station in Gwinnett County. In addition, at 12:32 p.m., Hughley’s cell phone was “in an area geographically close to the [gas station].” By 12:38 p.m., Hughley’s device was moving away from the gas station, and by 1:15 p.m., it was near the car rental location on Turnberry Place and remained in that area until about 1:34 p.m. Between 12:54 p.m. and 1:32 p.m., Collins and Booker sent text messages to Collins’s girlfriend with an address for the location of the car rental company, and Collins texted her, “hurry up. I got to turn this car in.” That day, Collins’s girlfriend picked up Collins and Hughley from Turnberry Place.

Cell phone records also showed that, minutes after the shooting, Hughley sent a text message to someone, saying he had to talk to the person, but that he could not “say it over the phone.” He texted, “Some s**t just happened ... I’m in the car. I’m so blows. ... [W]e got to get out this car, wipe it down.” Moreover, about two hours after the shooting, Hughley sent another text message asking whether the recipient would be interested in buying a Smith & Wesson 9mm handgun. In addition, there was evidence that Booker owned a “black sweatshirt with a large multicolored logo on it” and that the man who got out of the front passenger door of the Mercedes at the gas station and approached the front passenger door of Coleman’s car with a gun drawn was wearing what appeared “to be the same sweatshirt.”

As part of their investigation, law enforcement officials interviewed both Collins and Hughley. Collins admitted that he rented the Mercedes but said that on the day of the crimes, he loaned the car to an individual named “Man-man” and was not at the crime scene but was home in Lithonia. In the redacted portion of Hughley’s interview that was played at trial, Hughley admitted to shooting Coleman. Hughley said that when he got into Coleman’s car, he saw a gun on the front passenger seat. He added that Coleman “got up and ... jumped in the car” and started grabbing and hitting him. Coleman then pushed him, and they both fell outside of the car. He stated that Coleman reached for his gun, which was on the ground. Hughley said that, fearing for his life, he shot Coleman with his gun. In the redacted portion of Hughley’s statement, he does not mention Collins or Booker.

An expert in gang investigations concluded that, based on the co-defendants’ tattoos and social media posts, they were members of the “Bloods” gang. The expert also testified that criminal gang members are often involved in crimes such as murder, aggravated assault, hijacking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The expert testified that in July 2022, the “Bloods” criminal street gang was involved in the types of crimes that were committed in this case, and that committing crimes permitted gang members to maintain good standing or increase their status within the gang. Moreover, evidence of criminal gang activity was submitted under OCGA § 24-4-418 against all three defendants. That evidence showed that, among other crimes, the co-defendants previously had been convicted and arrested for crimes involving motor vehicle theft.

Case No. S26A0426

2. Collins claims that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle and the related street gang charges because the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence that he and his companions attempted to obtain Coleman’s vehicle from him.² We disagree.

When this Court evaluates a constitutional due process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we view all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 598 (2018). “This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony but rather defers to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Davis v. State, 316 Ga. 418, 420 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a defendant is guilty of a charged offense “upon proof that the crime was committed and that [he] was a party to it.” Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 744 (2012) (quotation marks omitted), and under OCGA 16-2-20(a),(b)(3), a person is a party to a crime if he, among other things, “[i]ntentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime.” “Conviction as a party to the crime requires proof of a common criminal intent, which the jury may infer from the defendant’s presence, companionship, and conduct with another perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes.” Badie v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A0051, slip op. at 4 (Ga. Mar. 17, 2026).

OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1) provides that

[a] person commits the offense of hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree when such person while in possession of a firearm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from an individual or the presence of another individual by force and violence or intimidation or attempts or conspires to do so.

