Clyde E. Johnson v. State of FloridaClyde E. Johnson v. State of Florida
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. State, 108 So. 3d 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), which certified conflict with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). We have jurisdiction. See
Clyde Edward Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of armed burglary of a dwelling, three counts of armed kidnapping, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of sexual battery using force or a weapon. He was
The United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Graham held that Florida‘s practice of sentencing juvenile offenders to life sentences for nonhomicide crimes violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75. In 2014, thе Legislature passed chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, which provided judicial review for juvenile offenders who were tried as adults and received more than 20 years’ incarceration, with exceptions. Later, this Court, in a unanimous decision, decided that juveniles who receive term-of-years sentences that do not provide a meaningful opportunity for early release based on maturity and rehabilitation during their natural lives are entitled to resentencing pursuant to chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida. Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 680 (Fla. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1455 (2016). Then, in Kelsey, a majority of this Court applied the reasoning in Henry to juveniles whose life sentences had been vacated pursuant to Graham, but who had not been resentenced under the new juvenile sentencing guidelines. Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5, 8-9 (Fla. 2016). We conсlude that reading these three cases together provides that that juvenile nonhomicide offenders are entitled to sentences that provide a meaningful opportunity for early release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation during their natural lifetimes and that gain time fails to meet those requirements.
In this Court‘s discussions of Graham, we have undеrscored the United States Supreme Court‘s emphasis on the status of the juvenile nonhomicide offender and the nature of the offense committed. See Henry, 175 So. 3d at 678 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). Accordingly, our focus has not been on the length of the sentence imposed, but the status of the offender and the possibility that he or she will be able to grow into a contributing member of sоciety. In other words, although Graham focused on life sentences as applied to juveniles, in Henry, we applied Graham‘s categorical rule as creating a special class of citizens, to wit: juvenile nonhomicide offenders.
Leighdon Henry, a juvenile offender who was tried as an adult, was convicted of multiple nonhomicide crimes and sentenced to life plus an additional sixty years. Henry, 175 So. 3d at 676. After Graham issued, Henry‘s life sentence
In Kelsey, we considered whether the remedy espoused in Henry applied to juvenile offenders who were resentenced from life to term-of-years sentences after Graham, for crimes committed before chapter 2014-220‘s July 1, 2014, effective date, but who did not receive the benefit of chapter 2014-220‘s review mechanism. Thomas Kelsey was 15 yeаrs old when he burglarized an apartment and raped the pregnant victim at knifepoint in the presence of her two small children. Kelsey, 206 So. 3d at 6. Kelsey pleaded guilty and received two life sentences and two concurrent twenty-five year terms for four nonhomicide offenses on March 26, 2010. Id. At a resentencing hearing held after the United States Supreme Court issued Graham, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of forty-five years. Id. at 6-7. The First District affirmed. Id. On review in this Court, we opined, “After we made clear that Graham does indeed apply to term-of-years sentences, we have declined to require that such sentences must be ‘de facto life’ sentences for Graham to apply.” Id. at 10 (citing Guzman v. State, 183 So. 3d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 2016)). Accordingly, we have determined that Graham prohibits juvenile nonhomicide offenders from serving lengthy terms of incarceration without any form of judicial review mechanism.
In the present case, Clyde Johnson was originally sentenced to six concurrent life sentences and, after those sentences were set aside pursuant to Graham, resentenced to one 100-year term and five concurrent forty-year terms.2 On appeal, where Johnson argued that the 100-year term still violated Graham, the Fifth District affirmed, relying solely on its previous opinion in Henry, a decision this Court reversed. See Henry, 175 So. 3d at 680. The Johnson opinion, in its entirety, states:
Clyde Edward Johnson challenges his 100-year sentence on a charge of burglary of a dwelling while armed, arguing that the sentence violates Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), as he was under 18 years old at the time of the offense. [FN1] As our court has already rejected the argument that a term of years sentence violates Graham in Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), rev. granted, 107 So. 3d 405 (Fla. 2012), we affirm. We certify that this decision conflicts with Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) and Adams v. State, [188 So. 3d 849] (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).
