9 Cal. App. 5th 272
Cal. Ct. App.2017Background
- LAPD contracts with private tow companies (OPGs) and OPG-LA maintains VIIC database; OPGs scan CHP 180 forms into Laserfiche (third‑party systems).
- Flynn litigation: a prior CPRA petition sought the same VIIC/Laserfiche materials; trial court held OPGs owned them and appellate relief was denied.
- Anderson‑Barker filed a CPRA petition seeking VIIC data and Laserfiche CHP 180s; she alleged the City actually owns the records and accused City officers of false statements in Flynn.
- Anderson‑Barker served interrogatories, requests for admission, and a broad document production; the City objected solely that the Civil Discovery Act (CDA) does not apply to CPRA proceedings.
- Trial court granted petitioner’s motion to compel, held the CDA applies to CPRA proceedings, ruled the City waived other objections, and imposed $5,560 in discovery sanctions.
- Court of Appeal: agreed CDA applies to CPRA matters, reversed the waiver/sanctions parts, vacated the order and remanded for the trial court to consider further objections and manage discovery scope.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Civil Discovery Act apply to CPRA proceedings? | Anderson‑Barker: CPRA is a "special proceeding of a civil nature," so CDA applies; discovery necessary to test ownership and alleged perjury. | City: CPRA's expedited procedures and §6259 language show Legislature intended court‑directed evidence, not party discovery; silence means no CDA. | CDA applies: CPRA is a special civil proceeding and absent an express statutory exemption the CDA governs, but trial courts may limit discovery to preserve expedition. |
| May trial court limit/shape discovery in CPRA proceedings? | Petitioner: broad civil discovery should be available to test factual disputes. | City: discovery would undermine CPRA expediency and impose heavy burdens; court should tightly control evidence. | Trial court has discretion to manage and limit discovery under CDA standards, considering relevancy, burden, duplication, and need for expeditious resolution. |
| Were discovery sanctions appropriate for City’s sole objection that CDA does not apply? | Petitioner: City’s objection was unjustified and waived other objections, meriting sanctions. | City: issue was one of first impression with some supporting authority; substantial justification existed for contesting CDA applicability. | Sanctions reversed: City acted with substantial justification on a novel, important question; sanctions were an abuse of discretion. |
| Did City waive other discovery objections by relying solely on the CDA‑inapplicability objection? | Petitioner: yes—failure to assert other objections in initial responses waived them. | City: illogical to assert statutory‑based inapplicability yet also invoke CDA procedural objection rules; should be allowed to assert objections if court orders discovery. | Waiver reversed: when a party challenges the applicability of the CDA itself, waivers grounded in CDA procedural rules do not automatically apply; on remand court must permit City to assert other appropriate objections and manage scope. |
Key Cases Cited
- Filarsky v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.4th 419 (explains CPRA purpose and procedures)
- Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.3d 1325 (CPRA exemptions and catchall balancing)
- Leake v. Superior Court, 87 Cal.App.4th 675 (CDA applies to special proceedings absent statutory exemption)
- Cheek (People v. Superior Court), 94 Cal.App.4th 980 (management of discovery in statutory special proceedings)
- Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.App.5th 1007 (CDA applies where statute is silent; trial court may limit discovery)
- Bernardi v. County of Monterey, 167 Cal.App.4th 1379 (discovery to determine public entity’s constructive possession of third‑party records)
- County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 242 Cal.App.4th 475 (prior VIIC/CHP 180 litigation involving Anderson‑Barker’s counsel)