*1 оusly proceedings impact monitor the so as to minimize the on the rights permit plaintiff’s [the] defendant’s and “should use of real required adequate [when] name such use is in order to ensure discovery.”35Finally, devices, the trial court is free to other use “such sеaling conjunction certain records and orders of nondisclosure plaintiff’s pseudonym, with the use of a to balance order lawful discovery requirements, providing while all reasonable confidentiali ty.36 complaint using pseudonym sum,
In we hold that Doe’s filed legal nullity ruling not a and reverse the trial court’s on that issue. We further remand the case for the trial court’s consideration of whether permitted proceed Doe is under a fictitious name in a manner opinion.37 consistent with this
Judgment Doyle, revеrsed and case remanded with direction. J., Miller, J., P. concur. July
Decided Keenan, Robertson, Nasrallah, Don C. Bodoh & Mathew G. appellent. Nasrallah, for Stephen
Smith, Russell, Forte, Gambrell & M. Richens, DanaM. appellees. A14A0724. CITY OF HAPEVILLE et al. v. GRADYMEMORIAL
HOSPITAL CORPORATION.
Presiding Judge.
DOYLE,
Grady
Hospital Corporation
Grady
Sys
Memorial
d/b/a
Health
(“the Hospital”)
complaint against
City Hapeville
tem
filed a
City Hapeville (collectively
and the Police
of the
“the
City”), alleging
City
that
failed to
for medical services
provided prisoners
custody
City.*
to four
in the
City responded, arguing
The
that it was immune from suit. The trial
pursuant
Surgical
court found that
to Cherokee
v.North Cobb
35Id.
36Id.
Jacobsоn,
(III) (“The
permit parties
proceed
reasons are committed in the first instance to trial court procedural posture case, Based genuine on the of this we assume that there is no issue City prisoners as to whether the had ofthe at the time the rendered treatment. City sovereign immunitybasedonOCGA P.C.,2 Assoc. had waived follow, 42-5-2.3For the reasons that we affirm. City transported The brief record before us reveals that the four prisoners Hospital Hospital for treatment. The now seeks City $81,694.74 from the amount of for the cost of the prisoners. services rendered to those filed a motion to *2 arguing, denying dismiss, alia, inter it that was immune from suit. In City’s Hospital dismiss, the motion to the trial court found that the “is suing puts for of services rendered. This the instant case in County Surgical line with P.C., Cherokee v.North Cobb Assoc. and re sovereign immunity analysis. Alternatively, the moves matter from legislature [City’s]sovereign immunity by the has waived the statute.” City appeals ruling, arguing this that the trial court erred finding ruling that it was not immune from suit. Wereview this under the de novo standard of review.4 Hospital correctly
1. The maintains that the trial court deter- provides mined that OCGA 42-5-2 a waiver of pursue case, in this which allows it to its claims that the has duty breached a for the medical services rendered to the prisoners by Hospital. the (a) states:
Except
provided
(b)
as
section,
subsection
ofthis Code
responsibility
governmental
it shall be the
of the
unit,
agency having
physical custody
subdivision, or
the
of an
furnishing
inmate
inmate,
to maintain the
food,
him
cloth-
ing,
any
hospital
needed medical and
attention;
any
corpus
proceedings
defend
habeas
or other
instituted
expenses
inmate;
on behalf of the
and to bear all
relative
any escape
recapture,
including
expenses
the
of
Except
provided
(b)
extradition.
as
in subsection
ofthis Code
responsibility
department
section, it shall be the
of the
any
necessary emergency
bear the costs of
reasonable and
provided
any
medical and
care which is
inmate
receipt by
department
provided by
after the
the
ofthe notice
(a)
physical
subsection
of Code Section 42-5-50 who in is
the
2
(471
561) (1996) (addressing
custody
SE2d
whether an inmate was in
expenses
such that
the
was
42-5-2), citing
liable for his medical
under OCGA §
County Hosp.
County,
(428
374)
Auth. v. Houston
(1993).
County,
(81
124)
But
(1914).