[FN1] Johnson was originally sentenced to life on this charge, and to concurrent life sentences on five related charges: three counts of armed kidnapping to facilitate a felony; one count of attempted first degree murder with a firearm; and, one count of sexual battery using force or a weapon (firearm). All six life sentences were set aside following the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in
Graham. The 100-year sentence challenged in this appeal was imposed at Johnson‘s resentencing. As for the other five counts, the trial court resentenced Johnson to concurrent 40-year sentences, which are not challenged on appeal.]
Johnson v. State, 108 So. 3d 1153, 1153-54 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).
The Florida Corrections Code provides several forms of allowable gain time. As defined by this Court:
Gain time is allowed by the state to encourage a prisoner to mend his ways, to conduct himself in an orderly fashion while paying his debt to society and by his conduct to earn the privilege of release earlier than the terminal date fixed by his sentence. A prisoner‘s right to accrued gain time is not absolute but is conditioned upon satisfactory service of the sentence as required by the statute.
Nicholas v. Wainwright, 152 So. 2d 458, 461 (Fla. 1963) (citation omitted). The statutes permit the accrual, forfeiture, and reinstatement of gain time, with different rules applying based on when an offense was committed, the type of gain time available on the sentence, and the type of offense committed. See
Johnson‘s sentences were based on offenses he committed on January 5, 1990, when he was seventeen years old. Under
On March 19, 2015, we quashed the Fifth District‘s decision in Henry, holding “that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under Graham is implicated when a juvenile nonhomicide offender‘s sentence does not afford any ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ ” during his or her natural life. Henry, 175 So. 3d at 679. We provided that “Graham applies to ensure that juvenile nonhomicide offenders will not be sentenced to terms of imprisonment without affording them a meaningful opportunity for early release based on a demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at 680 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 75) (emphasis added). In other words, in Henry we explained that Graham applies to term-of-yeаrs prison sentences, and that juvenile nonhomicide offenders’ sentences must provide an opportunity for early release that is: (1) meaningful, (2) based on a demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation, and (3) during his or her natural life. See Henry, 175 So. 3d at 680 (“Graham prohibits the state trial courts from sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to prison terms that ensure thesе offenders will be imprisoned without obtaining meaningful opportunities to obtain future early release during their natural lives based on their demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”)
The State argues that because gain time provides an opportunity for early release, Johnson‘s 100-year sentence does not violate Graham. However, the State‘s interpretation of Graham is too narrоw and the question before this Court is whether the application of gain time provides an opportunity for early release that meets all three Graham requirements as articulated in Henry. Because we conclude that gain time, generally, is not based on a demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation, Johnson‘s sentence, even including gain time, does not provide him with a meaningful opportunity for early release during his natural life.
In Henry, a unanimous Court agreed that “the Eighth Amendment will not tolerate prison sentences that lack a review mechanism for evaluating [juvenile nonhomicide] offenders for demonstrable maturity and reform in the future . . . .” Henry, 175 So. 3d at 680 (emphasis added). In Henry, and cases like it, we therefore remanded for resentencing under the new juvenile sentencing guidеlines. In Kelsey, we were asked to determine whether a juvenile offender who had already received resentencing pursuant to Graham was entitled to resentencing
Indeed, the State‘s argument in its Answer Brief concedes this point. The State argues that it is not the length of the sentence given, but rather whether the juvenile offender will hаve some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. State‘s Ans. Br. at 7 (“It is not the length of the sentence given to a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense that could potentially violate Graham, but rather, the fact that Florida currently has no standardized means to provide ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’ ”). Further, we previously acknowledged that the length of the sentence alone was not dispositive in Kelsey when we said that Kelsey‘s “sentence was unconstitutional not because of the length of his sentence, but because it did not prоvide him a meaningful opportunity for early release based on maturation and rehabilitation” during his natural life. Kelsey, 206 So. 3d at 11. Accordingly, irrespective of whether Johnson receives basic or incentive gain time to shorten his sentence, the application of gain time, alone, is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Graham, Henry, and Kelsey.
We conclude that Johnson‘s current sentence, even with gain time, exceeds his life expectancy by at least five years, and possibly 20 years. Therefore, the application of gain time does not provide him a meaningful opportunity for early release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation during his natural life. Because we conclude that Johnson‘s 100-year sentence violates the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Graham and our decisions in Henry and Kelsey, we quash the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result only.
LAWSON, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.