CITY OF CRESCENT CITY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SARVADA NAND HANUMANTHU REDDY, as Trustee, etc., Defendant and Appellant.
No. A143640
First Dist., Div. Four.
Feb. 16, 2017.
9 Cal. App. 5th 458
Law Office of Bradford C. Floyd and Bradford C. Floyd for Defendant and Appellant.
Silver & Wright, Matthew Raymond Silver, Ruthann Marie Elder and Robert Norris Black for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
OPINION
REARDON, P. J.—Defendant Sarvada Nand Hanumanthu Reddy is the beneficial owner of a motel in Crescent City (the city). In 2013, the city served on Reddy a notice and order to cure various building code violations at the motel. Later that year, after the necessary repairs were not made, Reddy entered into a stipulated judgment in which he committed to cure a number of specified violations within six months. When Reddy again failed to comply, the city filed a successful motion for the appointment of a receiver to oversee compliance.
Reddy contends the trial court (1) erred in overruling his objections to the city‘s evidentiary submissions, (2) erred in failing to take live testimony, and (3) abused its discretion in appointing a receiver. We find no merit in these arguments and affirm the trial court‘s order.1
BACKGROUND
The Townhouse Motel (property), a building located in the city and owned by a trust for which Reddy serves as trustee, first became a subject of code enforcement efforts in 2006. Between that year and 2013, the city repeatedly ordered Reddy to abate dangerous conditions on the property through letters and notices of violations, to little effect. In May 2013, following a thorough inspection, the city issued a notice and order to repair or abate listing 76 building code violations and other illegal conditions and ordering Reddy to rehabilitate the property within 30 days. After a subsequent inspection found that Reddy had not made the required repairs, the city filed a lawsuit in July 2013.
On stipulation of the parties, in November 2013 the trial court entered a judgment requiring Reddy to upgrade the property in various ways within six
Nearly a year later, the city inspected the property and found little or no improvement. Among other substandard conditions, city inspectors found exposed electric wiring, leaking plumbing, broken windows and holes in the walls, moldy and filthy conditions in many rooms, water damage to the foundation, a dilapidated roof, lack of proper weather protection, and junk and trash throughout the grounds. The inspectors concluded that “conditions on the [property] pose a substantial danger to the life, limb, health, and safety of the occupants of the motel, the residents of the surrounding community, and the public in general.”
Based on the foregoing circumstances, in October 2014, the city filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver to oversee rehabilitation of the property in compliance with the trial court‘s judgment. The motion was accompanied by declarations of a city building inspector and a city code enforcement officer that detailed the various code violations and attached pictures of the dangerous conditions.
In opposition, Reddy filed declarations from himself, the property‘s manager, and a general contractor. The contractor stated that he had repaired substandard conditions in the property framing and walls, replaced windows, and performed work to prevent further water damage. He inspected the property after the filing of the city‘s motion and disputed many of the city inspectors’ findings, primarily their concerns about the property‘s structural soundness. Although he found three of the rooms to be uninhabitable, he concluded the remaining rooms were “clean, neat and appear sanitary.” The property manager addressed the city‘s contentions point by point, denying the presence of exposed electrical wiring, leaking plumbing, water damage, a leaky roof, and unsanitary conditions in the rooms, as well as other conditions. Reddy‘s declaration detailed his extensive efforts to bring the property into compliance with the requirements of the judgment.
In reply, the city submitted supplemental declarations by the inspector and code enforcement officer. Both had inspected the property after the filing of Reddy‘s opposition papers and found that the code violations they had originally observed had not been cured. They concluded Reddy “has done little or nothing to comply and anything he has historically done has been unpermitted and substandard.” Shortly before the hearing on the motion, both parties filed a series of evidentiary objections to various statements in their opponents’ declarations.
At the outset of the hearing, the trial court noted the parties’ evidentiary objections and held that “generally those objections go to the weight to be
DISCUSSION
Reddy contends the trial court abused its discretion in (1) overruling his evidentiary objections, (2) failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing, and (3) appointing a receiver.
A. Reddy‘s Evidentiary Objections.
As noted above, the trial court effectively overruled both parties’ objections, concluding that they “go to the weight to be given to the evidence, not to its admissibility,” and considered all of the evidence submitted.