“The essential elements of the offense are (1) possessing a firearm or weapon; (2) while obtaining or attempting to obtain a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another; (3) by force and violence or intimidation.” Ward v. State, 376 Ga. App. 659, 660, (2025) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, there was evidence that Collins and Booker rented the Mercedes used in the crimes, and CSLI showed that Collins, Booker, and Hughley rode in the rented Mercedes to the gas station where Coleman was shot. Moreover, surveillance video from the gas station showed that the Mercedes parked close to Coleman’s vehicle. Once parked there, Hughley, who was armed with a firearm, entered the driver’s seat of Coleman’s vehicle and backed up the vehicle quickly, as if trying to drive away. However, Coleman and Hughley then engaged in a struggle that resulted in Hughley pulling Coleman from the car and shooting him. Moreover, after the shooting, Collins sent a text message to his girlfriend with an address for the location of the car rental company and told her to “hurry up. I got to turn this car in.” Cell phone records showed that, minutes after the shooting, Hughley sent a text message to someone, saying he had to talk to the person, but that he could not “say it over the phone.” He texted, “Some s**t just happened ... I’m in the car. I’m so blows. ... [W]e got to get out this car, wipe it down.” The evidence also showed that after the shooting, Collins’s girlfriend picked up Collins and Hughley from the street on which the car rental company was located.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the evidence, we conclude that the evidence summarized above was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins shared a common criminal intent with Hughley and Booker to use force in an attempt to obtain Coleman’s vehicle from him. As such, the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support Collins’s conviction for hijacking a motor vehicle at least as a party to the crime. See Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 594, 597–98 (2019) (holding that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to sustain a conviction for hijacking a motor vehicle where it showed that the defendant and his accomplice took possession of the victim’s vehicle after confronting the victim with a firearm); Richardson v. State, 373 Ga. App. 252, 254 (2024) (holding that evidence that the defendant, who was holding a handgun, demanded the keys to the victim’s car constituted an attempt to obtain the victim’s car and was sufficient to support the hijacking conviction even though the defendant did not ultimately obtain the victim’s car).

3. Collins claims that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury under OCGA § 24-14-8 that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated to establish a fact. Even assuming that the evidence supported the giving of a charge on accomplice corroboration, we conclude that Collins has failed to show plain error.

As Collins acknowledges, he did not object to the failure to instruct on accomplice corroboration at trial, and his challenge is therefore reviewed for plain error only. See OCGA § 17-8-58(b). To prevail on his plain error claim, Collins “must demonstrate that the instructional error was not affirmatively waived.” Stitts v. State, 323 Ga. 109, 114 (2025). Moreover, a failure to charge amounts to plain error only to the extent that it was obviously erroneous, it likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. “Satisfying all four prongs of this standard is difficult, as it should be. This Court does not have to analyze all elements of the plain-error test where an appellant fails to establish one of them.” Id.

Here, the trial court’s proposed charges included a charge on accomplice corroboration, but at the charge conference, counsel for Collins said, “I’m not sure why that would apply. I don’t think that should be charged.” The prosecutor and counsel for Hughley and Booker expressed their agreement, and the trial court said, “We’re going to strike … everything under the title accomplice corroboration. Is that correct?” Counsel for Collins then said, “Yes.” The trial court did not give the charge, and Collins did not object to the failure to do so. We conclude that under these circumstances, Collins has affirmatively waived any alleged error regarding the trial court’s failure to charge on the corroboration of accomplice testimony. See Szorcsik v. State, 303 Ga. 737, 742 (2018) (holding that, where the trial court indicated that it was going to charge on voluntary manslaughter and the defendant said that he did not want that charge given to the jury, the defendant affirmatively waived alleged error in failing to give the charge). See also Holmes v. State, 318 Ga. 213, 224 (2024) (holding that where the defendant withdrew a charge that he had earlier requested be given, “[t]rial counsel’s request for the instruction to be omitted amounted to an affirmative waiver”). Therefore, he cannot show that the trial court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury on accomplice corroboration.

4. Collins contends that the trial court committed plain error under Bruton v. United States, 391 US 123 (1968), when it allowed the introduction of Hughley’s hearsay statement. More specifically, Collins claims that, in the portion of Hughley’s statement admitted into evidence at trial, Hughley said that “he and the others” or “they” were intent on stealing Coleman’s car at the gas station and that this statement directly inculpated Collins with regard to his intent to steal the car and, thus, its admission violated Bruton. For this reason, according to Collins, his convictions for hijacking and its related gang charges must be reversed. We disagree.

To begin, Collins fails to provide citation to the record to support his assertion that, in the part of Hughley’s statement introduced into evidence, he said that “he and the others” or “they” were intent on stealing Coleman’s car. And our review of the edited portion of Hughley’s statement that was admitted into evidence at trial, which was approximately 16 minutes of Hughley’s almost three-hour interview by law enforcement officers, reveals no statement by Hughley that “he and the others” or “they” went to the gas station with the intent to steal Coleman’s car. Collins therefore has failed to identify any factual basis or cite any evidence in the record to support this claim, and, accordingly, he has failed to meet his burden of affirmatively showing error by the record. See Soto v. State, 303 Ga. 517, 523 (2018) (explaining that “[t]he burden is always on the appellant in asserting error to show it affirmatively by the record” (quotation marks omitted)). See also Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 650 (2023) (explaining that “[i]t is not the function of this Court to cull the record for a party to find alleged errors or to form arguments on the appellant’s behalf” (quotation marks omitted)). This claim fails for this reason.

