S20A0727. CLAY v. THE STATE.
S20A0727
Supreme Court of Georgia
August 24, 2020
309 Ga. 593
MELTON, Chief Justice.
MELTON, Chief
Following a jury trial, James Rashad Clay, acting pro se, аppeals his convictions for malice murder and related offenses in connection with crimes committed against Rashonda Patterson and Joseph Emener.1 On
1. As an initial matter, Clay enumerates many alleged errors that are not preserved for appellate review. Specifically, Clay asserts: that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), when it failed to produce a gunshot residue test;2 that his indictment was void because it was not returned in open court, because it contained numerous substantive and non-amendable defects, and because he is “actually innocent” of the charges;3 that there were issues conсerning the composition of his jury pool and the qualification of a member of the petit jury; that the State violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SCt 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986); that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by allegedly violating his attorney-client privilege prior to trial;4 and that the judge who presided over his case did so in violation of
2. Turning to the enumerations preserved for appellate review, Clay first asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. In support of this claim, Clay attacks the evidence presented against him at trial. However, “[t]his Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony; instead, evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury‘s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013).
Viewing the evidence presented at trial in this light, the record shows that Clay had been a resident at the Suburban Lodge, an extended-stay motel located in Gwinnett County. However, prior to the day of the crimes, Clay was banned from the premises. Despite this, Raymond Robertson, a resident at the motel, saw Clay on the property the day before the crimes. Then, on July 5, 2012, Clay entered the motel and rode the elevator tо the third floor with Ronald Collins, another resident at the motel who had known Clay for years. During their elevator ride, Clay took out a 9-millimeter pistol and cocked it. Collins asked “who you got that for,” to which Clay responded, “it ain‘t for you.” The men exited the elevator together and walked in opposite directions; when Collins reached his room, he called the front desk to inform them that Clay was on the property.
Law enforcement officers arrived at the scene and found Patterson unresponsive. Officers located two bullet holes in the door, two cartridge casings outside the door, and one bullet inside the room. During Patterson‘s autopsy, the medical examiner retrieved a single bullet from Patterson‘s head and noted the presence of wood splintering around her face; the medical examiner concluded that Patterson died as a result of the gunshot.
Witnesses provided a description of Clay to officers, and, after a short canvass of the vicinity, Clay was found at a nearby apartment complex. He was carrying a 9-millimeter pistol that the State‘s firearm examiner later matched to the shell casings and bullets collected from the scene and from Patterson‘s autopsy.
Clay testified at trial and denied being at the motel on the date of the murder and denied committing the shooting. However, he admitted holding a grudge against Emener‘s identical twin brother based upon allegations that Emener‘s brother had abused Clay‘s mother.
Based on the foregoing, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Clay guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.5 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
3. Clay argues that he is entitled to a new trial because his convictions were obtained based upon the perjured testimony of lay witnesses Collins and Robertson. See
4. Clay alleges that the trial court erred by: (a) allowing the introduction of “tainted” gun evidence at trial; (b) admitting Clay‘s custodial statement into evidence because he did not make that statement freely and voluntarily; and (c) failing to suppress the pre-trial identifications by Collins and Robertson. We address each of these clаims in turn.
(a) Gun evidence.
At trial, the court admitted the 9-millimeter pistol recovered from Clay into evidence. The State also called its lead detective as a witness. During his testimony, the detective explained that, in order to determine the cartridge capacity of the confiscated weapon, he removed unfired rounds from his duty weapon and рlaced them into the magazine of Clay‘s 9-millimeter until it was full. The detective testified that the magazine could only hold two additional rounds before the magazine was at full capacity. On appeal, Clay alleges that the trial court erred by admitting the 9-millimeter into evidence because, he alleges, the lead detective‘s actions amounted to “evidence tampering.” However,
Other than providing a conclusory citation of
(b) Clay‘s statement.
Next, Clay argues that the trial court erred by admitting his custodial statement to law enforcement into evidence at trial because officers made “inappropriate statements” during the interview.9 Prior to trial, Clay filed a motion to suppress his statement to officers, arguing that detectives offered him a hopе of benefit in violation of
(c) Witness identifications.
Next, Clay challenges the witness identifications of him by Cоllins and Robertson. We see no error. Concerning Collins‘s out-of-court identification, Clay argues that it resulted from an impermissibly suggestive identification procedure because Collins saw Clay being transported from the scene in handcuffs prior to his identification. This, Clay argues, tainted Collins‘s subsequent in-court identification.
As an initial matter, while Clay did seek to suppress Collins‘s photo lineup identification, that evidence was not introduced at trial. And, because Clay did not object to Collins’ in-court identification, we can review this claim only for plain error. See Gates, 298 Ga. at 327 (3). Once again, Clay has failed to show that the trial court committed clear or obvious error. It is well settled that “even if аn out-of-court identification is impermissibly suggestive, a subsequent in-court identification is admissible if it did not depend upon the prior identification but had an independent origin.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sharp v. State, 286 Ga. 799, 803 (4) (692 SE2d 325) (2010). Assuming arguendo that the pre-trial identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the record shows that Collins‘s in-court identification stemmed from an independent origin. See Humphrey v. State, 281 Ga. 596, 597 (1) (642 SE2d 23) (2007). Collins testified that he had known Clay for years, that he had worked with Clay‘s mother, and that, because of that relationship, Collins tried to be a father figure to Clay. Accordingly, Clay has failed to show plain error concerning Collins‘s in-court identification.
Regarding Robertson‘s photo lineup identification, Clay argues that thе identification should have been suppressed because the evidence at trial showed that Robertson identified Clay from a photo lineup over a month after the crime after seeing news reports of Clay‘s arrest. However, a challenge such as this goes to the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility. In other words, Clay is not сhallenging the identification procedure used by law enforcement, but, instead, is challenging the weight and credibility of Robertson‘s identification. And, such a question is specifically reserved for the jury. See Franklin v. State, 306 Ga. 872, 874 (1) (834 SE2d 53) (2019) (“[I]t is for the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and questions of witness credibility, not this Court.“) (citation and punctuation omitted).
5. Next, Clay alleges that the Superior Court Clerk of Court and the court reporter falsified all of Clay‘s transcripts. However, because Clay presents no evidence to support this assertion, this claim fails.
6. Finally, Clay argues that the four-year delay between the filing of his motion for new trial and the trial court rendering a decision on the same violated his right to due process. See Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253 (626 SE2d 102) (2006). “In assessing a due process claim premised on a post-conviction delay, we generally look at four factors: ‘the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant‘s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.‘” (Citations omitted.) Norman v. State, 303 Ga. 635, 642 (5) (814 SE2d 401) (2018). “But where prejudice is clearly lacking, we will not rеverse a conviction, even if the other factors favor the defendant.” Id. This requires a showing that the post-conviction direct appeal delay prejudiced “the ability of the defendant to assert his arguments on appeal,” leading to “a reasonable probability that, but for the delay, the result of the appeal would have been different.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. Here, Clay has failed to argue, let alone show, that a reasonable probability exists that he would have prevailed on appeal but for the post-conviction delay. Consequently, he cannot establish a due process violation.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED AUGUST 24, 2020.
Murder. Gwinnett Superior Court. Before Judge Turner.
James Rashad Clay, pro se.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Lеe F. Tittsworth, Samuel R. d‘Entremont, Daniel Sanmiguel, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.