Clyde E. Johnson v. State of Florida
215 So. 3d 1237
| Fla. | 2017Background
- Clyde Edward Johnson committed multiple nonhomicide crimes at age 17 and was originally sentenced to six concurrent life terms.
- After Graham v. Florida, Johnson’s life sentences were vacated and he was resentenced to one 100-year term and five concurrent 40-year terms; he appealed the 100-year term.
- The Fifth District affirmed, holding Graham did not apply to term-of-years sentences and certified conflict with the First District; the Supreme Court of Florida granted review.
- Florida gain-time rules can shorten term-of-years sentences, but gain time is awarded for behavior/programming and is not expressly tied to demonstrated maturity or rehabilitation.
- This Court’s decisions in Henry and Kelsey held Graham’s protections extend beyond literal life sentences: juvenile nonhomicide offenders must have a meaningful opportunity for early release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation during their natural lives.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Graham apply to term-of-years sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders? | Johnson: Graham applies; term-of-years that foreclose meaningful review violate Eighth Amendment. | State: Graham limited to life sentences; term-of-years compliant if release via gain time possible. | Graham applies to term-of-years; sentencing must afford meaningful opportunity for early release based on maturity and rehabilitation. |
| Does the availability of gain time satisfy Graham/Henry/Kelsey? | Johnson: Gain time is insufficient because it is not tied to demonstrated maturity/rehabilitation. | State: Gain time provides opportunity for early release, so sentence is constitutional. | Gain time alone does not satisfy the requirement; it typically is behavior/program-based, not a maturity/rehabilitation review mechanism. |
| Is resentencing alone (without Henry guidelines) an adequate remedy when life was vacated under Graham? | Johnson: Resentencing must include a mechanism for meaningful, review-based early release (per Henry/Kelsey). | State: Resentencing itself can be the meaningful opportunity, especially after many years incarcerated. | Resentencing alone is insufficient; defendants must be afforded the review mechanism contemplated by Henry/Kelsey. |
| Whether Johnson’s 100-year sentence violates Graham given life expectancy and gain-time prospects | Johnson: Sentence exceeds natural life expectancy even with gain time, so violates Graham. | State: With gain time, early release opportunity exists; no violation. | The 100-year sentence (even with gain time) violates Graham/Henry/Kelsey because it does not provide a meaningful, rehabilitation-based opportunity for release during Johnson’s natural life. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibits life sentences without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders)
- Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2015) (Graham’s rule applies to juvenile nonhomicide offenders and requires meaningful review for release based on maturity and rehabilitation)
- Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 2016) (post-Graham resentencings must provide the Henry review/remedy when lacking such mechanism)
- Johnson v. State, 108 So. 3d 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (district-court decision at issue, which held Graham did not apply to term-of-years and was quashed)