COUNTY OF FRESNO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. S015637
Supreme Court of California
Apr. 22, 1991.
53 Cal.3d 482
Max E. Robinson, County Counsel, and Pamela A. Stone, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
B. C. Barnum, County Counsel (Kern), and Patricia J. Randolph, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
OPINION
MOSK, J.—We granted review in this proceeding to decide whether
The Legislature enacted
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The present proceeding arose after the Legislature enacted the Hazardous Materials Release Response Plans and Inventory Act (Act). (
The County of Fresno (County) implemented the Act but chose not to impose the authorized fees. Instead, it filed a so-called “test” or initial claim with the commission (
The County then filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief against the State, the commission, and others, seeking vacation of the commission‘s decision and a declaration that
After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition and effectively dismissed the complaint. It determined, inter alia, that mandate under
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It held the Act did indeed constitute a “program” under County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46. It also held
II. DISCUSSION
We begin our analysis with the California Constitution. At the June 6, 1978, Primary Election, article XIII A was added to the Constitution through the adoption of Proposition 13, an initiative measure aimed at controlling ad valorem property taxes and the imposition of new “special taxes.” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231-232 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) The constitutional provision imposes a limit on the power of state and local governments to adopt and levy taxes. (City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 59, fn. 1 [266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522] (City of Sacramento).)
At the November 6, 1979, Special Statewide Election, article XIII B was added to the Constitution through the adoption of Proposition 4, another initiative measure. That measure places limitations on the ability of both state and local governments to appropriate funds for expenditures.
“Articles XIII A and XIII B work in tandem, together restricting California governments’ power both to levy and to spend [taxes] for public purposes.” (City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 59, fn. 1.)
Article XIII B of the Constitution was intended to apply to taxation—specifically, to provide “permanent protection for taxpayers from excessive taxation” and “a reasonable way to provide discipline in tax spending at state and local levels.” (See County of Placer v. Corin (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 443, 446 [170 Cal.Rptr. 232], quoting and following Ballot Pamp., Proposed Stats. and Amends. to
Article XIII B of the Constitution, however, was not intended to reach beyond taxation. That fact is apparent from the language of the measure. It is confirmed by its history. In his analysis, the Legislative Analyst declared that Proposition 4 “would not restrict the growth in appropriations financed from other [i.e., nontax] sources of revenue, including federal funds, bond funds, traffic fines, user fees based on reasonable costs, and income from gifts.” (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Stats. and Amends. to
Section 6 was included in article XIII B in recognition that article XIII A of the Constitution severely restricted the taxing powers of local governments. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 61.) The provision was intended to preclude the state from shifting financial responsibility for carrying out governmental functions onto local entities that were ill equipped to handle the task. (Ibid.; see Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig (1988) 44 Cal.3d 830, 836, fn. 6 [244 Cal.Rptr. 677, 750 P.2d 318].) Specifically, it was designed to protect the tax revenues of local governments from state mandates that would require expenditure of such revenues. Thus, although its language broadly declares that the “state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse . . . local government for the costs [of a state-mandated new] program or higher level of service,” read in its textual and historical context section 6 of article XIII B requires subvention only when the costs in question can be recovered solely from tax revenues.
In view of the foregoing analysis, the question of the facial constitutionality of
The County argues to the contrary. It maintains that
We do not agree that in enacting
The County nevertheless argues that no matter how characterized,
In our view, the County‘s argument is unpersuasive. Even if we assume arguendo that the intent of those who drafted Proposition 4 is as claimed, what is crucial here is the intent of those who voted for the measure. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56.) There is no substantial evidence that the voters sought what the County assumes the drafters desired. Moreover, the “legislative history” cited above cannot be considered relevant; it was written and circulated after the passage of Proposition 4. As such, it could not have affected the voters in any way.
To avoid this result, the County advances one final argument: “Based on the authority of [
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
Lucas, C. J., Broussard, J., Panelli, J., Kennard, J., and Best (Hollis G.), J.,* concurred.
