TARAUN COLLIE v. THE ICEE COMPANY et al.
E071654 (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1611741)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Filed 7/20/20
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Brian S. McCarville, Judge. Affirmed.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Lann G. McIntyre, Jeffrey S. Ranen, Erica Rocush and Aashish Bhargava for Defendants and Appellants.
Protection Law Group, Heather Davis, Amir Nayebdadash and Priscilla Gamino for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BACKGROUND
Collie alleged that he worked for Icee from November 2014 to August 2015. When he began his employment, he signed an arbitration agreement, which stated in pertinent part: “The Company and I mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration of all claims or controversies (‘claims‘), past, present or future, whether or not arising out of my employment (or its termination), that the Company may have against me or that I may have against the Company or against its officers, directors, employees or agents in their capacity as such or otherwise. . . . The claims covered by this Agreement include, but are not limited to, claims for wages or other compensation due . . . and claims for violation of any federal, state, or other governmental law, statute, regulation, or ordinance, except claims excluded elsewhere in this Agreement. [¶] Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, both the Company and I agree that neither of us shall initiate or prosecute any lawsuit or administrative action . . . in any way related to any claim covered by this Agreement.” The agreement provided that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA;
In July 2016, Collie filed his PAGA complaint on behalf of himself and other aggrieved employees. Icee moved to compel arbitration of Collie‘s “individual claim” in August 2018. It argued that the parties had agreed to bilateral arbitration only, so Collie had to arbitrate his PAGA cause of action on an individual basis—that is, he could not seek PAGA penalties on behalf of other Icee employees. And because Collie had agreed to arbitrate all claims or controversies with Icee, neither could he maintain a PAGA action on behalf of other employees in court. In other words, he had effectively waived his right to bring a PAGA action on behalf of other employees in any forum.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the trial court relied on a determination of law to deny Icee‘s motion, we apply the de novo standard of review. (Betancourt, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 444.) We are not bound by the trial court‘s reasoning and “may affirm the denial on any correct legal theory supported by the record.” (Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853, 864.)
DISCUSSION
The court did not err by denying Icee‘s motion to compel arbitration. Under PAGA, “‘an “aggrieved employee” may bring a civil action personally and on behalf of other current or former employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations.‘” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 380.) Before bringing the PAGA action, the employee must give notice of the alleged Labor Code violations to the employer and the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA). (
We held in Betancourt that an employer cannot rely on an employee‘s predispute arbitration agreement to compel arbitration of a PAGA claim. (Betancourt, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 445-449.) We explained that, generally, a nonparty to an arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate. (Id. at p. 445.) And given that a PAGA claim “‘is a dispute between an employer and the state,‘” the employee‘s “predispute agreement to arbitrate does not bind the state to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 447; accord id. at p. 449 [reasoning that the “‘state is the real party in interest‘” and is not bound by the employee‘s predispute arbitration agreement].) Several
We see no reason to depart from Betancourt here. Collie signed the arbitration agreement when he began his employment with Icee and before his PAGA claim arose. He executed the agreement in his individual capacity. The state had not deputized him to act at the time, and he therefore could not agree to arbitrate on behalf of the state. It does not matter that Icee wants to compel arbitration of Collie‘s cause of action on “an individual basis,” as opposed to as a representative of other aggrieved employees. Either way, Collie is suing “as a proxy for the state [and] only with the state‘s acquiescence.” (Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale‘s, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 678.) His predispute arbitration agreement does not encompass this PAGA action.
Icee argues that Betancourt and Iskanian are no longer good law after the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Epic. The argument is unpersuasive. Epic considered the relationship between the FAA and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA;
Moreover, to the extent that Epic reconfirmed the breadth of the FAA, our decision does not conflict with Epic. The FAA “requires courts ‘rigorously’ to ‘enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, including terms that specify with whom the parties choose to arbitrate their disputes.‘” (Epic, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1621].) And the FAA‘s “saving clause allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.‘” (Id. at p. 1622, quoting
Icee also argues that Collie‘s pursuit of “individual wage claims” under
In sum, the court properly denied Icee‘s motion to compel arbitration of Collie‘s PAGA action. The state—the real party in interest—is not bound by Collie‘s predispute agreement to arbitrate. (Betancourt, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 446.)
The order denying Icee‘s motion to compel arbitration is affirmed. Collie shall recover his costs of appeal. (
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.