5. Collins contends that the trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury on the commission of aggravated assault by a method not charged in the indictment. We conclude that Collins has failed to show plain error.

The indictment charged Collins with aggravated assault “by shooting” Coleman. However, when instructing the jury on aggravated assault, the trial court instructed the jury that the State had to show only “that the Defendant committed an act that placed the person in reasonable apprehension or fear of immediately receiving a violent injury.” See OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2) (defining simple assault as “[c]ommit[ing] an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury”). The court failed to instruct the jury on § 16-5-20(a)(1), which defines simple assault as “[a]ttempt[ing] to commit a violent injury to the person of another.” Collins argues that because the indictment charged him with committing aggravated assault by shooting the victim, the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the State could prove aggravated assault based on mere apprehension of injury.

Because Collins did not object to this instruction at trial, we review this claim for plain error only. We conclude that even assuming that the trial court instructed the jury on a method of aggravated assault not charged in the indictment, Collins has failed to show that the error likely affected the outcome of the proceedings. See Stitts, 323 Ga. at 114. We have repeatedly held that where the jury is instructed, as it was here, that the State has the burden “to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt” and is “provided with a copy of the indictment during deliberations,” an instruction by the trial court to the jury “on a method of committing a crime not charged in the indictment does not likely affect the outcome of the proceedings.” Gude v. State, 320 Ga. 308, 311 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Cato v. State, 304 Ga. 496, 498 (2018); Simpson v. State, 302 Ga. 875, 877 (2017). Moreover, here, where there is no dispute that Coleman died as a result of being shot in the head, it is highly improbable that the jury, in finding Collins guilty of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, did so based on a finding that Coleman was merely put in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury and not based on a finding that Hughley actually shot Coleman. See Gude, 320 Ga. at 312 (holding that the defendant, who raised the same plain error claim as here, failed to meet his burden of showing that the error likely affected the outcome of the trial, as it was undisputed that the defendant shot and killed the victim, making it “highly unlikely that the jury convicted [the defendant] of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault without a finding that [the defendant] intended to shoot [the victim]”); Cato, 304 Ga. 498–99 (rejecting the same plain-error claim as here in part because “the jury was properly instructed on felony murder, and there was no dispute that [the victim] died as a result of being shot (not as a result of being placed in fear),” reasoning that there was thus “no likelihood that the jury in convicting [the defendant] of felony murder, thought that the aggravated assault on which that charge was premised merely put [the victim] in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury”). Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.

6. Collins contends that the rule of lenity requires a sentence of no more than ten years on Count 10, hijacking a motor vehicle. As Collins correctly notes, Count 10 of the indictment charged him with hijacking in the first degree, OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1), and alleged that he “did attempt to obtain” Coleman’s vehicle by “acts which constitute a substantial step toward the commission of said crime.”³ He argues that the hijacking statute and the criminal attempt statute, OCGA § 16-4-1,⁴ punish the same conduct of attempted hijacking and that because the maximum sentence for the attempt to commit felony hijacking under OCGA § 16-4-1 would be ten years in prison, see OCGA § 16-4-6(b), instead of the maximum of 20 years in prison provided for that crime under the hijacking statute, see OCGA § 16-5-44.1(c)(1), the rule of lenity requires that he be sentenced under the criminal attempt statute. We disagree.

“The rule of lenity applies when a statute, or statutes, establishes, or establish, different punishments for the same offense, and provides that the ambiguity is resolved in favor of the defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment.” Smallwood v. State, 310 Ga. 445, 451 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). However, “the rule of lenity is a rule of construction that is applied only when an ambiguity still exists after having applied the traditional canons of statutory construction.” Sosebee v. State, 317 Ga. 424, 427 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Where there is a specific and a general criminal statute, the rule of lenity is not implicated, and a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.” Smallwood, 310 Ga. at 452 (citation and punctuation omitted). Accord State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406, 409 (2014).