see Nolan v. Cobb
out our case law on whether the to establish provider.7 involving a waiver anis inmate or a medical In cases an 6 Id. Macon-Bibb See County Hosp. Auth., App. (i) (730 [7] 439) (2012); Gish v. Thomas, at 483; Graham v. Cobb County, 862-864 900) (2010); (1) (b) against subdivision for failure to inmate’s claim provide the State or its contrary care, has taken the view medical this Court County 42-5-2 did not constitute § Macon-Bibb and held that OCGA express an waiver in such cases.8 by Supreme recently explained As the Court Ga. plain Coast, Inc.,9if v. Center a Sustainable the
Natural Resourсes language provide specific a waiver of of a statute “does not governmental waiver,... no nor the extent of such a waiver implied say can be or shown.”10That is not to that an act must phrase, sovereign immunity” [S]tate use the “the waives its express legislative act [in If] order for an waiver to occur. right against of action which can result [S]tate creates money judgment against treasury, [S]tate in a and the enjoyed sovereign immunity [S]tate otherwise would have legislative action, from thе cause of act must be consid ered a [S]tate’s waiver right legislative extent of the of action or the act would meaning.* have no Thus, the Court Macon-Bibb determined that Legislature’s containing require enactment of OCGA 42-5-2 ment that a medical or thе of Corrections reimburse a provider right money judgment created a to a on behalf ofthe provider, thereby waiving sovereign immunity. medical This Court has, hand, on the other determined that such a of action was not Legislature’s created with claims enactment of the statute when it deals against prison provide inmates officials for failure to Legislature disagreed Moreover, medical care.12 had the with clarify regarding desired to the conclusion this Court the waiver of sovereign immunity by OCGA 42-5-2 as statеd in Macon-Bibb County, it could have done so its overhaul of 42-5-50 et OCGA seq., which occurred in 2009.13 Thurman, (3), (4) 416) (1998); Cantrell v. County Hosp. 513-514 *4 Auth., App. (3). 207 Ga. at 532 8 Mitcham, App. 483; Graham, Gish, App. (1) (b) (i); See 325 Ga. at 316 Ga. 302 Ga. Cantrell,
App.
(4);
App.
(3), (4).
at 862-864
231
at
Ga.
513-514
9
2. Our is nоt at differently immunity municipality, therefore, treated in terms of departments, agencies subdivisions, or of the State.14 than other Generally speaking, relating sovereign immunity “State law to the of seq.”15 municipalities § in OCGA 36-33-1 et And a review is codified directly determining that the of case law has revealed no case waiver applies 42-5-2 for counties and the State also § found OCGA municipal corporations.16
Looking Chapter Code, 42 5 of Title addresses “Correc Chapter Counties,” tional Institutions of State аnd while 4 of Title 42 specifically police addresses “Jails” and includes the chief of a munici pal corporation jailers.17 seq. § its defined list of OCGA 42-4-1 et separate addressing charges a contains section medical for emer gency prоvided medical care services to inmates medical facilities —(a) (2) “municipal § OCGA 42-4-15 and this subsection includes county jail” thereby making provisions definition, or its some con applied municipal corpo tained in § OCGA 42-5-2 redundant as together Chaptеr Moreover, rations when read with Title chapter separate requirements imposing contains a section munici pal jails regarding requirements, sanitation, health and medical generally.18 treatment
Nevertheless,
there
while
seems to be some distinction made
Legislature
municipal jailers
county
in its treatment of
jailers,
(b)specifically
§
OCGA 42-5-2
covers inmates to whom OCGA
seq. applies, thereby including
by municipal
§ 42-4-1 et
inmates held
corporations. Accordingly,
sovereign
we conclude that the waiver of
immunity
providers alleging
against county
as to medical
claims
or
jailers
applies
State
as stated in also
to munici-
Const,
1983,
IX,
II,
IX,
Assembly may
See also Ga.
of
Art.
Sec.
Par.
General
waive
“[t]h.e
counties,
immunity
municipalities,
City
of
and school districts.” See
Thomaston v.
of
4,
Bridges,
906) (1994) (holding
that under the 1991 amendment
Ga.
Const,
I,
II,
municipalities
departments
of
Art. Sec.
Par. IX
are not the State or its
agencies).
15Precise,
(1). Generally, municipal
DILLARD, concurring judgment only. in Judge, judgment only agree I I that concur because do not with all majority opinion. majority’s opinion such, said in the As dеcides only presented judice may the issues in the case sub not be cited binding precedent. Appeals (a). See Court of Rule 33 July
Decided Daley, Gregory Reybold, LaVallee, Koster, Koster & Paul R. V. appellants. Harvey, appellee.
Samuel C.
A14A0730. THE FROST v. STATE. (761 Presiding Judge. BARNES, Gary appeals plea Glen Frost from the denial of his former jeopardy. Driving Frost was tried for Under the Influence ofAlcohol drive, extent that it was him less safe for (a) (1) (DUI safe); striking open fixture, 40-6-272; less OCGA jury container, OCGA § 40-6-253. After the reached a unanimous remaining counts, count, verdict on two but was deadlocked on the objection, granted over Frost’s the trial court a mistrial on all three appeal failing counts. Frost contends on that the trial court erred in grant request accept jury’s his unanimous verdicts on the two jury hung only counts ofthe three count аccusation one count. He also asserts that the trial where was on admitting court erred prior evidence of two DUI convictions under §§ OCGA 24-4-417 and (b). Following review, 24-4-404 our we reverse the denial of Frost’s summary judgment will affirm a trial court’s denial of a motion for if it is “[W]e Cochran, Lowry 325) (2010). reason.” v.