Cleveland v. Jones-McFarlaneCleveland v. Jones-McFarlane
JUDGMENT: REVERSED, PLEA VACATED, AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 9, 2020
Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court
Case No. 2018 TRC 033049
Appearances:
Barbara A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, and Karrie D. Howard, Chief Prosecutor, and Jonathan L. Cudnik, Assistant City Prosecutor, for appellee.
Fred D. Middleton, for appellant.
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Tomika J. Jones-
I. BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Jones-McFarlane, 42 years old, was pulled over on November 9, 2018, and charged with three traffic violations. Count 1 was a violation of
{¶ 3} The city of Cleveland represented that she was weaving within her lane before being pulled over, and that she had droopy eyes, lethargic movements, and underwent standard sobriety tests before proceeding to the Linndale Police Department for a test. Jones-McFarlane represented that she was pulled over because her headlights were off. She also represented that her breathalyzer test result was 0.02. She pled not guilty at her arraignment hearing. Counsel was later appointed.
{¶ 4} At a hearing on November 19, 2018, a plea deal was discussed under which Jones-McFarlane would plead guilty to an amended Count 1, and the other
{¶ 5} Defense counsel appears to have attempted to explain the plea deal to Jones-McFarlane during the November 19, 2018 hearing, but her responses throughout the exchange are largely reflected as “Inaudible” on the transcript. At one point, defense counsel stated “Your Honor, she‘s not clear on what her alternatives are.” Jones-McFarlane then stated, “I just want to get it over with. No.” Afterwards, the court stated, “That‘s not a reason to enter a plea” and continued the hearing to December 10, 2018. Jones-McFarlane and the court then had the following exchange:
JONES-MCFARLANE: Sir, I‘m agreeing to the plea.
COURT: No. You‘ve indicated you‘re not happy with what‘s going on. You need to talk to your attorney and figure out what you want to do.
JONES-MCFARLANE: No.
COURT: We‘re coming back on 12-10 at 11 o‘clock.
{¶ 6} The plea hearing proceeded on December 10, 2018. With counsel present, Jones-McFarlane pled guilty to an amended Count 1. As amended, Count 1 charged a violation of
COURT: How do you plead to the amended charge?
JONES-MCFARLANE: Guilty.
COURT: You understand what‘s going on in here?
JONES-MCFARLANE: Enough.
COURT: By entering this plea, you know you‘re giving up certain constitutional rights?
JONES-MCFARLANE: I‘m sorry.
COURT: By entering this plea, you know you‘re giving up certain constitutional rights?
JONES-MCFARLANE: I understand that.
COURT: Did your attorney advise you of your constitutional rights before today?
JONES-MCFARLANE: No.
COURT: You know you have a right to a trial or to a bench or to a jury. You have the right to call witnesses on your behalf. You have the right to confront witnesses who might testify against you. You have the right to be presumed innocent of all these charges - (inaudible) - do you understand those rights?
JONES-MCFARLANE: Yes
COURT: You have the right to have the prosecution prove each and every element of the charges against you. You have the right to remain silent at all stages of these proceedings. Do you wish to give up all those rights today?
JONES-MCFARLANE: Yes.
{¶ 7} The prosecutor then set forth the factual basis for the charge. Afterwards, the court informed Jones-McFarlane that if she had insurance, she
COURT: All right. We will proceed with sentencing today. $1,000. 180 days. Does she want to do the Three Day Alternative or three days in jail?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: She said she can‘t afford the Alternative to Jail.
COURT: Are you working, ma‘am?
JONES-MCFARLANE: No, I‘m on disability.
COURT: What are you on, SSI?
DEFENDANT: Social Security Disability
COURT: SSD. If you get a drug test today, how would you do?
DEFENDANT: Pretty good.
COURT: Come back negative or positive?
DEFENDANT: Negative.
COURT: Was it a test or refusal?
PROSECUTOR: Urine test, your Honor.
COURT: Do we have the results?
PROSECUTOR: That is - she‘s - that‘s why she is not - she is pleading to Physical.
COURT: Okay. I‘m going to get a report. January the 23rd. 10:00 a.m.
I‘ll get a report. I‘ll see what they recommend. If they recommend they want to pay for you doing the three day program, they may do that. If they want to recommend you just go to jail, they may do that. I don‘t know what they‘re going to say. Just go down to probation. I‘ll see you next month.
