Opinion
—Real Party in Interest Cynthia Ander son-Barker filed a petition under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.; CPRA) to compel the City of Los Angeles (City) to disclose electronically stored documents and data that contained information relating to vehicles impounded by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The City argued that the requested materials did not qualify as “public records” because a private third party owned them.
Prior to the hearing on the petition, Ander son-Barker propounded discovery requests seeking evidence regarding the City’s claim that it did not own the materials. The City asserted a single objection to each discovery request contending that the Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et seq.) did not apply to actions brought under the CPRA. Anderson-Barker filed a motion to compel the City to provide further responses to her discovery. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that (1) the Civil Discovery Act applied to CPRA proceedings and (2) the City had waived any other objections to the discovery requests. The court ordered the City to respond to the discovery requests without any further objections, and imposed discovery sanctions in the amount of $5,560.
The City filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an order directing the trial court to vacate its order, and enter a new order denying the motion to compel. We issued an order to show cause, and now grant the City’s petition in part. Although we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the Civil Discovery Act applies to CPRA proceedings, we reverse the remainder of the order, and remand for further proceedings.
A. Background Facts
The LAPD uses privately owned companies to tow and store impounded vehicles.
Whenever an LAPD officer needs to impound a vehicle, he or she contacts an OPG to tow and store the vehicle. The LAPD officer is required to prepare a “CHP 180 form” that documents the vehicle seizure. The officer and the OPG each retain a portion of the CHP 180 form. The OPG is required to enter certain information regarding the impoundment into a database known as the “Vehicle Information Impound Center” (VIIC). The VIIC is maintained by the “Official Police Garage Association of Los Angles” (OPG-LA), a private organization comprised of tow companies that have OPG contracts with the City. The OPGs are also required to scan their portion of the CHP 180 form into “Laserfiche,” an independent document storage company that OPG-LA contracts with to store OPG-related documents.
B. Summary of Prior Litigation Seeking Disclosure of VIIC Data and Laserfiche Scans
On March 10, 2014, Colleen Flynn submitted a written request to the LAPD seeking “the following electronically stored data: [(1)] All data recorded in [the VIIC] database. [(2)] All documents as scanned into Laserfiche regarding vehicle seizures. . . .” Although Flynn’s request acknowledged that the VIIC data and Laserfiche scans were “stored in systems maintained by [OPG-LA],” she asserted that the materials qualified as “public records” because the City’s “contracts” with OPG-LA and the OPGs provided it the right to “access and possess” the materials.
The LAPD declined Flynn’s request. In a letter, the LAPD explained that the materials Flynn had requested did not qualify as “public records” within
On March 27, 2014, Flynn’s attorney, Donald Cook, filed a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Government Code section 625 8
In its briefing, Flynn argued that the following provision set forth in an attachment to the OPG contracts established that the City owned the VIIC data and the Laserfiche scans: “Unless otherwise provided for herein, all documents, materials, data and reports originated and prepared by CONTRACTOR under this contract shall be and remain the property of the City.” The City, however, argued that a separate provision set forth in section 14.3 of the OPG contracts clarified that the OPG was to “retain ... the VIIC and Laserfiche records,” and that the City was only permitted to inspect the records for “purposes of audit . . . and law enforcement.” In the City’s view, this language demonstrated that it did not own the materials, and was only allowed to access the information for limited purposes.
The court agreed with the City, explaining that the provision Flynn had relied on provided the City ownership of all work product the OPGs had produced under their contracts with the City “ ‘unless otherwise provided for’ in the OPG contract.” The court further explained that “[section] 14.3 meets the ‘otherwise provided for’ requirement, thereby negating [the ownership provision set forth in the attachment provision].” The court also noted that the OPG contracts described the two circumstances under which the City could access the VIIC data and the Laserfiche scans (audit and law enforcement), which would have been unnecessary if the City owned those materials.
Flynn filed a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to section 6259, subdivision (c) seeking immediate review of the trial court’s order. On February 20, 2015, Division One of this district denied the petition. Flynn then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which the court denied in April of 2015.