Here, the clear language of the first-degree hijacking statute, OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1), demonstrates that it is a specific statute that criminalizes the attempt to hijack a motor vehicle. On the other hand, the general criminal attempt statute, OCGA § 16-4-1, is a general statute that criminalizes the attempt to commit any crime. Because OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1) is the more specific statute and there is no indication that the General Assembly did not intend for it to control over the more general criminal attempt statute, Collins was properly sentenced under the hijacking statute, and the rule of lenity is not implicated. See Smallwood, 310 Ga. at 452–53 (holding that the rule of lenity was not applicable to the defendant’s claim that he should have been sentenced for misdemeanor criminal trespass, OCGA § 16-7-21(b)(1), instead of the felony of entering an automobile, OCGA § 16-8-18, concluding that OCGA § 16-8-18, which prohibits the entry of an automobile for the purpose of committing certain designated crimes, was the more specific statute and prevailed over the more general criminal trespass statute, which prohibits the unauthorized entry into numerous places, including a vehicle, for a general unlawful purpose).

Case No. S26A0427

7. Hughley contends that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction for hijacking a motor vehicle (Count 10) and was therefore also insufficient to support his Gang Act convictions that were predicated on the hijacking offense (Counts 11 and 12).⁵ More specifically, he contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of force or violence necessary to support the hijacking conviction. We disagree.

We evaluate this constitutional due process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the principles discussed in Division 2. See Jones, 304 Ga. at 598; Davis, 316 Ga. at 420. Hughley is correct that an element of the crime of hijacking a motor vehicle is the use of force or violence in obtaining or attempting to obtain the motor vehicle in question. See OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1); Ward, 376 Ga. App. at 660. Here, Hughley argues that the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that force or violence was used only after he and Coleman were struggling outside of Coleman’s car, at which point Hughley was attempting to flee and the attempt to hijack Coleman’s car had been abandoned. However, there was evidence that Hughley entered Coleman’s car armed with a firearm, that the two men struggled inside the car, and that Hughley pulled Coleman out of the car before shooting him. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdicts and deferring to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that force was used in an attempt to obtain Coleman’s vehicle. For this reason, Hughley’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.

8. Hughley contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress his confession on the ground that it was induced by a hope of benefit. See OCGA § 24-8-824. We disagree.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the deficiency prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must demonstrate that trial counsel “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 683 (2022) (quotation marks omitted). To prove prejudice under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.” Burke v. State, 320 Ga. 706, 708 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). And, if a defendant fails to make a sufficient showing on one prong of the Strickland test, we need not address the other prong. Starks v. State, 320 Ga. 300, 304 (2024).

Moreover, when, as here, “we evaluate a claim that counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to suppress, we ask whether a motion to suppress on the specific basis proposed by the appellant would clearly have succeeded if counsel had raised it.” Moss v. State, 322 Ga. 757, 767 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). Hughley cannot make that showing here. The ground that Hughley contends that counsel should have asserted to suppress his statement is that it was induced by a hope of benefit in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824. During his interview with law enforcement officers, they told Hughley that if he cooperated and showed remorse, “it could be the difference between life without parole or life with parole, which means you might get a chance to get out. We don’t know that, we can’t say anything about that, but how you are portrayed could impact that.” After several more minutes, during which Hughley was told that the evidence, including the tracking of his cell phone to the crime scene, was strong and that he should do what was morally right for the victim’s family, Hughley told the officers about the shooting. Hughley claims that the officers’ statement that if he cooperated, “it could be the difference between life without parole or life with parole” was an improper hope of benefit.

Under OCGA § 24-8-824, a confession is not admissible if it was “induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” “The phrase ‘slightest hope of benefit’ is not to be understood in the colloquial sense”; instead, it “refers to promises related to reduced criminal punishment — a shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at all.” Lewis v. State, 311 Ga. 650, 658 (2021) (quotation marks omitted). Accord State v. Leverette, 320 Ga. 806, 809 (2025). And we have said that “noncommittal statements” by officers relating to the possibility of reduced punishment do not “amount to promises related to reduced criminal punishment.” Short v. State, 321 Ga. 613, 621 (2025) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, the officers did not promise reduced criminal punishment. Instead, they said that Hughley’s cooperation and remorse “could be the difference between life without parole or life with parole,” and they added that they did not know if his cooperation would lead to that result, saying that “[w]e don’t know that, we can’t say anything about that, but how you are portrayed could impact that.” Such noncommittal statements do not amount to an improper hope of benefit in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824. See Short, 321 Ga. at 620–21 (holding that officers’ statements that the defendant’s cooperation could lead to a plea deal with a reduced punishment of what “could be 25 years” and that the punishment under such a deal would be “a lot shorter than life without parole” did not amount to a promise relating to reduced punishment because the officers also said that, although they had input with the district attorney, the district attorney would have the final decision regarding any such deal). See also Mitchell v. State, 314 Ga. 566, 573–74 (2022) (holding that officers’ statements that the defendant might be able to “get some arrangement” if he cooperated but that it would require the agreement of the district attorney did not amount to a promise of a reduced sentence); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 212 (2007) (concluding that officer’s “discussion of the death penalty and life without parole and the officer’s statement that the district attorney based the charges brought on a recommendation from the police” did not amount to a hope of benefit). For these reasons, Hughley has failed to show that a motion to suppress based on an alleged improper hope of benefit clearly would have succeeded if trial counsel had raised it. See Moss, 322 Ga. at 767.⁶ Accordingly, Hughley has failed to show that counsel performed deficiently in failing to file such a motion to suppress, and his claim of ineffective assistance claim fails.