{¶ 9} The case was scheduled for a sentencing hearing on January 23, 2019. Jones-McFarlane appeared that day, but requested a continuance because she wanted to retain private counsel. The court continued the sentencing hearing to February 20, 2019. Jones-McFarlane failed to appear that day and a warrant was issued on February 24, 2019. She was arrested on March 5, 2019, and appeared before the court on March 11, 2019, at which the court set another sentencing hearing date for March 20, 2019. Jones-McFarlane also did not appear on the March 20, 2019 date. The court set a hearing for March 27, 2019, that was continued to May 6, 2019, at Jones-McFarlane‘s request.
{¶ 10} A sentence was not entered on the docket until May 6, 2019, five months after the plea hearing. On May 6, 2019, the court sentenced Jones-McFarlane to 180 days of incarceration and ordered her to pay a $1,000 fine. The court suspended 177 days of the incarceration sentence and $500 of the fine. The court also ordered one year of community control supervision and ordered Jones-McFarlane to complete four Mothers Against Drunk Driving sessions. The trial
{¶ 11} This appeal followed. Jones-McFarlane asserts the following assignment of error:
The guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently or voluntary [sic] entered when there is no record of the statement of possible sentences based on a change of plea and thus in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution and violation of Criminal Rule 11 and Traffic Rule 10.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 12} “We review the trial court‘s compliance with
{¶ 13} The Ohio Supreme Court has further explained:
When the trial judge does not substantially comply with
Crim.R. 11 in regard to a nonconstitutional right, reviewing courts must determine whether the trial court partially complied or failed to comply with the rule. If the trial judge partially complied, e.g., by mentioning mandatory postrelease control without explaining it, the plea may be vacated only if the defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect. * * *The test for prejudice is whether the plea would have otherwise been made. * * *
If the trial judge completely failed to comply with the rule, e.g., by not informing the defendant of a mandatory period of postrelease control, the plea must be vacated. * * *
A complete failure to comply with the rule does not implicate an analysis of prejudice.
State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶ 14} Jones-McFarlane argues that her guilty plea and sentence should be vacated because she was not made aware of the possible sentences associated with the charge before entering her plea. She argues that the trial court violated
A. Jones-McFarlane‘s guilty plea was governed by Crim.R. 11(E).
{¶ 15} “A trial court‘s obligations in accepting a plea depend upon the level of offense to which the defendant is pleading.” State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877 N.E.2d 677, ¶ 6, citing Watkins at ¶ 25.
B. Trial court‘s obligations under Crim.R. 11(E) required the trial court to inform Jones-McFarlane of the “effect of her plea.”
{¶ 17}
Misdemeanor cases involving petty offenses. In misdemeanor cases involving petty offenses the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such pleas without first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty. The counsel provisions of
Crim.R. 44(B) and(C) apply to division (E) of this rule.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 18} The Ohio Supreme Court has found that “effect of the plea” described in
{¶ 19} In Jones, the court held:
We hold, therefore, that to satisfy the requirement of informing a defendant of the effect of a plea, a trial court must inform the defendant of the appropriate language under
Crim.R. 11(B) . In this case, before accepting a guilty plea to a misdemeanor for a petty offense, the court was required to inform Jones that a plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt.* * *
Although
Crim.R. 11(E) does not require the trial court to engage in a lengthy inquiry when a plea is accepted to a misdemeanor charge involving a petty offense, the rule does require that certain information be given on the “effect of the plea.” Whether orally or in writing, a trial court must inform the defendant of the appropriate language underCrim.R. 11(B) before accepting a plea.
{¶ 20}
(B) Effect of guilty or no contest pleas. With reference to the offense or offenses to which the plea is entered: (1) The plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant‘s guilt.
{¶ 21} Thus, pursuant to
C. Crim.R. 11(E) did not require the trial court to inform Jones-McFarlane of the maximum or potential penalties associated with her guilty plea.
{¶ 22}
{¶ 23} The Ohio Supreme Court has also concluded that the “effect of the plea” language in
D. The trial court did not comply with Crim.R. 11(E).
{¶ 24} Although the trial court was not required to inform Jones-McFarlane of the possible sentence associated with her plea, we find that the trial court otherwise failed to satisfy
{¶ 25} Where there is a “complete failure to comply with the rule,” a prejudice analysis is not necessary; the plea must be vacated. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, at ¶ 32. The trial court‘s failure to mention any of the
{¶ 26} Jones-McFarlane‘s guilty plea is vacated. Judgment is reversed, plea vacated, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR