Joseph CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas DINAPOLI, as State Comptroller of the State of New York and New York State Police and Fire Retirement System, Robert Coughlin, Individually and as Supervising Attorney for the New York State Police and Fire Retirement System, Dana S. Riell, Individually and as Supervising Attorney for the New York State Police and Fire Retirement System, John Doe, One Through Ten, New York State Police and Fire Retirement System, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-464-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Jan. 31, 2013.
510 Fed. Appx. 49
The district court also did not err in denying Ashmore leave to amend. District courts should generally not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.2000). However, leave to amend is not necessary when it would be futile. Id. (finding leave to replead would be futile where the complaint, even when read liberally, did not “suggest[] that the plaintiff has a claim that she has inadequately or inartfully pleaded and that she should therefore be given a chance to reframe“). Here, granting leave to amend would be futile as the barriers to relief for Ashmore‘s claims cannot be surmounted by reframing the complaint. See id.
We have considered all of Ashmore‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. We expressly decline to address whether the domestic relations exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction applies to federal question actions.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Victor Paladino, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General; Denise A. Hartman, Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY, for Appellees.
Present: PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Clark appeals from the district court‘s grants of the State‘s motions for judgment on the pleadings, entered on October 14, 2011 and January 3, 2012, finding for the State Defendants on all claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.
Clark brought a number of constitutional claims against the State Defendants including (1) a pre-deprivation due process claim, (2) a post-deprivation due process claim, (3) a “class-of-one” equal protection
The district court properly dismissed Clark‘s claims against the State Defendants for money damages as precluded by the Eleventh Amendment, but did not address whether the Eleventh Amendment also barred Clark‘s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. Under the doctrine established in Ex parte Young, “[a] plaintiff may avoid the Eleventh Amendment bar to suit and proceed against individual state officers, as opposed to the state, in their official capacities, provided that his complaint (a) alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and (b) seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff may not use this doctrine to adjudicate the legality of past conduct. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277-78, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986).
Assuming that the Retirement System violated due process by unduly delaying Clark‘s post-deprivation hearing, that delay ended once the System held a hearing on December 15, 2009, and issued a final written determination and order of dismissal in February 2010. We find no merit to Clark‘s assertion that this did not constitute a final hearing and decision on the merits. Thus, Clark has alleged injuries stemming only from past conduct with no plausible threat of future violations. Such claims do not fall within the Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, regardless of how the request for relief is styled. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985); Ward v. Thomas, 207 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir.2000). Thus, Clark‘s post-deprivation due process claim fails because it is precluded by the Eleventh Amendment, as was his claim for monetary damages.
Although the State Defendants did not raise this particular Eleventh Amendment defense at summary judgment, they raised it in their Answer to the First Amended Complaint, and, moreover, this Court can address an Eleventh Amendment defense in the first instance because it “sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); see also Shabazz v. Coughlin, 852 F.2d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir.1988) (addressing an Eleventh Amendment defense in the first instance relying on Edelman).
We have considered Clark‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED and is AFFIRMED on different grounds than the judgment below with respect to Clark‘s post-deprivation due process claim.