ARABIAN, J., Concurring.—I concur in the determination that
* Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
The majority find
Of at least equal importance,
I do not hereby seek to undermine the majority holding but rather to set it on a firmer constitutional footing. “[S]tatutes must be given a reasonable interpretation, one which will carry out the intent of the legislators and render them valid and operative rather than defeat them. In so doing, sections of the Constitution, as well as the codes, will be harmonized where reasonably possible, in order that all may stand.” (Rose v. State of California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 723 [123 P.2d 505]; see also County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 58 [233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202].) To this end, it is a fundamental premise of our form of government that “the Constitution of this State is not to be considered as a grant of power, but rather as a restriction upon the powers of the Legislature; and . . . it is competent for the Legislature to exercise all powers not forbidden . . . .” (People v. Coleman (1854) 4 Cal. 46, 49.) “Two important consequences flow from this fact. First, the entire law-making authority of the state, except the people‘s right of initiative and referendum, is vested in the
As the majority opinion impliedly recognizes, neither the language nor the intent of article XIII B conflicts with the exercise of legislative prerogative we review today. Of paramount significance, neither section 6 nor any other provision of article XIII B prohibits statutory delineation of additional circumstances obviating reimbursement for state mandated programs. (See Dean v. Kuchel, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 101; Roth Drugs, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 720, 729 [57 P.2d 1022]; see also Kehrlein v. City of Oakland (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 332, 338 [172 Cal.Rptr. 111].)
Furthermore, the initiative was “[b]illed as a flexible way to provide discipline in government spending” by creating appropriations limits to restrict the amount of such expenditures. (County of Placer v. Corin (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 443, 447 [170 Cal.Rptr. 232]; see
This conclusion fully accommodates the intent of the voters in adopting article XIII B, as reflected in the ballot materials accompanying the proposition. (See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245-246 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) In general, these materials convey that “[t]he goals of article XIII B, of which section 6 is a part, were to protect residents from excessive taxation and government spending.” (County of Los Angeles v. State of California, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 61; Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin (1985) 38 Cal.3d 100, 109-110 [211 Cal.Rptr. 133, 695 P.2d 220].) To the extent user fees are not borne by the general public or applied to the general revenues, they do not bear upon this purpose. Moreover, by imputation, voter approval contemplated the continued imposition of reasonable user fees outside the scope of article XIII B. (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to
“The concern which prompted the inclusion of section 6 in article XIII B was the perceived attempt by the state to enact legislation or adopt administrative orders creating programs to be administered by local agencies, thereby transferring to those agencies the fiscal responsibility for providing services which the state believed should be extended to the public.” (County of Los Angeles v. State of California, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 56; see City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 66 [266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522].) “Section 6 had the additional purpose of precluding a shift of financial responsibility for carrying out governmental functions from the state to local agencies which had had their taxing powers restricted by the enactment of article XIII A in the preceding year and were ill equipped to take responsibility for any new programs.” (County of Los Angeles v. State of California, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 61.) An exemption from reimbursement for state mandated programs for which local governments are authorized to charge offsetting user fees does not frustrate or compromise these goals or otherwise disturb the balance of local government financing and expenditure.2 (See County of Placer v. Corin, supra, 113
The self-executing nature of article XIII B does not alter this analysis. “It has been uniformly held that the legislature has the power to enact statutes providing for reasonable regulation and control of rights granted under constitutional provisions. [Citations.]” (Chesney v. Byram (1940) 15 Cal.2d 460, 465 [101 P.2d 1106].) ” ‘Legislation may be desirable, by way of providing convenient remedies for the protection of the right secured, or of regulating the claim of the right so that its exact limits may be known and understood; but all such legislation must be subordinate to the constitutional provision, and in furtherance of its purpose, and must not in any particular attempt to narrow or embarrass it.’ [Citations.]” (Id., at pp. 463-464; see also County of Contra Costa v. State of California (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 62, 75 [222 Cal.Rptr. 750].)
“[Initiative] provisions of the Constitution and of charters and statutes should, as a general rule, be liberally construed in favor of the reserved power. [Citations.] As opposed to that principle, however, ‘in examining and ascertaining the intention of the people with respect to the scope and nature of those . . . powers, it is proper and important to consider what the consequences of applying it to a particular act of legislation would be, and if upon such consideration it be found that by so applying it the inevitable effect would be greatly to impair or wholly destroy the efficacy of some other governmental power, the practical application of which is essential and, perhaps, indispensable, to the convenience, comfort, and well-being of the inhabitants of certain legally established districts or subdivisions of the state or of the whole state, then in such case the courts may and should assume that the people intended no such result to flow from the application of those powers and that they do not so apply.’ [Citation.]” (Hunt v. Mayor & Council of Riverside (1948) 31 Cal.2d 619, 628-629 [191 P.2d 426].)
land, and not to raise general revenues, are simply not the type of exaction that can be used as a mechanism for circumventing these tax relief provisions. [Citation.]“].)
