CNW, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW SWEDEN IRRIGATION DISTRICT, an irrigation district, Defendant-Respondent, and City of Idaho Falls, a municipal corporation, and Doe Defendants 1 through 6, Defendants.
Docket No. 43005
Supreme Court of Idaho, Idaho Falls, September 2016 Term.
Filed: November 3, 2016
383 P.3d 1259
Hearn & Wood and Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Chartered, Idaho Falls, for appellant.
Hall Angell Starnes, LLP, Idaho Falls, for respondent.
ON THE BRIEFS
HORTON, Justice.
This is an
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
CNW owns an office building in the Taylor’s Crossing business subdivision in Idaho Falls. In mid-June of 2012, a sinkhole developed under the parking lot of CNW’s building. It was later determined that the sinkhole was caused by water from Porter Canal infiltrating an abandoned sewer line and eroding the soil under the parking lot. Porter Canal is owned and operated by NSID. The abandoned sewer line is owned by the City of Idaho Falls (City).
On July 18, 2012, CNW’s attorney contacted NSID’s president, Lou Thiel, to discuss the sinkhole. Mr. Thiel informed CNW’s attorney that he should contact Jerry Rigby, NSID’s attorney, regarding the sinkhole. From July to October 2012, CNW and NSID communicated about the sinkhole exclusively through Mr. Rigby. On October 18, 2012, CNW sent a notice of tort claim to NSID which was addressed to “New Sweden Irrigation District c/o Jerry R. Rigby” and mailed to Mr. Rigby’s office in Rexburg.
After receiving the notice, Mr. Rigby forwarded it to NSID’s secretary, DeLillian Reed. When she received the notice, Ms. Reed forwarded the claim to NSID’s insurance carrier. Ms. Reed also sent a letter to CNW. This letter confirmed that Ms. Reed had received the notice that CNW sent to Mr. Rigby and informed CNW that Mr. Rigby did not represent NSID in connection with the matter. Ms. Reed requested that future communications be directed to NSID. Ms. Reed informed CNW that, if it wished to file a notice of tort claim, it would need to fill out an additional form and return it to NSID. The letter included a form for CNW to complete and return. CNW ceased communicating with Mr. Rigby but did not return the form to Ms. Reed.
At this time, NSID denied responsibility for the sinkhole. On October 30, 2012, CNW served the City with a notice of tort claim. On December 5, 2012, NSID admitted that it had worked on the Porter Canal in the spring of 2012. Prior to this date, NSID had repeatedly denied performing any work on the canal.
CNW filed this lawsuit against NSID and the City on December 19, 2012. On January 25, 2013, CNW served NSID with an amended notice of tort claim. NSID moved for summary judgment on September 29, 2014.
On December 31, 2014, the district court granted NSID’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found that CNW’s letter of October 18, 2012, was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA). The district court also found that the 180 day time limit expired before CNW served the amended notice of tort claim in January.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Appellate review of a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the same as that required of the district judge when ruling on the motion.” Turner v. City of Lapwai, 157 Idaho 659, 661, 339 P.3d 544, 546 (2014) (quoting Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249, 251, 61 P.3d 606, 608 (2002)). Summary judgment is proper when, “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c). “The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with the party moving for summary judgment.” Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). “On review, this Court liberally construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party’s favor.” Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 747, 890 P.2d 331, 333 (1995).
III. ANALYSIS
There are some issues which are not in dispute. First, neither party disputes that the ITCA applies to CNW’s claim against NSID. Next, NSID does not dispute that the October 18, 2012, letter contained sufficient information to qualify as a notice of tort claim under
The primary disputed issue is whether the October 18, 2012, letter that was forwarded to NSID by Mr. Rigby and received by Ms. Reed satisfied the presentment requirement found in
A. The delivery of the notice of tort claim to NSID’s secretary satisfied the presentment requirement of Idaho Code section 6-906.
The dispositive issue presented by this appeal is whether CNW complied with the requirements of
All claims against a political [subdivision] arising under the provisions of this act and all claims against an employee of a political subdivision for any act or omission of the employee within the course or scope of his employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.
Irrigation districts are included in the definition of political subdivisions.
The purposes of the ITCA notice requirement are to “(1) save needless expense and litigation by providing for amicable resolution of the differences between parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the [governmental entity’s] liability, if any, and (3) allow the
While
This Court recently revisited this issue in Turner v. City of Lapwai. There, the district court found that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirement when the city clerk had not received the notice of the plaintiff’s claim even though the claim had been communicated to other city officials. Turner, 157 Idaho at 663, 339 P.3d at 548. The plaintiff in Turner was a former city employee who was seeking unpaid wages from the city. Id. at 660, 339 P.3d at 545. In pursuing her claim, the plaintiff talked with an auditor who worked for the city, the mayor of the city, and a member of the city council. Id. at 661, 339 P.3d at 546. Upholding the decision of the district court, this Court noted that the notice had not been communicated to the clerk and the clerk did not know of the claim. Id. at 663, 339 P.3d at 548. Although we held that
Here, CNW complied with the requirements of
NSID relies on Turner for the proposition that notice should be delivered directly to the
To hold otherwise would require a claimant to personally deliver the notice of tort claim to the secretary of the irrigation district. We have specifically held that we will not read a negative pregnant into the statute which would require such service. This Court has consistently stated that the ITCA notice requirement should be liberally interpreted. We hold that the presentment requirement of
B. We do not address CNW’s claims regarding the commencement of the 180 day period and that NSID is estopped from asserting a defense based on Idaho Code section 6-906.
Because we find that the delivery of the notice of tort claim satisfied the requirements of the statute, we do not reach CNW’s alternative arguments that the 180 day time period did not begin to run until December of 2012 or that NSID is estopped from asserting lack of notice as a defense.
C. We award costs, but not attorney fees, to CNW.
Both parties request an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. CNW requests attorney fees under
Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a) provides that, “[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the court.” I.A.R. 40(a). As the prevailing party, CNW is entitled to its costs on appeal.
This Court has held that
IV. CONCLUSION
We vacate the judgment dismissing CNW’s action and remand for further proceedings. We award costs on appeal to CNW.
Chief Justice J. JONES and Justices EISMANN, BURDICK and W. JONES concur.