C. Summary of Proceedings in the Present Matter
On June 4, 2015, petitioner in the current action, Cynthia Anderson-Barker, submitted a request to the LAPD seeking the disclosure of a portion of the information Flynn had previously sought. Specifically, Anderson-Barker requested that the LAPD disclose (1) “All data recorded in [the VIIC] database, for any vehicle seized at LAPD direction at any time from June 1, 2010 to the present, for which a CHP 180 form was prepared,” and (2) “All CHP 180 forms for any vehicle seized at LAPD direction at any time from June 1, 2010 to the present, for which a CHP 180 was prepared. This includes, but is not limited to documents that are indexed in Laserfiche. . . .”
In response, the LAPD informed Anderson-Barker it would “respond to [the] portion of [her] request” that sought copies of CHP 180 forms (or portions thereol) located in the LAPD’s investigative files. The LAPD declined, however, to disclose any VIIC data or Laserfiche scans, explaining that OPG-LA and the OPGs owned and maintained those materials. The LAPD further explained that “the issue of whether the information in the VIIC database and the documents in the Laserfiche system constituted ‘public records’ under the CPRA [had been] vigorously litigated in [the Flynn action].” The LAPD noted that after receiving extensive evidence and briefing, the trial court in Flynn had ruled the requested materials were not “public records” within the meaning of the CPRA, and that the California Court of Appeal had denied a petition for writ of mandate seeking reversal of that decision.
On June 18, 2015, Anderson-Barker, represented by the same attorney who had represented Colleen Flynn (Donald Cook), filed a petition for writ of
The petition further asserted, on information and belief, that “in claiming [the City] does not ‘own’ the requested public records at issue, [the City’s agents] have committed perjury and have suborned perjury.” The petition alleged that the declaration Detective Ben Jones had submitted in the Flynn action falsely asserted that the LAPD had sought search warrants to obtain VIIC data or documents stored in Laserfiche. The petition further alleged, on information and belief, that (1) the City “has never sought a search warrant to obtain VIIC date or CHP 180 forms as stored in Laserfiche,” and (2) the city attorney who drafted Jones’s declaration had done so “for the purpose of deceiving the Flynn court as to the ownership of VIIC data and CHP 180 forms stored in Laserfiche.”
After the City filed its answer to the petition, Anderson-Barker propounded several forms of discovery on the City seeking information related to (1) the City’s claim that it did not own the VIIC data or the Laserfiche scans, and (2) Detective Jones’s statement that the LAPD had previously obtained search warrants to secure such materials. The discovery included (among other things) nine written interrogatories, 16 requests for admission and an inspection demand requesting the production of 40 categories of documents.
On October 7, 2015, Anderson-Barker filed a motion to compel responses to her discovery. Anderson-Barker argued the discovery was necessary to demonstrate that the City did in fact own and control the VIIC data and the Laserfiche scans, and that it had “committed and suborned perjury” in the Flynn action by filing a declaration that falsely claimed the LAPD had
In its opposition, the City argued that the language and intent of the CPRA demonstrated that the Civil Discovery Act was inapplicable to CPRA proceedings. In support, the City relied on language in section 6259, subdivision (a) stating: “The court shall decide the case after examining the record in camera, . . . papers filed by the parties and any oral argument and additional evidence as the court may allow.” The City argued that section 6259 authorized the “trial court ... to request any additional evidence that [the] court deems necessary to make a proper ruling. That is a far cry from allowing a party to import all the discovery provisions of the Civil Discovery Act [in]to a CPRA [proceeding].” The City explained that if the Legislature had intended the Civil Discovery Act to apply, it would have included explicit language in the CPRA. The City further asserted that allowing full-scale discovery in CPRA proceedings was inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent that such proceedings be resolved in an expedited manner.
The City also argued that even if the court found “section 6259 provides some discretion to allow [a petitioner] to propound discovery,” it should deny Anderson-Barker’s discovery requests because they were duplicative of discovery she had obtained in prior lawsuits. The City explained that Anderson-Barker and her attorney, Donald Cook, served as cocounsel in multiple lawsuits challenging the vehicle impound practices of various California law enforcement agencies, including the LAPD.
