City Union Mission, Inc. v. Sheriff Mike Sharp; Jackson County Sheriff‘s Office; Jackson County, Missouri
No. 20-3435
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
June 10, 2022
SHEPHERD, WOLLMAN, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
Submitted: September 23, 2021
Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
Before SHEPHERD, WOLLMAN, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
City Union Mission is a Kansas City, Missouri nonprofit organization located near Margaret Kemp Park that provides food, shelter, employment, and a Christian discipleship program to poor and homeless individuals. A Missouri law prohibits persons convicted of certain sex offenses (Affected Persons) from being present in or loitering within 500 feet of any public park containing playground equipment. After the Jackson County Sheriff‘s Office informed City Union Mission that the statute prohibited some of its guests from being present within 500 feet of the park, even when receiving City Union Mission‘s charitable services, City Union Mission filed suit, bringing 12 claims against the Jackson County Sheriff‘s Office, Jackson County, and Sheriff Mike Sharp in his
I.
City Union Mission is a faith-based nonprofit organization that has operated for over nine decades and serves Kansas City‘s poorest individuals. Its services include providing meals, overnight shelter, and occasionally, employment. City Union Mission also offers a one-year, biblically based discipleship and rehabilitation program called the Christian Life Program (CLP) for men seeking help with life skills and addiction. City Union Mission occupies several properties, with a shelter at 1108 East 10th Street, the CLP program at 1111 East 10th Street, and its headquarters at 1100 East 11th Street. Margaret Kemp Park, a park containing playground equipment, is also located on 10th Street and is within 500 feet of City Union Mission‘s shelter and headquarters locations.
Missouri law provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person who has been found guilty of [certain enumerated sex crimes] . . . shall not knowingly be present in or loiter within five hundred feet of any real property comprising any public park with playground equipment . . . if such facilities exist for the primary use of recreation for children.”
In September 2016, an officer from the Jackson County Sheriff‘s Office emailed City Union Mission, explaining that the Jackson County Sheriff‘s Office had revised its May 2016 Position and would now enforce the statute only against Affected Persons present within 500 feet of Margaret Kemp Park, allowing City Union Mission to provide services to Affected Persons at its 1111 East 10th Street location but not at its other 2 locations. See R. Doc. 1, at 11. In February 2017, an officer from the Jackson County Sheriff‘s Office alerted City Union Mission that Affected Persons were prohibited from maintaining employment at the 1108 East 10th Street location. See R. Doc. 1, at 11-12 (alleging Jackson County Sheriff‘s Office indicated that it “would issue a citation if the matter were
City Union Mission brought 12 claims against the County. Claims 1-6 were brought pursuant to
Because the constitutionality of the state statute was called into question, the State intervened and moved to dismiss Claims 1-12 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The County similarly moved to dismiss Claims 1-13. The district court granted the State‘s motion to dismiss, explaining that
Following discovery, Sheriff Sharp filed a motion for summary judgment on City Union Mission‘s claim for damages against him in his individual capacity, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court found that Sheriff Sharp was entitled to qualified immunity, explaining that, at the time of enforcement of the statute, there was no clearly established constitutional right for City Union Mission to provide religious services to Affected Persons within 500 feet of a park. See R. Doc. 135, at 5. The district court also explained that “there is no basis to conclude that” Affected Persons receiving City Union Mission‘s services were not loitering. See R. Doc. 135, at 5.
II.
City Union Mission now appeals the district court‘s dismissal of its claims against the County and its grant of summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Sharp.
A.
We first consider whether the district court erred in dismissing City Union Mission‘s 12 claims against the County, in which City Union Mission sought a declaration that
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A claim is facially plausible where the complaint contains enough facts such that the court can “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.‘” In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). This is a “context-specific task” in which we must draw on our “judicial experience and common sense.” See McDonough v. Anoka Cnty., 799 F.3d 931, 945 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
First, we conclude that City Union Mission‘s claims seeking broad injunctive relief prohibiting Sheriff Sharp and Jackson County from “enforcing or threatening to enforce”
Further, all parties agree that City Union Mission does not provide services in Margaret Kemp Park, so the only language in
B.
Having resolved Claims 1-12, we move to the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Sharp on Claim 13, applying a de novo standard of review. See Dowden v. Cornerstone Nat‘l Ins. Co., 11 F.4th 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2021). City Union Mission brought a First Amendment claim against Sheriff Sharp pursuant to
“In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we apply the familiar two-prong framework: first, ‘whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for violation of a constitutional or statutory right,’ and second, ‘whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged infraction.‘” Garang v. City of Ames, 2 F.4th 1115, 1121 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). We are free to decide which prong to address first, and unless we find both that the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for violation of a constitutional or statutory right and the right was clearly established at the time of the infraction, the defendant-officer is entitled to qualified immunity. See Nord v. Walsh Cnty., 757 F.3d 734, 738-39 (8th Cir. 2014).
Here we begin with the second prong, asking whether, in 2016, City Union Mission‘s right to provide services to Affected Persons in a building located within 500 feet of a park with playground equipment was clearly established “such that ‘every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.‘” Ness v. City of Bloomington, 11 F.4th 914, 921 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). When determining whether a right is clearly established, we do not view the law with a high level of generality but instead “look for a controlling case or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority. There need not be a prior case directly on point, but ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.‘” See Thurmond v. Andrews, 972 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
City Union Mission does not direct us to any case that clearly establishes its constitutional right to provide services to Affected Persons within 500 feet of a park with playground equipment. In its brief in this Court, City Union Mission begins by citing two Supreme Court cases, Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561 (2018), and Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019), for the proposition that “[t]he right to engage in First Amendment religious activity in a private building . . . is clearly established.” See Appellant Br. 39. City Union Mission then directs us to cases like City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), and Fields v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that loitering, absent any criminal activity, is constitutionally protected. However, these cases are not instructive. We are not tasked with deciding whether the right to engage in First Amendment religious activity in a private building or to loiter is clearly established. Instead, the at-issue right is more complex:
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
KOBES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “loitering bans” are unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972). It makes no difference that Missouri‘s loitering ban only applies to certain sex offenders, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 73 (1999) (plurality opinion) (enjoining loitering law for gang members), or that the law is geographically limited, see Bell v. City of Winter Park, 745 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that fifty-foot buffer zone that prohibited loitering was unconstitutional). And, contrary to the majority, I don‘t think the fact that City Union Mission has “expressly and repeatedly disavowed” that its members were loitering means it can‘t challenge the statute. The very reason that loitering bans are unconstitutional is that no one can give a precise definition of “loitering,” allowing law enforcement to perform “arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.” Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162.
I concur in the judgment, however, because I agree that City Union Mission‘s claim is moot. City Union Mission requested an injunction preventing Jackson County from enforcing