9. Hughley contends that the trial court committed a non-waivable error for which prejudice must be presumed when it deviated from the language of the oath that OCGA § 15-12-132

requires to be given to panels of prospective jurors.⁷ We conclude, however, that this claim fails.

To begin, Hughley is correct that the trial court deviated from the specific oath set forth in OCGA § 15-12-132 by omitting the word “true” when administering the oath to both panels of prospective jurors.⁸ However, Hughley did not object either time, and existing precedent from this Court requires defendants to object to errors in administering the oath required by OCGA § 15-12-132 to preserve the issue for appeal and to show prejudice from the alleged error. See Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 654–55 (1981) (holding that even if a trial court completely fails to give the voir dire oath required by OCGA § 15-12-132, any error is waived in the absence of an objection and a defendant must show actual prejudice from the error, as harm will not be presumed). See also Hargett v. State, 285 Ga. 82, 86–87 (2009) (holding that defense counsel performed deficiently by failing to object when the trial court deviated from the oath required by OCGA § 15-12-132, but, citing Gober, concluding that harm would not be presumed and the defendants failed to show prejudice), overruled in part on

other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 23 (2020).

In addition to the voir dire oath required by OCGA § 15-12-132, OCGA § 15-12-139 requires the trial court or clerk to administer an oath to the trial jury.⁹ We have long held that a deviation in the trial jury oath is subject to waiver if an objection is not raised at trial. See Phillips v. State, 275 Ga. 595, 596 (2002) (explaining that where the trial court deviated from the required oath by failing to inform the jury that it should return a “true verdict,” the error was waived because of the defendant’s failure to object to the error); Stockford v. State, 276 Ga. 241, 243 (2003) (relying on Phillips to hold that the defendant “waived any objections to the jurors’ oaths by failing to object at trial”); Smith v. State, 63 Ga. 168, 168–69 (1879) (concluding that “[i]n swearing the jury, if the oath administered deviates from that prescribed by statute, the prisoner should object” and that “[a]cquiescence until after the verdict has been returned and the jury discharged, is a waiver of objection”).

In contrast to the foregoing waiver rules, we have held that a trial court’s total failure to give the trial jury oath required by OCGA § 15-12-139 is a non-waivable jurisdictional defect that automatically renders any trial a nullity. See Slaughter v. State, 100 Ga. 323, 324–30 (1897) (concluding that “while administering the wrong oath to a jury in a criminal case may be regarded as a

mere irregularity of which the accused cannot avail himself after deliberately maintaining silence until after verdict,” the complete failure to administer the trial jury oath results in a jury that is not a “lawfully constituted” jury, is an error that is “jurisdictional in its character,” and “is a matter which cannot, in any manner or under any circumstances, be waived; and as a consequence, a conviction by an unsworn jury is a mere nullity”). Accord Bowman v. State, 315 Ga. 707, 710–11 (2023) (relying on Slaughter to conclude that the complete failure to administer the trial jury oath is a “jurisdictional defect” that means that the jury was not lawfully constituted and had no authority to pass on the issues submitted to it); Spencer v. State, 281 Ga. 533, 534 (2007) (same).