Finally, the City argued that if the court intended to allow Anderson-Barker to proceed with her discovery, it should allow the City to assert further objechons to each of her requests: “The City’s objechon to all of the propounded discovery is that [petitioner is not entitled to conduct discovery in a CPRA action because the Legislature did not make the Civil Discovery Act applicable to such actions. It would be illogical to object to discovery but at the same time also engage in the discovery process by asserting any and all other objections that might be applicable under the Civil Discovery Act. The threshold issue in this case is whether the CPRA incorporates the Civil Discovery Act into sechon 6258 and 6259. As explained above, it does not. However, if this court disagrees and orders the City to respond to the propounded discovery, the City must be able to assert any and all appropriate objechons.”
On December 16, 2015, the court held a hearing on the motion to compel. The city attorney argued that although the CPRA authorized the trial court to obtain evidence from the parties, it did not allow “full blown civil discovery.” Petihoner’s counsel, however, argued that discovery was permitted in CPRA proceedings when necessary to resolve factual disputes regarding the agency’s disclosure obligation. According to counsel, the question whether the City owned the information it was refusing to disclose should be decided based on “the factual evidence of ownership,” and not on the City’s self-serving statements. The court concluded that “discovery should ... be permitted,” but clarified that “the only issue raised ... by this particular motion is the question whether discovery is available under the CPRA. . . . [T]o decide that issue, the court doesn’t have to go to [the] question whether the discovery was necessary or not, so the court hasn’t addressed that issue in its . . . ruling.”
Following the hearing, the court issued a written order explaining that the CPRA qualified as a “special proceeding of a civil nature,” and was therefore subject to the Civil Discovery Act. According to the court, the fact that the CPRA did not expressly provide for discovery was irrelevant because, by its terms, the Civil Discovery Act “automatically applies to [all] actions of a civil nature regardless of whether the statute giving rise to the cause of actions specifically incorporates its provisions.” The court further ruled that the City had waived any further objections to petitioner’s discovery requests by failing to raise them in its initial discovery responses. The court also
On January 13, 2016, the City filed a request for stay of proceedings and a petition for writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order, and enter a new order denying petitioner’s motion to compel. We stayed the trial court’s order, and requested that petitioner file opposition to the writ of mandate. After receiving the opposition, we issued an order to show cause.
DISCUSSION
A. Availability of Writ Relief and the Standard of Review
As discussed in more detail below, we are not aware of any prior decision that has addressed whether the Civil Discovery Act applies in CPRA proceedings. “Writ review is appropriate in discovery matters where, as here, it is necessary to address ‘questions of first impression that are of general importance to the trial courts and to the [legal] profession, and where general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.’ [Citation].” (People v. Superior Court (Cheek) (2001)
B. Summary of the CPRA
“The CPRA was modeled on the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.) and was enacted for the purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving members of the public access to information in the possession of public agencies. [Citation.] The Legislature has declared that such ‘access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.’ (Gov. Code, § 6250.)” (Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002)
‘“A state or local agency, upon receiving a request by any person for a copy of public records, generally must determine within 10 days whether the request seeks public records in the possession of the agency that are subject to disclosure. (§ 6253, subd. (c).) If the agency determines that the requested records are not subject to disclosure, for example because the records fall within a statutory exemption [citation], the agency promptly must notify the person making the request and provide the reasons for its determination. (§ 6253, subd. (c).)” (Filarsky, supra,
Sections 6258 and 6259 “set[] forth specific procedures for seeking a judicial determination of a public agency’s obligation to disclose records in the event the agency denies a request by a member of the public.” (Filarsky, supra,
“The court’s order either directing disclosure by a public official or supporting the decision to refuse disclosure ‘is . . . immediately reviewable
C. The Civil Discovery Act Applies to CPRA Proceedings
1. A CPRA proceeding qualifies as “a special proceeding of a civil nature” to which the Civil Discovery Act applies
Although pehtioner and her amicus curiae have identified prior CPRA cases in which the parties conducted discovery,
The CPRA does not contain any reference to discovery or the discovery act. By its terms, however, the discovery act applies to both “civil action[s] and . . . special proceeding^] of a civil nature.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.020, subd. (a); see § 2017.010 [permitting “discovery ... in the pending action”]; § 2016.020, subd. (a) [defining “action” to “include[] a civil action and a special proceeding of a civil nature”]; see also People v. Yartz (2005)
“An ‘action’ is defined as ‘an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense.’ [Citations.]” {Yartz, supra,
A CPRA proceeding falls within the definition of a “special proceeding of a civil nature.” The proceeding is not an action at law or a suit in equity, but rather is established strictly by statute, and may be commenced independently of a pending action. (See Los Angeles Police Dept. v. Superior Court (1977)