We find Reddy‘s challenge to the trial court‘s evidentiary rulings to be forfeited. If a party contends that an evidentiary objection was improperly overruled by the trial court, the party must identify the specific objection, provide legal argument explaining why the trial court‘s ruling was in error, and support that argument with citation to pertinent legal authority. (Salas v. Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1074 [129 Cal.Rptr.3d 690] (Salas).) Rather than address the propriety of any of his specific objections, Reddy simply “ask[s] this court to rule on each of these objections as should have been done by the trial court,” essentially seeking de novo review of his evidentiary objections.
Under similar circumstances, the Salas court held that the appellants’ challenge to the trial court‘s evidentiary rulings was forfeited by their failure to separately identify and discuss individual evidentiary objections. In that case, the trial court had sustained objections to most of the appellants’ evidence. (Salas, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1073.) Although the appellants disputed those rulings in general, they did not separately discuss specific objections. In finding the appellate claims forfeited, the court explained: “It is
In any event, a cursory review of Reddy‘s objections suggests the trial court‘s ruling was appropriate. Reddy‘s first objection, for example, contends that the city inspector‘s statement that he had visited the property “multiple times” lacks foundation because in a prior declaration the inspector said he had inspected the property only twice. Plainly, while the inspector‘s statement may have been false, it did not lack foundation; the inspector was in a position to testify about his own activities. The evidentiary objection was therefore without merit, if not frivolous. We reviewed many of Reddy‘s other objections and found a similar pattern. While the objections are phrased as objections and purport to be based on evidentiary grounds, they are not truly evidentiary objections. Instead, the purported objections are merely a premise for arguing with the conclusions stated in the city‘s declarations. Based on this review, we find no reason to doubt the trial court‘s conclusion that the objections, such as they are, go to the weight to be given the declarations, not their admissibility.
B. The Failure to Hear Live Testimony.
At the hearing on the motion, Reddy‘s counsel suggested for the first time that the trial court should take live testimony. Reddy contends the court erred in ignoring that request.
The trial court properly disregarded Reddy‘s request to present live testimony because Reddy failed to follow proper procedures for seeking leave to present such testimony. A motion for the appointment of a receiver is expressly classified as a ” ‘[l]aw and motion‘” proceeding under
Even if Reddy had complied with the Rules of Court in requesting a live hearing, we would have no hesitation in affirming the trial court‘s decision not to take oral testimony. It seems clear from counsel‘s application that Reddy sought simply to present as live testimony the evidence already in the record in written form. In these circumstances, that would have been of little assistance to the trial court in ruling on the city‘s motion.
C. The Appointment of a Receiver.
The city sought the appointment of a receiver under both
The Supreme Court considered the appointment of a receiver under
We review an order appointing a receiver for abuse of discretion. (City and County of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 744 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 256].) An abuse of discretion is demonstrated if the court‘s decision was not supported by substantial evidence or the court applied an improper legal standard or otherwise based its determination on an error of law. (McGuire v. Employment Development Dept. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1041 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 105].) “As to factual issues, ‘we determine whether the record provides substantial evidence supporting the trial court‘s factual findings. [Citation.] Applying the substantial evidence test on appeal, we may not reweigh the evidence, but consider that evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court, indulging in every reasonable inference in favor of the trial court‘s findings and resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citations.] The question on appeal is whether the evidence reveals substantial support—contradicted or uncontradicted—for the trial court‘s conclusion that the weight of the evidence supports the commission‘s findings of fact. [Citation.] We uphold the trial court‘s findings unless they so lack evidentiary support that they are unreasonable.‘” (Richardson v. City and County of San Francisco Police Com. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 671, 692 [154 Cal.Rptr.3d 145] (Richardson).)
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s appointment of a receiver under
Reddy‘s argument for an abuse of discretion cites the declarations he submitted in opposition to the motion and argues they demonstrate that no dangerous condition existed. The argument is made in disregard of our substantial evidence standard of review, which precludes us from reweighing
Reddy also contends that a receiver should not be appointed if a less drastic remedy is available. While there is some authority to support this position when a receiver is appointed for other purposes,
In his reply brief, Reddy contends the trial court erred in failing to visit the property and in failing to make an express finding that the property was substantially dangerous. Reddy cites no authority requiring a trial court personally to visit real property prior to appointing a receiver, and we are aware of none. On the contrary, the court was permitted to rely on the evidence before it in making that determination. (
As noted, the city also sought appointment of a receiver under
The city argues it is entitled to attorney‘s fees on appeal, either under
DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court appointing a receiver is affirmed. The city may recover its costs on appeal. (
Rivera, J., and Streeter, J., concurred.