Coffman v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth.Coffman v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth.
Rendered on January 17, 2013
William Coffman, pro se.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Peter L. Jamison, for appellees.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, William Coffman (“appellant“), appeals from a judgmеnt of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by defendant-appellee, the Ohio State Adult Parole Board (“Parole Board“), and from a judgment denying a motion for joinder filed by appellant‘s wife, Belinda L. Coffman (“Mrs. Coffman“). Because we find that the Parole Board was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mrs. Coffman‘s motion for joinder, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Appellant is a prison inmate, incarcerated at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, serving an indefinite sentence of 11 to 40 years. In April 2010, the Parole Board conducted a parole hearing and scheduled appellant for parole release on
{¶ 3} Appellant filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the Parole Board acted in bad fаith by rescinding his release on parole. Mrs. Coffman filed a motion for joinder, seeking to add claims for loss of consortium and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court issued a judgment denying Mrs. Coffman‘s motion for joinder. Both the Parole Board and appellant filed motions for judgment on the рleadings. The trial court entered a judgment denying appellant‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings, granting the Parole Board‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
{¶ 4} Appellant appeals from the trial court‘s judgments, assigning two errors for this court‘s review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED OUT OF ORDER ON THE MOTION‘S [sic] FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS BECAUSE THE STATE MOVED FOR JUDGMENT AND THE COURT WAS BY LAW TO INTERPRET CIVIL RULE 12(C) MOST FAVORABLE TO THE NON-MOVING PARTY.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF‘S WIFE FROM JOINING HER HUSBAND AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
{¶ 5} In the statement of his first assignment of error, appellant suggests that the trial court erred by ruling “out of order” on the motions for judgment on the pleadings.
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} Generally, “the deсision to grant or deny parole is within the exclusive discretion of the Ohio Parole Board.” Fuller v. Collins, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-297, 2010-Ohio-5444, ¶ 12. Further, it is well-established that the Parole Board possesses discretion to rescind an unexecuted order granting parole at a future date. State ex rel. Zanders v. Ohio Parole Bd., 82 Ohio St.3d 421, 422 (1998); Hattie v. Anderson, 68 Ohio St.3d 232, 233 (1994). “There is no constitutional or inherent right to be released bеfore the expiration of a valid sentence.” State ex rel. Miller v. Leonard, 88 Ohio St.3d 46, 47 (2000).
{¶ 8} Although appellant concedes that he has no vested right to parole, he argues that the waiver of extradition and conditions of supervision forms constituted written contracts providing for his release on October 1, 2011. Appellant claims that the Parole Board breached these written contracts by rescinding its earlier parole decision.
{¶ 9} ” ‘A contract is generally defined as a promise, or a set of promises, actionable upon breach. Essential elements of a contract include an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained for legal benefit and/or detriment), a
{¶ 10} Appellant argues that the waiver of extradition and conditions of supervision forms constituted written contracts providing that he would be released on parole on October 1, 2011. Appellant asserts, in effect, that in exchange for his agreement to abide by the conditions set forth in these forms, the Parole Board agreed to release appellant on parole on October 1, 2011. As explained above, the Parole Board has broad discretion to grant or deny parole or to rescind a decision granting parole before a prisoner has been released. Therefore, an agreement by the Parole Board to limit its right to change appellant‘s parole date or rescind his parole prior to release could constitute sufficient consideration to form a contract. However, there is nothing in either the waiver of extradition form or the conditions of supervision form suggesting that the Parole Board intended to or agreed to limit its discretion to change appellant‘s parole date or rescind his parole prior to his release date. To the extent that appellant believed he was entering into written contracts providing that he would be released on October 1, 2011, it appears that there was no “meeting of the minds” as to whether the Parole Board agreed to be bound by the parole release date. Thus, the waiver of extradition and conditions of supervision forms do not constitute binding contracts requiring the Parole Board to release appellant on parole on October 1, 2011.
{¶ 11} To the extent that the waiver of extradition and conditions of supervision forms could be read as contracts, it is clear that they impose obligations on appellant after
{¶ 12} Appellant argues, however, that he was subject to certain obligations before his release on parole. In support of this argument, appellant cites to portions of documents labeled “Ohio Parole Board Decision.” One of these documents contains the following note:
Release on PRD [projected release date] is contingent on good institution behavior and/or reduction from maximum security status. A PRD may be extended for a Class II violation when the case is reviewed at the PRD Pre-Release Review.
Another document also contains this note:
A release recommendation is subject to review and approval by the Parole Board Chаir, and is not final until actual release from custody occurs. The physical release may be stopped by the Parole Board Chair up to and including the day of release if significant new information is received that was not considered at the release hearing. Significant new information сan include institutional rule infractions and/or a petition from the Office of Victim Services for a Full Board hearing pursuant to
Section 5149.101 of the Ohio Revised Code .
Based on these provisions, appellant argues that his release on parole was contingent on good institutional behavior prior to his parole releаse date. Thus, he argues that his contractual obligations commenced before he was released on parole. Appellant further
{¶ 13} We reject appellant‘s contention for two reasons. First, the “Ohio Parole Board Decision” documents were not attached to appellant‘s complaint or any of the other pleadings. “Determination of a motion for judgment on the plеadings is restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings, as well as any material incorporated by reference or attached as exhibits to those pleadings.” Curtis at ¶ 24. Therefore, these documents were not properly within the trial court‘s consideration in ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Second, even if the documents had been within the court‘s consideration, they would not change the result. Nothing in either of the provisions imposes a limit on the Parole Board‘s broad authority to change or rescind appellant‘s parole. Rather, these clauses simply reflеct some of the circumstances in which the Parole Board could exercise its authority to rescind the grant of parole. Even taking this language into consideration, we find no contractual obligation requiring the Parole Board to release appellant on October 1, 2011.
{¶ 14} Accоrdingly, appellant‘s first assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.
{¶ 15} In appellant‘s second assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court erred by denying his wife‘s motion to join the action as a plaintiff. On October 27, 2011, Mrs. Coffman filed a motion for joinder as a plaintiff pursuant to
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} Because
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} Further, as the Parole Board notes on appeal, Mrs. Coffman‘s claims were based on tort law and would be compensated by monetary damages. The Court of Claims of Ohio has exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions against the state for money damages that sound in law. Pankey v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-35, 2011-Ohio-4209, ¶ 5. Appellant filed his action in the common pleas court, which would not have jurisdiction to award money damages on Mrs. Coffman‘s claims. Thus, if the trial court granted Mrs. Coffman‘s motion for joinder, it ultimately would have been required to dismiss her claims for lack of jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mrs. Coffman‘s motion for joinder.
{¶ 20} Accordingly, appellant‘s second assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.
{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule both of appellant‘s assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
KLATT and CONNOR, JJ., concur.
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