Our courts have repeatedly concluded, however, that the discovery act applies to statutorily enacted special proceedings that are silent with respect to discovery. For example, in Leake, supra,
The City next contends that the language of section 6259 demonstrates the Legislature did not intend discovery to be available in CPRA proceedings. Section 6259 states, in relevant part: “The court shall decide the case after examining the record in camera, . . . papers filed by the parties and any oral argument and additional evidence as the court may allow.” (Id, subd. (a).) According to the City, the phrase “additional evidence as the court may allow” indicates that the Legislature intended “the trial court, not the parties, [to] direct[] [any] exchange of information between the parties.” As stated in its briefing, the City contends that while “[t]here may indeed be instances where courts require additional information beyond the parties’ initial briefs and evidence to determine whether records have been withheld properly, . . . it is the judge—not the records requester—who leads this inquiry where it is necessary to test the agency’s claims.” Thus, the City essentially argues that section 6259 provides the trial court exclusive authority to request any evidence beyond that which the parties have voluntarily provided, precluding the parties from seeking discovery directly against one another.
Finally, the City argues that providing discovery rights in CPRA proceedings “is directly contrary to the Legislature’s main goal of providing expediency in the public records process.” According to the City, “common sense dictates that the ‘[t]he legislative purpose of expediency and immediate reviewability . . . cannot be served by transforming a public record request into a drawn out discovery battle.’ (Wilder v. Superior Court (1998)
Although we conclude the discovery act applies to CPRA proceedings, the right to discovery nonetheless “remains subject to the trial court’s authority to manage [and limit] discovery” as required. (Cheek, supra,
The general scope of discovery is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010: “Unless otherwise limited by order of the court . . . , any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” “Thus, ‘for discovery purposes, information should be regarded as “relevant to the subject matter” if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof.’ [Citations.]” (Cheek, supra,
There are, however, numerous provisions in the discovery act that authorize the trial court to limit or restrict discovery that otherwise satisfies Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010’s “relevancy requirement.” (Bouton, supra,
In Cheek, supra,
Similar considerations apply in the context of CPRA proceedings. Like the SVPA, the CPRA is intended to “permit the expeditious ‘determination’ ” of a narrow issue: whether a public agency has an obligation to disclose the records that the petitioner has requested. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2009)
In assessing the permissible scope of discovery in a CPRA proceeding, trial courts may also look to federal case law addressing the use of discovery in cases arising under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 5 U.S.C. § 552
Given the “clear legislative intent that the determination of the obligation to disclose records requested from a public agency be made expeditiously” (Filarsky, supra,
D. The City Acted with Substantial Justification in Opposing the Petitioner’s Motion to Compel
The City argues that even if we conclude the trial court correctly determined the discovery act applies to CPRA proceedings, we should reverse the portion of the order imposing discovery sanctions. Under the discovery act, the trial court is required to “impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party . . . who unsuccessfully . . . opposes a motion to compel a further response to [a written interrogatory, inspection demand or request for admission], unless it finds that [the party] acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (d) [sanctions provision governing written interrogatories], 2031.310, subd. (h) [sanctions provision regarding inspection demands]; see § 2033.290, subd. (d) [sanctions provision governing requests for admissions].) The trial court concluded that discovery sanctions were warranted in this case because the City had “provided little if any support” for its argument that the discovery act did not apply to CPRA proceedings. We review the trial court’s sanction order for an abuse of discretion. (Diepenbrock v. Brown (2012)
Our courts have interpreted the term “substantial justification” to mean “well grounded in both law and fact.” (Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011)
Given the unsettled nature of the issues presented, the existence of some federal authority that arguably supports the City’s position and the importance of the issue raised, discovery sanctions were not appropriate. (Cf. Diepenbrock, supra,
E. On Remand, the Trial Court Shall Allow the City to Assert Additional Objections to Petitioner’s Discovery Requests
The City also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it has waived any further objections to the discovery, and therefore must respond to all of petitioner’s discovery requests without further objection. The trial court’s written order characterized the City’s decision to object to the discovery solely on the basis that the discovery act does not apply to CPRA proceedings as a “risky tactic” that did not support a departure from the general “rule that an objection not raised in an initial response to discovery
The City acknowledges the discovery act contains provisions that require a party to raise all objections to a discovery request in the initial response. It argues, however, that these rules are inapplicable where the responding party has objected to discovery on the basis that the discovery act is inapplicable to the particular proceeding at issue. The City contends that under such circumstances, ‘“[i]t would be illogical to object to discovery but at the same time also engage in the discovery process by asserting any and all other objections that might be applicable under the [discovery act].”