Hughley acknowledges that cases like Gober, Hargett, and others are adverse to his position, but says that we should now apply the rule of Bowman and Slaughter, which govern the complete failure to administer the trial jury oath of OCGA § 15-12-139, to deviations from the voir dire oath of OCGA § 15-12-132, such that no objection to the voir dire oath would be required and any deviation from the oath would result in a new trial. However, Hughley does not expressly ask us to overrule those decisions, and in any event, he “does not engage in the type of stare decisis analysis that overruling” those cases would require. We therefore do not engage in that undertaking here and decline to overrule these cases. Profet v. State, 322 Ga. 731, 738 n.3 (2025) (declining to engage in stare decisis analysis required to overrule case where the defendant did not do so). Accord Owens v. State, 317 Ga. 125, 126–27 (2023). Accordingly, this enumeration fails.

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Notes

The crimes occurred on July 10, 2022. On October 12, 2022, a Gwinnett County grand jury returned an indictment against Collins, Hughley, and co-defendant David Booker individually and as parties to the crimes. They were charged with two counts of felony murder (Counts 1 and 7), ten counts of violating the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 15), aggravated assault (Count 4), hijacking a motor vehicle (Count 10), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 13). The three defendants were jointly tried. The first trial, which occurred in October 2023, ended in a mistrial due to an improper comment by the prosecutor. After a second jury trial that ended on January 28, 2025, Collins, Hughley, and Booker were found guilty on all counts. On January 29, 2025, the trial court sentenced Collins and Hughley to life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1, to 20 years in prison on Counts 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15, and to five years in prison on Count 13, with all sentences to run consecutively to the sentences entered on the preceding count. The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Collins and Hughley filed timely motions for new trial, which they subsequently amended with new counsel. On October 1 and 3, 2025, the trial court denied Collins’s and Hughley’s motions for new trial, respectively. Collins and Hughley filed timely notices of appeal, and their cases were docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. Booker’s case is not a part of these appeals.

Collins claims that the only evidence that the accomplices attempted to obtain Coleman’s vehicle was a statement by Hughley to law enforcement officers that Hughley and “the others” were “only trying to steal a car,” and Collins argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support the hijacking conviction under OCGA § 24-14-8 because there was no corroboration of Hughley’s accomplice statement. However, in the redacted portion of Hughley’s statement to law enforcement officers that was introduced into evidence at trial, there is no statement by Hughley about “trying to steal a car.” Accordingly, we evaluate Collins’s claim that that there was no evidence of an attempt to steal Coleman’s vehicle as a constitutional sufficiency argument.

Georgia’s motor-vehicle hijacking statute, OCGA § 16-5-44.1(b)(1), provides as follows:

A person commits the offense of hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree when such person while in possession of a firearm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from an individual or the presence of another individual by force and violence or intimidation or attempts or conspires to do so.

OCGA § 16-4-1 provides as follows: “A person commits the offense of criminal attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he performs any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.”

Hughley also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for other counts of which he was found guilty that were based on the hijacking offense, including felony murder (Count 7) and two Gang Act violations predicated on Count 7 (Counts 8 and 9). However, those counts were vacated or merged, so Hughley’s challenge to those counts is moot. See .

Pointing to the absence of the word “promise” in OCGA § 24-8-824, Hughley claims that whether a law enforcement officer made a promise for a reduced sentence should play no role in determining whether a defendant made a confession that was induced by an improper hope of benefit, and he argues that cases that contain that requirement should be overruled. Thus, to the extent that Hughley claims that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to argue before the trial court that the requirement of a promise should be abrogated, counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to do so, as “[a] criminal defense attorney does not perform deficiently when he fails to advance a legal theory that would require an extension of existing precedents and the adoption of an unproven theory of law.” (quotation marks omitted).

OCGA § 15-12-132 provides that the trial judge or clerk shall administer the following oath to each panel of prospective jurors: “You shall give true answers to all questions as may be asked by the court or its authority, including all questions asked by the parties or their attorneys, concerning your qualifications as jurors in the case of __________ (herein state the case). So help you God.”

The trial court, however, explained to one of the panels of potential jurors that the process of voir dire was about to begin, that the process involved the court and counsel asking questions of the potential jurors in order to choose a jury, that voir dire “means to speak the truth,” that “it means that you will speak the truth to us when we ask” you questions, and that the court “need[ed]” the jurors “to be as truthful and candid as possible.” The court gave similar directions to the other panel.

OCGA § 15-12-139 says:

In all criminal cases, the following oath shall be administered to the trial jury: “You shall well and truly try the issue formed upon this bill of indictment (or accusation) between the State of Georgia and (name of accused), who is charged with (here state the crime or offense), and a true verdict give according to the evidence. So help you God.” The judge or clerk shall administer the oath to the jurors.