Although the parties have not identified any decision that has specifically addressed this issue, we find the court’s resolution of a similar situation in Cheek, supra,
On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the discovery act applied to SVPA proceedings, and provided additional guidance regarding the permissible scope of discovery in such a proceeding. The court further concluded that because the record was ‘“inadequate for informed review concerning whether the depositions of [the mental health physicians] [we]re within the permissible scope of discovery or whether the depositions [we]re properly subject to a protective order or a motion to quash,” the trial court should ‘“reconsider its rulings in accordance with those provisions of the [discovery act] which authorize a trial court to exercise its discretion to manage civil discovery.” (Cheek, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th. at pp. 994-995.)
We also believe that further discovery proceedings are warranted to permit the trial court to set boundaries on the permissible scope of discovery in this proceeding[]. (Cf. Bouton, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 426-427 [where appellate court’s decision had ‘“only now clarified [what] the trial court must decide in the [special] proceeding,” “procedural fairness” required that the parties be permitted to conduct additional discovery].)
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding the superior court to vacate its order granting petitioner’s motion to compel, and to enter a new
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 20, 2017, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.
These undisputed “Background Facts” are based on a factual summary set forth in an order issued in Flynn v. Los Angeles County Superior Court (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2014, No. BS147850 (Flynn)), which denied a CPRA petition seeking the same categories of information that are at issue here. As discussed in more detail below, the attorney who filed and litigated the Flynn action also represents petitioner Anderson-Barker in this case. The City has filed a request that we take judicial notice of several documents filed in Flynn, including the trial court’s order denying the CPRA petition. We grant the City’s request. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [judicial notice may be taken of the “[ljecords of . . . any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States”].) For the purposes of this writ proceeding, these background facts are not disputed.
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory citations are to the Government Code.
The request for production sought a wide range of documents including, for example: all writings “showing that . . . [the City] considered” the OPGs to be the owners of the VIIC data and the Laserfiche scans; “[e]ach and every [search] warrant” referred to in the Jones declaration; all writings and documents regarding the drafting and amendment of various provisions in the OPG contracts; and “each and every writing concerning” the creation, storage and ownership of the VIIC data and the Laserfiche scans.
One of those cases resulted in a published decision. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2015)
For example, in Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008)
During oral argument, the City appeared to take a slightly narrower position, asserting that while section 6259 does not categorically preclude discovery in a CPRA proceeding, the language of the statute indicates that the trial court, rather than the parties, is responsible for issuing whatever discovery requests it believes are necessary to decide the case. As discussed above, however, neither section 6259 nor any other provision in the CPRA contains any language referencing discovery. We must therefore presume that the legislature intended the procedures set forth in the discovery act, including those that allow the parties to initiate discovery requests, to apply in the context of the CPRA.
This portion of the court’s written order appeal's to conflict with the court’s statement at the motion healing that it was only considering “whether discovery is available under the CPRA,” and not “[the] question whether the discovery was necessary or not, so the court hasn’t addressed that issue in its . . . ruling.”
On remand, the trial court should consider any further objections the City may raise to petitioner’s discovery requests, and also consider the City’s prior assertion that the discovery sought in this case is unnecessary given that (1) another trial court has already ruled that VIIC data and Laserfiche scans are not public records, and the ruling was affirmed on appeal, and (2) petitioner and her attorney have sought and obtained similar discovery in several non-CPRA cases brought against multiple law enforcement agencies.